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This study examines the post-acquisition operating performance and the employment
effects of 79 takeovers that took place in the U.K. within the period from January 1990 until
December 1996. The aims of the research are (1) to investigate whether M&As, on average,
are followed by an increase in post-takeover operating performance, (2) to examine the
operating performance of merging firms that share certain common characteristics, (3) to
examine whether the stock market can forecast the post-merger changes in operating
performance in the period of the event announcement, (4) to investigate what is the impact of
M&As on merging firms' employment rates and costs.
The findings suggest that merging firms experience a decline in their post-acquisition
operating performance, regardless of whether the effects of pre-acquisition performance on
post-merger performance are controlled for or not. However, Strategic acquisitions and
related acquisitions exhibit a post-takeover performance improvement. Hostile acquisitions
are followed by a performance decline and whether the acquirer paid a relatively high
premium for the acquiree or not has no significant effect on post-merger performance. Large
acquisitions perform better than all other acquisitions, especially when the target and the
bidder operate in the same industry. Performance was adjusted using both industry-median
firms and pairs of matched firms on the basis of industry relatedness, pre-acquisition
performance and size for each target and bidder. These results are not sensitive to the
benchmark used to adjust operating performance. Acquisitions financed solely by cash
underperform those financed solely by stock or by a combination of stock and cash.
We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the operating cash
flow returns on assets in the post-takeover years and the combined cumulative market-
adjusted returns on assets at the time of the event announcement, after controlling for the
effects of pre-merger performance on post-merger performance. However, we identify a
degree of optimism on behalf of the stock market agents in the period of the event
announcement.
There is no significant evidence that employee costs per thousand pounds of sales
decline in the three years following the acquisition completion. Merging firms employ as many
employees per thousand pounds of sales as their industry peers in the pre-merger period,
whereas employment rates fall below industry's norms in the post-takeover period.
Nonetheless, no statistically significant change was identified in the median number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales between the post- and the pre-merger periods.
Finally, our evidence suggests that hostile acquisitions are followed by job losses and by an
increase in costs per employee, while related acquisitions are followed by a decrease in costs
per employee without a decrease in the number of employees.
The findings of the research imply that shareholders are more benefited from
acquisitions where synergies are more likely to occur. The finding that, on average, post-
takeover performance declines is consistent with a view that competition in the market for
corporate control in the U.K. is strong and that there are not many opportunities for a large
number of profitable takeovers. However, this decline may imply that managers have non
profit-maximising objectives, when taking acquisition decisions, in a market for corporate
control where competition is weak. Alternatively, in a market for corporate control where
competition is weak, managers may take acquisition decisions with the expectation to
increase profits, but fail to do so. Which of these interpretations better explain managerial
objectives needs further investigation. Finally, the findings may bear some interesting
implications for government policy with regard to which acquisitions create value and
contribute to the social benefit and which acquisitions serve the aims of employment policy.
I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself with the work my own and that
this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.
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One of the most controversial subjects in the field of Industrial Organisation
is that of the takeover activity. This is not surprising, given the large amount of
money and resources that are devoted each year to the accomplishment of firm
consolidation and the far from consensus that prevails among scholars regarding the
value of such decisions. In the U.K., between 2000 and 2005 1, 3577 domestic
acquisitions have been recorded with a total value of £236 billion. In that respect,
Mergers and Acquisitions represent major corporate investment decisions; for many
companies the largest investments of capital they are likely to consider.
Common sense suggests that, rationally thinking management teams would
be engaged in merger activity only if the result is beneficial for both participating
firms; or, when the bidding management team is convinced that it can manage the
target's resources more efficiently than the current management team. However,
reality is more complex than it appears. A rich body of literature suggests that M&As
on average are beneficial for the participating companies and that the aggregate
outcome is positive for them, while at the same time, there is plenty of empirical
evidence indicating that M&As destroy value and the participants fail to realize the
promised economic gains. On these grounds it is unsurprising that the desirability of
M&As is considered as a conundrum.
1.2. Context and Value of this Work.
This study examines the post-merger corporate operating performance of a
sample of 79 acquisitions between public companies in the U.K. which were
1
Apart from domestic acquisitions which are defined as transactions made by U.K. companies, 1055
transactions made by overseas companies and 2103 overseas transactions made by U.K. companies
with a value of £195 and £321 billion respectively have been observed in the U.K., for the same
period. Source: Office for National Statistics.
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completed in the period from the 1st of January 1990 until the 31st of December
1996 . The effects of these transactions on engaging firms' employment rates and
employee costs in the years subsequent to merger completion are also examined.
Finally, we also examine the ability of the stock market to forecast post-takeover
changes in operating performance at the time of the event announcement.
Our research and analysis is focused on the economic effects ofM&As on the
individual interests of two sets of stakeholders; the owners of the firm and the
employees (including managers). This is not to say that the consequences of M&As
on other groups of stakeholders like customers, suppliers, creditors, competitors,
taxpayers, and local society are of minor importance. However, our research is
concentrated on the private interests of these two sets of stakeholders since they are
the ones that are directly affected from M&A activity.
We examine the economic effects of M&As by measuring the actual
economic benefits that are generated by the combined firms' assets in the post-
merger years by using an operating cash flow return on assets metric. We believe that
an investigation of merging firms' real economic performance in the post-merger
years is an additional measure of performance of M&As to the numerous existing
share price performance studies. Typically, firms justify their acquisition strategy by
referring to increased revenues, cash flows, and profits through the enhancement of a
competitive advantage and the reduction of costs. Therefore, an estimation of the
actual impact of the acquisition on firm's performance should be made by a direct
examination of these accounting variables rather than by exclusively relying on the
perception of the stock market agents about the deal. Moreover, share prices may
reflect the impact of other factors than firm's expected performance. Such factors
could be market swings, fads, and euphoria. After all, advancements in the field of
behavioural finance have posed challenges to the assumption that stock markets are
always efficient (see for example R. Thaler (1993) and A. Shleifer (2000)). However,
we also test the ability of the stock market to forecast changes in post-merger
corporate operating performance. We examine the relation between the abnormal
asset returns of the combined target and bidder at the time of the event
announcement and the operating cash flow return on assets in the post-merger years.
2 In late 1990's and early 00's stock markets experienced significant fluctuations. We avoid including
this period so as to ensure that our results are free from time-specif factors.
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We use two alternative performance benchmarks to evaluate asset
productivity. The first is the Industry Operating Performance where the target's and
bidder's combined performance is measured against the median operating
performance of the industries within which they operate. We chose this analysis so as
to draw inferences about the combined firm's productivity before and after the
merger, having isolated the impact of events which are unrelated to the merger and
may be caused by industry-wide or economy-wide factors. This approach provides
the first set of empirical results.
However, there is a debate in the existing literature as to whether this kind of
benchmarking provides unbiased results about merger productivity. This is because
bidders tend to be relatively large firms which outperform their industry firms in the
period before the decision of an acquisition. Therefore, we match each combined
firm with a pair of firms which operate within the same industry with that of the
target and the bidder, have similar operating performance in the pre-merger period,
and similar size with them. This approach provides the second set of empirical
results.
In this study we also examine the effects of M&As on the other group of
stakeholders which are affected most after the shareholders; namely, the employees.
Research in this field is not very rich, especially in the U.K. We believe that the
measurement of the effects of M&As on the employment of merging firms should
include both a metric for the number of employees as well as a metric for the
employee costs. Inferences about post-merger labour efficiencies are more
appropriate when considering employment rates in relation to the associated costs.
This examination provides the third set of empirical results.
Our research differs from that of previous U.K. studies in several important
ways. First, unlike other studies where cases were deleted when Datastream values
were missing it employs an updated comprehensive sample constructed with the use
of two databases. We completed the missing data from Datastream by consulting
accounts from Companies House. In addition, our sample companies are purified
from acquisition events that otherwise would have contaminated our results. In the
entire time period under examination no sample company was engaged in another
significant acquisition. This restriction decreased the number of acquisitions that
3
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were included in our sample; however, this was considered necessary for the results
to reflect only the changes in operating performance that are attributable to the
acquisition in question and not operating cash flows of other recently acquired
companies.
Second, this study uses a more recent dataset than any other study for the U.K.
and so is able to distinguish the effects of mergers between the periods 1990 - 1993
and 1994- 1996.
Third, no previous study in the U.K. has examined the operating performance
of Strategic takeovers. Evidence from the U.S. suggests that Strategic acquisitions
exhibit significant operating performance improvements in contrast to Financial
takeovers, and to takeovers on average that just break even (Healy, 1997). Our study
investigates the effects on corporate operating performance of Strategic acquisitions.
Fourth, this study investigates the effects on operating performance of
acquisitions where the acquirer paid a relatively high premium for the acquiree and
of acquisitions where the acquiree was purchased at a discount. The operating
performance behaviour of such acquistions has not been examined in previous
studies for the U.K.
Fifth, we test the stock market's ability to forecast future changes in operating
cash flow by using both the methodologies provided by Healy (1992) and Ghosh
(2001). None of the previous studies on the post-merger operating performance for
-j
the U.K. employs both methods for this purpose .
Finally, we examine the effects of M&As on merging firms' employment
rates and employee costs in the U.K. Very few previous studies have examined the
impact ofM&As on this important group of stakeholders. Our study uses a different
methodology than that used by previous studies on the subject.
A clarification for the usage of the terms 'merger' and 'acquisition' is
considered useful at this point. In this thesis, we use the terms interchangeably since
by both terms we mean the combination of two commercial enterprises into a unified
enterprise under a single management. The consolidated accounts of the acquirer are
used for obtaining data in the post-merger years. Therefore, it is indifferent whether
3 Manson et. al (1994) and Manson et.al. (2000) employ a methodology which is similar to that used
by Ghosh (2001) for the U.S. Powel and Stark (2005) follow Healy's (1992) approach to test stock
market's ability to forecast future changes in operating performance.
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the acquiree is legally absorbed by the acquirer or it stands as an independent legal
unit. The case of 'pure' mergers where the acquirer and the acquiree are dissolved
and constitute a new singe enterprise after the completion of the transaction is very
rare in the U.K. In fact, no such transaction was identified in our sample.
Our findings suggest that merging firms, on average, experience a decline in
their post-acquisition operating performance, regardless of whether the effects of pre-
acquisition performance on post-merger performance are controlled for or not.
However, Strategic acquisitions and related acquisitions create synergies which are
reflected in an observed improvement of their post-takeover performance. Hostile
acquisitions underperform friendly ones, and whether an acquisition closed at
relatively high premium or not has no significant effect on post-merger performance.
Large acquisitions perform better than all other acquisitions especially when the
target and the bidder operate in the same industry. Performance was adjusted using
both industry-median firms and pairs of firms, matched on the basis of industry
relatedness, pre-acquisition performance, and size, for each target and bidder. These
results are not sensitive to the benchmark used to adjust operating performance. We
also found evidence that acquisitions that were financed solely by cash underperform
those that were financed solely by stock or by a combination of stock and cash.
A positive and statistically significant relationship was found between the
combined cumulative market-adjusted returns on assets at the time of the event
announcement and the post-merger operating cash flow returns on assets once the
effects of pre-merger performance on post-merger performance are controlled for.
However, we identified a degree of optimism on behalf of the stock market agents in
the period of the event announcement.
Merging firms employ as many employees per thousand pounds of sales as
their industry peers in the pre-merger period, whereas employment rates fall below
industry's norms in the post-takeover period. Nonetheless, no statistically significant
change was identified in the median number of employees per thousand pounds of
sales between the post- and the pre-merger periods. There is no significant evidence
that employee costs per sales decline in the three years following the acquisition
completion. However, costs per employee appear to decline following acquisitions
that were financed either by cash or stock. Hostile acquisitions are followed by a
5
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decline in the number of employees which is not accompanied by a decline in
employee costs. Acquisitions that closed at a premium are followed by an increase in
employment costs while employment rates do not change. Finally, some evidence
was found that large acquisitions lead to an increase in employee costs, while
employment rates remain the same as in the pre-merger period.
A number of implications for shareholders, managers, and the government
arise from our study. The average performance decline of merging firms implies that
there is not a large number of opportunities for performance improvements after the
merger, and this is consistent with a view that the U.K. market for corporate control
is competitive. However, this decline is also consistent with an interpretation that
managers are not pursuing profit-maximising acquisitions in a corporate environment
where competition in the market for corporate control is weak. Alternatively, the
negative average post-takeover performance of merging firms may imply that
competition in the market for corporate control is weak and managers are pursuing
profit maximising acquisitions - as they expect to increase profits - but fail to do so,
either because of poor planning or because of unexpected events.
On the other hand, shareholders are benefited from Strategic mergers,
mergers between firms with overlapping business operations, mergers where the
means of payment involves stock, and friendly transactions. Therefore, it is to the
interest of investors to examine the aims and the goals of management before the
approval of an acquisition decision. Acquisitions without a strategic orientation to
exploit economies of scale after friendly negotiations and with a prior aim to improve
targets' efficiency by replacing the incumbent management, seem to lead to lower
productivity of assets, while debt-financed acquisitions exhibit performance
deterioration in the years following the transaction.
Our research suggests that mergers are not followed by a reduction in labour
costs, while there is some evidence that merging firms employ fewer employees than
the control firms in the post-merger period4. Moreover, hostile acquisitions are
followed by job losses and by increased costs per employee, while related
acquisitions are followed by a decrease in costs per employee without a decrease in
the number of employees.
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These findings may bear some implications for government policy. This is
mostly visible if the interests of different UK regulatory authorities are considered.
To begin with, the Competition Commission5 - whose interests focus on the
assessment of mergers and markets in the UK to accommodate public interest and
social welfare - can allow mergers when they increase productivity and efficiency in
terms of cash flows and in terms of employment6. Evidence that the present study
provides on these matters can potentially serve as indications for future regulatory
directions. Second, the interests of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) are of
relevance to the results of this study, with regard to the Regulator's objective to
promote efficient, orderly and fair markets (FSA Annual Report 2005/06). The
results of this study indicate that mergers which have a strategic orientation improve
productivity of assets and cash flows in the three or five years following the
acquisition. When the acquirer and the acquiree operate in the same industry there is
a substantial improvement in cash flow returns and this is more obvious when the
acquisition is large. According to our study, cash acquisitions - which are typically
financed by debt - lead to performance deterioration. Our evidence support the idea
that regulatory authorities should stimulate strategic mergers and mergers where the
participating parties operate within the same industry and where the method of
payment involves stock. Examining labour efficiency both in terms of the number of
employees and in terms of employment costs, our study indicates that mergers, on
average, do not lead to substantial improvements. However, related acquisitions and
stock acquisitions should be encouraged since they both exhibit an improvement in
labour costs without a decline in the number of employees in contrast to hostile ones
which are followed by a decline in the number of employees but with an increase in
labour costs.
In the next Section, a description of the structure of the thesis is provided.
Issues related to employment
5 The Competition Commission was established by the Competition Act 1998 and replaced the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1999. The Commission conducts inquiries into mergers,
markets and the regulation of the major regulated industries. Every inquiry is undertaken in response
to a reference made to it by another authority, usually by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
(www.competition-commission.org.uk.)




This thesis consists of ten Chapters. In Chapter 2 we discuss the alternative
theories which analyse the driving forces for M&A activity. There is a very rich
literature on this issue, since academic research has focused on the motives behind
takeover decisions due to the increase in both the number of such decisions and the
amount of resources devoted in each subsequent merger wave. Typically, the
examination of the motives for M&As is based on conclusions that are drawn after
investigating their consequences on shareholders' wealth, firm's performance, and
the post-merger position of the united firm in the industry.
The existing literature on the effects of M&As on firm's profitability is
discussed in Chapter 3. We evaluate the alternative approaches and methodologies
that have been used in various previous studies. Particular emphasis is given to the
evaluation of the effectiveness of various types of methodologies to clarify whether
M&As create value and to the limitations of each methodology. In the second part of
Chapter 3 the research questions of this study are presented, and in Chapter 4, we
explain the methodology that was adopted for addressing our research questions,
given the conclusions drawn from the discussion on the available methodologies and
their limitations. Chapter 5 deals with the criteria for the selection of our sample
firms and with the process for our sample construction. Chapters 6 and 7 provide a
detailed description of our results on the operating performance of merged firms after
applying two alternative methods for measuring performance and two different
benchmarks for evaluating it. In Chapter 8 we present our results concerning the
effects of M&As on the number of employees and on the employment costs of the
united entity. Finally, in Chapter 9 we analyse our findings from chapters 6, 7, and 8
in terms of the research questions. Chapter 10 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2.
THE DRIVING FORCES FOR MERGER ACTIVITY.
2.1. Introduction.
Much research has been carried out in the past four decades to examine what
are the driving forces for M&A activity. The relevant literature has traditionally
drawn on synergy, private information, growth, agency, and market power as
motives for M&As. In this Chapter the main theories on motives for M&As are
reviewed and the relevant empirical evidence is discussed and analysed. The
structure of this Chapter is as follows. In the next Section the literature on motives
for M&As is discussed. The Section is divided into eight sub-sections, each one
referring to a different motive explaining M&A activity. First, financial, operational
and managerial synergies as motives for mergers are discussed. Second, information
asymmetry for the value of a target, between the acquiring firm's management and
other parties is considered and analysed as a driving force for acquistions. The
underlying assumption in these two parts of Section 2 is that the acquiring
management expects to increase value through the acquisition. Third, we discuss the
basis and the implications of the 'hubris' hypothesis which, although - in strict terms
- it is not considered a reason for acquistions; it provides an explanation of acquiring
management purchasing behaviour. In the fourth and fifth sub-sections, firm's
growth and agency problems are discussed as motives for takeovers respectively.
Here, the underlying assumption is that managerial objectives and shareholders'
interests are likely to divert, especially in firms where there is a complete separation
of ownership and control. In the sixth sub-section Gort's Economic Disturbance
Theory is considered as an explanation of the variation of the number of takeovers in
different time periods. The increase in market power is discussed as a motive for
mergers in the seventh part of Section 2, and finally, the desire of acquiring firm's
management to increase earnings per share, by means of PE ratio manipulation,
choosing the appropriate target for this purpose, is discussed. This Chapter closes
with a concluding third Section.
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2.2. The Different Dimensions ofM&As.
A merger between an acquiring firm, A, and an acquired firm, B, takes place
if it is considered that the two entities are placed in a stronger competitive position -
and thus, they are worth more together than apart.
According to Brealey and Myers (1996), if the present values of firms 'A'
and 'B', as perceived by shareholders, are PVa and PVb respectively, and if the
present value of the combined entity is considered to be PVab, then the transaction
comes to effect only if:
Gain=PVAB-(PVA+PVB)>0. (1)
Plausibly, the prospective gain from the merger must be greater than the cost that is
incured by the acquirer. This cost is the premium the acquiring firm pays to the
owners of the acquired firm over its value as a separate entity.
Apparently, a gain from a merger is expected by management teams, engaged
in the activity, due to their perception of the existence of a value gap. Crook (1995)
explains that a valuation gap may result from differences in information or
differences in the appraisal of information between the management of the acquirer
and the acquiree and the market. However, the decision for an acquisition is often
taken even when the acquiring company's management possesses the same
information and appraises it in the same manner as other management teams and as
the market does. In this latter case, the acquirer expects that the two companies
together will be more efficient and will compete more effectively than they would do
otherwise. In other words, a target may worth more to a potential acquirer than it is
worth as an independent company.
It is important to note at this point that, in a perfectly competitive capital
market value gaps would not occur and there would be no acquisitions. As Crook
(op.cit.) points out, in such a market, all potential buyers and sellers have the same
objectives, the same expectations concerning future profits, the same degree of risk
10
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aversion and the same time horizon for each potential investment. However,
according to the author, these particular assumptions do not describe the real world.
2.2.1. Synergy as a Motivating Factor for Acquisitions.
While each takeover is implemented under conditions uniquely attributable to
the specific acquirer and acquiree and their contemporary external environment, the
expectations for the creation of a competitive advantage or the enhancement of an
existing one after the merger, so that net economic gains are to be realized, can be
recapitulated in the Literature under the title 'synergy'. When there is not any kind of
information asymmetry, management teams engaging in takeover activity may
expect that the combined entity after the merger will be worth more than the two
separate units through the realization of the expected synergistic1 gains. Trautwein
(1990), outlines three forms of synergy; financial synergies, operational synergies
and managerial synergies.
a) Financial synergies
Financial synergies can benefit merging firms that operate in unrelated
business through the creation of a portfolio of production activities where some
products with high market share and exhausted growth opportunities, and some other
products with low market share and very promising growth opportunities, ensure
• 9
stable cash flows through time, so as the mother firm can finance its activities .
Therefore, the establishment of financial synergies is often the reasoning behind the
acquisition of a company that operates in unrelated business on behalf of managers
seeking to lower the systematic risk of their company's investment portfolio.
Financial synergies, may also be derived from the creation of internal capital
markets. Internal financing is considered to lower the financing costs since the firm's
1 The word 'synergy' is derived from the Greek word 'synergeia' that means 'doing something together'.
2 This strategy of the creation of a portfolio of production activities underlies the Boston Consulting Group
Growth/Share matrix. Profits from high yield products (the 'cash cows'), can subsidise other ones with high
growth opportunities to increase their market share (the 'Rising Stars') or the 'Problematic Children' until they
both become 'Cash Cows' in the next investment cycle.
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headquarters can transfer money from units with an excess of cash to units in need,
avoiding the time consuming procedures required for external financing and - more
importantly - without high transaction costs and the monitoring requirements that are
imposed from external financiers. Having available superior information undisclosed
to external parties, management can, therefore, allocate capital more efficiently.
Another source of financial synergies can result from the increase of firm size.
Big and/or diversified firms are considered to be exposed to lower risk of default.
Since an acquisition increases the firm size it also increases its debt capacity.
Grinblatt (1998) suggests that, since diversification reduces the risk of bankruptcy
for any given level of debt, it can increase the amount of debt in the firm's optimal
capital structure, which in turn can lower the firm's cost of capital. In addition, the
transaction costs for issuing debt may be lower than the sum of the costs that would
be incurred by the two firms before their merger. It is also possible that after an
acquisition, the united entity will have cost advantages in issuing new stock or other
securities. Depending on the economic environment also, larger firms may enjoy
larger tax savings to their debt.
The realization of financial synergies after the takeover, however, is not
unquestionable. Besanko et.al. (2000) argue that unless a firm is big enough to
possess an autonomous financial institution, it is more likely than not, to be unable to
effectively compete with other financial institutions in implementing its internal
financing functions. The financial functions in such a corporation are a 'by-product'
of its core business, and as a result, external banks and other financial institutions
with more focus and expertise in financing activities may serve the needs of the firm
in more favourable terms3.
The argument regarding diversification of production activities to reduce risk
is also open to the criticism that if the shareholders of a firm wish to diversify in
different businesses, then this could be accomplished by the shareholders themselves,
by purchasing stakes in the firm of their personal interest, with the advantages that
they could do so at their preferred time, and with normally lower transaction costs.
Moreover, Levy and Sarnat (1971) proved that unless a conglomerate acquisition can
produce economic gains from synergies or economies of scale there is no other
3
Exceptions to this argument are some very big companies that conduct enough transactions to develop the
necessary skills to perform financial activities themselves, like GE Capital Corporation and Tesco.
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advantage for shareholders that invest in perfect capital markets. In such markets,
with prices being in equilibrium, investors would have included in their market
portfolio the shares of their preferred firms in the optimal proportion, so as to reflect
the possibility of the respective acquisition. Hence, it is unlikely for the share value
of the combined entity after the acquisition would be greater than the sum of the
share values of the two firms if they would have operated separately. Risk reduction
per se, therefore, is not a source of economic gains through firm diversification in
perfect capital markets.
On the other hand, a takeover allows management to exploit any potential
financial synergies through the coordination of production activities, which cannot be
achieved by the shareholders themselves if they choose to diversify their portfolios
instead. However, a question arises as to whether the exploitation of any financial
synergies offset the costs imposed by the operation of unrelated business under the
same top management4, especially in the contemporary economic environment where
intense competition drives firms not only to increasingly focus on their core business
but also to outsource parts of their activities in an attempt to enhance their flexibility
and their expertise5. It is also noticeable that the conglomerate merger wave of the
60's was followed by an extensive wave of divestitures.
Stapleton (1982), challenges the proposition that an acquisition can always
yield economic benefits to the shareholders through the increase of firm's debt
capacity. Stapleton suggests that the degree to which shareholders are likely to enjoy
gains depends on two economic parameters; first, the level of the wealth transfer
from shareholders to bondholders at the time of the merger, and second, the extent to
which the bondholders' gain provides for a greater debt capacity that consequently
allows greater leverage for the firm. The increased leverage could allow gains for the
shareholders greater than the loss they suffered at the time of the merger for the
benefit of the bondholders - however, this should not be taken for granted.
Stapleton's argument is based on the proposition that an option on a portfolio
4
Apart from the economic fact that any gains from the realisation of synergies after the takeover must more than
offset the costs of the transaction, other costs may emerge as a result of (l)the integration process, (2) the
difficulties of monitoring the process on behalf of the shareholders, (3) the possible change in the level of mid-
and lower management productivity after the feeling that some explicit or implicit working contracts will be
cancelled, and (4) the possible clash of cultures in the integrating organizations, and others.
5 This argument questions not only the expected financial synergies after an unrelated takeover but also all other
forms of synergies that will be discussed later in this section.
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is generally worth less than a portfolio of options. Considering a firm's equity as a
call option on the cash flow and assets of the firm with an exercise price equal to the
obligations to the bondholders, the equity of the joint company after the merger
represents a call option on its cash flows and assets at an exercise price equal to the
two separate bondholder obligations. In other words, this is an option on a portfolio
that is worth less than the portfolio of options that the equities of the two separate
companies represented before the merger. As a result, shareholders suffer a loss.
On the other hand, bondholders enjoy a gain; Stapleton compares the yields
of two hypothetical companies before and after the merger. The yield of the debt of
the combined entity falls, reflecting the added protection the merger provides to the
bondholders6. However, the yield after the merger depends on the correlation of
earnings of the two firms; with perfectly correlated earnings the yield remains
unchanged while it falls as the correlation decreases. Moreover, added protection to
the bondholders is provided by the merger - even with perfectly correlated earnings -
if one of the two merging firms is below its debt capacity at the time of the merger;
in this case debt yield falls reflecting an increase in debt value of the united entity. In
short, Stapleton, using option pricing theory, proves that at the time of the merger,
ceteris paribus, shareholders suffer a loss ofwealth and bondholders gain.
Therefore, in the case of an unrelated7 acquisition, apart from the possible
gains resulting from financial synergies, management must weight the possibility that
the value of equity of the combined entity is likely to be less than the sum of the
individual equity values, and the value of the debt to be increased.
b) Operational Synergies
Operational synergies can result from several sources, such as cost savings,
economies of scale and scope, transfer of knowledge and pooled negotiating power,
and tax savings. Cost savings arise when combining firms can share tangible assets
or resources. This is the case when the merging firms can share the usage of
6 The fall in yield indicates the increase of the value of the obligation to bondholders of the merged firm.
7 In the case of a pure conglomerate merger, Stapleton assumes, that one would not expect perfectly correlated
earnings.
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manufacturing facilities, research laboratories, information systems and sales staff,
economizing from the elimination of jobs, facilities and functions that are no longer
necessary; this kind of cost reduction is possible especially in horizontal mergers.
Mergers between firms operating across the production chain - vertical integration -
can help them to avoid costs related to various problems that may exist between a
customer and a supplier. The united entity can reduce inventory and logistic costs or
it may have better access to the market outlets. In manufacturing, firms that are
integrated vertically may expect to face fewer delays and barriers associated to
contracts that may exist across the supply chain, and therefore they can accelerate the
procedures of the development of a new product. Speeding the development and
production of a new product is sometimes a very crucial factor for market success,
especially in competitive industries where the first mover advantage is really
important8.
Vertical Integration provides for the elimination of transaction costs that
firms operating across the supply chain may incur when trading and implementing
their transactions in the classical market contracting mode.
Reekie and Crook (1994) illustrate the efficiency argument for transaction
costs rationalization through vertical integration. When two trading parties are
proceeding to construct a trade contract, it is very likely that they possess incomplete
information. Given the limits of the information available to them, they attempt to
achieve the best possible outcome; that is they seek to realise a satisfactory level of
performance instead of maximizing it. This is a rational choice on behalf of
contractors if one takes into account the exceptionally high - and often unacceptable
- costs for searching and gathering the relevant information. However, the resulting
contract is incomplete in the sense that it fails to maximize performance because the
contractors are 'boundedly rational' for they are not fully informed9. Therefore, costs
may arise during the life of a contract due to bounded rationality of the contractors;
the traders cannot write perfect fully detailed contracts and they are not able to
foresee every possible contingency in contract execution. In addition, it is almost
8 This is not to say that the first mover does not face risks or possible costs. In some instances, however, a
successful firm tactic imposes the fast launch of a new product.
9 Contractual incompleteness may also be the result of information asymmetry between the contractors.
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impossible to decide and agree beforehand on alternative courses of action in the
presence of such contingencies.
Furthermore, during the life of a contract, it is likely that contingencies
related to opportunistic behaviour of the two parties arise. According to the authors,
transaction costs economics assume that the two parties trade with each other 'not
only with incomplete information but each is motivated to a greater or lesser degree
to conceal information which he does have to make the terms of trade finally agreed
upon less favourable to the other' (p.425). Contractors may possess different
information about the nature of the trade at the pre-contractual period. Such an
information asymmetry between the two parties may give incentives to either side to
conceal or misrepresent information about itself10, given that each one tries to
optimize performance within constrains of information. Post-contractual
opportunistic behaviour, on the other hand, arises because contracts are rarely
complete. As a result they fail to align the incentive of both parties. It is likely that
each contractor has different level of commitment to achieve the same goals. Thus,
an attempt for the ex-post renegotiation of specific terms of the contract under
conditions more adverse for either party or even the renege on the contract is
probable. Moreover, when such an opportunistic behaviour is detected it is difficult
and costly - if not impossible - for the terms of the contract to be enforced.
Reekie and Crook (op. cit.) considering vertical integration as a solution to
problems related to contractual inefficiencies that result to high transaction costs,
illustrate the Williamsonian argument about the time dimension of contracts.
Transaction costs may prove high, after the time at which the contract is drawn up
and executed. Initially, at the time of the trade agreement, the terms of the trade
depend on the number of varying suppliers (or demanders) and the degree to which
there are monopolistic (or monopsonistic) conditions in the industry they operate.
Typically, there is a large number of bidders for the trade contract. However, when
the nature of the trade requires a contract renewal, it is likely that the number of
potential bidders has become small. This is because after the trade has been initiated
the supplier supports the trade with the development of human and physical assets
10 Consider the example where a potential supplier of an industrial firm proceeds to contractual negotiations,
concealing information about the supplied product's future maintenance costs in order to provide a more
competitive offer and win the contract. Or, individuals seeking to buy a life insurance contract from an insurer,
while being dishonest about their full health condition.
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specific to the agreement. Therefore, once the time for contract renewal comes, the
demander is more likely to continue the trade with the existing supplier since he or
she may face difficulties to find another supplier who can support the agreement with
the required specific assets; or, even if she or he finds a supplier willing to create the
specific assets to serve the agreement, this would presumably be feasible with less
favourable terms in comparison to those provided by the existing supplier". Hence
when asset specificity condition exists, hold up problems may arise. Asset specificity
provides for a fertile ground for the development of opportunistic behaviour at the
renewal stages of the contract which can increase substantial the cost of trade.
In the light of the above arguments, firms may choose vertical integration to
avoid the high transaction costs that accompany contracts in the conventional trade
across the supply chain. Bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity
condition are all reasons for vertical integration.
Acquirers frequently choose acquirees within the industry in which they
operate with the expectation to increase the size of production in order to realize
economies of scale. Economies of scale arise with the increase of the production
output rate; average cost of production declines as fixed costs are distributed over a
•12
greater range of units . Weston et.al. (1998) say that economic theory assumes that
economies of scale do exist in the industry and that prior to merger, firms may
operate at levels of activity that are not adequate for the realization of economies of
scale. Costs for salaries, costs for utilization of machinery and equipment, costs for
plant operations and other fixed costs, provide increasing returns if spread over a
large number of units of output. In other words, the firm activity must be above a
minimum level so as it can minimize the costs of production. Thus, large producers
can be more competitive than small producers, and therefore, a takeover is often the
means for the increase in production so economies of scale can be achieved.
Economies of scale also result from specialisation of labour and equipment, from
stochastic factors and from geometric relationships all of which may be gained at
larger plant size. Notice, however, that operational economies of scale occur at the
11 On the supply side, specific assets will have higher value in contract renewal rather than in other uses.
12 As Besanko et.al (2000) explain, when there are capacity constrains fixed costs can decline up to the level of
output; above that level, marginal costs per unit of output increase above average cost and as a result average
costs rises as production increases.
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level of the plant (which does not change in size in a merger) rather than at the level
of the firm.
Economies of scope arise when a firm can increase the variety of goods and
services it produces using the same infrastructure; the firm then enjoys cost savings
since total costs of producing a range of products together are less than if each kind
of product would be produced separately by two or more other firms. A characteristic
example of realization of economies of scope is that, when a financial institution
with a focus and expertise on mortgages is merged with another one whose basic
business is insurance. The latter using the clientele, the sales force and the outlets of
the former, can sell insurance to existing or future homebuyers. Acquisitions that aim
to achieve economies of scope can take place between firms operating within the
same industry or within related industries or even in totally unrelated ones. This
depends on the strategy of the merging firms' managements for the variety of
products and services which can be produced and promoted together using their
common production lines and outlets.
Nevertheless, it is essential for a potential acquirer to specify, as precisely as
possible, the sources of cost savings that can be achieved after the merger with the
candidate acquiree, and the extent to which it is feasible to realise those expected
cost savings. Eccles et. al. (1999), identify three possible problematic areas in which
the aim of cost savings may prove very difficult. First, since definitions of cost
categories vary from one company to another, it may happen that the elimination of
costs in a category be much more difficult in practice, than the initial evaluation
suggested. Second, because companies differ in their structures, it may not be
possible for expected administrative cost reductions to be achieved at corporate or
divisional level, as essential work is done in unexpected places. Finally, projections
for estimating the level of firm downsizing after consolidation can prove to be
unrealistic, for example where skilled and talented personnel must be shifted to other
positions within the firm instead of being dismissed. Then cost savings due to
salaries elimination are not in line with the initially projected numbers of cut
positions. More importantly, the time horizon needed for the integration to be
successfully completed is often not well specified. As a result, costly delays may
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occur for unexpected problems to be resolved or because employees of the
previously independent companies sometimes exhibit resistance to change.
It is obvious from the above discussion that the achievement of operational
synergies on behalf of the two merging firms, by sharing their tangible assets or by
the increase in production, can prove to be very beneficial, as long as a scrupulous
planning and a detailed integration timetable have been constructed by the acquirers.
More importantly, before the acquisition the acquirer must possess for the acquiree
all the necessary information needed to allow for the efficient exploitation of the
common resources. Economies of scale and scope, for example, assume the
capability of the integrated firm to adjust all factors of production optimally.
Coordination is essential to handle efficiently the increase in production. Otherwise,
what the firm economizes from the spread of costs over a larger number of units of
output will be wasted in situations of bottlenecks in the production line, or in
additional costs arising from an inefficient inventory management or in unreasonable
logistic delays and expenditure.
The efficient sharing of tangible assets, therefore, has as prerequisite the
ability of coordinating operations and sharing know-how and 'best-practices'. Hence,
another form of operational synergies can result from the combination of intangible
assets of merging firms. Firms often develop skills and know-how on specific tasks,
processes and functions through time. This knowledge is part of the firm capital and
is bound with the organisational culture. An acquisition may serve the purpose for
the two engaging firms to obtain gains from the realisation of operating synergies by
pooling together their insights into a particular process, function or geographical area.
The transfer of organisational knowledge from one team of employees to another, by
setting people with different ways of getting things done to work together, can offer
benefits to both firms. Combining the expertise of different units can enhance
specialisation and offer more competitiveness. It can also facilitate the creation of a
new innovative business unit with combined know-how and expertise that is
extracted by different units.
Rosen (1972) considers specific knowledge vested 'in the firm', as an asset
that is transferable through the firm being acquired. Its price is the market value of
the firm net of the market value of the physical capital. This knowledge is identified
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with a type of entrepreneurship where the entrepreneur organises functions, trade
connections and an efficient 'production team' which can be operated and
maintained even in his/her absence . Therefore, several small firms that are
considered to possess special capabilities and an advanced knowledge of conducting
their business are acquired by firms that place great emphasis on this type of synergy
as they are increasingly concerned for corporate regeneration and growth. Apparently,
sharing organisational knowledge and tangible resources are the two sides of the
same coin - that of operational synergies.
A sideline of the benefits resulting from operational synergies is related to the
increased bargaining power the merged firm enjoys over its suppliers. Negotiations
with suppliers for the costs of production inputs, the quality of these inputs and the
financial arrangements for the payments, may result in more favourable agreements
and contract terms for the united entity than what they would have been able to
achieve as two firms if they were negotiating separately. Moreover, a takeover can
benefit a firm in its negotiations with other stakeholders, like customers and the
government.
c) Taxation.
There are often tax benefits for merging firms that may make the acquisition
argument stronger, depending on the method of financing the purchase. Acquisition
tax reliefs differ from one jurisdiction to another - for example, an acquirer may
substantially reduce the overall tax burden by financing the transaction through a
finance subsidiary in an offshore financial center.
Sudarsanam (2003) summarises the basic concepts of tax rules applying to
capital gains resulting from corporate acquisitions for the U.K and the U.S. In the
U.K when an acquisition is financed by cash, the target's shareholders are
immediately liable for capital gains tax, unless they are capital-gain-tax-exempt
institutions, such as pension funds. However, U.K tax rules allow a target's
13 Rosen distinguishes the specific firm-vested knowledge from the knowledge vested exclusively to the owners
or managers of the firm which refers to the personal entrepreneurship skills of organising and maintaining
complex production processes. This asset is not saleable since the firm value in the absence of the owner or
manager has zero worth, if its physical capital is excluded.
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shareholders to offset capital gains realised after the transaction against realised
capital losses on other shares in their portfolio. Moreover, capital gains are indexed
for inflation and consequently real gains on which capital gains tax is charged may
not be large. Thus, under certain circumstances depending on the target's
shareholders nature of business and the composition of their shares portfolio, the
capital gains tax burden may be mitigated or even eliminated.
On the other hand, when an acquisition is financed by shares the target's
shareholders are not immediately liable to capital gains tax. In fact, shareholders are
liable to capital gains tax at the time of the disposal of the shares. In other words,
U.K tax rules provide target shareholders with some flexibility regarding the timing
of the capital gains realisation and the resultant tax. In the case of a loan stock
transaction, target shareholders' capital gains that are accrued up to the time of the
takeover are 'frozen' and carried forward until the loan stock is eventually disposed
off. However, in this case accrued capital gains cannot be offset with any subsequent
losses on the loan stock. Target shareholders may be unwilling to accept an offer
financed by a loan stock if the acquirer is not a financially strong corporation. This is
because the target's shareholders are still liable for capital gains tax on the frozen
gains, if the acquirer fails. The advantage of loan stock transaction is that the interest
on it is deductible for the acquiring firm.
In the U.S, for an acquisition to be non-taxable at least the 50% of the
target's shares must be exchanged for stock in the merged entity. Then the stock
portion satisfying this condition can be deemed taxable or non-taxable for personal
tax purposes. Moreover, when the offer contains less than 50% stock, all
compensation is taxable. When an acquisition is considered as taxable the
shareholder must pay tax on any gain he or she realises in the acquisition. In fact, a
non-taxable acquisition represents only a tax deferral for target firm shareholders.
This is similar to what happens in U.K. acquisitions which are financed by stock. The
target's firm's shareholders can have some flexibility as to when they will realise the
acquisition gains and the resultant tax.
Since in a non-taxable offer the target's shareholders maintain substantial
ownership in the combined entity, tax rules allow for the deduction of any target
firm's unused tax credits and previous net operating losses (NOLs) from the
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combined firm's future taxable income. In a taxable offer such a carryover is not
allowed. However, the acquirer is allowed to step up the depreciation basis of the
acquired assets and therefore to reduce its future taxable income. This is because the
target's shareholders ownership rights are considered sold.
In the U.K, when the mode of the acquisition is stock, any revaluation of the
target's assets has no tax implication. This is because the asset step up does not alter
the capital allowance the target was already entitled to. Moreover, the carry over of
previous years' possible net operating losses of the target so as to be offset with
profits of the united entity, is subject to stringent conditions such as the continuation
of business for three years after the acquisition on either side.
Although tax considerations cannot be viewed as a sole factor motivating
takeover activity, there is evidence that they have an influence on investors'
perception about the value that an acquisition creates. Further, even if M&As are
undertaken for other motives, managements may structure the transactions in a
manner that maximizes tax benefits.
Hayn (1989) indicates that from a sample of 640 mergers and acquisitions
under examination in the U.S, 54% of them were taxable transactions. This implies
that tax could not be the main motive for takeovers. Moreover, targets in taxable
acquisitions enjoy abnormal returns about 10 percentage points higher than in non¬
taxable acquisitions and this pattern is also followed by the acquiring firms'
abnormal returns14 (although abnormal returns of the acquirers are the one tenth of
those of the targets). These results indicate that tax does have an influence on
investors' perception about the value of an acquisition. However, other factors than
taxation may be more influential in M&As. For example, the author discovers that
for both tax-free and taxable transactions targets' abnormal returns are substantially
higher for tender offers than they are for mergers. Taking into account that most
tender offers are financed by cash while most mergers are stock exchange
transactions, one could argue that the role of financing decision is more influential
than tax. In addition, variables like the relative size of the bidder and a target and the
resistance of target's management to the offer, could better explain announcement
abnormal returns than the tax variables alone, in the regression studies.
14 Most of tax-free transactions in this sample were mergers, while most of the taxable transactions were tender
offers.
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Manzon et.al (1994) examined the effect of tax factors on the equity value of
U.S multinational corporations making foreign acquisitions. The authors found that
abnormal returns at the announcement are not related to the variable which captures
the differences between tax rates in target countries and the United States, but are
related to the tax status of acquiring firms in the U.S. Brown and Ryngaert (1991)
argue that tax rules may affect the mode of acquisition decision of bidders. Bidders
with unfavourable private information about their equity value are more likely to
choose offers containing some stock to avoid the capital gains tax burden of cash
offers. Ceteris paribus, target shareholders would demand higher prices in cash
takeovers. Thus, acquirers with higher private valuation about their equities are more
likely to offer cash despite the tax consequences. On the other hand, acquirers with
lower private valuation about their equities are more likely to offer at least 50% of
the offer in stock in order to avoid paying the higher cash price15.
Taxation therefore, is a factor that affects the planning and the structure of
corporate combinations. However, it cannot be considered as a determining factor
when a merger or an acquisition is planned.
d) Managerial Synergies
According to Trautwein's (op. cit.) classification, a third form of synergy is
that of managerial synergy. This is a type of synergy that can be realized when the
acquirer's management is considered to possess superior planning and monitoring
capabilities and it is expected that it can manage the acquiree resources more
efficiently for the benefit of both firms' shareholders. It could be argued, that
managerial synergies are a form of the aforementioned operational synergies which
are achieved through knowledge transfer between the two firms. However, the
difference is that managerial synergies refer exclusively to capabilities attributable to
the acquirer's managers that can be applied to acquiree resources, and not to the
mixture of different firm cultures and business processes conducted by the various
15 It is worthwhile to mention that Brown and Ryngaert's model is consistent with Hayn's (op.cit.) empirical
evidence indicating that targets and bidders participating in taxable acquisitions realise higher abnormal returns
than targets and bidders participating in non-taxable acquisitions. Non-taxable (at least 50% of the value of the
offer is stock) acquisitions it is more likely to be undertaken by bidders that posses unfavourable private
information about their equities.
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working teams across the firm's hierarchical pyramid. Moreover, the acquirer's
management capabilities may not have been developed within the firm that they
currently manage and consequently, such capabilities are not necessarily an integral
part of organisational knowledge and culture. Merger terms may account for the
creation of a top management team comprising of people coming from both firms16
so that the merged firm benefits from the superior generic managerial capabilities of
the acquirer management and from the firm-specific knowledge that the acquiree
management possess. Thus, managerial synergies of joint planning and monitoring
can be achieved.
The preceding discussion suggests that synergy, in all its possible forms, is
frequently the driving force behind acquisition decisions made by managers seeking
to maximize future profits. It is not the assumption that the candidate acquiree is
undervalued or it could be mismanaged that drives such decisions, it is the acquirer's
management evaluation of the available information which suggests that the united
entity will worth more than the two firms if they operated separately, because of
unrealized synergies; the acquisition decision then, serves the purpose of exploiting
this value gap.
e) Evaluation.
However, there is skepticism in the literature regarding both the ability of
firms to benefit from synergistic effects after the merger, and the level of the price
that is often paid for the option to exploit the possible synergies. Goold and
Campbell (1998) assert that corporate executives often take the existence and the
achievement of synergy for granted. As a result, only after wasting capital and
precious resources do they understand that expected synergy often falls short of
management's expectations. Management should distinguish between the natural
desirability of synergy and the feasibility of a synergy programme through to
rigorous evaluation; in this way they can better estimate the possible benefits of a
16 This may be the case of a merger implemented through a takeover that is agreed by both the acquirer's and the
acquiree's managements, or even of a hostile one when the bidder's offer includes a proposition to some of the
acquiree's top managers to participate in the merged firm's management team. When the acquiree remains an
autonomous business unit belonging to the acquirer, there is often an exchange of people between the two top
management teams.
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usually expensive acquisition and also avoid the opportunity costs that are incured
when management focuses on synergy projects that are unlikely to succeed.
The authors suggest four common biases which usually lead managers to
believe that synergy is easier to be realised and less costly than in fact it is. First is
synergy bias, when executives feel that the achievement of synergy is an essential
part of their work; they feel obliged to create synergy -even when they do not have
any special insight in creating synergy - in order to justify the existence of their
corporation and the value of their work, especially to investors. Thus, being under
pressure to create synergy by any means, they make unwise decisions and
investments. Consequent to synergy bias is parenting bias17, when top management
believes that if synergistic opportunities exist they must get involved themselves in
order for synergistic gains to be realised. They assume that unit managers are
naturally unwilling to collaborate as they may be protective of their own authorities
and be focused only on their own unit's businesses. However, unit managers -
according to the authors - have many reasons to cooperate, while whenever this does
not happen, it is usually for good reasons. As a result of parenting bias, corporate
executives often discount unit managers' objections and intervene excessively,
creating conflicts and disappointment feelings that lead to declining productivity. A
corollary effect of parenting bias is the belief of being able to intervene effectively
where they feel it is needed, on behalf of corporate executives. This belief of having
always the necessary skills for intervention often creates more problems than those it
resolves. This is the third kind ofmanagerial bias related to synergy - the skills bias.
Finally, is what the authors call upside bias that may prove harmful for firms trying
to implement synergy initiatives without sufficient rational planning.
Goold and Campbell (1998) argue that managers often overestimate the
benefits of collaboration and underestimate the possible side effects. Collaboration
programmes may create a fertile ground for exchanging knowledge, expertise and
best-practices. On the other hand, it can have adverse effects on employee motivation
and innovation, on the feeling of personal accountability on behalf of employees, on
the pace of organisational change, and on the way unit managers understand their
businesses and their roles. Therefore, the clarification and evaluation of the
17 See Goold and Campbell (1998).
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objectives and benefits of a synergy programme is essential for the success of such
an initiative.
Sirower (1997) takes an even more skeptical view against synergy benefits.
The author, quoting a brief overview of the post war empirical evidence on M&As,
suggests that there is consistent evidence that acquisitions destroy value after the
1980's. He asserts that 'for most acquisitions achieving significant synergy is not
likely'. The level of this 'significance' is strongly related to the premium the acquirer
pays; even when synergy is present, performance improvements fall short of what is
required for the justification of the premium paid. Paying the premium, an acquirer
makes a commitment to deliver more than markets already expect from current
strategic plans. In the absence of trial and error opportunities, the integration process
is a non-stop funding project18 with no way of a cheap exit if difficulties arise.
Moreover, competition in the industry is always present, with competitors chasing
the same objectives with those of the acquirer. Thus, acquirers are often trapped in
synergy illusions paying the premium upfront for the right to manage the acquiree
resources later.
2.2.2. Private Information as a Determining Factor for Acquisitions.
As it has been stated at the beginning of this chapter, synergy is sometimes
the expected outcome from acquisition decisions based on an acquiring
management's perception of the target's worth. This perception may occur when
acquirers possess the same information as other actors in the industry and it evaluates
this information in the same manner. The acquiree has a special and unique value for
the acquirer for it will increase efficiency and it will enhance competitive advantage
through the realisation of synergies if the two firms operate jointly. Implicit in this
case is the notion that the acquiring management acts in accordance with their
shareholders best interests; it attempts to ensure future profit maximization.
18
According to Sirower (1997), p.6, '...once companies begin intensive integration, the costs of exiting a failing
acquisition strategy can become very high the integration of sales forces, information and control systems, and
distribution systems, for example, is often very difficult to reverse in the short term. And in the process, acquirers
may run the risk of... .losing their ability to respond to changes in the competitive environment'.
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However, the managers of an acquiring firm may possess different
information from that of other parties, for a specific target19. This information is
nonpublic and therefore is not reflected in the current share value of the target. In
other words, the acquirer's management perceives the potential acquiree as a
• • 90
'bargain' and they are willing to pay a premium to take over the management of the
acquiree resources.
Positive private information, regarding the value of a potential target, may
refer to future opportunities for growth and profitability - in a short- or mid-term
time horizon - in the business area of the target21, or the acquirer may consider that
the resources of the potential acquiree are not efficiently used for the purpose of
profit maximization. The mismanagement of the acquiree resources under the current
management team has as a consequence an evaluation by the market below its
potential value. The public offer for the acquisition then, is itself a revealing action
of the existence of an undervalued target. Apparently, this argument assumes that the
efficient market hypothesis - at least in its strongest form - does not hold. In practice,
acquisition targets incur a substantial upward revaluation from the market after the
22first offer, which seems consistent with the private information hypothesis .
Research has focused on unsuccessful offers in order to test the validity of the
information hypothesis. Supportive empirical evidence is provided by Dodd and
Ruback (1977). The authors examined successful and unsuccessful bids for U.S.
firms in the period froml958 to 1976. Their findings indicate that both acquirers and
acquirees exhibit positive abnormal returns on the value of their stock, in the month
of the offer announcement. However, only successful bidders earn significant
positive abnormal returns, while stockholders of both successful and unsuccessful
target firms earn large significant positive abnormal returns during the announcement
month - a significant 20.6% for the former, and a significant positive 19% for the
19 It is apparent that the procession of positive private information for a potential acquiree on behalf of the
acquirer management and the objective of realisation of synergies or economies of scale are not mutually
exclusive. To the contrary, such an 'overlapping' of the motives of acquirers, sometimes make the results of
research difficult to interpret.
20
Obviously acquirer's management is willing - or should be willing - to pay a premium, which is less or equal
to the amount that the acquiree is undervalued by the market, as it has been evaluated by the acquirer at the
acquisition evaluation projections that made before the bid.
21
However, such a hypothesis does not answer to the question why other players in the industry that are chasing
the same goals and objectives with those of the potential acquirer are not being able to perceive these
opportunities.
22 Nevertheless, as Caves (1989) suggests, this positive revaluation of the target after the first offer may be
consistent with the receiving of an anticipated premium.
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latter. While the results regarding acquirers give some support to the synergy
hypothesis23, the returns for acquirees strongly support the information hypothesis.
Similar evidence is provided by Firth (1980) in a study of U.K. firms in the
period from 1969 to 1975. The findings suggest a significant increase in abnormal
returns (6.5% for target firms being taken over, and 8.4% for target firms not being
taken over) in the month prior to the announcement of the offer. After the
announcement, abnormal returns for targets were not found significantly different
from zero, regardless of whether the bid was successful or not24.
However, these results are challenged in a study by Bradley et.al. (1983).
Extending the study period, the authors discover that when an unsuccessful tender
offer is not followed by a successful one within a five year period, the share price of
the target firm is completely reversed to its original level (before the first offer). This
finding indicates that if the 'positive information' hypothesis was true, the price
should not be reversed, since the positive information released at the time of the first
offer would be valid, regardless of the outcome of the offer. The authors explain that
the price rise is caused in the light of the potential synergy, and this is the reason why
the price is reversed to its original level when the possibility of the merger declines.
In the same study, unsuccessful bidders' share price behaviour is not in favour of the
information hypothesis either. Bidders that made an unsuccessful bid which was not
followed by further bids do not experience considerable changes of their share price.
However, when an unsuccessful bid was followed by another rival bid that turned out
to be successful, the original bidder experiences a statistically significant decline of
its share price of 2.84% at the time of the rival's bidder announcement. The evidence
is interpreted by the authors as supportive to the synergy hypothesis; the market
perceives the loss of the acquisition competition on behalf of the initial bidder, as a
lost opportunity to acquire a valuable resource.
While the hypothesis that the acquirer's management may possess private
positive information for the target seems weak in the light of the empirical evidence
provided by Bradley et. al., Roll (1988) 'modifies' the argument suggesting that the
23 Since only successful bidders enjoy positive abnormal returns, markets expect a better performance from firms
engaging in takeover activity, due to synergy. However, when the period of study is extended to a two-month
window, bidders' performance declines to a negative 1.7%.
24
Contrary to targets, bidders experience no abnormal returns prior to the announcement and a significant
negative abnormal return of 6.3% in the month of the offer announcement
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offer may reveal the possibility of the existence of private positive information and
not the certainty of such information. When positive information about a potential
target does exist before the first bid, it is more likely that further bids will be elicited.
Such targets have increased probabilities of being acquired. But if positive
information does not exist in the first place, the target is unlikely to elicit further bids
because there would not be much incentive from other potential acquirers to bid As a
result, such targets are less likely to be acquired and their share price falls back to its
original level. As far as price behaviour of unsuccessful biding firms is concerned,
Roll explains that the appearance of a rival bid increases the probability that there is
some private positive information, while it decreases the probability that the initial
bidder is the exclusive possessor of such information and the probability that it will
be the ultimate acquirer. Hence, unsuccessful bidders experience losses. However,
unsuccessful bidders' share price behaviour is consistent with the synergy hypothesis
as well.
Niden (1993) provides evidence supportive to Bradley et.al. reasoning that
synergy, and not private information, is the main force driving bidding firms. The
author examined the characteristics of white knight acquisitions in comparison with
hostile and friendly non-white-knight acquisitions. Although his results are strongly
supportive of overbidding by white knights, the sample is characterized by positive
synergies, on average, regardless of the segmentation of the data on the basis of
target management response to the bid. In detail, white knights experience losses,
after entering to the bidding contest, greater on average than those experienced by
friendly non-white-knight bidders and in some cases greater than those experienced
by hostile bidders. Targets acquired by white knights experience gains which are not
significantly different from those that experienced by targets acquired by non-white-
knights in multiple-bidder acquisitions25.
These results challenge Shleifer and Vishny's (1986) argument that an
acquisition by a white knight represents an optimal synergistic combination of target
and bidding firm assets. The underlined idea of this argument is that a target
possesses private information regarding the achievement of the highest valuation of
25 In fact, target gains at the announcement period are similar for white knight and non-white-knight acquisitions
only after controlling for bidders' competition in the regression of the wealth effects at the announcement against
the variables describing acquisition characteristics.
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its assets which it shares with the white knight but it withholds from other bidders. If
such a hypothesis hold, greater synergies (i.e. combined target and bidding firm
shareholder wealth effects) should be observed in white knight acquisitions than in
non-white-knight ones.
2.2.3. Hubris -Winner's Curse.
It is worthwhile to underline at this point that the above discussion is based
on the assumption of the absence of efficient markets. If private information for the
present or future performance of a potential acquiree exists, then at least the strong
form of the efficient market hypothesis does not hold. Moreover, it was implicitly
assumed that an acquirer's management makes rational26 decisions when it evaluates
information concerning acquisition opportunities while it implements its main task,
the enhancement of shareholder value.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is more likely that the individual
decision makers make mistakes in their assessment of a potential acquiree's value
rather than the markets making mistakes.
Roll (1986) developed the hypothesis that in an efficient stock market the
initial bidder is the market, and the initial public offer is the current price. The
potential acquirer knows for certain that the shareholders of the target firm will not
sell below that price. Thus, when the bidder's valuation falls below that price no
offer is made, while if the bidder's valuation exceeds the market price, a bid may be
made and becomes part of the public record. The bidder's valuation includes any
estimated economies due to synergy and any assessments of weak management that
might have caused a discount in the target's current market price. However, any bid
above the market price represents an error. Roll postulates the strong form of the
efficient market hypothesis to support the argument; all available information
regarding a potential target before the first offer is reflected in its share value.
The author asserts that even if each individual investor behaves irrationally, a
market actually populated by rational beings is observationally equivalent to a
26 Becker (1962), defines 'rational behaviour' as the 'consistent maximization ofa well-orderedfunction, such as
utility or profitfunction
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market characterized by grossly irrational individual behaviour that cancels out in the
97
aggregate, leaving only the systematic behavioural component that all participants
have in common. Hence, the real value of any (target) firm is reflected on its market
price. On the other hand, the management of the bidding firm may have convinced
themselves that their valuation is right and that the market does not reflect the full
economic value of the target firm. Hence, this overoptimism of managers of
acquiring firms leads to positive valuation errors, and as a result, acquiring firms pay
too much for their targets. Overoptimism on behalf of acquiring managers arises
from an excessive feeling of self-confidence, and arrogance and pride; this is the so-
called "hubris" hypothesis. Hubris is an explanation regarding the driving forces
behind takeover activity that is based on an overbearing presumption of bidders that
their valuations are correct. The hubris hypothesis maintains that acquisitions are
motivated by managers' mistakes and that there are no ex post gains from synergy.
Since acquirers overpay for acquirees which are already fairly priced by the market,
there is a wealth transfer from acquirer's shareholders to acquiree's shareholders28.
A plausible question about hubris is that if acquisition decisions benefit only
acquiree's shareholders, then why do bids still happen and why is each subsequent
wave of merger larger than the previous one both in terms of value and of the
number of the engaging firms?
As Roll points out, there is little reason to expect that the individual bidder
will refrain from bidding because he/she has learned from his/her own past errors.
Although some firms engage in many acquisitions, the average individual
bidder/manager has the opportunity to make only a few takeover offers during
his/her career. Moreover, in a later publication, Roll (1988) relaxed the argument
about hubris stating that 'hubris cannot be the sole explanation of the takeover
phenomenon' (p.250). Asserting the opposite would imply that after every bid
announcement a decline of the bidder's share price should be observed. In fact, there
is some evidence in the literature -though weak - that there is an average increase in
bidder's share value after the offer. In addition, if hubris was the only inspiration for
takeover offers, shareholders would strictly prohibit them by applying a prohibition
27 Roll (1986, p. 199), explains that "one possible definition of irrational or aberrant behaviour is independence
across individuals, and thus, disappearance from view under aggregation".
28 Even if there were synergies, competition among bidders - or the prospect of the emergence of a potential rival
bid - encourages acquiring managers to pay more than the future gains from the prospective synergistic gains.
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clause in the corporate charter29. Thus, acquirers' shareholders might occasionally
find individual acquisition decisions beneficial.
Seth et.al. (2000) provide supportive empirical evidence to this more
moderate version of the hubris hypothesis which is consistent with the synergy
hypothesis and managerial rationality. Using a sample of 100 cross-border
acquisitions which were implemented by US firms, the authors find that in the
majority of the acquisitions, gains are explained by the synergy hypothesis while the
hubris hypothesis appears to play a role in value creating transactions. The
explanation provided is that rational managers may be motivated to undertake
acquisitions which are expected to be value creating transactions and which do
indeed result in synergistic gains. However, rational managers may make valuation
mistakes about the value of a target. Therefore, although synergistic gains are
positive - i.e., the value of the combined entity exceeds the pre-acquisition value of
the combining firms on average - some such acquisitions may result in overpayment
by the acquirer to the target, and hence, in a loss to shareholders of the acquirer firm.
The results provided by Seth et.al, (op. cit), are consistent with that provided by
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) who found evidence of hubris in a sub-sample of
takeovers that reflected positive gains.
Varaiya (1988) points out that the hubris hypothesis is in essence a special
case of the winner's curse from auction theory. The winner's curse hypothesis
maintains that in a common value auction , when there are many bidders for an
object of a highly uncertain value the winner of the auction is likely to be a loser. It is
likely, that the winner has made the highest positive valuation error amongst all
bidders regarding the value of the auctioned object. In the case of acquisition offers
• • • i 31the winning bid may exceed the expected value of the target firm and consequently
the bidder loses money, or, the value of the target may prove simply less that the
estimations on which the winning bid was based, and so the winning firm is
disappointed.
29 However, in a world with no transaction costs such a prohibition would be irrelevant to a diversified investor
who holds securities trading in a perfect capital market, because hubris implies a wealth transfer from the one
security to the other.
30 Thaler (1992) explains that a common value auction is an auction where the asset has the same value to all
bidders.
31 Bidders evaluate the prospective benefits from the acquisition before they bid. Their evaluation is based on the
assessment of the available information about target's assets and on their perception of the future benefits they
will enjoy if they manage these assets.
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The winner's curse is a manifestation of irrationality on behalf of the
acquiring management, which consequently leads to overpayment. According to Cox
and Isaac (1984), the winner's curse cannot occur if all bidders are rational. Bidders
pay more because they exhibit irrational behaviour overestimating the value of the
target. An important distinction must be made, however, between hubris and the
winner's curse. Despite the fact that both hypotheses assume that bidders often
behave irrationally and commit valuation errors, the former ascribes the source of
this irrationality to managerial overoptimism and excessive arrogance that happens
even without competition, while the latter assumes that there are more than one
bidder in competitive circumstances and the winning bidder may commit a valuation
error of a non defined source. Thaler (1992) quotes extensive empirical evidence,
supporting to the winner's curse in common value auctions.
Nonetheless while both hypotheses seem intuitively appealing, it would be an
exaggeration to argue that all takeovers take place because of managerial arrogance,
and that every winning bid is a result of an unintentional positive valuation error. In
addition, a target's assets and resources may have different values for different
bidders, and therefore, the valuation of each potential acquirer may be based on
different assumptions of their post-takeover utility32.
2.2.4. Growth.
Referring to the hubris hypothesis and in the light of the large number of
unsuccessful acquisitions, Mueller (1989) argues that it seems unlikely for scientific
management to be continually wrong in assessing the potential gains from an
acquisition. Moreover, for the author there is an issue as to whether past experience
leads to a correction of future expectations; in other words it seems unreasonable that
managers do not learn from unsuccessful past acquisition records.
Mueller suggests that apart from the case that managers are victims of their
overoptimism, there might be two other possible motives for mergers. The first
possible explanation for the large number of unsuccessful mergers is that managers
32 In other words, acquisitions may not be common value auctions.
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simply might not expect them to be successful . If a large company is based in a
slow growing or even declining industry the management may engage in an
acquisition of a company outside the industry of its operation. Such an acquisition is
attractive to the management of the acquiring firm, not because of its possible future
prospects for the two partners, but simply because managers are not keen on
supervising a company which operates in a declining industry34.
The second explanation ascribes a more straightforward reasoning for growth
seeking motives to management; managers may undertake a takeover as a quick way
to expand a firm's size. In light of the complete separation of ownership from control
in the modern corporation, when management compensation schemes are based on
firm's size , managers may be willing to sacrifice some profits and present value of
a firm's stock in order to achieve sales or asset growth.
Regarding the first possibility, in an earlier work Mueller (1969) asserts that
growth maximizing management may undertake conglomerate 36 acquisitions
selecting first from those firms which promise some synergistic interaction with their
own operations and turn to firms with no synergistic potential only after the former
opportunities have been exhausted or been blocked. Additionally, it can be assumed
that a growth maximizing management would engage in takeover activity regardless
of the availability of acquirees that offer synergistic opportunities. Therefore, the
argument goes, if managers pursued shareholder wealth maximization mergers,
takeover activity would decline over time after the exhaustion of all synergistic
opportunities37. Mueller concludes that this does not seem to be the case, since in the
period under examination - from 1962 to 1968 - acquisition activity occurred at a
scale that was many times higher than the scale of the preceding periods both in
terms of the number of the engaging firms and the total acquired assets.
33 Mueller (1989) argues that the large number of acquisition deals that are financed by stock when an acquirer's
stock outperforms the stock market during periods of general optimism, gives support to the hypothesis that
acquiring managers are aware that the acquisition may not be a value enhancing one.
34 It should be noted, however, that such a motivation is not necessarily against shareholders' interests. In other
words, managerial interest for growth might come together with the attainment of possible synergies.
35 Firth (1991) provides evidence that top managers may enjoy higher income and perks even when there is a
decline in performance of the acquiring firm.
36 Mueller (1969) suggests that the growth maximization hypothesis, while it is particularly useful for explaining
conglomerate mergers, it can be applied in all type ofmergers.
37 Mueller (op. cit.) suggests that shareholder wealth maximization mergers can be justified as beneficial to the
acquiring firm's shareholders only if some economy of scale or synergistic potential exists.
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However, one could challenge the above argument, assuming that the
periodic occurrence of merger waves represents exactly the opposite of what Mueller
suggests; i.e. the end of each merger wave is the result of the exhaustion of
synergistic merger opportunities that emerge in each new economic and
technological cycle, on behalf of wealth enhancing oriented managements.
Alternatively, while it seems plausible that shareholder wealth maximization
managements would undertake acquisitions only if a synergistic potential, or a
possibility for creation of economies of scale exist, there is no certainty about the
limits of synergistic merger opportunities in a world of rapid technological
advancements and divergent resources and interests.
The second possibility - which assumes that managers seek growth
maximization in order to secure their status and increase their income - precludes
any possibility of profit maximization motives on behalf of acquiring managers.
Growth maximizing management may justify an acquisition as 'synergistic', but
knowingly proceed to an unprofitable transaction to fulfill its own objectives. In this
case there are totally divergent interests between the shareholders and the
management of the acquiring firm. It is therefore the principal - agent relationship
which gives managers the discretion to pursue personal goals at the expense of
shareholders' interests.
The growth hypothesis - in contrast to hubris - implies that the payment for
an acquisition, and specifically the premium that is paid, does not necessarily reflect
the acquiring management's perception about the value which can be created in the
post acquisition period. Acquisition payment is a means for company growth;
decision makers pay what the acquisition market requires in order to increase a
firm's size. Management evaluates all available information regarding a potential
target, but in this case the management's objectives are not related to value creation
opportunities and profit maximization.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to clarify whether acquiring managements
undertake unprofitable acquisitions by mistake or because they knowingly seek some
alternative objective. As Mueller (1989, p.7) points out, such a question is
unanswerable 'in the absence of testimony at the time of an acquisition by managers
under the influence of truth serum'.
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2.2.5. Agency.
The managers' behaviour towards maximizing their own utility by means of
increases of their firm's size at the expense of shareholder wealth, as described in the
above section, is often referred to the literature as "managerialism". This argument
suggests that the management incentive for acquisitions - and consequently the result
of them - is often the extraction of value from the acquirer shareholders by acquirer
TO
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management . Managerialism, therefore, implies that takeover activity is a
manifestation of the agency problems of inefficient external investments by
managers.
Compensation, power, prestige, and job security are likely to be valued by
managers, and maximizing size might improve the probability of achieving these
goals. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) argue that the acquirer management may
identify the target as one that is most suited to increase its own welfare rather than
the welfare of the acquiring company's shareholders. For example, specialist
managements may acquire firms in their own lines of business so the success of the
combined entity will depend even more on their specific skills. The management can
exploit this dependency to increase perquisite consumption or defeat rivals who are
better than itself in running some of the operations of the firm. Such management
actions result in inefficiencies that reduce the total value of the combined firm
available to shareholders.
Moreover, in large corporations where equity is widely dispersed and
efficient monitoring on behalf of shareholders is very costly or even impossible, top
management may use the available cash to proceed with acquisitions which serve the
purpose of increasing their own power. Managing very large corporations, CEOs can
enjoy prestige and power to influence decisions within or outside of their local
society. Thus, management often may have strong incentives to undertake even
negative net present value acquisitions in order to increase the resources under their
control.
38 The underlined idea of this argument - the separation of ownership and control in the firm - falls within the so-
called managerial theories of the firm developed by Baumol (1959), and Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964).
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Considering the agency costs associated with conflicts between managers and
shareholders over the payout of free cash flow, Jensen (1986), formulated the free
cash flow hypothesis. Free cash flow is the remaining cash flow after financing all of
a firm's positive net present value projects. According to Jensen, a shareholder
39wealth maximizing firm must pay out the free cash flow to shareholders . However,
in cases where a firm generates substantial cash flows, severe conflicts between
shareholders and managers may arise over the firm's pay out policies. This is
because payment of cash flows reduces the resources that are controlled by managers
and limits their ability to exercise their power and influence. Moreover, when paying
free cash flows to shareholders, a management is potentially subject to monitoring by
capital markets, should the firm need to obtain new cash.
Therefore, management may often undertake negative net present value
investments so as to expand firm size, instead of paying out dividends to
shareholders; this policy increases the resources under their control and also it often
increases their compensation40. In addition, Jensen suggests that the tendency of
some firms to reward middle managers through promotion, instead of yearly bonuses,
creates an organisational bias towards growth in order for the necessary new
positions required from such a promotional scheme to be supplied.
The Free cash flow hypothesis is special case of a wider range of agency
problems which may exist in the firm. Since shareholders and their agents - the
managers - are self-interested, there are conflicts over the choice of the best
corporate strategy. Agency problems incur costs to shareholders, such as costs of
monitoring and bonding managerial behaviour and efficiency losses that are incurred
should the conflicts of interests persist. Agency problems can not be resolved
perfectly since they are embedded in the very nature of the principal - agent
relationship.
In cases where agency problems become very costly for a firm's shareholders,
takeovers can be considered as a solution. A takeover can serve the purpose of the
replacement of a management that pursues its own objectives instead of the
39 In their well - known work, Miller and Modigliani (1961), argue that in perfect capital markets dividend policy
is irrelevant to firm's value. However, in the real world, there is a well - documented preference on behalf of
investors towards cash payments in the form of dividends, instead of the uncertain future capital gains or
increased future dividends should the residual cash be retained and invested in the firm.
40
Murphy (1985) suggests that where growth is measured by increases in sales there is a positive relation
between management compensation and firm's growth.
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maximization of shareholder wealth. In this sense, a takeover is not a manifestation
of agency problems as managerial theories suggest, but the natural outcome of them.
Even when equity holders are dispersed and unorganized, in the view of serious
agency costs, a more profit-oriented firm can acquire the necessary number of shares
by publicly announcing a bid, in order to replace the existing management and to
increase profitability and the value of the firm; under such conditions, plausibly, the
shareholders of the target would be willing to accept a premium and replace the
problematic management team.
The Marketfor Corporate Control.
The preceding discussion suggests that an acquisition is a last resort solution
of agency problems between a target's shareholders and managers. If the associated
costs become excessive, the firm's efficiency may decline and consequently its value
will drop below the level that would be acceptable for its shareholders to continue to
hold the stock. In addition, other management teams may recognize that the firm
operates below its full potential, failing to maximize profits. The same result,
however, is produced when the management of the firm is inefficient in the
utilization of available resources. If the incumbent management team is not
competent to maximize a firm's profitability by timely and effectively exploiting all
the internal and external opportunities41, then alternative management teams may
enter in a competition for the rights to manage corporate resources (Jensen and
Ruback, 1983). Thus, takeover threat can serve as a disciplinary mechanism for
managers. At the same time a takeover is a means for the replacement of a
management that lags in performance either because of inefficiency or because of
agency problems42.
41 Jensen (1988) explains than when changing technology or market conditions require a major restructuring of
corporate assets, incumbent managers often have trouble in effectively proceeding with this restructuring. It is
often necessary to abandon major projects, relocate facilities, to change managerial assignments and to close or
sell all unnecessary facilities or divisions. After a takeover, it is easier for the new top-level management to
implement these changes since it has a fresh view of the business and no ties with employees and local
communities.
42 Roll (1988) argues that an inefficient management can be replaced by a variety of devices not just by a
takeover; such devices include proxy fights, replacement of operating managers by the board of directors, or
replacement of directors through stockholder vote. Probably, takeover costs are lower than those of such
alternatives.
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The idea that the market for takeovers provides an external control device for
management actions has its roots in Marris' (1964) theory of the firm. Marris' theory
maintains that the degree to which a firm is well - managed, and therefore the
possibility that it can be a takeover target, can be identified by reference to a single
variable; the so called valuation ratio, which is defined as the stock-market value of a
firm over the book value of its net equity assets. The valuation ratio is a composite
quantitative measure of all the management's actions, and therefore it is a very good
indicator of success and market favour since it is a result of both market and book
factors.
Marris asserts that in a possible takeover bid the proposed purchase price
reflects the market valuation ratio based on the expected results of existing
managerial policies. Under this model, the valuation ratio depends on three variables;
the first is the retention ratio (i.e. the proportion of earnings retained within the firm)
while the second is the expected rate of return on firms projects. According to
Marris' theory, the management can absolutely influence the retention ratio while it
has some influence on the expected rate of return since this is affected by the quality
of the projects the firm undertakes. The third variable is the rate of discount, which is
determined by the market (since it is applied by investors to the firm's shares).
Through the influence of managerial policies on the retention ratio and the expected
rate of return43, the management team can keep the valuation ratio of a firm 'i' within
a range of acceptable standards; otherwise, another management team which
probably perceives a higher valuation ratio for firm 'i' than that the market perceives,
could acquire the shares of the firm at a price acceptable to its shareholders (higher
than the market value of the shares or the value of other bids, and lower than the
value that the raider perceives). This value gap that is perceived by the raider -
whether due to anticipated managerial improvement (Marris) or to anticipated
synergy or other possible factors, like market power - can be expressed in terms of
valuation ratios.
Apparently, management teams that try to avoid becoming takeover victims
should pursue a strategy which maximises the valuation ratio. Marris theory on
43 Nevertheless, Newbould (1970) indicates that a competent management could actually influence even the
third factor; the discount rate applied to the firm's shares by investors. Skilful public relations, favourable profit
forecasts and the appropriate dividend policy are all factors which can influence the rate of discount applied to
firms' equity (within the general rates set by the market).
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valuation ratio underlines the idea that unless a management team pursues strategies
which are appreciated by the capital markets to keep the value of the firm within a
range of acceptable standards, a takeover bid may be elicited by other management
teams that recognize the opportunity to reorganise or redeploy the firm's assets and
thereby create new value44.
The market for corporate control, therefore, is a mechanism external to the
firm that disciplines management to act in accordance with shareholders best
interests. It also reduces agency costs since it provides for an external threat to top-
management positions should the owners and the markets realise that the firm
follows non-profit maximising strategies. Finally, it is a possible partial solution to
agency problems - like the ones the free cash flow hypothesis predicts - because
dispersed and unorganised equity-holders can achieve the replacement of inefficient
management through the acceptance of a public offer which may be elicited by an
alternative management team if the firm is considered undervalued under the current
management.
2.2.6. Economic Disturbance Theory.
Gort's (1969) developed the economic disturbance theory of mergers which
maintains that mergers are in part or entirely motivated by speculative or
expectational motives. The economic disturbance theory suggests, in general, that
mergers occur because outsiders expect to earn more with a given firm's assets than
do its present owners. This implies that there may be expectations value gaps in long
run equilibrium, and merger activity happens because of this divergence of
expectations.
Hughes and Singh (1980) summarizing the main arguments of Gort's theory
explain that mergers are expected to take place during periods of either rapidly rising
or rapidly falling market prices. In a period of rising stock market prices, mergers
44 However, if the voting majority of shareholders are convinced that incumbent management is inefficient, there
would not be a reason for its replacement through a costly takeover bid. An offer on behalf of the bidder of a
higher price for target's firm shares, underlines a disagreement between target's voting majority shareholders and
bidder's management while it serves as a means for persuading them, Roll (1988). Roll's argument obviously
excludes cases where the equity holders are unorganised and they are dispersed, a fact that would make it difficult
- if not impossible - to exercise their voting and other ownership rights.
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occur when outsiders obtain information about the future prospects of the firm that
lead them to upgrade their evaluation about the firm's future performance, while the
present holders do not hold such information. Moreover, during periods of rising
market prices, outsiders may become far more optimistic than present holders about
the firm's prospects on the basis of the information they already hold. In both the
cases there is an asymmetry in expectations between insiders and outsiders; the
former are relatively less optimistic than the latter, and thus, their different
expectations lead to a merger.
Conversely, when there is a rapidly falling stock market, the present
stockholders may hold information concerning the firm's prospects that outsiders do
not hold. Thus, they may expect more rapid decline in the firm's stock price than
outsiders expect, or they may be far more pessimistic about the future prospects of
the firm than outsiders are. Therefore, insiders may be keen on selling the firm at the
present price level45.
Hughes and Singh (1980) criticizing Gort's theory, argue that the theory does
not discuss the source of outsider optimism. The authors suggest that, during a stock
market boom the optimism of managers for their ability to improve the performance
of acquired firms accompanies a general state of optimism among investors, leading
to higher share prices. Moreover, the levels of stock prices at market peaks represent
a dramatic overoptimism on the part of investors regarding what future profits and
dividends streams will be. Therefore, managers of acquiring firms may simply be as
optimistic as all the investors during a stock market boom.
Trautwein (1990) asserts that Gort's theory does not discuss the institutional
framework for mergers; it does not answer for example why the oil crisis of the early
70's did not trigger a merger wave, while in the late 60's a merger wave was
triggered without any major macro economic disturbance. In addition, since most
economic disturbances are of a sectoral nature, according to Trautwein one could
expect a sectoral pattern of mergers. While food and oil industries are examples, the
merger wave of the 60's is a counterexample.
45
However, as Hughes and Singh (1980) assert, since merger activity tends to increase with rapid upswings in
stock market prices and usually is curtailed very rapidly when stock market prices fall, this is a significant
contradiction to the economic disturbance theory.
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More recently, Gort's economic disturbance theory was tested empirically in
a study conducted by Crook (1995) for the U.K in the period from 1969 to 1989.
Crook hypothesized that the level of share prices should be positively related to the
level of acquisition activity under the predictions of the theory. Also, the level of
acquisition activity was hypothesized to be positively correlated with Tobin's Q ratio,
since the theory predicts that in industries with low barriers to entry46 the range of
possible valuations is limited and hence, the likelihood of mergers because of
valuation differences decreases. Finally, since Gort argues that the number of
valuation differences increases with the increase in the number of firms that require
additional capacity, Crook hypothesized a positive relation between the level of
acquisition activity and output growth. No support was found for a long term
relationship between the level of share prices, the Q ratio, and output growth and the
appropriate measure for the level of acquisition activity, and hence, for the
predictions of economic disturbance theory.
2.2.7. Market Power.
While cost reductions and efficiency increases that merger activity can bring
about through synergies are seen in the literature as motives for mergers, a frequently
hypothesized reason for mergers and takeovers is the assumed desire of the firm to
limit competition and influence prices in the industries in which it operates - and
consequently to increase its profit margins - namely, market power.
Hughes and Singh (1980), suggest that mergers can increase a firm's market
power in several ways, depending upon the type of merger involved. A horizontal
merger may allow a firm to increase its market share in an industry to such a degree
that explicit or tacit collusion with other firms becomes possible. Moreover,
horizontal mergers may increase barriers to entry. Having increased its market share
through a merger, a firm may enjoy substantial cost reductions provided from scale
economies; thus, it would be easier in such circumstances for the firm to engage in
46
According to Crook, in such industries Tobin's Q can not rise much above 1. This is plausible, because the
replacement costs of a firm's assets cannot rice much above their market value in industries with no or low
barriers to entry.
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price competition war than it would be for its potential competitor47. Similarly, by
integrating vertically, a firm with substantial market power in one market can
increase the effective market power of the purchased firm in the supply market
(backward integration). Hence, such a vertical linkage may make competition more
difficult for those companies operating in the supply market. In addition, a vertically
integrated firm can also constitute a threat to potential entry, since any potential
entrant should enter all the markets where the firm operates, in order to compete
effectively.
Market power is considered in the literature as a motive for conglomerate
takeovers as well. Martin (1994) explains that when a firm operates in many
industries, some of its divisions may buy products from independent companies,
while others sell inputs to those same companies. The conglomerate may then
attempt to use the patronage of its purchasing divisions to promote the sales of its
supplying divisions. Moreover, two firms that are each potential purchasers of one
another's products, may upon a merger, provide captive markets for one another's
products, and consequently may increase the market power of each. Thus, any
potential entrant into either market would be at a competitive disadvantage due to the
captive nature of the demand of each firm's products.
The degree to which merger activity limits competition, and hence influences
prices, is often associated in the literature with the extent to which it increases
concentration.
The process of concentration is defined as an increase in the extent to which
economic activity is controlled by large firms. The Cournot theory of oligopoly
suggests that when a small number of large firms operate in an industry then each
firm makes its output decision so as to maximise profits given the output of all other
firms. Hannah and Kay, (1977) assert that the concept of the Nash equilibrium
should be incorporated in order for the behaviour of firms towards profit
maximization to be more accurately described. This concept suggests that a firm
chooses the strategy with the highest possible pay off, given the strategies of all other
participants. Cowling and Waterson (1976) suggest that the Nash-Cournot
47 An increase to market share of a firm may provide for cost cutting from scale economies due to a larger
production rate. However, what is implied here is the ability of the firm to enjoy profits above the competitive
levels because of its ability to depart from competitive pricing.
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explanation of firms' behaviour in an oligopolistic market implies a positive
association between prices and concentration. In other words, the less the output the
rest of the industry supplies the lower the elasticity of demand an individual firm
faces and consequently the greater its capacity to raise prices and profits by limiting
its own output. This argument is valid for all the firms in the industry and, thus, the
greater the degree of concentration the greater the excess of prices over costs.
Goldberg (1973) suggests that industry concentration could be a good
indicator of the level of competition in an industry; although he asserts that no single
absolute measure of competition exists. According to the author, a theory of
4o
oligopoly does offer some justification for this measure of competition. The larger
the share of the N largest firms, the lower will be the cost of detecting violators of
collusive agreements and the more likely will the departure from competitive prices
be. Infinitely repeated game theory also indicates a link between concentration and
price cutting. In the light of the above arguments, many authors - and often the
regulatory authorities - regard concentration as an indication of competition.
Therefore, the question as to whether mergers are being planned and executed
to achieve market power turns to the question how merger activity affects industry
49
concentration .
Hughes (1993) argues that although two merger waves have occurred since
1945 and concentration also has risen and then stabilized, there is no single one-to-
one match between the two. In particular, while merger activity accelerated in the
60's and reached its peak in the period between 1968 and 1973, concentration
increased in the 60's but it stabilized when merger activity took off. In addition, the
fastest increase in aggregate concentration took place during the 1950's when merger
activity exhibited modest rates. Moreover, the increased merger activity in 1980's
did not affect concentration at all.
Goldberg (1973) examined the level of concentration in the US in industries
where firms were acquired by large conglomerate acquirers for the period from 1954
to 63. The author examined the level of the 4-firm and 8-firm concentration ratios
48 See Stigler, G.J. (1964).
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Although such an approach presumes that any effect ofmerger activity on concentration is a deliberate result of
management motives, the possibility that industry concentration levels might be affected by merger activity being
driven by other motives cannot be precluded. In any case, however, if merger activity increases concentration,
this cannot be considered to be out of the attention of top-management when a merger is planned.
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before and after a conglomerate acquisition as well as the Herfindahl index, in
various product markets. He also examined the percentage change in the
concentration ratio by dividing the change of the concentration ratio by the initial
concentration level. The results of the study indicate that more industries experienced
decreases in concentration than increases after conglomerate mergers had occurred.
The author also used regression analysis to investigate the possible influence
on concentration change of various variables, which were hypothesised to have some
effect. These variables were the assets of the acquiring company, the assets of the
acquired, the length of time in months during which the merger had had a chance to
affect the concentration ratio, and the average level of concentration (the initial
concentration level plus the final concentration level divided by two). None of the
coefficients of the regression were found to be significant either when the
measurement of concentration was the 4-firm concentration ratio or when it was the
8-firm concentration ratio. Hence, the author concludes that the evidence does not
support the argument that conglomerate mergers affect concentration ratios in the
industries of the acquired firms and therefore it is unlikely that competition in those
industries be adversely affected by merger activity.
Stillman (1983) examined the merging firms rivals' share price in 11
horizontal mergers which took place between 1964 and 1972, and which were
challenged by antitrust enforcement agencies. If the "market power" hypothesis was
true - the author suggests - their share price should rise at the time of events that
increase the probability of the merger, and fall when the probability of the merger
declines Stillman found that rivals' share prices, on average, remain unaffected after
the announcement of the merger. Similar results for a larger sample of horizontal
mergers are reported by Eckbo (1983). Ghosh (2005), after examining more than
2000 U.S. acquisitions that were completed during the 1980s and 1990s, reports that
although market concentration, as measured using the Herfindahl index, increases
around acquisitions, the increase is economically small. The author found no
evidence that acquisitions are motivated to increase industry concentration, and
benefit from large monopoly rents.
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2.2.8. The Price Earnings Ratio as an explanation ofmerger activity.
One of the most important indexes regarding the value and the future
prospects of a firm is the Price Earnings Ratio, PE, for it embodies all the
information about how the market assesses firm's future performance. A firm
exhibiting an increase in earnings per share for a number of subsequent years tends
to be valued more favourably than another, whose earnings per share have been
rising with lower rates; that is the market probably extrapolates its past performance.
The price of a firm's stock at a given time is a function of the earnings per share at
that time and its PE ratio at the same time.
There is a body of literature - though not very rich - suggesting that merger
activity may be motivated from the acquirer's management desire to increase the
united entity's earnings per share and its share price by means of PE manipulation,
choosing the appropriate target for this purpose. This argument rests on the fact that
when an acquirer has a higher PE than that of the acquiree, there is an automatic
increase in earnings per share and the share price of the acquirer immediately after
the merger if the merger is transacted at the share price.
Steiner (1977) illustrates a simple arithmetic example to support the
aforementioned argument. The author makes two assumptions; first, that the PE
ratio of a particular company tends to become an established parameter and to
change but slowly over time. Therefore, any increase in earnings per share of the
firm leads to an increase of its stock price. In addition, the PE ratio tends to increase
secularly if the rate of growth of earnings increases. Second, when a company 'A'
acquires a company 'B' with a different historic PE ratio, then investors transfer the
acquiring company's PE ratio to the acquiree's earnings. Supposing that firm 'A' has
2000 shares selling for £1 each and earnings per share of 0.05, the firm's PE ratio is
20. If company 'B' has 1000 shares selling for £1 each and earnings per share 0.10,
then 'B's PE ratio is 10. In the absence of any synergy50, a simple combination of
'A' and 'B' would suggest a company, 'A+B', with 3000 shares that sells again for
50
Target's core business is assumed to be within an unrelated industry than that of the acquirer's.
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£1 each51. Its earnings per share would be 0.067 (2000 x 0.05 + 1000 x 0.10 / 3000)
and its PE ratio 15.
However, in case where firm 'A' acquires firm 'B' on a share for share
exchange, the earnings per share of the acquirer immediately after the acquisition
will be again 0.67 (since earnings per share as reported in the financial statements of
the two entities do not change, regardless of the acquisition). However, these
earnings are now converted by the stock market into a price per share based on
company's 'A' PE ratio of 20:1. Thus, each share of the acquirer is now selling at a
price of £ 1.33 (20 = P / 0.067). Indeed, the increase in company's 'A' share price is
one of 33%, and that is a profit which resulted solely from the fact that the target
company had a PE ratio lower than that of the acquirer52. Any other source of gain,
such as synergy, was assumed absent since the acquisition is a conglomerate one.
Steiner suggests that the upward revaluation of the acquirer's share price
(from £1 to £1.33) and its earnings per share (from 0.05 to 0.067) may further inflate
the market's assessment of its PE ratio, since these increases are considered as
favourable events for the firm. In any case, investors may speculate that such a
performance will continue in the future, and this would justify an upward revision of
its PE ratio. Assuming that PE ratio rises to 25, then the share price of the acquirer
rises to 25 x 0.067 = £ 1.67. The author argues that while the rise of the acquirer's
share price due to acquisition (from £1 to £1.33) is real enough and can be
sustainable as long as the earnings per share of the two (merged) companies continue
to rise in the future at levels pertaining at the time of the acquisition, the rise (to £
1.67) that results from the speculative upward revaluation of PE is not sustainable in
the future, unless the acquirer proceeds with another acquisition of a target with
positive earnings and relatively low PE ratio (lower than its own). This is because the
market's speculative assumption that the rate of earnings per share growth will
increase in the future (which lead to the upward revision of PE and thus, the share
price) is not reasonable in the absence of any synergy or other sources of real gains.
In addition, sequential acquisitions of selective targets with lower PE ratio can not
51
Company 'A+B' is the weighted average of company 'A' and company 'B'. Its share price would be (2000 x
£1) + (1000 x £1) / 3000
52 It is assumed for simplicity that one share of the acquirer is exchanged with one share of the acquiree. If for
example there was a 20% premium to B's stockholders there would be more shares (3,200) and the earnings per
share would rise to 0.625 and the price per share to £1.25 instead of £1.33 (at a PE of 20).
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last for ever, first because such opportunities would be exhausted after some time ,
and second, due to the probable market's revaluation of its assessments on such cases.
The author says that the conglomerate merger wave of the 60's can be explained by
the above mechanism, if it is taken into account that during that period acquiring
companies tended to have significantly higher PE ratios than acquired companies,
and that in the short run PE ratios did not fall after the acquisition.
Indeed, Levine and Aaronovitch (1981) in a study for 154 U.K companies
that were involved in large mergers in 1972, find that one of the financial
characteristics that discriminates between acquirers and targets is the PE ratio.
Acquirers were found to have on average higher P/E than both the targets and the
sample average54.
However, Newbould (1970), in a study referring to the conglomerate merger
wave of the late 60's, notices that there are reasons to doubt as to whether the PE
ratio is a sole, or even a prime, consideration of the merger terms. Nevertheless, the
author illustrates evidence suggesting that there was a widespread common view in
the market that a firm should take over only firms whose price earnings ratio is lower
than its own55. In addition, this point of view was re-enforced by the behaviour of the
investors to apply the acquirer's PE ratio to the acquiree's earnings per share
immediately after the merger.
Tzoannos and Samuels (1972), found that the higher the ratio the less likely
for a firm to be a takeover target. This is consistent with the argument that since
markets are very interested in price earnings ratio, companies seek to acquire others
with a lower P/E in order to improve their own earnings position. However, there
was no evidence found that acquirers have significantly higher price earnings ratio
than the average.
The PE ratio approach for explaining merger activity may stand as an
intuitively appealing one; however it seems unlikely that acquirers base their
53 The sequential acquisitions of targets with low PE will lead to an increased competition for the remaining
targets which in turn will lead to an increase of the acquisition price relative to their earnings.
54 The other financial ratios examined in the study, were the valuation ratio and the size. Acquirers were found to
be larger and with higher valuation ratio on average than acquirees.
55The author characterises this view as 'myopic' (p.80) since the positive revaluation of earnings per share and PE
immediately after the merger are of a temporary nature.
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decision for an acquisition exclusively on the expectation for share price increases
resulting from the temporary upward revaluation of earnings per share and the PE
immediately after the merger. While empirical investigation suggests that acquirer's
take into account the possible benefits that may result from acquisitions of
companies with relatively lower PE, acquisition decisions are costly ones, and even a
management with short term motives would consider several other factors before the
acquisition decision. On the other hand, sophisticated investors and analysts would
not give credit to a management that proceeds to sequential acquisitions merely
because the selected targets have a lower PE ratio. Steiner says that this may be a
reason for the end of a merger wave, however, it sounds plausible that such
managerial short-termism would have been discredited by market observers much
faster.
2.3. Conclusions.
The main theories on motives were outlined in this Chapter. These can be
summarised into two broad categories: first, to those assuming that acquiring firm's
management acts in line with shareholders' interests and it proceeds with an
acquisition because it expects to increase the firm's value through the realisation of
synergies and the exploitation of cost economies, or alternatively because it holds
positive private information for the target. In all these cases, the target firm has a
unique value for a bidder's management who expect to take advantage of a 'value
gap' between their and other parties' perceptions of the target's value. Second, to
those which assume that, in light of the separation of ownership from control in the
modern enterprise, acquiring management may follow its own objectives. These
theories view acquisition activity as a resolution or a manifestation of agency
problems. Growth-seeking managements may be motivated by the desire to achieve
their personal goals rather than by shareholders' interest for profit maximisation.
The desire of an acquirer to increase market power and to exploit benefits that
result from the increase in concentration in the industry which it operates was also
discussed. Finally, the implications of the 'hubris' Hypothesis as an explanation of
acquiring firm's purchasing behaviour was presented, and the Gort's economic
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disturbance theory as an explanation of the variation of the number of takeovers
through time was outlined.
It must be noted that with the exception of Gort's economic disturbance
theory, all other theories discussed in this Chapter infer the motives for M&As from
their consequences. The effects ofM&As on firm's performance are discussed in the
first part of the next Chapter.
50
THE EFFECTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS N.GL1MIDIS
CHAPTER 3.
THE EFFECTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS AND
RESEARCH QUESTIONS.
3.1. Introduction.
In the previous Chapter the motives driving merger and acquisition activity
were discussed. Several theories that attempt to answer the question 'what causes
mergers and acquisitions?' were described. In general terms, most of them regard the
consequences ofM&A activity as the driving factor behind the acquisition decision1.
In this Chapter the analysis is focused on the economic effects of M&As. In
fact, there are many sets of stakeholders that may be affected by changes in firm
combinations implemented through M&As. Firms' shareholders, employees,
consumers, competitors, suppliers and creditors are all groups of stakeholders that
have economic interests in the deal, as well as local communities and the government.
The outcome ofM&A activity therefore, is of relevance to a wide range of interests;
private and social ones. Social interests that may be influenced by M&A activity can
be seen as those relevant to social welfare, such as the degree of concentration and
monopoly power in industries, the growth of national productivity and
competitiveness, the development and transfer of technology and the implications for
taxpayers. While undoubtedly all of these issues are of great importance in the
context of the economic life of a society, the focus in this study is on the
consequences of M&As for the two sets of individuals which are directly affected;
the owner-shareholders and the employees .
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: In Section 2 the empirical
evidence on merger performance that is derived from share price studies is discussed
1 Gort's (1969) Economic Disturbance Theory and Roll's (1986) Hubris Hypothesis obviously do not regard
merger consequences as a motivating factor behind mergers and acquisitions.
2 It is often difficult when considering the effects of mergers on private interests to precisely distinguish between
private interests and social interests. For example any possible wealth transfer from employees to shareholders
due to mergers may be considered as an influence on the private interests of the two specific sets of individual
stakeholders. However, the possibility of the elimination of jobs due to downsizing or the creation of new ones
due to innovation and an increase in competitiveness have definitely ancillary consequences affecting local
communities and society in general.
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in six sub-sections. In the first, we discuss the evidence from short-term event studies
for the U.S. and in the second the corresponding evidence for the U.K. In the third
sub-section we discuss the evidence which results from share price studies that
examine the combined returns of the acquiree and acquirer. In the fourth the
empirical evidence from long-term event studies for the U.S. is illustrated while the
corresponding evidence for the U.K. is discussed in the fifth. Finally, in the sixth
sub-section an evaluation of the overall evidence from share price studies is made. In
Section 3 of this Chapter we outline the empirical evidence on merger performance
that is derived from accounting studies for the U.S. and the U.K. Finally, in Section 4
we address and discuss the research questions of this work.
3.2. The Evidence on Merger Performance Derived from Ex-ante Studies.
The available empirical evidence on the effects of mergers on corporate
performance comes mainly from two basic types of large sample studies; event
studies and performance studies . Event studies focus the analysis on a day-window
around the date of the takeover announcement and examine the presence of any
possible abnormal returns on firm's equity in the light of the new information
released and the perceived prospects of the merger. Daily abnormal returns are
calculated by adjusting daily raw returns for what investors required that day. In
simple words, daily raw return is the change in share price that day plus any dividend
paid, divided by the closing price of the previous day. Then, daily abnormal returns
result from the subtraction of a benchmark that represents the rate of return that is
expected to have occurred if the announcement had not been made. The benchmark
returns are usually determined from the market model. These studies provide
evidence of expected post-merger corporate performance, assuming that stock
markets are efficient and that share prices are determined as the present value of the
expected future cash flows to shareholders; therefore, they are considered as
'forward looking' or 'ex-ante' studies.
3
Large sample empirical studies also include survey-based studies that investigate the effects of M&As by
exploring the views of managers who were involved in takeovers. The focus of this study, however, is on
evidence that is derived from accounting and share price quantitative data.
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Performance studies are more straightforward studies in the sense that they
base their analysis on the actual post-merger financial data of acquiring firms as they
are reported in accounting statements for a period after the merger. These studies
usually examine rates of profitability, cash flows, returns on assets and equity, the
earnings per share and other financial indicators of the firm before and after merger.
The performance benchmark consists of estimates of the firm's performance if the
acquisition had not occurred. These estimates often take the form of the performance
of a portfolio of firms belonging to the same industry that have not engaged in
merger activity in the period of examination. In some methodologies this
performance benchmark consists of firms of similar size and industry as that of the
merging firms. Researchers then examine whether merging firms outperform the
benchmark.
Firstly, we will consider short term event studies which are characterised by
returns being calculated on a daily basis where the estimation period is typically up
to 120 days before the announcement and the event window is up to 120 days after
the announcement. Secondly, I will consider long term event studies.
3.2.1. The Empirical Evidence from Short-Term Event Studies.
The overall empirical evidence from short-term event studies is consistent
and provides support for the view that corporate acquisitions increase corporate value.
Shareholders of the target firm capture the lion's share while acquiring firm's
shareholders either capture small benefits or even experience small losses. The gains
to bidders on average have declined over time while the opposite trend applies to
target firms.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) averaged the results of about twenty empirical
studies and found an increase of target firm abnormal returns of 20% for mergers and
30% for tender offers after the announcement. The empirical evidence for bidding
firms was less clear. In some studies results were positive while in others, negative.
Roll (1988) reports that different papers have found different results for bidders
because methods, time periods, and samples of firms vary across studies, making it
difficult to draw conclusive inferences. However, whether bidding firm price
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movements are positive or negative on average, they are generally small in
percentage terms - much smaller than target firm returns - and are less statistically
significant.
Asquith (1983a) analysed the abnormal stock price performance of 196
NYSE firms that engaged in merger bids. The author reports that while bidders of
both successful and unsuccessful bids realised significantly positive abnormal returns
during the pre-announcement period, they exhibited insignificant excess returns,
either positive or negative, in the period of the merger outcome. On the day of the
merger announcement, both successful and unsuccessful bidders had positive but
insignificant excess returns. During the interim period (from the announcement day
to the outcome day) bids which were successful exhibited insignificantly negative
abnormal returns, while for mergers that did not come to be consummated, high
significantly negative abnormal returns were realised. An interesting finding of this
study is that in the post outcome period both successful and unsuccessful bidding
firms had negative abnormal returns of high statistical significance.
The results for target firms, both successful and unsuccessful exhibit positive
and significant excess returns on the press date and the date before. In the interim
period from the announcement date to the day of outcome, there are significantly
positive excess returns for successful targets4 while for unsuccessful ones, the case is
exactly the opposite (the excess returns are +8% in the former case and -8.1% in the
latter).
Asquith suggests that the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
target firms have unique resources which provide synergy when combined across
firms. There are stockholder gains associated with a merger bid and these gains
increase as the probability of the merger increases and decrease as the probability of
the merger decreases. Most of these gains go to stockholders of the target firms with
the stockholder of the successful bidding firms earning little if any return. According
to the author, a possible source of the merger gains is the inefficient management of
the target firm. If a firm's resources are underutilized, this information is reflected in
its stock's price. If the firm is acquired and more efficiently managed, positive
abnormal returns are generated. This is consistent with the fact that prior to the bid
4 The term 'successful target' is means that the takeover is finally realised.
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announcement, both successful and unsuccessful target firms display positive
average cumulative excess returns, since the stock market expects a better utilization
of target's resources in the future.
Similar results for acquiring and acquired firms' share prices are reported by
Dennis and McConnel (1986). The authors examined various classes of securities of
both acquired and acquiring companies around the announcement dates in a sample
of 132 mergers which took place over the period from 1962 through 1980. It was
found that, on average, acquired companies' common stockholders, convertible and
non-convertible preferred stockholders and convertible bondholders receive
statistically significant gains in mergers. The acquired firms' non- convertible
bondholders gain statistically insignificant positive or negative returns.
For acquiring companies' common stocks, the results are sensitive to the time
period used to measure returns, while acquiring companies' convertible bondholders,
non-convertible preferred stockholders, and non-convertible bondholders neither
gain nor lose by a statistically significant amount following merger announcements.
In addition, on average, there is no evidence that acquiring companies' stockholders
lose.
The authors suggested that the results indicated that mergers, on average, are
value-creating activities for combined firms and for both the acquired and acquiring
companies individually. Dennis and McConnel argue that the finding that on average
acquiring firms' stockholders receive negligible gains if any following merger
announcements seems contradictory with the fact that acquiring firms' stockholders
approve merger decisions and that managers pursue them. However, as the findings
indicate, on average convertible preferred stockholders receive positive and
statistically significant gains in mergers. Thus, some classes of security holders other
than common stockholders reap a gain and that is sufficient motivation to pursue the
merger.
Positive returns for bidders are also reported by Asquith et.al. (1983b) for a
sample of 170 mergers which took place in the period from 1963 to 1979. The
authors report statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of 3.48% for
successful mergers and a non significant cumulative abnormal return of 0.70% for
unsuccessful ones on the day before and the day of merger announcement. Similar
55
THE EFFECTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS N.GLIMIDIS
results for bidders are provided by Malatesta (1983), and Wier (1983). The first
reports abnormal returns of + 0.90% but they are not statistically significant on the
day of the event announcement for a sample of 256 successful bidders, while the
latter reports 3.99% not statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns on the
previous day and the day of the event announcement for a small sample of 16
unsuccessful mergers.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) provide evidence from 461 tender offers that took
place in the 60', 70's and 80's. The wealth effects on acquiring firms' shareholders
were positive, 0.90% on average, and statistically significant. In the 80's, however,
abnormal returns to acquiring firms were negative but indistinguishable from zero.
The explanation provided by the authors for the relatively small wealth effect on
acquiring firm stock prices is that the full wealth effects may not be observed at the
time of the bid because they are disguised in other information or are a relatively
small component of acquirer's wealth. Moreover, competition among alternative
bidders ensures that any excess returns are realised by targets. The small negative
wealth effect for acquirers that are observed in acquisitions which took place in the
80's, are attributed by the authors to the fact that advancements and innovations in
financial markets and in defensive tactics on behalf of targets made competition
among bidders more fierce.
Consistent evidence with that published in the 80's is available in more recent
research. Loderer and Martin (1990) examined a sample of 5172 bidders that
participated in mergers and tender offers between 1966 and 1984. The event period
was from 5 days before the deal announcement in the Wall Street Journal until the
day of the completion. The results indicate that corporate acquisitions benefit the
bidding firm's shareholders in the majority of the cases and the returns are higher on
average in large acquisitions and when the bidder is not a frequent acquirer. However,
it is noticeable that wealth effects for bidders' shareholders are declining over time5.
Smith and Kim (1994) found positive but not significant abnormal returns for
bidders that participated in 177 tender offers6 and, unsurprisingly, a statistically
significant positive wealth effect of 30.19% for targets. Similarly, Schwert (1996)
5 Segmenting the sample into three time intervals, the authors observe a statistically significant positive wealth
effect of 1.72% and 0.57% for the periods from 1966 to 1968 and from 1968 to 1980 respectively, but an
insignificant negative effect of -0.07% for the period from 1981 to 1984.
6 The sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful tender offers.
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indicated that in 666 mergers and tender offers, targets enjoyed a statistically
significant positive wealth effect of 26.3% and bidders an insignificant 1.4%.
Maquieira et al. (1998) examined wealth changes for 1283 publicly traded debt and
equity securities of firms involved in 260 stock for stock mergers. Apart from
bidding firm shareholders in conglomerate mergers who experience a statistically
insignificant loss, all other major classes of debt and equity securityholders of both
bidders and targets either breakeven or experience significant wealth gains7.
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) studied the wealth effect of takeovers in the
Canadian market for corporate control for a sample of 1261 bidders and 332 targets
which were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and which participated in takeover
transactions that took place from 1964 until 1983. Both successful acquirers and
targets enjoyed statistically significant abnormal gains of 1.71% and 7.45%
# o
respectively . However, when the study was extended to examine 390 U.S bidders
that acquired Canadian targets, the evidence indicated that bidding firms
shareholders experienced negligible losses. Kohers and Kohers (2000) report 1.37%
statistically significant abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders at the day and the
day after of the announcement of 961 acquisitions that took place between 1987 and
1996 for firms belonged to high-tech industries where the transaction method was
cash. They also examined 673 acquisitions in the same industries and for the same
period that financed their transactions by stock and the acquiring firms' shareholders
were found to experience a significant abnormal wealth gain of 1.09%. A study by
Leeth and Borg (2000) provides evidence for 466 bidders and 72 targets in the period
of the second merger wave, i.e., between 1919 and 1930. The average abnormal
returns were 3.12% for bidders and 13.27% for targets, both statistically significant.
The empirical evidence considered so far indicates that acquirees'
shareholders enjoy significant wealth enhancement at the days around the event
announcement while the gains to acquirers' shareholders are positive but
indistinguishable from zero. However, there are several studies providing evidence
7
Specifically, targets were found to enjoy substantial gains in both non-conglomerate and conglomerate mergers
as do bidding firm stockholders in non-conglomerate mergers. Bidding firm shareholders in conglomerate
mergers experienced insignificant losses, while all other securityholders enjoyed significant wealth increases.
8 The estimation period for abnormal returns is 5 years, or 60 monthly return observations preceding the
announcement date. However, results are similar when the authors examine the wealth effects to shareholders in
the two days following the takeover announcement
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of substantial losses for acquirers' shareholders around the date of the event
announcement.
Dodd (1980) reports that bidders experience statistically significant losses
around the announcement of a takeover proposal regardless of the outcome of the
deal. Proposal announcements for acquisitions which turned out to be successful
resulted in negative abnormal returns of -1.09% for bidders at the previous day and
the day of the merger proposal. The average cumulative abnormal returns from first
public announcement through to the date of stockholders approval of the merger
proposals was -7.22%. For cancelled mergers the respective figures were -1.23% and
-5.50% both statistically significant. Target shareholders enjoyed high statistically
significant abnormal returns in both successful and cancelled mergers.
Varaiya and Ferris (1987) illustrate statistically significant losses for a sample
of 96 successful acquirers which participated in takeover activity in the period from
1974 to 1983. The average losses ranged from -2.15% when excess returns were
measured during the previous day of the announcement to -3.9% when the
calculation period starts from 20 days before to 100 days after the acquisition
announcement. The authors suggest that overpayment is the cause of losses for the
acquirers. Indeed, for 58% of the sample where the bid premium overstated the
expected takeover gain the losses are as high as -14%, while for the rest of the
sample where the bid premium did not overstate the expected gains positive returns
were observed.
Negative abnormal returns for bidders around the merger announcement day
are also found by Servaes (1991) and Franks et.al. (1991). Using a sample of 384
successful bidders that participated in tender offers between 1972 and 1987, the
former reports significant losses of 1.07% measured from the date of the
announcement to the day the target delisted or the takeover became unconditional,
while the latter found insignificant bidder losses of -1.02% for bidders participating
in a sample of 399 mergers and tender offers between 1975 and 1984 using an event
window of 5 days. Similarly, Byrd and Hickman (1992) found negative and
significant abnormal returns for the stock of 111 firms which participated in 128
tender offer bids from 1980 to 1987, during the day of the bid announcement.
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A loss of bidders' stock value around the day of the announcement of a bid is
also documented in more recent studies. Walker (2000) provides evidence for
significant losses of -0.84% for 278 acquirers in the period from 1980 to 1996,
measured for a 2-day window around the event announcement. Delong (2001)
examined 280 acquirers9 between 1988 and 1995. Measuring cumulative abnormal
returns from 10 days before to the next day of the merger announcement, the author
reports statistically significant losses of -1.68%. In a study of 64 bank mergers that
took place from 1985 to 1996, Houston et.al. (2001) found that acquirers experienced
significantly negative abnormal returns of -3.47%, measured from 4 days before until
the next day of the deal announcement10.
3.2.2. The U.K. Evidence from Short-term Event Studies.
The evidence from short-term event studies for the U.K. is similar to that in
the U.S. The impact of acquisitions on shareholder value in the short term is positive
for acquirees' shareholders and zero or small and negative for acquirers'
shareholders.
Firth (1980), reports statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns for
targets of 28%, and -6% and statistically significant cumulative losses for bidders in
an event window of one month around the announcement of the proposal of the deal.
The study refers to 486 acquisitions in the period from 1969 to 1975, and the
benchmark for measuring abnormal returns was the market model. Similarly,
Sundarsanam et.al. (1996) found 29% statistically significant abnormal returns for
targets and statistically significant losses of -4% for bidders, using the market model
as a benchmark for estimating abnormal returns that were calculated from 20 days
before until 40 days after the event announcement - the sample consisted of 429
acquisitions.
Acquirer shareholders appear to experience zero returns in several studies of
U.K. acquisitions. Franks and Harris (1989) found that bidders break even while
targets enjoy significant returns of 22%. For a sample that consisted of 1445
9 The sample consists of deals in which at least one party is a bank.
l0Both Houston et.al. (2001) and Delong (2001) report high and statistically significant abnormal returns for
targets; 20.80% by the former and 16.61% by the latter.
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acquisitions in the period from 1955 to 1985 and an event window of one month, the
authors used the market model to estimate abnormal returns and the results did not
change substantially when the CAPM was employed. Limmack (1991) also used the
market model to examine the share price performance of 462 U.K. acquisitions that
occurred between 1977 and 1986. Using an event window of about three months"
around the event announcement the author reports statistically significant abnormal
returns for targets of 31.38% and slightly negative but indistinguishable from zero
abnormal returns for bidders.
Higgson and Elliot (1998) report evidence that is consistent to that presented
above. The cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 830 bidders and targets that
engaged in takeover activity between 1975 and 1990 were statistically significant at
37.5% for targets and almost zero for bidders. Abnormal returns for the 100 largest
takeovers — i.e. for takeovers where the target's market capitalisation was at least
25% of that of the bidder's value one month before the bid - were about 31% for
12
targets and zero for bidders. Returns were calculated for about a three month
window during the bid period. The benchmark model that was used for the
measurement of abnormal returns was adjusted for size effects13.
Cumulative abnormal returns for acquiring firms' shareholders were found to
be zero by Baker and Limmack (2002) in a period of one month around the event
announcement. The sample consisted of 595 acquiring firms in the period from 1977
to 1990 and the results were similar across a variety of eight different benchmark
models. Sundarsanam and Mahate (2003) reported that the 519 bidders in their
sample experience average losses ranging from -1% to -2%, depending on whether
the benchmark is the market model or it is adjusted for size or book to market value
effects. However these losses were statistically insignificant. Goergen and
Renneboog (2004) examined the share price performance of 70 bidders and 66
targets that engaged in takeover activity between 1993 and 2000. The event window
" The event window was started at the beginning of bid month and ended at the end of outcome month.
12 The bidder's and target's abnormal returns were calculated from the beginning of the month in which the
announcement takes place until the end of the completion month; 90% of the takeovers in this study were
completed within a three month period after the announcement month.
13 Returns for each acquirer are computed using monthly data from the London Share Price Database. Returns are
aggregated as the holding period abnormal return, which is the difference between the return to buy and holding
the stock over the observation period and the return on the benchmark over the same period. The benchmark
return is the return on an equal-pound portfolio of all firms in the acquirer's size decile in each period. Portfolios
are rebalanced monthly.
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was sixty days before and sixty days after the announcement of the acquisition
proposal and the benchmark model for the measurement of the abnormal returns was
the CAPM. The results indicated a statistically significant cumulative abnormal
return of 29% for the shareholders of targets and an insignificant cumulative
abnormal return of around -2% for acquiring firms' shareholders.
3.2.3. The Combined Empirical Evidence from Event Studies.
The above discussion may be seen as supportive of the general notion which
prevails in a large part of the literature dealing with merger performance on an ex-
ante basis: that takeovers do create value on average. The argument suggests that
since the value enhancement for target shareholders is high and it is statistically
significant, along with the general finding that acquirers either experience minor
losses or they break even or in some cases they even realise gains, then on average
the aggregate outcome of the takeovers is beneficial for shareholders. In efficient
markets, where the free diffusion of information is quickly absorbed and assessed,
the value creation potential of a takeover is reflected in share prices of the two parties
on the days around the event announcement. However, the fact that acquirers are
typically larger than acquirees raises doubts as to whether the actual money value for
targets and bidder taken together is positive. The sum of the large percentage gain for
target and the variable wealth change of acquirers do not necessarily yield a
significant positive value.
Despite the crucial importance of this argument, research on the topic of the
combined returns to shareholders of acquiring and target firms is not as rich as that
which considers the wealth effects of takeovers for the two participating firms
separately. Although a number of research papers provide evidence of positive
combined returns on average, there is no unanimity on the research results. Moreover,
where a positive combined return is the outcome of the examination, the evidence is
often too weak to argue that the increase in wealth for both parties' shareholders is a
definitely established fact.
In a study of 236 tender offers that took place from 1963 to 1984 Bradley
et.al. (1988) report that the weighted average abnormal return to target and bidder
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firms is a statistically significant 7.43% in the period of ten days surrounding the
event announcement. However, 25% of the combined valuations were negative while
53% of the bidders realised negative returns. Similarly, in a study by Berkovitch and
Narayanan (1993), while aggregate combined returns for targets and bidders were
positive, in 23.6% of the sample cases the combined returns were negative with a
mean loss of $ 146.5m; moreover, more than 50% of the sample bidders experienced
losses. Servaes (1991) found that the combined returns for acquirers and acquirees
in 384 mergers and tender offers that took place between 1972 and 1987 were
significantly positive, but for 280 of the cases where only one bidder was involved in
the acquisition the returns were indistinguishable from zero. In addition, for 142
equity transactions abnormal returns were negative but insignificant. In a study by
Houston et.al. (2001), the findings indicated significantly positive combined
abnormal returns for 58% of the sample (bank mergers implemented from 1991 to
1996) while for the rest of the cases returns were indistinguishable from zero (bank
mergers implemented from 1985 to 1990).
Nonetheless, Franks et.al. (1991) report significant and positive combined
returns as do Kaplan and Weishbach (1992), Smith and Kim (1994), Mulherin and
Boone (2000), and Bhaggat et.al. (2005).
In an earlier study, Firth (1980) studied 434 U.K. acquisitions that were
implemented from 1969 to 1975. The author measured the change in market
capitalization of the bidder firm and target firm from one month before the first offer
to the month of the acceptance of the successful offer14. The results indicated that
350 out of the 434 acquirers experienced losses while only 3 out of the 434 acquirees
realised negative gains. More importantly, in more than 50% of the cases the
combined outcome of the acquirers and the acquirees was negative15, and the total
change in market capitalization of all the firms in the sample was negative16.
In summary, despite an extensive literature on the subject of merger
profitability that is implemented by means of short-term event studies, the issue of
whether acquisitions create value for the participating firms' shareholders is still
14 The period includes revised and counter offers. In cases where the acquirer held a pre-acquisition share stake in
the target firm the gain to the shares of the target firm already held by the acquirer firm were deducted from the
target firm gain to avoid double counting.
15 In 224 out of the 434 transactions the combined market capitalisation of the two firms engaging in acquisition
activity was reduced.
16
Acquirers realised equity decreases of £1,140.2m and acquirees experienced gains of £ 1.103.6m.
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unclear. In fact, there is strong evidence that the targets outperform the market as
soon as the intention of a takeover bid is revealed by an acquirer but it is far from
definitely established that the two firms together enjoy substantial gains due to
acquisition. At least, the size differential between targets and bidders in most of the
cases does not allow us to draw conclusive inferences about the actual money value
for shareholders in a deal where the target experiences significant gains and the
bidder faces insignificant losses.
Clearly, there is evidence for positive returns in a number of studies.
However, even if we admit the prevalence of the strongest form of the market
efficiency hypothesis, the market reaction to information that is elicited during an
acquisition bid may reveal the market perception of synergies that are expected to be
realised but this is by no means a warranty that during the integration process in the
long-run, the synergy realisation will be successful17. The existence of the potential
for synergistic gains is not the same thing as the realisation of them.
Market reaction at and around the event announcement days is justified by
the information investors have in hand at this point in time. In the short-run more
information becomes available about the terms of the transaction and any initially
obscure points of the deal. In addition, inside information possessed by bidder's
management about the worth of the target and the potential for its assets to be more
productively deployed will be widely diffused. Thus, one expects positive valuations
regarding a good deal to be upgraded well after the announcement. In the mid- and
long-term, the capability of the two organisations to be successfully integrated will
also be re-evaluated by the markets.
3.2.4. The Empirical Evidence from Long-Term Event Studies.
Due to the inconclusive evidence from the short-term event studies and the
ambiguity of the results that are based on research of share prices behaviour for a
small number of days surrounding the acquisition announcement, research has
focused on the examination of merging firms' equity behaviour over longer periods
17 In Chapter 2 of this study there was extensive reference to circumstances where expected synergistic gains may
fail to be realised.
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after the announcement or the completion of the transaction, so as to better evaluate
merger performance by capturing the capital market's perception about the deal
when more information is available. In addition, the full effects of an acquisition may
take several years to occur and during this period expectations by investors will
change. This type of research - long-term event studies - extends the period of the
examination to one to six years after the announcement of the deal or - some others -
after the completion of it and the returns are typically calculated on a monthly basis.
The evidence from the vast majority of long-term event studies is consistent
and negative as far as the share price performance of the acquirers is concerned.
Langetieg (1978) examined the share price performance of 149 successful acquirers
which engaged in merger activity from 1929 to 1969, for 72 months after the
1 8
completion of the merger . The author reports significantly negative abnormal
returns of -6.59% for the consolidated firm in the first year, statistically significant
abnormal losses of -5.64% for the second year, while from the 25th month to the 70th
month after the merger completion the consolidated firm experiences significant
losses of-13.9%19.
Similarly, Asquith (1983) reports significant losses of -7.20% for 196
successful acquirers that participated in merger activity between 1962 and 1976. The
period of study extended from the date of merger approval until 240 days
20 • • • • •afterwards . The author also examined the price behaviour of acquirers in the period
between 480 and 20 days before the event announcement in the press. The findings
indicate positive and highly significant abnormal returns of +14.3% in that period.
According to the author, these results show that not all of the entire market reaction
to a merger bid occurs at the time of announcement.
Conflicting evidence to that provided by Asquith regarding the pre-merger
returns of acquirers is reported by Malatesta (1983). In the period of 61 months
ending with the event announcement acquiring firm stockholders suffered
18 90% of the mergers in the sample took place after 1950 and over 60% of them took place after 1960.
19 The results are based on Jensen's (1969) performance index based on the Sharp (1964) and Lintner (1965)
version on the Capital Asset Pricing Model which requires the existence of a riskless asset, adjusted for industry
returns. To test whether the measured excess returns are due to the merger or, alternatively some external
influence other than the market and industry influence, the author incorporates in the model a non-merging well-
matched control firm as a third factor. Results remain negative with all measurement methods.
20 In the same study, the share price behaviour of 89 unsuccessful acquirers was also examined for the period
starting at the date the result of the proposal became available to the press and for 240 days afterwards.
Unsuccessful acquirers experienced significantly negative abnormal returns of -9.60%
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statistically significant wealth losses. Regarding the post merger performance of the
121 acquiring firms in the sample that engaged in mergers from 1969 to 1974, the
monthly cumulative abnormal returns were negative and statistically significant at -
91
2.90% in the year following the merger approval . The 59 acquisitions that took
place after 1970 caused significant losses for the acquirers of -13.7% in the year
99
following the merger . The author asserts that market inefficiency is an unlikely
explanation for negative abnormal post-merger returns to acquiring firms since in
that period information concerning mergers was already widely disseminated.
Franks et.al. (1991) suggest that the estimated long-term performance of
acquirers depends on the benchmark that is used for the abnormal returns estimation.
The authors examined 399 successful acquirers, in respective acquisitions that took
place from 1975 to 1984, for three years after the acquisition completion date and
they report findings that range from significantly positive to significantly negative,
depending on the benchmark that is used for the measurement of the abnormal
returns.
9*5
Agrawal et.al. (1992) examined the performance of 765 mergers that were
implemented between 1955 and 1987, for 5 years after the completion of the deal.
The results indicated negative statistically significant abnormal returns for the united
entities of -10.26%24. The authors assert that the results reported by Franks et.al.
(op.cit.), of positive post-outcome bidders returns were a function of the time period
selected for study. In contrast, Loderer and Martin (1992), after examining the post-
acquisition performance of 1298 acquirers which engaged in mergers and tender
offers from 1966 to 1986, concluded that M&As are not a wasteful activity in the
• i • 25
sense that acquirers do not underperform a control portfolio during the five years
following the acquisition. In fact, the authors discover an insignificant average of
1.5% abnormal return for acquiring firms. The statistically insignificant finding is
21
Only the sub-sample of the 62 acquirers with a total equity value greater than $300m as of 12 months before
the approval announcement exhibited significant positive abnormal returns in the year following the merger
approval. The 59 acquirers with total equity value of less that $300m, as of 12 months before the approval
announcement, experienced significant losses of -7.7% in the year following the merger approval.
22 The author tested the share price behaviour of acquirers after 1970, since Schipper and Thompson (1983)
provide evidence that regulatory changes occurred during the period 1967 - 1970 were associated with negative
abnormal returns to firms which had previously announced acquisition programmes.
23 The authors measure abnormal returns by first calculating abnormal performance of individual stocks by using
the Dimson and Marsh (1986) procedure, then averaging the abnormal performance across all firms in an event
month, and finally adding the monthly performance over 60 months.
24 In the same study, tender offers exhibited returns that were not statistically different from zero.
25 Both Agrawal et.al. (1992) and Loderer and Martin (1992) adjust for firm size and beta risk.
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interpreted by the authors as being satisfactory for investors who earn the required
rate of return. However, for the first three years after the acquisition the authors
report some negative performance for acquirers, especially during the 1960's and
1970's.
The evidence from some newer studies indicates that acquirers that
participate in successful tender offers outperform the set benchmarks over a long
period after the deal, while the outcome for firms that participate in mergers is
negative. Loughram & Vijh (1997) report that in an overall sample of 947 deals that
took place from 1970 to 1989, acquirers that make merger bids earn on average
15.9% less than matching firms whereas acquirers that make tender offers earn
43% more than matching firms during a five year period after acquisition. The
authors also report that the method of financing the acquisition affects the results. In
detail, the 5-year post acquisition abnormal returns for merger offers that were
financed by stock is a significant -25% and the 5-year post acquisition abnormal
returns for tender offers that were financed by cash is a highly significant +61.3%.
According to the authors, the large abnormal returns in the post-acquisition period
are an indication of market inefficiency. Markets systematically overestimate or
underestimate efficiency gains (or losses due to inefficiencies) from acquisitions.
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) assert that, in contrast to short term event studies
the long term event studies are sensitive to the model that is used for the computation
of normal returns, and thus, conflicting evidence such as that provided by Agrawal
et.al. (op.cit.) and Loderer and Martin (op.cit.) may be due to this sensitivity. Based
on Kama and French (1992) evidence that beta does not capture much of the cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns, the authors examined abnormal returns
of acquirers that participated in 3169 mergers and 348 tender offers using a
benchmark of control firms that are adjusted not only for size and beta risk but also
for market to book ratio. Fama and French (1993, pp.54) conjecture that acquiring
firms might tend to be large, successful firms with low book-to-market ratios and
therefore a methodology controlling for the below-average returns of low book-to-
market firms would reveal no persistent negative abnormal returns. The results are
consistent with those provided by Loughram & Vijh (op. cit), suggesting that on
26 Abnormal returns are measured by calculating the difference between 5-year holding period returns of sample
stocks and matching stocks (chosen to control for size and book to market effects).
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average acquirers in mergers underperform control portfolios by a statistically
significant 4% over a period of three years after the merger completion date, while
acquirers in tender offers earn a statistically significant 9% on average. A possible
explanation for this difference in performance between mergers and tender offers is
that since tender offers are more often hostile acquisition proposals - as compared
with mergers - leading to the replacement of the incumbent management teams of the
targets, the realised gains could be expected to result from managerial efficiencies
after the appointment of a new management team.
Moreover, the authors argue that glamour acquirers which are firms of
superior past performance both in terms of stock returns and cash flows are more
likely to be managed by management teams that are infected by hubris. Such firms
tend to have low book to market ratios (Lakonishok et.al, 1994). Management and
decision makers, taking positive feedback from the markets strengthen their own
beliefs about the correctness of their decisions. In addition, markets over extrapolate
past performance of the bidder when they assess the value of an acquisition and large
shareholders may give the management the benefit of the doubt and approve its
acquisition plans. On the other hand, in firms whose management has a poor track
record - such as firms with high book-to-market ratios - managers, directors and
large shareholders will be more prudent before approving a major transaction may
determine the survival of the firm. Such acquisitions are not motivated by hubris and
therefore it is more likely to create shareholder value rather than to destroy it. Indeed,
the results of their study verify the authors' hypothesis. The authors report that value
bidders far outperform glamour bidders in the three years after the completion of the
merger or the tender offer. Value bidders earn statistically significant positive
abnormal returns of 8% in mergers and 16% in tender offers, while glamour
acquirers earn statistically significant negative abnormal returns of -17% in mergers
and insignificant abnormal returns of 4% in tender offers.
3.2.5. The U.K. Evidence from Long Term Event Studies.
The U.K. evidence for long-term returns of acquirers is similar to that of the
U.S. In general terms, the U.K. acquirers achieve value losses rather that value gains
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with their acquisition strategy. The only study that reports break even for acquirers is
that by Firth (1980). The sample consisted of 434 acquirers in the period from 1969
to 1975 and the event window was 36 months after the merger completion. Normal
returns were measured using the market model. Using the market model as a
benchmark for estimating abnormal returns, Franks and Harris (1989) report that the
post-acquisition performance of 1048 successful bidders in the period from 1955 to
1985 was significantly negative in the 24 months following the date that the merger
went unconditional. Specifically, in the first year bidders experience statistically
significant losses of -4.8%, and during the two years the cumulative monthly
abnormal returns are-12.6%. However, results prove sensitive to the benchmark
used to measure normal returns. When the CAPM is used, monthly cumulative
abnormal returns for the two years post-acquisition period are significant and
positive at +4.5 %.
Limmack (1991) investigated the wealth effect of 448 mergers that took place
from 1977 to 1986 on acquirers' share price in the 24 months following the
announcement of the proposal outcome. His results are similar to those provided by
Franks and Harris (op.cit.). For completed and abandoned bids there was a
downward drift in returns over the whole period. Monthly cumulative abnormal
losses for acquirers range from an insignificant -1.47% for successful bids and a
significant - 10.10% for abandoned ones in the first year after the date the outcome
of the offer was announced, to a significant -4.47% for successful bids in the two
years following the announcement of the offer outcome and a significant -20.33% for
• .07
unsuccessful bids in the same period" .
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) studied the post-acquisition share price
performance of 247 acquirers in the 23 months following the merger completion date.
The overall size adjusted returns were negative, with bidders experiencing significant
27
Reported abnormal returns were measured by using the Market Model as a control model for estimating normal
returns. The author also used the Index Model that assumes an alpha of zero and beta of one. The analysis was
also repeated using the London Business School Risk Measurement Service Betas (RMS). RMS Betas are
estimated on the basis of regressing trade-to-trade security returns on the market returns observed over identical
periods of time. All three models revealed the same pattern of negative returns for acquirers over the two year
period following the outcome of the offer announcement date. In the same study, the investigation was also
extended to the period before the event announcement and to the period between the event announcement and the
date of the proposal outcome for bidders and targets. Despite the significant wealth gains experienced by targets'
shareholders in the pre-bid period, the author concludes that the gains made by target company shareholders are
at the expense of shareholders of bidder companies, and that there is no evidence of net wealth increase resulting
from takeover activity in the period under examination.
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losses of -4.92% during the second year and indistinguishable from zero returns
• 90
during the first year after the merger completion . Gregory (1997) criticises previous
research work on post merger performance, by means of long term event studies, in
the U.K. for not taking into account the book to market value effects in calculating
normal returns. Gregory conducted a thorough analysis of the share price behaviour
of 452 acquirers that made acquisitions from 1984 to 1992 by using six alternative
benchmark models29 to estimate normal returns. Controlling for size and book to
market effects, the author discovered that the performance of acquiring firms is
significantly negative in the two years following the acquisition completion. All six
benchmarks that were used to measure normal returns provided the same negative
pattern of post-acquisition performance. Results ranged from -3.83% to -9.28 during
the first year after merger completion, depending of the benchmark used. During the
second year, returns ranged from -3.40% to - 7.38%. An interesting element of this
study was the examination of the cumulative monthly abnormal returns starting at the
date of the offer announcement until 24 months after merger completion. The results
capture the market's perception about the deal for a period that includes the
intermediate months from takeover announcement to takeover completion. Returns
are also significantly negative, ranging from -11.02% to -17.73% depending on the
model used to measure normal returns. The author concludes that 'the post-takeover
performance ofU.K. companies undertaking domestic acquisitions is unambiguously
negative, on average, in the long-run', (p.p.998). Commenting on Gregory's results,
Limmack (1997, p. 1006)) suggests that it would be 'premature' to conclude that
takeover activity in the U.K. is a wealth destructive action. Limmack wonders
whether the results are time specific, since the sample is restricted to takeovers that
happened in 1984-1992 period and, in addition, whether Gregory's benchmark
models which control essentially for size and book to market effects are
appropriately descriptive - the author suggests that 'whether there are other control
models or methods which are more appropriate is an open question...' (p. 1006)
28 The authors used the Dimson and Marsh (1986) size-decile control method.
29 The benchmark models used were the CAPM, the Dimson-Marsh risk and size adjusted model, the Simple size
control portfolio, the multi-index model using equally weighted smaller decile minus large decile returns, the
value-weighted multi-index using the Hoare-Govett Index as the measure of smaller company performance, and
the Fama and French (1996) Value-weighted three factor model.
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Contrasting evidence to that reported by Gregory is provided by Higson and
Elliot (1998). The authors, after examining the price behaviour of a sample of 722
U.K. acquirers in the period from 1975 to 1990, and after controlling for size
OA
effects , discovered that acquirers show zero abnormal returns in the three years
following completion. However, the authors report that acquisitions implemented
during the period from 1981 to 1984 exhibited highly positive abnormal returns in
the two years following completion, while for the rest of the period under
examination the two-year post-acquisition performance was negative. The difference
in performance between the three sub-samples of acquisitions is attributed to market
conditions prevailing in the late 1970's and the late 1980's and early 1990's.
Whereas the post-takeover period for takeovers completed in 1981 through 1984 was
the period of the mid-eighties boom, the post-acquisition period for the rest of the
• T1
sample coincided with periods of deep recession.
Negative post-acquisition performance for acquirers is also documented by
Baker and Limmack (2002). In a study that examines the performance of 595
acquirers in the period from 1977 until 1990, the findings indicate that the negative
performance pattern in the five years following acquisition completion is present
irrespective of the model that is used for measuring normal returns. Abnormal returns
in
range from a significant -26% to a significant -31%. An interesting finding of this
study is that frequent acquirers suffer no significant wealth losses regardless of the
benchmark model used and they consistently outperform single acquirers. This last
finding suggests that managements tend to learn from past acquisition experience.
In a study concerning 519 U.K. acquirers in the period from 1983 to 1995
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) add evidence to the widely documented evidence of
significant value destruction in U.K. acquisitions. Using a variety of alternative
benchmark models, the authors report an average loss (across the various benchmark
models) of -15% over a three-year post-acquisition period. Following the Rau and
Vermaelen methodology that it used for the US, they report consistent results for the
30 Abnormal returns are measured as the difference between the return to buying and holding the acquirer's stock
at completion and the return to a benchmark portfolio of stocks of the same size as the acquirer.
31 The finding of the time sensitivity of bidders' performance is consistent with Agrawal's et.al. (1992) assertion
that Franks' et.al. (1991) mixed results of positive and negative post-acquisition bidders' performance in the U.S.
were not due to different models employed but due to time specificity of the sample.
32 Another interesting finding was that cash financed acquirers do not experience significant wealth changes in
the five post-acquisition years, in contrast to acquirers that used a method of financing based on equity. Also,
large acquirers experienced less wealth losses in comparison to smaller ones.
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U.K. Specifically, the results based on Market to Book Value as a proxy for glamour
acquirers indicated that over a three year post-acquisition period value acquirers
outperform glamour acquirers. However, in the bid announcement period stock
market investors do not seem to extrapolate the pre-bid performance of acquirers,
which means that there is no difference in performance between value and glamour
acquirers33.
In a recent study, Gregory (2005) examined the long term share price
performance of 217 UK acquirers that made an acquisition from 1984 to 1992, over a
period of 60 months after the completion of the transaction. The results are
substantial and significantly negative. Over a 36 month period after the merger
acquirers seem to experience losses of -17.7% which increase to -19.9% after 60
months from merger completion34. A very interesting finding of the study is that
acquirers with high free cash flow outperform acquirers with low free cash flow
which implies that Jensen's Free Cash Flow hypothesis does not hold for U.K.
n c
firms . However, whilst the difference in returns between acquirers with high free
cash flow and acquirers with low free cash flow is substantial, it is only significant at
the 10% level.
3.2.6. Evaluating the Evidence of Event Studies.
Despite the numerous studies devoted to the examination of merger
profitability by means of event study methodology, the empirical evidence on this
issue is still equivocal. The question of whether M&A activity does properly serve
the private interests of shareholders cannot be answered with certainty. Nor does the
extensive examination of share price performance of firms engaging in such activity
support the view that mergers are adequately explained by a profits maximization
assumption. The only established fact is that target firm's shareholders earn high
abnormal returns during the bid period. While this could be explained by a market
33 The results indicate that acquirers experience significant losses in the region of -1.4% at the time of the bid
announcement.
34 Abnormal returns are measured using control portfolios adjusted for size and book to market ratios. Reference
portfolio returns are calculated using the 'buy and hold' method as described in Lyon et.al., 1999 p.169) with
returns being value weighted.
35 In contrast, Lang Stulz and Walking (1991) report evidence indicating that Jensen's Free Cash Flow hypothesis
holds for the U.S. However, in this study the authors used announcement period returns.
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expectation for more efficient usage of the acquiree's assets and resources, it also
seems consistent with the anticipation of a - usually generous - premium. Acquirers
usually earn insignificant positive or insignificant negative abnormal returns in the
period around the bid announcement. In some studies, however, acquirers appear to
experience statistically significant losses.
The highly positive announcement returns of target firms' shareholders along
with the acquiring shareholders' almost break even position some days after the
acquisition proposal would suggest that the overall result is positive or at least,
shareholders on aggregate, receive the required rate on return from their investment,
even if there would be a transfer of wealth from acquirer shareholders to acquirees'
shareholders during the announcement period. However, the fact that acquirers are
larger than acquirees in the vast majority of the transactions imposes doubts as to
whether the higher percentage returns of acquirees' shareholders can offset the
smaller percentage losses of acquirers in terms of actual profitability. Although
studies attempting to investigate the issue by examining the combined returns for
targets and bidders during the bid announcement period provide some confirming
evidence for positive combined returns, they are not conclusive; at least, the evidence
is not adequate to support the notion that merger profitability is definitely established.
On the other hand, studies that use long-term event study methodology
provide consistent evidence - with very few exceptions - that acquirers, on average,
experience significant losses in comparison to similar non-acquiring firms or the
market. The losses vary substantially, depending on the benchmark model that is
used to estimate normal returns against which abnormal performance is measured.
There is also some evidence that some types of acquirers - such as those that
engaged in tender offers, those that finance the acquisition by cash or the so-called
'value' acquirers - perform better than the others or even that they enjoy some gains
in the long run.
The general view about merger profitability that is derived from short term
event studies is more optimistic than that which is derived from long term ones. The
question that arises then is whether stock markets overreact to the possibility of
efficiency gains at the time of proposal announcement - which implies the existence
of market imperfections - and whether they revise their evaluation as they digest
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additional information at the time it becomes public36. Or do the markets correctly
evaluate the potential for synergy and efficiency gains at the time of merger
announcement which during the integration period fail to be realised?
In the first case the implication is that stock markets are not efficient and
takeovers are not, on average, in the interests of bidding firms' shareholders.
Managers act according to their private interests with destructive consequences for
shareholders wealth. Stock markets then react with a large time lag. As Limmack
(1997, p. 1006) says, such an argument is 'easiest to state but most difficult to
swallow'. In the second case, managerial motives are in line with shareholders' best
interests and acquisitions have a real potential to be profitable. Efficient stock
markets react positively at the announcement reflecting the expected gains that will
result after the completion of the deal. However, in many cases the difficulties of the
integration may be underestimated during the acquisition projections on behalf of
acquiring management or the acquiring management may overestimate its own
capabilities to lead such a difficult task. But if this is the case why do stock markets
not adversely react when the deal is announced? After all, in the light of the
disappointing evidence derived from the long term event studies one might ask why
large sophisticated shareholders of bidding firms approve acquisition decisions and
bear high transaction costs if they do not expect to earn a positive return.
In summary, the evidence regarding merger profitability that is derived from
the examination of the share price behaviour of acquirers and acquirees is still
perplexing despite the large volume of academic papers that have been published on
the issue. The short term share price performance of bidders and targets provide a
positive view on the subject and the overall impression is that M&As enhance the
profitability of targets while bidders experience negligible losses or gains. On the
other hand, the majority of studies that examine the long term performance of
acquiring firms' stock provide a pessimistic view about merger profitability.
Acquirers' shareholders usually experience, on average, statistically significant
losses in the three to six years following the merger completion. Whether this is due
to a stock market anomaly or because mergers can be profitable in their theoretical
36 There is a rich body of literature in the relatively new field of 'Behavioural Finance' suggesting that markets
are imperfect, or at least less 'responsive' than the Efficient Market Hypothesis' suggests. See for example Thaler
(1993), Campbell & Shiller (1998), Shleifer (2000), etc.
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planning but profitability improvements prove difficult to implement is an
unanswered question from event studies. On top of that, the endogenous
methodological problems of event studies leave little space for drawing general
inferences about whether merger activity on average is profitable or not. Therefore,
the attention of a thorough researcher should turn to studies that examine the actual
merger performance, using accounting data
3.2.7 Stock Price Studies Vs Accounting studies
The two major literature strands that deal with merger performance - namely,
stock-price studies and accounting studies - are based on different assumptions and
provide different results.
Short term event studies are based on the assumption that stock markets are
efficient and, therefore, the information that is released with an acquisition proposal
is very quickly incorporated in the stock price of the acquirer and acquiree. The sign
and the magnitude of any stock price change indicates the evaluation of this
information on behalf of efficient stock markets. Thus, under the efficient market
hypothesis, share prices reflect the net present value of the synergistic and/or
efficiency gains that will be derived from the prospective merger at the time of the
bid announcement. However, the few days window around the announcement is
often not adequate for an unbiased evaluation of all information concerning a
prospective deal. Additional information about the details of the transaction, the
possible benefits as they have been projected by the decision makers, the existence of
the necessary capabilities for a successful integration, and competitors' reaction to
the merger are all issues that become publicly available for evaluation as time passes.
Thus, research turned to the examination of the share price performance of the united
entity for a long period - usually three to six years - after the consummation of the
merger.
Following the long-term event study approach, extending the time period in
which an acquirer's share price is examined for several years after the completion
date, allows one to capture the impact of events related to the merger which cannot
be captured within a few days interval around the announcement. However, it is
74
THE EFFECTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS N.GLIMIDIS
more likely than not that during this time span other events and major corporate
decisions unrelated to merger - such as strategic or operational or financial policy
changes - will have an impact on corporate value and the firm's share price. For
example the conglomerate merger wave in the U.S. of the sixties was followed by an
extensive divestiture activity. Examining share price performance of the sixties'
conglomerate acquirers for several years, entails the 'side effect' of measuring the
impact of the divestitures that followed. The longer the time period of examination
the greater the chances of incorporating the impact of unrelated events into the
results.
Another problem with long term event studies refers to the benchmark model.
Because the length of such studies extends to several years after merger completion it
is possible that changes to the strategic or other orientations of the firm happen
during the examination period. Therefore control firms are initially chosen on the
basis of similar characteristics to those of acquiring firms may not be the appropriate
basis for comparison after such changes have taken place. If for example the CAPM
is the selected benchmark, then two firms with similar betas are expected to earn the
same returns. However, an acquirer's risk profile may substantially change after a
-1*7 t
strategic takeover . Then, the benchmark is no longer valid unless it undergoes a
similar transformation. In addition, the comparison of results between studies is
difficult because some studies assume normality of statistical distributions of stock
returns and use parametric statistical tests while others use non-parametric tests
assuming that stock returns are skewed.
Accounting studies examine the operating, rather than the stock market
returns-based, performance of merging firms in order to get additional insight into
the impact of acquisitions. Companies usually, when announcing an acquisition
strategy, refer to the enhancement of competitive advantage by improving revenues,
profits, cash flows and reducing costs. Therefore, the direct examination of these
variables provides for the estimation of the actual impact of the acquisition on firm's
performance, in contrast to stock returns studies which measure indirectly the
success or failure of acquisition strategy relying exclusively on what investors think
about the firm. After all, share prices may often be affected by other factors than
37 A horizontal or a vertical acquisition may alter the market share or the cost structure of the firm and
consequently its earnings volatility and its risk profile.
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company's expected performance such as market swings, fads and euphoria .
Controlling for these factors through a research design that adjusts for a variety of
benchmarks, still leaves open the possibility that share price movements often do not
reflect the underlying performance of the company. Moreover, unlike accounting
studies, share-price studies do not offer an explanation as to where possible
improvements come from.
Therefore, while admittedly no research model can assimilate and describe
reality perfectly, we believe that accounting studies are more reliable in drawing
inferences about merger performance.
3.3 The Ex-Post Evidence from Accounting Studies.
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), in a study for the U.S., examined operating
performance in 1974 to 1977 for 471 firms acquired between 1950 and 1977 using
TQ • •
accounting profitability . The performance measure was operating income, before
deduction of interest charges, extraordinary items, and income taxes to end-of-fiscal
year assets. The results indicate a significantly negative relationship between return
on assets and tender offer activity. Specifically, while pre-takeover profitability of
target companies was negligibly below industry norms, post-takeover performance of
targets exhibited a significant decline of 3.10% in relation to other industry firms that
had not engaged in acquisition activity, over the years 1975 to 1977. Where purchase
accounting was applied performance was worse than where the pooling of interests
accounting rules were applied. The decline in post-acquisition performance was
attributed by the authors to the premiums paid to reflect prevailing stock market
values and to induce target firm shareholder and/or management acquiescence.
Under the purchase accounting rules that were adopted in most tender offers the
acquired assets were written up to reflect the value of premiums paid over pre-
acquisition book entries, and consequently, the denominator of performance metric
38 Advancements in the field of behavioural finance have posed challenges to the assumption that
stock markets are always efficient, see Thaler (1993), Shleifer (2000).
j9 The authors obtained financial performance data for 2732 lines of business (LBs) from the Federal Trade
Commission's Line of Business programme. Among them, 153 manufacturing LBs had a tender offer acquisition
history including 46 LBs affected by hostile tenders unsuccessfully opposed by incumbent management and 44
LBs acquired by 'white knights'. The remaining 2579 non-tender lines served as a control group.
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was increased. When the ratio of cash flow (i.e. the operating income before the
deduction of depreciation) over sales is employed as a performance metric, the
target's performance in the three years under examination was negative but
statistically insignificant. The authors conclude that the slightly inferior pre-takeover
profitability of targets relative to their industry peers along with the significant post-
acquisition decline in their performance, do not support the hypothesis that takeovers
are directed toward displacing inefficient managers and that takeover activity is an
efficiency-increasing mechanism.
Herman and Lowenstein (1988) examined 56 hostile tender offers that were
initiated in the years from 1975 to 1983. Targets' return on equity in the five years
preceding the first bid was remarkably good; targets on average earned about as
much as their industry peers in the early years before the bid announcement while
they earned substantially more in the two immediate years before the bid. Therefore,
as did Ravenscraft and Scherer (op.cit.), the authors argued that such a pre-bid
performance was not a typical one for firms that are underutilizing their resources,
and that the inefficient management displacement hypothesis then, did not seem to be
a primary reason for hostile takeovers. Moreover, the authors reported that bidders in
the early pre-bid years enjoyed returns on equity which were good - approximately
10%, with the respective return for American nonfinancial firms being about 13% in
the same period- but not quite as good as those of the target firms. In the two years
before the bid acquirers exhibited an improvement in their returns but not at the same
magnitude as that of targets40. The comparison of pre- and after-takeover
performance of bidders indicated a non significant average improvement after the
takeover.
However, when the examination of bidders' post acquisition performance
took place for two distinctive sub-samples, one for the earlier bidders (1975 to 1978)
and one for later bidders (1981 to 1983), the results showed remarkable differences
between the two groups. While the two groups of bidders exhibited similar rates of
return on equity in the pre-bid years, i.e. steadily rising returns, after the takeover
earlier bidders continued to enjoy the steady improvement in profitability that they
40 The authors argue that comparisons of the profitability of bidders and targets ought to be more favourable to
the bidders, if bidding firm's managers owned superior capability to more efficiently utilise assets than target
firm's managers.
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enjoyed before the bid. For the earlier group of bidders the return on equity grew
from about 14% in the year before the bid to 16% in the third year after the bid and
about 17% in the fifth year after the bid. In contrast, the later bidders experienced a
dramatic deterioration in the two years following the takeover. Like the return on
equity of the earlier bidders, the return on equity of later 1981-1983 bidders was
about 14% in the preceding year of the bid. In the first two years after the acquisition
of the target company, however, the return on equity fell to an average of less than
9%, and interestingly, the larger the bidder the worse the results. It is also noteworthy
that the later group of bidders acquired targets with return on equity which was
almost twice as much as that of the targets which were acquired by the earlier group
of bidders in each of the five years preceding the bid. In addition, in each of the three
years preceding the bid earlier bidders acquired targets with lower rates of
profitability than their own, while for the later bidders the case was the opposite.
The authors argued that the difference in performance between the two groups was
due to the diminishing opportunities in the market for corporate control over time.
Finding an opportunity the innovators exploit it with success. But since the supply of
attractive opportunities was limited, when others sought to imitate that success,
investments deteriorated. Earlier bidders were able to find targets with lower rates of
return than their own and yet achieve for the combined operations better rates of
return than those they experienced before the acquisition, maintaining their upward
momentum. With the passage of time results were reversed since the speculative
aspect of the tender offer activity came to overwhelm the original economic rationale.
Flerman and Lowenstein's interpretation of their study results on the basis of
exhausting opportunities for profitable hostile acquisitions within an arbitrary time
period leaves space for questions regarding the general acceptance of their arguments.
Profitable and non-profitable hostile takeovers also occurred before 1975 and
innovators also existed after 1981. Correspondingly, acquirers in the sample may
have learned from the experience of the before-1975 acquirers, and innovators after
1981 may have chosen their targets by applying different criteria than those applied
by the successful acquirers of the 1975-1978 period. Moreover, while fads are a
usual phenomenon in markets - the market for corporate control not being exempted
- why should it be assumed that the 1981-1983 acquirers imitated successful
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acquirers of the 1975-1978 period? Maybe another remarkable economic event, like
that of the late 1970's oil crisis which substantially affected firms' profits and
operations and the economy as a whole, might have caused the differences in the
results.
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), in their seminal study, criticise Herman
and Lowenstein (op. cit) for the performance measure they use to examine merger
profitability. The return on equity measure does not control for differences in pooling
and purchase accounting, methods of merger finance and, most importantly, the
effect of common industry shocks. Moreover, post merger data are available only for
two years for transactions made after 1979, a fact that limits the analysis to a small
number of years for the later group of bidders (1981-1983). Healy, Palepu and
Ruback also criticise Ravenscraft and Scherer's (op. cit.) study, by challenging the
comparability of the results since the examination of post merger performance is
taking place in the years 1974 - 1977 for firms acquired between 1950 and 1977 and
therefore, post merger years are not aligned with merger. Additionally, the exclusive
examination of the acquired firm's line of business is not sufficient for judging the
post acquisition performance since synergistic gains may well have benefited other
lines of business of the acquiring firm. Also, definitions of business segments may
have changed after merger if acquirers restructured their operations.
Healy et.al. (op. cit), examined the post merger performance of the 50 largest
acquisitions in the industrial sector, in the period from 1979 to 1984. The
performance measure that was used was the operating cash flow return on assets, and
the authors controlled for industry shock effects by using the respective industry
performance of each acquisition as a benchmark. The study extended from five
financial years prior to, until five financial years after, the acquisition completion. In
the pre-merger years each pair of acquirer and target was treated as a unified firm by
the usage of pro-forma accounting data. The results indicated a dramatic increase in
cash flow returns on assets in the five years following acquisition completion. In
each of the five pre-merger years, the median industry-adjusted cash flow return on
assets of the combined targets and bidders in the sample was statistically
insignificant, indicating the targets and bidders performed around their industry
standards. However, in each of the 5 post-merger years, the merged firms
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outperformed their industry peers by 3% in the first year, by 5.3% in the second year,
by 3.2% in the third year, and by 3% and 2.5% in the fourth and fifth post-acquisition
years respectively. All figures - except that referred to the fifth year - were
statistically significant. The median annual performance of the combined firms in all
the five pre-merger years was an insignificant 0.3% while the respective figure for
the post-merger years was a statistically significant 2.8%. To distinguish between
any persistence of the pre-merger performance of the combined firm in the post-
merger years and the performance increase that is attributable to the merger, the
authors examined the relationship between the industry adjusted cash flow returns on
assets for the pre-merger years and the industry adjusted returns on assets for the
post-merger years by regressing the latter on the former with the coefficient of the
regression being described as the change in performance attributable to the merger.
The regression results confirmed that acquisitions were the cause of a median
increase in annual performance of merged firms of 2.8%. The authors also found a
significant positive correlation between the stock market revaluation of merging
firms at the time of the merger bid and the actual post-merger cash flow
improvements.
In a later study, however, Healy et.al. (1997) investigating the same sample
of acquirers discovered that the acquirers did not generate any additional cash flows
beyond those required to offset the premium paid. In other words, the results
indicated that acquisitions are a zero sum game for acquiring firms. In this work,
Healy et.al. used the same methodology as they used in their earlier study, but in the
cash flow return metric they included the premium paid to the target in the asset base
for the five years following the merger completion. For each of the post acquisition
years separately, and for all the five post acquisition years in aggregate acquirers
experienced median cash flow returns on assets which were insignificantly different
from their industry peers.
The most interesting finding of this study, however, was that the profitability
of individual transactions varied widely. Acquirers that engaged in friendly
acquisitions of firms in overlapping businesses that were financed by stock were
found to outperform their industry peers, while the opposite was the case for hostile
takeovers that were financed by cash for firms in unrelated business lines.
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Parino and Harris (1999) examined the post merger operating performance of
197 acquirers in the period from 1982 - 1987. The average annual operating cash
flow return on assets in the five post merger years was a statistically significant 2.1
percentage points above industry average. In this study, when target management
was replaced, acquisitions had significantly better post-acquisition performance than
when management was retained. In addition, post-merger returns are significantly
higher where the target and the acquirer share at least one common business line and
when they merge to take advantage of technology.
Ghosh (2001), criticising Healy's et.al. (1992) research design argued that the
usage of industry performance as a benchmark for evaluating post-acquisition
performance is likely to be biased. This is because pre-acquisition performance of
merging firms may be higher than industry-median firms' performance because of
permanent and/or temporary factors. Permanent factors which may cause merging
firms to exhibit superior performance in the pre-acquisition years may result from the
systematic differences in size between merging and industry-median firms.
According to Fama and French (1995) large firms will be more profitable than
smaller firms, and therefore, large merging firms are expected to perform better than
smaller industry-median firms. Moreover, Morck et.al. (1990) suggests that acquiring
firms may undertake acquisitions following a period of above-normal operating
performance, a fact that is likely, in part, due to temporary factors which will be
driven away by competitive forces in the future and above-normal profits will be
eliminated. Therefore, Ghosh suggests that an appropriate benchmark for evaluating
post-merger performance should control for effects associated with possible
persistence of pre-merger performance in the post-merger years and with size
differences between merging firms and control firms. Using a sample of 315
acquiring and target firms in the period from 1981 to 1995 and a control portfolio of
two firms for each transaction matched on industry, performance, and size, the author
reports that there is no evidence that operating performance improves in the three
years following merger completion. Only acquisitions that were financed by cash
exhibited a statistically significant increase in operating performance after merger.
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3.3.1 The Evidence from Accounting Studies in the UK.
The U.K. evidence from ex-post studies can be divided into two broad
categories; the first includes studies that examine the change in the return on assets
of the acquiring firm in the post-merger years relative to a control group of firms,
while the second category of ex-post studies identifies the effects of merger on cash
flows. Typically, the evidence that is reported from the former suggests that
performance deteriorates after merger while the latter indicate that merger improves
cash flows.
Utton (1974) examined the profitability of 39 intensive industrial acquirers in
the period from 1954 to 1965. The pre-tax profit over net assets was found to be no
better than their industry peers in the years 1966 and 1967. However, a significant
decline in average profitability appeared when the acquisition intensive sample was
compared to a random sample of internal growth firms in the years 1961 - 1970.
Meeks (1977) examined the profitability of 233 mergers that took place in the
U.K. during the merger wave of the 1960's (1964-1972). The performance measure
was the return on net assets and it was adjusted for the effect of the performance of
same industry firms. The author reported that in the year of the merger a slight
improvement in profitability was recorded, with less than 40% of the sample
recording a fall in profitability. However, in the three and five subsequent years an
average decline in profitability was reported. The scale of this decline was
considerable, amounting in some years to more than half the level of profitability
achieved by the industry. The results were irreversible even when the author
removed outliers and adjusted the net asset base of the combined company by
subtracting the increase in goodwill that was the result of the overpayment41. Similar
results are reported by Kumar (1984), after an examination of 241 mergers in the
U.K. in the period from 1967 to 1974. The return on net assets exhibited a
statistically significant decline in the three post-merger years but an insignificant
decline in the fourth and fifth year, relative to the performance of the same industry
peers.
41 A possible downward bias to profitability may result from the way in which goodwill of the acquired company
is recorded in the accounts of the acquirer. If the acquirer pays more than the book value of its acquisition then it
will record the premium as additional goodwill. This increases the asset base of the combined company and hence
may reduce the measured rate of return.
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Conflicting evidence to that of Meeks and Kumar is provided by Cosh et.al.
(1980). The authors examined 225 takeovers that took place between 1967 and 1969,
comparing the average profitability42 of the acquiring and acquired firms with a
control group of non-acquiring and non-acquired firms of similar size and in the
same industry. In the three and five years following the merger, the authors report
evidence - though weak - that merging firms were more profitable than the matched
control group companies. However, since pre-merger performance of acquiring firms
was about the same as that of the matched control firms and the performance of
acquired firms in the same period was distinctly lower than their matched control
group, the weak increase in profitability in the post-merger years suggests that
merging firms perform better than the control group of firms.
A sharp decline in the post-merger profitability is also reported by Dickerson
et.al. (1997) for a sample of 613 acquirers which engaged in acquisitions from 1948
to 1977. The return on net assets for the year of the first acquisition was 1.38
percentage points lower than that of non-acquirers while the total reduction in
profitability was 2.90 percentage points per annum in the five following years. Since
the mean rate of return across all non-acquiring firms was 16.43%, the shortfall in
performance of acquiring firms was (2.90/16.43) around 17.7% per annum.
Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) segmented a sample of 144 mergers that took
place from 1977 to 1990 into two sub-samples. Before 1985, UK mergers exhibited
no significant increase in profitability after merger. However, mergers that took place
between 1985 and 1990 showed a significant improvement in accounting
profitability returns in years following the merger completion. The authors attributed
this difference in results to the accounting standards adopted after 1985. According
to the authors, the two new standards (FRS6 and FRS7) allowed companies to enjoy
great discretion over the valuation of assets by the widespread application of write¬
off accounting which affected future profits, and hence, the significantly positive
change in reported profitability.
As with the U.S. studies, results derived from cash flow measures of
performance are more optimistic about merger performance than those derived from
profitability measures.
42 The profitability measure was the average net income over the historical value of net assets.
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Manson et.al. (1994), examined the operating performance of 38 U.K.
acquirers and acquirees in the period from the beginning of 1985 until mid 1987. The
measure of operating cash flow was similar to that employed by Healy et.al. (1992),
i.e. the pre-tax, pre-depreciation cash flow return on market value of assets (market
value of equity plus book value of net debt and preferred stock). The operating cash
flow measure was also adjusted for changes in working capital, i.e. changes in stocks,
debtors, and non-tax prepayments, less changes in creditors, and non-tax, non-
interest accrual. In this way, the authors argued, the performance measure remains
unaffected by accruals accounting difficulties related to inventory valuation and the
recognition of bad debts. Merging firms' operating performance was adjusted for
industry operating performance by subtracting the respective industry's median
operating performance from the merging firms' operating performance for each year.
The results indicated that industry adjusted operating performance in the post-merger
years increased by a statistically significant 3.7% on average. Moreover, there was
evidence that market assessments of the mergers at the announcement day were
positively correlated with the increase in cash flows in the post-merger years.
Manson et.al. addressed the problem of the appropriate benchmark for
measuring operating performance by looking at the counterfactual dimension of the
issue. The authors argue that the key element to any test on the effect of a takeover is
to model the pro-forma joint performance of the acquirer and of the target as if the
takeover had not taken place, and they offer an analysis similar to the model that is
provided by Healy et.al. Constraining the coefficient of the pre-merger industry-
adjusted operating gains in the regression of the post-merger operating cash flows on
the pre-merger operating gains to be equal to 1 or 0, they consider the problem from
the point of view of competitive advantage. This approach implies that if the merging
firms operate in a fully competitive industry then any competitive advantage of the
two firms in the pre-merger period will disappear very fast due to competitive forces
and hence, in the absence of a takeover, the industry adjusted performance of the two
firms will be equal to zero. Thus, the estimate of the gains from the takeover would
be equal to industry-adjusted post-takeover performance and the coefficient of the
pre-merger industry adjusted operating performance will be zero. Then, the
appropriate benchmark for post-merger industry adjusted returns is zero. Similarly,
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in an uncompetitive industry, any pro-forma joint performance of the acquirer and
the acquiree above or below industry standards would persist in the absence of a
takeover, and therefore, in the regression of the post-merger industry-adjusted
operating performance on the pre-merger industry-adjusted operating performance
the coefficient of the independent variable should be restricted to be equal to 1. Then,
the appropriate benchmark is the pre-merger performance. Finally, in the case of not
perfectly competitive industries - as is the case in the real world - the pro-forma
joint performance of the acquirer and the acquiree in the absence of a takeover would
be a positive fraction of less than one of the pre-merger performance. This is
assumed because imperfect competition would gradually erode any competitive
advantage of the two firms with the passage of time until their joint performance
returns to industry norms. In addition if industries are relatively uncompetitive it
would be reasonable to expect that a level of the pre-merger performance would be
sustained. Flence, in this case the gains from the takeover will be the actual post-
merger performance minus the positive fraction of the pre-merger performance (as in
Healy et.al (1992)). Nonetheless, this analysis, while theoretically comprehensive
for examining the extreme cases of Healy's counterfactual model - i.e. the possibility
that industries are perfectly competitive and the possibility that industries are fully
uncompetitive - in essence it offers little new practical insight into the problem of
what would have happened in the absence of a takeover, since in the real world
typically product markets are imperfect.
Manson's et.al. study suffers from two major drawbacks. First, the study
refers to a relatively small sample of acquisitions which were clustered in a short
period of time, and hence, this might pose doubts about the generalisability of the
conclusions. For example, the period of time under examination preceded a large
scale decrease in stock market values in the U.K., and therefore it is unknown what
the results would have been if the period under examination had included the next
couple of years. Second, while the authors address the important issue of the
exclusion from the sample of the acquirers that engaged in more than one acquisition
during the period in examination, they exclude only those acquirers who took part in
more than one takeover in an unspecified 'relatively short period of time surrounding
the takeover under examination'' (op. cit, p. 12). However, this may distort the
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credibility of the results since acquisition performance was examined for five years
prior to until five years after the acquisition, excluding the year in which the
acquisition took place. If an acquirer made a relatively large acquisition during the
five years before or after the takeover under examination, then its consolidated
accounts would also reflect the performance of the additional acquiree.
The authors explain that their sample aims to include only those takeovers
that constituted a single major strategic decision for the acquirer. However, the
criteria for classified a takeover as a strategic one instead of another type are not
explained. This is important because in the literature there are a variety of viewpoints
for what constitutes a strategic takeover for an acquirer. For example, in the merger
wave of the 1960's conglomerates justified their acquisitions as strategic actions for
faster growth. In the seventies, the wave of divestitures was also justified as a
strategic movement by sellers and acquirers towards company focus. Healy et.al.
(1997) provide evidence that strategic acquisitions are outperformed, describing
them as those financed by stock, in overlapping business, uncontested by the target
management, while Megginson et.al. (2004) found that among strategic acquisitions
those that increase business focus and are financed by cash outperform the rest in the
post-acquisition period regardless of the target's management attitude towards the
bid. In addition, one could argue that regardless of the strategic orientations of the
firm and the criteria used for the sample construction, an acquirer that made one or
more relatively large additional acquisitions in the eleven years under examination,
would disclose the combined results in the financial statements making the
evaluation of the post-acquisition performance difficult.
Powell and Stark (2005) examined the post-merger operating performance of
191 U.K. takeovers completed over the period from January 1985 to July 1993. The
research design of this study included both Healy's et.al. (1992) and Ghosh's (2001)
methodologies. Two alternative operating cash flow definitions were used; one as in
Healy et.al. (op.cit.) and one as in Manson et.al. (1994). The operating cash flow
returns measure was also tested for its sensitivity to three alternative deflators; total
market value of assets, sales, and book value of assets.
The results indicated some improvements in post-merger performance
depending, however, on the choice of operating cash flow definition and the deflators
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that were used. Specifically, when Healy's regression model was used, the intercept
of the regression that represented the operational gains which were attributable to the
takeover was found to be 1.9% and significant at a 10% level when the operating
cash flows were defined as in Healy et.al., and 1.6% significant at a 5% significance
level when operating cash flows were defined as in Manson et.al. When the
benchmark was adjusted for industry and size and pre-acquisition performance the
respective numbers were 2% significant at a 10% significance level and 3.1%
significant at 1% significance level. The deflator was the total market value of assets
adjusted for market reaction at the announcement.
When additional parameters were added to the regression model, like the
form of payment, whether the acquisition was friendly, whether it was disciplining,
and the industry relatedness, none of the coefficients were statistically significant43.
Similar results were produced when the benchmark for performance adjustment was
pairs of firms, matched on the basis of industry relatedness, size, and pre-merger
performance4 . In all the alternative forms of the regression model, interestingly, it
was found that acquirers who paid by cash performed worse than acquirers that paid
by stock, and industry relatedness between acquirer and target had a positive effect
on post-acquisition performance. However, none of these effects was found to be
statistically significant. Moreover, post-acquisition performance was partially
explained by pre-acquisition performance since the coefficient of the industry
adjusted operating performance was always high and statistically significant. Similar
results were produced when the deflator of operating cash flow returns was total
sales. When the deflator was the book value of assets takeover gains appeared to be
larger than when using the other deflators. This difference is not surprising since the
historical cost of assets is typically much lower than their market value. However,
using book values of assets makes performance comparisons difficult since the
choice of accounting policy varies over time and across companies. When total sales
is used as a deflator, biased estimations of operating performance may be produced,
43
Except when Manson's definition of operating cash flows was used, with a benchmark adjusted for industry
and size and pre-acquisition performance. In this case the intercept was found 3.3% statistically significant at a
5% significance level using two-tails test.
44 In this case, when Healy's operating cash flow definition was used, the intercept indicating the takeover gains
was 2% only significant at a 10% significance level using a two tail test, and 3% highly significant when
operating performance was measured as in Manson's. When controlling for the form of payment, industry
relatedness, whether the nature of the acquisition was hostile, and whether it was disciplining no statistical
significance was found.
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since firms may increase sales after aggressive pricing for market share increase
purposes. In addition, sales may be affected by other factors than acquisitions in
short periods of time.
When the authors used Ghosh's (2001) model for measuring operating
performance, i.e. when the coefficient of pre-acquisition performance is restricted to
be 1 and the takeover gains are measured against pre-acquisition performance, the
improvements were negligible and statistically insignificant. The only exception to
this was when the benchmark used was adjusted for industry, size and pre-acquisition
performance and the operating cash flows were calculated as in Manson et.al. (1994).
Then, the increase in operating cash flows over the total market value of assets
employed (adjusted for market value revaluation of assets at the announcement
period) was highly significant at 1.78%.
Powell and Stark's study provides for a good comparison between the results
from alternative research designs and benchmarks which have been employed in
previous studies. The authors suggested that they found some evidence of modest
improvements in post-merger operating performance. The alternative models that
were employed provided results that range from minor losses of -0.23% per annum
to significant gains of 3.1% per annum, on average. This is not surprising since
different models employ different measuring techniques.
On the other hand, what is more important in light of the high number of
failing takeovers and the increased insistence of top management and large
shareholders for new takeovers, is the answer to the question of what are the
characteristics of successful transactions. Bruner (2004, p.53) refers to the widely
held view that 'only about 20% of all mergers really succeed' and argues that
conventional wisdom generalizes too readily from the findings of some studies. In
this summary paper, Bruner concludes that the average, benchmark adjusted return to
corporate investment in M&A is close to zero as would be expected in any form of
corporate investment in competitive markets, but the distribution of corporate returns
is wide, that is, many buyers may realize losses.
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Overall, the evidence from accounting studies is less favourable for
acquisition performance than that derived from ex-ante event studies45. In addition,
accounting studies that employ return on assets as a measure of profitability provide
a gloomier view about the average outcome of takeovers than others that employ
cash flow as a measurement metric. This last observation is true for the U.S.
acquisitions as well as for the U.K. ones. A possible explanation for this contrast in
the results between profitability and cash flow studies may be associated with
different accounting treatments which will be discussed in the next Chapter. Another
explanation could be the fact that different studies cover different time periods and
some of the results might be time specific. For example, Meeks's (1977) study
covered fully the merger wave of the 1960's while Kumar's (1984) and Cosh's et.al.
(1980) studies covered only parts of that wave. What is definite, however, is that the
puzzling issue of whether M&As create value has not yet received a unanimous
answer, and therefore it needs further investigation.
3.3.2 An Evaluation of Powel & Stark' Study.
Whilst Powel and Stark provide a useful comparison between results from
different models, they do not offer an explanation of what factors contribute to
successful takeovers in the U.K. Indeed, in the very rich literature on M&As, the fact
that some studies indicate substantial losses for acquirers while others indicate that
they break even or they realise some gains in the post-merger period is well-
established. The question in the 1990's shifted to which acquirers are successful
given the best alternative methodologies for evaluating post-acquisition performance.
This study emphasises on distinguishing which acquisitions are successful and what
are their characteristics. For this reason we examine the performance of Strategic
acquisitions in the U.K, the impact of the premium paid for the transaction, and how
the interaction of different characteristics ofmerging firms affect cash flow returns.
45
Perplexing evidence on merger profitability is provided by qualitative studies, as well. A survey using
interviews with 107 executives on 700 'of the most expensive deals' by KPMG International, indicated that 53%
of deals reduced shareholder value and 30% broke even while only 17% of deals increased shareholder value
(Deogun, 1999). Another survey by Mercer Consulting revealed that for 215 transactions that took place in the
1980's and in 1990's, 52% of 1990's deals outperformed their industry standards, compared to 37% of the 1980's
deals (Lajoux and Weston, 1998). In a survey for the UK., Ingham et.al. (1992) report that among CEOs of 146
large firms 77% believed that profitability increased after merger and 68% believed that the benefits lasted for the
long-run.
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Moreover, the authors do not report how the issue of successive acquisitions
from the same acquirers within a short period of time was dealt with. Many acquirers
are systematic acquirers and in such cases, acquisition performance may be distorted
by the financial results of the additional acquirees which will be reflected in the
consolidated financial statements during the period of study. It is also important that
acquirers that are engaged in a number of important international acquisitions during
the period under examination be excluded from the sample. An investigation into the
post-merger results of domestic bidders and targets does not eliminate the need for
considering the case that the financial results of an acquirer may reflect performance
which is partially the outcome of a significant international acquisition. In fact, in the
1990's U.K. acquirers engaged in more 5188 international acquisitions46. We deal
with this problem by carefully identifying all the domestic and international
acquisitions conducted by our sample acquirers and excluding the acquirers that
conducted more than one significant acquisition within the whole period that this
study extends47.
Note also that the authors do not report how they treat the changes to SIC that
occurred in 1992. Companies that belonged to a specific number 4 Industrial Code
before 1992 were classified under a different definition from 1992 onwards, without
having altered their core business, just because SIC changed. We dealt with this
anomaly by manually grouping the appropriate number 4 Industrial Sectors so as to
ensure homogeneity as described in Chapter 5.
Another noticeable characteristic of the study was the distribution of the
takeovers in the period under examination. Out of the 191 takeovers, 150 or about
80% of the sample occurred from 1985 until the end of 1989, and over 72% or 131
takeovers were completed during the takeover boom period of 1985 to 1988. This
might increase the possibility that some of the reported results of the study are time
specific to the years during which most of the sample acquisitions occurred.
The period 1987-1989 was a typical period of expansion of U.K. companies
through acquisitions and also these years represented the target peak in M&A
46 Source: Office for National Statistics.
47 In our study we examine acquisitions that occurred from the beginning of 1990 until the end of
1996. Assuming a 5-year window in examining operating performance we search for systematic
acquirers for five years prior to and five years following the merger completion.
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activity by numbers. It is quite possible, therefore, that motives and effects of
takeovers do differ between time periods and especially between peaks and troughs
in merger activity. For example, in the 1980's a greater percentage of takeovers were
48
hostile than in the 1990's . Motives and objectives between friendly and hostile
takeovers are different and the outcome of takeovers is likely to be different too.
Indeed, Kini et.al. (2004) report that in the U.S., the role of the takeover market as a
source of performance-related discipline has changed from the 1980's to the 1990's.
The decline in hostile takeover activity during the period 1989-1998 is concurrent
with an increase in the intensity of alternative internal governance mechanisms
which reduced the role of the takeover market as a source ofmanagerial discipline.
Moreover, since the 1980's, competition policy has become more oriented
towards considering the effects of takeovers on competition. This, may have altered
the priorities of acquirers when considering an acquisition strategy from the pursuit
of a rapid increase in profits through market power to the achievement of synergies
and cost reductions through economies of scales or to the expansion to newly
emerged industries. In turn, the alteration of acquirers' motives and objectives may
have led to different effects of takeovers. In our study we have chosen the
examination period to extend within the 1990's so as to update evidence concerning
post-merger operating performance49.
3.4 The Research Questions of this Study.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether U.K. takeovers are efficient
transactions and consequently if they increase operating performance. In spite of 30
years of intense research on the subject of takeovers' effects on firms' efficiency
there is not a clear and unanimous answer to the question of whether takeovers
48 Kini et.al. (2004), report that the 1980's were characterised by intense takeover activity, an increased number
of hostile takeovers, and less effective internal control mechanisms. In contrast, the first 8 years of the 1990's
were characterised by a relatively lower takeover activity, friendly transactions and more evolved alternative
governance mechanisms.
49 This study refers to the period 1990-1996. This period was considered as the appropriate for the
examination of merger performance in the 1990's since from 1997 onwards stock markets
experienced unprecedented fluctuations. An examination of merger performance during this period
would possibly provide time-specific results.
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increase profitability for the engaging firms. On the contrary, conflicting evidence is
provided by different studies for different periods of time.
The question becomes more crucial when considering the takeover activity of
the last decade, since the 1990's have the distinctive characteristic of the intense
technological advancements and the rapid innovation in management techniques
which led companies to respond to competitive forces arising from the demands of
the new corporate environment by extensive restructuring programmes and mainly
through M&As. Companies that announce an acquisition strategy almost always
justify the decision with the rationale of the creation of a competitive advantage or
the enhancement of an existing one, seeking an increase in cash flows and profits for
the benefit of shareholders. What is interesting, therefore, is whether takeovers that
took place in the 1990's were investment decisions that increased efficiency and
shareholder wealth. The latest evidence on U.K. takeovers was published after most
of the research for this study was completed, by Powell and Stark (2005)50 who
examined that M&As occurred from 1985 to mid 1993. However, only 21% of their
sample acquisitions or 41 transactions occurred after 1989.
This study focuses on acquisitions that occurred from January 1990 until
December 1996 so as to provide evidence on the effects of mergers on firm's
efficiency in the 1990's corporate environment which was substantially different
from that of the 1980's and 1970's.
3.4.1. Overall Gains.
The existing evidence on takeover profitability that was discussed in the
preceding section suggests that there is a wide dispersion of returns both within and
across studies, indicating that there are good deals that pay more and bad deals that
pay less. In a relatively large sample of small and large acquisitions one should
expect that the average benchmarked post-merger performance cannot be
substantially different from industry standards. As Bruner (2004) puts it, M&As are
not homogeneous and some factors differentiate deals and predispose them to
50 We learned of the Powell and Stark study four years after research for this thesis began.
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success or failure. Hence, the average outcome of a large number of takeovers is
likely to be zero.
Therefore, the first hypothesis that this study will test is that, in the corporate
environment of the 1990's post-merger performance of acquirers is, on average,
close to industry standards against the alternative hypothesis that acquirers'
performance is different from industry's standards.
On the other hand, the average return from M&As is, to an extent, a reflection
of (1) competition for corporate control, (2) the existence of impediments to takeover,
and (3) the distribution of managerial objectives.
Competition allows assets and resources to move quickly to their most
efficient use and companies can adjust quickly to changes in the corporate
environment through this market. In addition, companies operate under the scrutiny
of a large number of alternative management teams that continuously evaluate their
performance and judge whether inefficiencies leave space for better profits under
their management. Competition among management teams implies that incumbent
management give their best efforts to maximize firm's profitability by timely and
effectively exploiting all the internal and external opportunities. The threat to be
taken over is also a disciplinary mechanism for resolving agency problems between
managers and shareholders before such problems become very costly and affect a
firm's efficiency.
Therefore, when the market for corporate control is extremely competitive
firms would be expected to operate to their maximum level of efficiency and
management to act in accordance with shareholders' best interests. Consequently, the
more competitive a market for corporate control is the lower the number of
potentially profitable takeovers there would be. Most potential takeover targets
would operate in a manner such that almost all the opportunities for efficiency
increases have been adequately exploited, and as a result, few takeovers would offer
new opportunities for performance improvements. Even when a potential target
operates inefficiently and a number of investment opportunities are lost, competition
of alternative management teams to acquire it and improve its performance would
increase the level of the acquisition price to a point that almost all the future
performance improvements would be reflected in the acquisition premium.
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Otherwise there would be no reason for shareholders to accept an offer. Thus, the
investment, at best, will break even. A competitive market for corporate control is a
factor that ensures that companies operate efficiently and that there is not much space
for performance increases through M&As. Profitable acquisitions would be limited
to a few cases where two already efficient firms are merged for the exploitation of
synergies or economies of scale.
Nonetheless, no market is expected to be perfectly competitive in practice.
There are impediments to takeover. Entry to the market for corporate control is an
expensive and risky business. One prerequisite for competition to work is that all
potential acquirers that could improve a potential target's performance have access to
the necessary capital for entry into the acquisition contest. Firms, however, face
capital constraints^1. A small and innovative firm with a very competent management,
for example, would probably find it difficult to lever the necessary funds to acquire a
large potentially more profitable firm that operates under a slack and inefficient
management.
If a firm's performance falls below a certain level, the larger the firm the
fewer the number of potential acquirers that are able to fund the acquisition. The
number of potential acquirers of a large inefficient firm may be so small in practice,
that due to the lack of competition the acquisition price may be below the net present
value of all future performance improvements, providing opportunities for positive
returns on investment and ensuring the exploitation of the value gap between the
52
present and the future value of the inefficient target .
Therefore, if capital constraints are a serious impediment to takeover one
should expect fewer acquisitions but a relatively large proportion of acquisitions that
51 Marris (1964) suggests that there is a mutual dependence between growth and profitability. Firms choose
between a profit maximising point and a growth maximising point, which is subject to the supply of capital
constraint. For a given rate of profit there is a limit in external financing, which is set by the stock market; only if
a firm increases its retention ratio it would be able to finance higher growth. However, this would have happened
at the expense of the dividends, a fact that would depress the ratio of the amount of external finance that investors
would be willing to subscribe as a percentage of profits (matching latio), given tiiat investors' prefeience is
towards current profits rather than futuro onos resulting from subsequent investments. Thus, there is a trade off
between profit rate and growth rate reflecting that firms can maximise growth - by any means including M&As -
for a given rate of profit. In addition, because acquisition projects entail high levels of risk, investment banks
would not be willing to finance any potential acquirer; only large firms with established relations with investment
banks would be able to get support for financing an acquisition.
52 Even when an incumbent management is inefficient, however, potential acquirers may not be able to replace it
and increase target's efficiency. According to Grossman and Hart (1980), assuming that each shareholder is very
small to affect the outcome of a bid s/he has incentives to retain their shares in anticipation of participating in
future profit increases, in the belief that other shareholders will decide to sell their stakes in the target.
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are profitable, because the fewer the potential acquirers the less disciplined a
potential target's management team would be, and the greater the probability for a
firm to operate below its maximum efficiency standards.
In a perfectly competitive market information is available to everyone
instantly. It would be oversimplistic, however, to assume that information is widely
available in the market for corporate control. Asymmetry of information between
current and potential managements is pervasive. Assuming internal managers have
superior information compared with external managers, and that there is asymmetry
of information between potential acquirers, the winner's curse seems highly likely to
occur. This will also deter potential bids.
Internal information for bargain identification is not only limited to a certain
number of experts inside and around a firm but is costly to gather and to evaluate.
Information asymmetry among possible acquirers will make incumbent management
teams in potential targets less alert about their firm's efficiency levels. This implies
that when information about a target's potential for efficiency increases is available
to a prospective acquirer, it is likely that the acquisition will be performance
increasing.
The distribution ofmanagerial capabilities may be a reason for the occurrence
of profitable acquisitions. Managerial capabilities are not homogeneous across the
market for managerial labour. Some management teams are more competent than
others. This condition applies to all firms; thus, however competitive a market for
corporate control would be, some managers simply could not meet - at least
occasionally - such performance standards so as to avoid becoming takeover targets.
Given a distribution of managerial capabilities, the less efficient a management the
greater the probability that a superior management group will observe this and make
a bid. The distribution of managerial capabilities therefore, may be a reason for a
profitable acquisition when a competent acquirer decides to act.
Furthermore, managers can pursue objectives other than profit maximisation
when the market for corporate control is not extremely competitive. This diversity of
managerial objectives may increase the number of takeovers, though not necessarily
profitable ones. As discussed in the previous Chapter, there is evidence that
managers conduct takeovers for a variety of reasons; it is not solely the increase in
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profitability by means of improving the performance of an inefficient target that
forms the main motive for engaging in an acquisition. Managers' personal objectives,
increase in the rate of growth through 'purchase of sales', seasonal fads, or the desire
to dispose of excess cash to directions other than shareholders, may be some of the
motives for acquisitions. If, therefore, a relatively large number of acquirers seek to
make acquisitions for other reasons than increasing the efficiency of an inefficient
target, a much larger number of value gaps will occur with a consequently higher
number of acquisitions (Mueller, 1989). But a sizeable proportion of these
acquisitions will not result in increased profitability.
Notice that, in the 1990's some of the impediments to takeover have loosened
due to the advancements in financial services and information technology.
Investment banking has developed innovative products for financing an acquisition
to a degree that capital constraints have been decreased33. Information technology
also contributed to the wider dispersion of information about firms' performance and
made monitoring more effective. Finally, as Kini et.al. (2004, p. 1512) suggest, in the
1990's corporate environment 'there is less takeover-related discipline to be applied
to target firms when a higher level ofmonitoring is already in place
The above discussion indicates that one cannot predict what the average
outcome of M&As may be. The profitability of M&As depends upon a variety of
parameters. Assuming that the market for corporate control is very competitive we
can expect a smaller proportion of acquisitions to be profitable. However, no market
is expected to be perfectly competitive in practice. Impediments to takeover, like
capital constrains, may limit the number of potential acquirers. This may lead
potential targets' managements to be less disciplined and thus, we can expect fewer
acquisitions but a larger proportion of profitable ones. On the other hand,
information asymmetries between internal and external managers and between
potential acquirers may lead to overpayment for a target and the winner's curse
seems very likely to occur. However, information asymmetry may also be a reason
for profitable acquisitions, as well. In the presence of information asymmetry,
incumbent managements are likely to be less alert about their firm's potential
53 The U.S. experience from the 1980's where a large number of L.B.O's were implemented through the issuance
ofjunk bonds is an example of financial products innovations that serve the financing of acquisitions.
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efficiency level; thus, should a prospective acquirer become aware of the target's
potential for efficiency increase, the resulting acquisition is likely to be profitable.
Moreover, the distribution of managerial capabilities may be a reason for profitable
acquisitions to occur. Finally, the diversity of managerial objectives is a factor that
may determine the proportion of profitable acquisitions. If there is a relatively large
number of non-profit maximising managements, then one can expect a large number
of acquisitions to occur, a sizeable proportion of which will not be profitable.
Therefore, because of the multitude of parameters influencing the potential
number and profitability of prospective M&As, one cannot ascertain what the
average outcome of takeovers may be. This study seeks to contribute to addressing
this issue for the U.K. corporate environment of the 1990s.
3.4.2. Distribution of Gains or Losses.
If on average one cannot say whether acquisitions increase or decrease
profitability, a question that arises is which takeovers perform well and which do not.
There is evidence in the U.S. (Healy et.al. (1997), Megginson et.al. (2004)) that
strategic or synergistic acquisitions outperform financial acquisitions. Strategic
takeovers are those that are financed by stock, are friendly, and the acquiring and
target company are in the same line of business. According to Healy et.al., strategic
mergers combine firms in the pursuit of synergistic gains while financial acquisitions
intend to generate cash flow for the acquirer from the break-up of the target firm.
Thus, the financing method, the relatedness of business operations of the acquirer
and target, and the attitude of the acquirer towards a target's management, may play
a determining role in the success or failure of a prospective acquisition.
The Financing Method.
In the presence of information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders, managers have the incentive to issue equity when they perceive it to be
overvalued (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In the context of acquisitions, this implies
that acquirers prefer to pay by stock when they consider their stock overvalued and
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by cash when stock is undervalued. There is plenty of empirical evidence consistent
with this theory. Rappaport and Sirower (1999) report that in studies covering more
than 1200 deals researchers have consistently found that at the time of announcement
shareholders of acquiring companies fare worse in stock transactions than they do in
cash transactions and the difference between cash and stock transactions becomes
greater over time54.
Moreover, Erickson and Wang (1999) provide evidence that firms
conducting stock-financed acquisitions manage their earnings upward prior to their
acquisitions so as to inflate their stock price and thereby reduce the cost of the
acquisition. This implies that operating performance in the years subsequent to stock-
acquisitions should be lower than the operating performance of cash-acquisitions,
since accounting procedures prohibit accruals to reverse. The inflation of reported
earnings in one period will have an offsetting effect in the next periods.
Fishman (1989), and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) argue that bidders
offer cash when they have favourable private information about the value of the
target due to potential synergies, so as to increase the likelihood of the acceptance of
the first bid and thus, to eliminate delays during which competing bids may be
elicited. In addition, to the degree that an acquirer feels confident for the prospects of
an acquisition it increases the fraction of the cash in their offer so as to ensure a
higher participation to the synergistic gains55.
Therefore, the second research question of this study is whether cash
acquisitions are associated with better post-merger operating performance than stock
acquisitions. The hypothesis is that cash acquisitions outperform stock acquisitions
against the hypothesis that cash acquisitions do not outperform stock acquisitions.
The Attitude.
54 See for example Travlos (1987), Huang and Walkling (1987), Asquith et.al. (1987). Moreover, Andre et.al.
(2004), in a study for Canada found that M&As financed entirely by equity underperform relative to cash
transactions in the long-run. However, Drapper and Paudyal (1999) in a study for the U.K., report that share
prices of acquiring firms decrease most if the shareholders of the target firms are given an option to receive the
payment in shares or in cash.
55
Rappaport and Sirower (1999) explain that in stock transactions the synergy risk is shared in proportion to the
percentage of the combined company the acquiring and selling shareholders each will own.
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The third research question of this study is associated with the attitude of the
acquirer towards a target's management and its strategy. If an acquirer considers a
target's management and its strategies ineffective due to either agency costs or to
poor capabilities then it may conduct a hostile takeover by means of a tender offer to
the target's shareholders in order to replace inefficient management and to abandon
their strategy. If, however, the deal is negotiated and the acquirer plans to retain key
managers and to continue and develop their current strategy then the acquisition is
considered as friendly. Thus, it is expected that hostile takeovers should outperform
friendly ones if target's pre-takeover strategy is not successful and its management
inefficient. On the other hand, friendly takeovers would outperform the hostile ones
if targets' pre-takeover strategies are successful and their management efficient. If
such is the case the change in strategy and the organisational policies, the
replacement of a successful management, and the feeling of insecurity across the
organisational pyramid which is associated with a hostile takeover, would reduce
post-takeover performance. Thus, the hypothesis is that targets' managements are
inefficient and hostile takeovers outperform friendly takeovers. The alternative
hypothesis is that targets' managements are efficient and hostile takeovers do not
outperform friendly ones.
The business line overlap.
Companies undertaking acquisitions very often justify their decision on the
grounds of expected synergies, cost benefits through economies of scale and scope,
and an increase in market share. Plausibly, such benefits are more likely to occur in
mergers between firms that operate within the same or similar lines of business than
in mergers between firms with unrelated business operations.
On the other hand, diversification is usually considered as a means for
achieving financial synergies and a strategy for balancing the investment portfolio of
an acquirer; funds from mature slow growth industries are invested in industries with
greater growth potential. However, there is evidence that diversification strategies
destroy value (Berger and Ofek (1995), Maquieira et.al. (1998), Doukas et.al. (2001)).
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To Williamson (1975) the allocation of resources within a diversified M-
firm is more efficient in that it provides internal capital control. Others argue
(Bowman and Singh (1993)) that the procedure of the allocation of resources across
businesses is more effectively served by the stock market rather than the top
management of a diversified firm during capital budgeting processes. There should
be doubts about the quality of information that is received from division heads and
the degree to which the evaluation of this information by top management is based to
objective criteria and is not influenced by personal feelings. To the extent that these
decisions are influenced by internal lobbying, resource allocations may be inefficient.
In contrast, capital markets allocate resources for independent firms more efficiently
since observers regularly monitor how companies acquire and use their funds. A
firm's share price and bond ratings are constantly re-evaluated on the basis of
monitoring results. Moreover, assuming that top management of diversified firms has
the proper incentives to work on behalf of shareholders, they must use costly control
systems that reward division managers on the basis of division profits and discipline
managers by tying their career to business units' objectives.
In unrelated acquisitions there may be efficiency reductions due to
employees' lower productivity to a greater degree than in horizontal acquisitions.
New owners who are unfamiliar with business operations may try to economise from
lowering employee's benefits that are based on implicit contracts made with former
owners; this is because new owners are not bound to honour such contracts. On the
other side, employees with relationship-specific investments in the target firm may
become vulnerable to having quasi-rents taken by new owners. Since employees
cannot sell their firm-specific assets which have been developed in the firm in the
labour market at a comparable price to what they currently receive, they may
consider leaving the firm if they receive less from the new owners before the external
market value of the firm-specific asset is reached (Besanko et.al. (2000)). Similar
situations with adverse effects on business efficiency may emerge with other
stakeholders like suppliers, customers or creditors when relations are based on
implicit rather than explicit contracts. Therefore, long-term efficiency may be in
jeopardy since stakeholders being aware of a firm's past behaviour may be reluctant
to invest in firm-specific assets in the future unless they are sufficiently compensated
100
THE EFFECTS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS N.GLIMIDIS
for the risk of not receiving quasi-rents in the future. The problem could be more
severe if an acquirer enters a new industry and lacks sufficient knowledge and
understanding of business operations. These arguments suggest that companies
should not attempt to do what investors can do themselves and more cheaply.
Therefore, if synergy is more likely to be realised in horizontal mergers and if
diversification is a costly and more risky way for the achievement of what investors
can do themselves, one could expect that post-merger operating gains should be
higher for merging firms that operate within the same industry than merging firms
with different business operations. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is that horizontal
mergers create value against the alternative one that acquisition relatedness does not
create value.
Strategic Mergers.
Each of the above takeover characteristics has different implications for the
source of operating gains (or losses) in the post-merger years. Acquisitions, however,
share combinations of these characteristics which in turn may be associated with
better or worse post-merger performance. It is essential therefore to examine what is
the outcome of acquisitions that share a number of the above characteristics. It is
well established in the literature that friendly acquisitions are usually financed by
stock or by a combination of stock and cash and hostile by cash. It is also well-
documented that many of the diversification deals fail.
Friendly acquisitions that occur within the same industry and are financed by
stock or by a combination of stock and cash - we define them as Strategic - are likely
to outperform other types, for a number of reasons. Strategic deals are deals between
firms in related industries where it is more likely that greater operating synergies, a
stronger market position and cost reductions through economies of scale, will be
achieved. Strategic acquirers also are engaged in friendly negotiations to arrange the
terms of the deal avoiding the disruption of organisational operations through the
replacement of a target's management. Retaining key managers, the acquirer is in a
better position to embody and absorb an acquired organisation. Mid and lower
management may be more cooperative since established explicit or implicit career
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contracts can continue to exist. In addition, in friendly strategic acquisitions the
acquiring management has access to internal proprietary information about the target
and can ensure that their valuation about the price of the acquisition and the future
gains are more precise. Finally, paying by stock strategic acquirers reduce their risks,
in the case that future synergistic and other gains do not fully materialise. This is
because a fraction of this risk is borne by the target's shareholders through the
exchange of stock56. For the same reason, stock payment reduces the cost of possible
valuation errors that may occur during the negotiation process on behalf of acquirer's
management. On the other hand, by giving a choice of stock-and-cash payment to a
target's shareholders, an acquiring management signals that it does not consider the
acquisition as a means for expansion using overvalued stock as a payment method.
A possible counter-argument to the above could be that hostile acquisitions
occur typically to improve the performance of the target's management. Flowever, on
balance, we argue that it is likely that Strategic mergers are more likely to
outperform other types.
Thus, the sixth hypothesis in this study is that, in the U.K. Strategic mergers
outperform other types ofmergers.
Relative size.
If acquisitions increase efficiency and have positive effects on performance,
then the benefits of an acquisition should be more visible to the degree to which
acquisitions are large. The larger a beneficial acquisition is, the higher the gains. This
should be particularly observable to related acquisitions. The benefits from synergy
would be higher for acquisitions where the target's size is comparable to that of the
bidder. When the target is very small relatively to the acquirer, even if the firms
operate more efficiently together than they did as separate entities, one should not
expect substantial gains to be observed since the improvements due to the small
acquisition would be negligible in comparison to the size of the acquirer. By the
same token, cost reductions due to economies of scale and scope in the post-merger
period would be substantial as a percentage improvement of the pre-merger
56
Target's shareholders accept such a risk with the expectation to participate in future increased earnings.
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performance when operations and sales of the two firms are comparable in size.
Supposing that a firm acquires a target that is only 2% of its size and implements a
very successful cost reduction plan, then the improvements in post-merger years
would not be substantial when measured against the acquirer's size standards.
It is argued that related acquisitions often occur for strengthening merging
firms' position in the industry where they operate by increasing market power. The
bigger the merging firms and the larger the relative size of target and bidder the
higher will be the profits attributable to the increased market power. Thus, the
highest performance improvements are expected in related acquisitions when bidders
and targets are relatively large firms and the relative size of target and bidder is large.
On the other hand, small acquisitions - those for example where a target's
size is 10% or lower of that of the acquirer - are likely to perform better since the
integration process may be easier and the acquirer is able to have a better
understanding of the target's business. Sirower (1997) refers to a McKinsey &
Company study which reports that the failure rate of acquisitions fell from 61%
overall to 54% when the acquisitions were less than 10% the size of the acquirer.
Literature in the subject, however, provides mixed results. Shelton (1988) and Seth
(1990b) find positive effects for relative size on acquirer performance while Kusewitt
(1985) reports the opposite. Fowler and Schmidt (1989) find no significant
relationship.
On the basis of the above, we test the following hypotheses: (1) large
acquisitions perform better than other acquisitions in the U.K. (2) the performance
improvements are higher for large acquisitions between large firms and (3) the effect
should be amplified when large acquisitions are between firms that operate in the
same industry.
Acquisition Premium.
An acquisition premium is the amount the acquirer pays on top of the market
value of the target in order to acquire it. An acquisition premium is often necessary
in order for the target firm's shareholders to be willing to sell their shares. On the
other hand acquirers before proceeding with an offer, evaluate the potential gains of
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the acquisition and make their offer which is usually higher than the current value of
the target but less than the present value of the economic benefits that they expect
from the deal. In any case, this is a rational economic approach for the justification of
any investment decision. An acquisition premium, in other words, represents a
proportion of the value gap between the current value of the target and the expected
increase in value due to acquisition, which is paid to the target's shareholders to
accept the offer. We would expect that an acquirer's expectations for future gains of
the combined entity should more than offset57 the acquisition premium that is paid in
advance for the option of the acquirer to manage a target's resources.
There is a widespread view in the literature and in the financial press that
often acquiring management offers very high premiums for acquisitions. High
acquisition premiums are considered those that not only substantially exceed the pre-
bid market value of the target but also those that require performance improvements
that are virtually impossible to realise. Target firms in the pre-acquisition period are
valued by the market participants at a price which embodies all future gains that are
expected for these firms to achieve. Thus, an acquisition premium implies synergistic
and other gains above what is already expected by these firms. The high rate of
acquisition failures, therefore, is often accrued to overpayment. On the other hand,
the extent to which an acquisition premium is 'high' is determined from the
acquiring management's expectations for acquisition performance" .
Crawford and Lechner (1996) suggest that a target's valuable attributes will
cause the target to command a higher price, and thus, a higher premium. Therefore,
to the extent an acquisition is considered as beneficial the premium should be high.
On the other hand, the higher the premium an acquirer pays the higher should be the
post-merger gains necessary to justify that premium.
There are several acquisition cases where acquirers which paid a low
premium get worse than acquirers that paid a relatively high premium. Eccles et.al.
(1999) report that for 10 deals where the acquirers paid a premium from 1% to 19%
over the pre-bid market values of the targets the total returns on investment of the
57 In economic terms, the increase in gains which is attributed to acquisition must offset not only the premium,
but also the transaction costs associated with the deal and the intangible costs that the acquirer incurs - like the
time and energy of senior management - in order for the deal to come in effect.
58 Jensen (1988), summarising the empirical evidence on the effects of mergers reports that historically the
premiums paid in hostile takeovers exceed 30% on average, while during the 80's they have averaged about 50%.
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acquirers one year later were negative and ranged from -9% to -59%. For 10 deals
where the acquirers paid a relatively high premium which ranged from 34% to 115%
of the pre-bid target's value, the one-year total returns59 were positive between 4%
and 49%. However, as the authors suggest the size of the premium does not always
correlate with the success of the deal.
The above discussion leads to the following expectation. If acquisition
premium reflects the target's valuable attributes and the acquirer's expectations for
future performance improvements, then acquisitions that were closed at a relatively
high premium should outperform all other acquisitions. Alternatively, if acquisition
premium reflects overoptimism on behalf of the acquiring management or a
deviation of the acquiring management from shareholders' interests, then
acquisitions that were closed at a premium should underperform all other
acquisitions. So, our hypothesis is that on average there is no relationship between
whether an acquisition closed at a relatively high premium or not and post-
acquisition performance.
As it was discussed in Chapter 1, this work also examines the effects of
M&As on merging firms' employment and employee costs, and tests the stock
market's ability to forecast future changes in merging firms' operating performance.
These two issues are discussed in chapters 8 and 9 respectively, where also the
relevant research questions are addressed and the corresponding results are reported.
3.5. Conclusions.
The first part of this Chapter summarised the existing literature on the effects
ofM&As on firms' performances in the U.S. and the U.K. The most notable studies
on the subject were discussed. These studies are divided into two groups in respect to
the two main research methodologies that are used in large sample studies. The
evidence from the first research type - research that is conducted by means of event-
study methodology - is contradictory and is sensitive to the time period under
examination, i.e. to whether the examination is conducted in a short period of a few
59 Total returns are the cumulative market-adjusted returns for the first year after the completion of the deal.
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days around the event announcement or it extents to a longer period of several
months after the merger completion.
With the assumption of stock market efficiency - i.e. assuming that the stock
market properly discounts all future changes in performance when a deal is
announced - short-term event studies examine the market reaction for a few days
window around the event announcement and provide consistent evidence that targets
experience statistically significant gains that are exceptionally high in many cases,
while bidders experience negligible gains or losses. A conclusion for the combined
effect in performance for the two merging firms, however, is difficult to make
because of the size differential between targets and bidders. A few studies on this
topic provide some positive evidence, but the fact that M&As increase wealth of both
targets' and bidders' shareholders, on average, is far from established.
When the time period of share price examination is extended to several
months after the merger completion date, there is a stark contrast to the results. There
is an almost unanimous finding that in the long run the united entity underperforms
the market60. More importantly, a general disagreement among researchers about the
appropriate benchmark for evaluating share price performance changes makes
comparability of the results difficult.
In an attempt to explain the contradictory results between short and long-term
event studies, some researchers express doubts about the fundamental assumption
under the methodology which is the efficiency of the stock market. This argument
implies that in light of the declining share price performance after merger completion,
the positive findings of short term event studies should be accrued to market
anomalies and to the possibility that investors are overoptimistic about the prospects
of the deal. However, the possibility that merger, on average, may be beneficial in
their theoretical planning but in many cases there are failures in the implementation
process cannot be disregarded. Some other researchers question the degree to which
long-term event study methodology is robust enough to draw conclusive inferences
on the effects of mergers, since it is based on the benchmarking of returns for long
periods during which the firm's risk and/or size may well have changed. Nonetheless,
60 Or what the performance would have been without the acquisition.
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in the thirty five or so years of research on the subject models have been enriched
and evolved to a degree that at least the general findings can be regarded as robust.
Overall, despite the many volumes of papers on the subject, evidence on
merger profitability that is based on event studies is still perplexing, and so is on both
sides of the Atlantic.
The other main type of research on the effects ofmerger uses accounting data
to evaluate whether mergers contribute to performance improvements. The evidence
for both the U.K. and the U.S., is sensitive to the metric that is used to evaluate
performance. Profitability metrics, like benchmarked returns on assets, provide a
pessimistic view about mergers while operating performance measures, like the
benchmarked cash flow returns on assets indicate that merger is beneficial, on
average. Whether these contrasting results are due to different measurement
approaches or due to time-specific effects is a question which is not satisfactorily
answered.
In the U.K., the latest evidence on the subject mainly refers to M&As
conducted during the 1980's and provides some weak evidence for performance
improvements using a set of alternative methodologies and benchmarks that were
initially applied for the U.S. The generalisation of the findings, however, with no
further research concerning the 1990's environment should not be appropriate since
the corporate environment of the 1980's and the 1990's are substantially different,
implying differences in the motives for M&As and consequently in their effects. In
addition it would be interesting for the results to be compared with those of the
1990's after the removal of some drawbacks concerning the sample construction.
The second part of this Chapter addresses the research questions that this
study is going to address. Since there is not much evidence on the effects of mergers
for the 1990's corporate environment in the U.K., and in light of some
methodological drawbacks of previous studies on the subject, it would be interesting
to examine issues related to the effects ofM&As in the U.K. that occurred in the last
decade. First, an examination of the average outcome of M&As will be considered.
Secondly, the question of whether Strategic mergers perform better than other types
of mergers is addressed. Third, the examination turns to the issue of the degree of
competition in the market for corporate control and what the outcome of M&As
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implies for it. Fourth, we addressed the question of what is the relation of merger
characteristics, like the means of payment, the industry relatedness and the attitude of
target's management towards the proposal, with the merger outcome. Fifth, the
relation between the relative size of target and bidder is considered, and sixth, the
relationship between the post-merger performance and whether the acquisition closed






The previous Chapter addressed the disparate results from different research
approaches on M&As performance. Short term ex-ante studies provide evidence that
M&As, on average, create value1 while most of the evidence provided by long term
event studies is more pessimistic. The former research approach has been extensively
criticised for taking the strong form of market efficiency for granted, while the latter
suffers from methodological weaknesses associated with the benchmark that is used
for evaluating share price abnormal returns over a long period of time. Ex-post
empirical evidence on the performance of M&As is mainly provided by studies
focusing on profitability measures or on cash flow measures. Profitability studies
provide mixed results as far as merger performance is concerned while cash flow
studies typically suggest that M&As lead to a performance improvement in the post-
acquisition years; a debate over what is the appropriate benchmark for evaluating
performance is also addressed in the literature for accounting studies.
In this Chapter we describe the methodology that is used in this work. We
address the research questions of this study by measuring the actual post-merger
performance of the merging firms using accounting data. This approach is chosen
because when announcing an acquisition strategy companies typically refer to the
enhancement of a competitive advantage that leads to increased revenues, profits,
and cash flows. Therefore, it was considered appropriate that instead of measuring
the success or failure ofM&As by relying exclusively on what investors think at the
time of the event announcement, one might directly examine the actual performance
of the merging firms in the post-acquisition years. The benchmarked cash flow
returns on market value of total assets are used as a metric for evaluating post-merger
1




performance so as to avoid the accounting biases that arise when profitability
measures are employed, as will be discussed later. Because the choice of the
appropriate benchmark is a controversial issue among academics two alternative
benchmarks were employed to evaluate performance: the performance of other firms
in the same industry as of the acquirer and the acquiree, and the performance of a
pair of firms matched with the acquirer and acquiree on the basis of pre-merger
performance, industry relatedness, and size.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: in section 4.2 we describe the
performance measurement process; in section 4.3 the choice and the construction of
the performance benchmark are presented while in section 4.4 we provide an
alternative performance benchmark. In section 4.5 an approach for examining the
relation between market's assessment of future operating improvements from
takeovers in the period of the event announcement and the actual gains generated in
the post-takeover years is presented. Finally, a method for measuring the
employment effects ofmergers is illustrated in section 4.6.
4.2. The Measurement of Operating Performance.
Following Flealy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) the performance measure that is
employed in this study is the pre-tax and pre-depreciation operating cash flow return
on assets. Cash flows are defined as:
Sales - (Cost ofGoods Sold + Selling & Administrative Expenses) + (4.1)
Depreciation + Goodwill Expenses
The use of operating cash flows for measuring performance is considered more
reliable than the use of net earnings. This is because profits can be more easily
manipulated by managers especially before major corporate events such as
110
METHODOLOGY N. GLIMIDIS
takeovers . Moreover, cash flows represent the actual economic benefits generated
by the assets.
The definition of the operating cash flows metric that is employed in this
study suggests that the measurement of performance is unaffected by taxation, the
method of depreciation, interest expenses, and goodwill expenses. As far as goodwill
expenses are concerned, the accounting treatment up to December 1999 in the U.K.,
was to write-off purchased goodwill against shareholders reserves. From January
2000 onwards, according to Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 10, purchased
goodwill is capitalised and is amortised through the profit and loss account.
Therefore, in measuring the cash flows of our sample companies and for the control
firms, no adaptation for goodwill expenses is needed for the years from 1985 to
1999. For the years 2000 to 2002 goodwill expenses are added back, as in formula
(4.1) to get the operating cash flows.
Cash flows are computed before interest expenses so as to make the results
comparable across takeovers that were financed by different methods of payment.
When an acquisition is financed by cash or debt net earnings are computed after
deducting interest expenses that represent the cost of debt but before allowing for any
cost of equity, and therefore, for the same transaction post-merger profits will be
lower if it is financed by cash rather that if it is financed by stock. Therefore, cash
flows are computed before interest expenses so as to get a metric that reflects
differences in economic performance and not in the method of financing the
acquisition.
Changes in operating cash flows (OCF) are dependent on the size of the
assets employed to generate them. To get a metric of operating performance that is
comparable across firms, cash flows are deflated by the market value of total assets
of the firm. Following Healy et.al. (op.cit.), we use the market value instead of book
value of assets first because simplify cross-sectional comparisons3 and second.
2 For example, acquiring managers may have an increased interest to inflate earnings before the initiation of an
acquisition strategy especially when the method of payment is the acquirer's stock. According to Barber and
Lyon (1996) the use of cash flows is considered the appropriate performance measure after significant corporate
events. Management, in certain circumstances, can be motivated to overstate their reported earnings. In such
situations the researcher should use a cash-based performance measure rather than an accrual-based performance
measure, so as to avoid erroneous conclusions that sample firms have experienced an erosion in performance
post-event when sample firms are reporting lower income merely as a result of their use of accruals to overstate
earnings pre-event.
3
Companies may revaluate the book value of their assets at certain time points. This makes comparisons difficult.
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because market values represent the opportunity costs of the assets. As in Manson
et.al. (1994) total market value of assets (TMV) is approximated by the sum of the
market value of equity plus the book value of net debt plus the book value of
preferred stock at the beginning of each financial year4.
Operating cash flow for each target and each bidder is calculated for the 5
financial years prior to the takeover and the 5 financial years following the takeover,
with the year of the merger completion, i.e. the financial year in which the merger
went unconditional, being excluded5. This ensures that any special acquisition costs
or accounting treatments associated with the year of consolidation do not distort our
results. Hence, for each target and each bidder operating performance is measured
for the years -5 to -1 and the years +1 to +5.
We measure the operating performance (OP) of each pair of targets and
bidders for the pre-merger years as the pro forma consolidated operating cash flows
of the two firms deflated by the sum of their total assets. Therefore, for each pair of
target and bidder and for each pre-merger financial year, the consolidated operating
performance is:
Pro-forma pre-merger performance of the two firms:
OPu = oc^e) +ocif;r)TMV^f +TMVf;r)I ,t I ,t (4.2)
Where,
OPj,t is the consolidated operating performance for the pair of acquiree and acquirer
i, for the pre-acquisition year t.
OCFj,t(ee), is the operating cash flows for the acquiree i, for the pre-merger year t,
OCFi,t(er), is the operating cash flows for the acquirer i, for the pre-merger year t,
TMVM(ee), is the total market value of assets of the acquiree i, at the beginning of the
financial year t, and
4 The end of each financial year for each firm, however, is not perfectly aligned across firms. Therefore, we use
the calendar year in which a financial year ends to define the pre- and post-acquisition annual periods.
5 Where data were not available for a 5-year pre- and a 5-year post-merger period, we restricted our analysis to a
3-year window around the acquisition with the year of the merger completion being excluded.
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TMVj,t(er), is the total market value of assets of the acquirer i, at the beginning of the
financial year t.
t = -5, -4, -3, -2, -1.
Operating performance for the post-merger years, is measured using
accounting data of the combined entity, i.e., it is the acquirer's cash flows for each
post-merger year divided by the total market value of its assets. However, the
cumulative daily change in market value of equity6 of the acquirer and the acquiree
around the date of the event announcement is excluded from the asset base for each
one of the post-merger years.
Post-merger performance is computed using data for the combined firm.
OCF^r)OP = -
TMV{er) - TC11V1 V i t 1^'MV
Where,
t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
TCmv is the sum of the daily changes in market value of equity of the acquirer and
the acquiree between the dates from 10 days prior to the first bid (not necessarily by
the ultimate buyer in the case of the acquiree) until the date at which the merger went
unconditional, adjusted for the movements of the FTSE All Share Index in the same
period. Therefore, TCmv is the sum of the cumulative daily market adjusted changes
in equity value of the acquiree (TCmv(cc)) and the cumulative daily market adjusted
changes in equity value of the acquirer (TCMv(er)):
TC = TC(ee) + TC{er) (4 4t1 MV 1 MV ^ 1 MV
Following Gadad (2000), we calculate the market adjusted cumulative daily change
in equity value of each acquiree (acquirer) using the following formulae:











n is the date of the merger completion,
MVt is the market value of equity of the acquiree (acquirer) at the day t,
MV,_i is the market value of equity of the acquiree (acquirer) at the day t-1,
FTSE, is the Financial Times All Share Price Index at the closing day t,
FTSEn is the Financial Times All Share Price Index at the closing day t-1,
The market adjusted changes in equity in the period from 10 days before the
announcement of the first bid until the date of the merger completion are excluded
from the denominator of the measure of operating performance for the post-merger
years (formulae (4.3)), in order for any improvements in operating performance due
to merger to be revealed. In efficient stock markets, any anticipated improvements in
cash flows due to merger will be capitalised and be reflected in the market value of
equity at the period of the event announcement. Therefore, without this adjustment
possible improvements in operating performance in the post-merger years would not
be observed.
4.3. The Performance Benchmark.
Comparing post- with pre-merger performance would not be an indicative
measurement for operating performance since industry-wide or economy-wide
factors could affect merged firms' performance in the post-merger years. Healy et.al.
(1992) found that the performance of the combined entity declines in the post-
acquisition years. However, after an adjustment for industry performance merging
firms were found to exhibit a performance improvement in the post-merger years.
Factors that may affect the operating performance of all firms operating in an
industry or the economy as a whole can vary and make it difficult to distinguish
performance changes that are attributable to the takeover. For example, a change in
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interest rates, ceteris paribus, affects stock prices and the market values of firms.
Consequently, the denominator of our measure of operating performance would be
affected by such changes which are unrelated to the takeover. Therefore, the
operating performance of our sample firms must be adjusted for the acquirer's and
acquiree's industry performances so as to get a measure of performance that is
unaffected by the impact of industry-wide or economy-wide economic shocks.
The adjustment is made by measuring cash flow returns for all firms that
belong to the same industry7 with that of the acquiree and the acquirer (after
excluding the acquiree and the acquirer from the respective industry). To identify in
which Level 5 Industrial Sector an acquiree or an acquirer belongs we take as
o
reference year the year -1. Then we calculate the median value of cash flow returns
of all firms that belong to acquiree's (acquirer's) industry for each year to get the
median annual acquiree's (acquirer's) industry operating performance (IOPi,t<mee>,
IOPj,t(mer)) for the acquisition i and the year t.
For the pre-merger years, the pro forma annual median operating
performance for the acquisition i in the year t (t = -5, -1) (IOPi,t) is the weighted
average of the acquiree's median industry operating performance (IOPj>t(mee)) and
the acquirer's median industry operating performance (IOPj,t(mcr)) with the weights
being the relative total market value of the acquiree's and acquirer's assets for the
year, as in formulae (4.6).
7 Industrial definitions are based on the Datastream Level 5 Industrial Sectors which broadly correspond to the
Stock Exchange industry classifications.
8 We use median values to mitigate the impact of possible outliers.
Industry Operating Performance for the pre-merger years





It is useful to clarify at this point that there are differences in financial year-
ends for firms in the same industry. Therefore, in measuring operating performance
of industry firms, the OCF of a firm is computed for the financial year ending in the
same calendar year as the relevant financial year of the acquiree or acquirer. The
total market value is calculated by using the market value of equity at the end of the
previous calendar year combined with the book values of net debt and preferred
stock for the respective financial year.
Because acquiree and acquirer are not observed as separate entities in the
post-merger period, contemporary total market values cannot be calculated.
Therefore, (4.6) cannot be applied for measuring industry operating performance
(IOPM) for the post merger years. To get a measure of industry performance that
reflects both of the industries to which the acquiree and the acquirer belong,
following Healy et.al. (op.cit.), the weights used in constructing a pro forma post-
takeover industry median performance measure are those corresponding in the year -
1 (formulae (4.7)).
Then, industry adjusted operating performance for the takeover i for year t
(IAOPiit) is taken after subtracting the pro forma pre- and post-takeover industry
median operating performance as they calculated in (4.6) and (4.7) respectively for
takeover i for year t from the pro forma pre- and post-takeover operating
performance for takeover i for year t as they calculated in (4.2) and (4.3)
respectively. Hence,
Industry Operating Performance for the post-merger years
iopk, [tmvff ■ iop^'e)+ tmvff ■ iop^er)\tmvfj? + tmvfj?*■ > ' ' > * (4.7)
Where t = 1,
laopy -opit -iopu (4.8)
t = -5,-4, ,-1,1,...,5.
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Formulae (8) provides estimates of merging firms' operating performance that is
unaffected by contemporaneous downward or upward trends in the industries in
which acquirers and acquirees operate.
However, in examining whether operating performance increases following
acquisitions the basic question is what are the changes in cash flow returns which are
attributable to the merger? In other words, post-merger performance may be affected
by pre-merger performance if some permanent or temporary patterns in cash flows
persist over time. If for example an industry is not sufficiently competitive some
fraction of the post-merger cash flows may be due to the persistence of a competitive
advantage of the acquiree and acquirer in the post-merger years. This fraction of
performance of the two firms in the post-merger period would be observed even in
the absence of the acquisition. Therefore, to address the issue of the counterfactual
problem and to examine what is the actual performance change that is attributable to
merger, the following regression is run:
IAOlir!) = a + bIAOP;fe) + el
Where,
IAOP(pj] , is the median of the industry adjusted operating performance for the
years prior to takeover for takeover i, i.e. IAOP{pr.] = Median {IAOP^.s, , IAOPj.
.}
IAOP^pos,), is the median of the industry adjusted operating performance for the
years following the takeover i, i.e. IAOPl(posl) = Median {IAOPj, i, , IAOP^}.
In (4.9), the intercept coefficient is the measure of the abnormal industry
adjusted operating performance. This represents the mean amount of post-takeover
performance that is unexplained after controlling for the effects of the pre-merger
performance. The slope coefficient b captures any correlation in cash flow returns
between the pre- and post-merger years. Therefore, b IAOP(pj) indicates the effect of
the pre-merger performance on the post-merger performance. A positive and
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statistically significant b would indicate that if the acquiree and/or the acquirer
possess a competitive advantage before the merger, this persists in the post-merger
years and explains a significant fraction of the post-merger performance. Since the
measure of operating performance is expressed relatively to industry performance,
such a finding would indicate that U.K. industry (ies) are not sufficiently
competitive. The argument is based on the rationale that in competitive industries a
competitive advantage would very fast erode and firm's performance will return near
to the industry's norms.
The methodology for estimating changes in operating performance due to
merger that has been described so far is based on Healy's et.al. model which, for the
sake of simplicity, we will call the Regression Model since it employs a regression-
based approach to estimating any improvements in performance, post-takeover.
If (b) in (4.9) is constrained to equal one, improvements in performance are
measured as post-takeover performance less the combined, target and acquirer, pre-
takeover performance IAOPjit(p0St) - IAOPj.t(pre). Because the basis of comparison for
estimating any improvements in the post-merger period is the combined, target and
bidder pre-merger performance, this model is referred to as the Change Model.
In Chapter 6, the results, after the application of the above methodology on
our sample companies, are illustrated. In the univariate analysis, pre- and post merger
benchmarked operating performance of the sample companies is reduced to summary
statistics. The median annual industry adjusted operating performance (IAOP) of the
79 sample combined companies is illustrated for each of the pre- and post-acquisition
years and for the entire pre- and the entire post-merger periods. To test whether the
median performance is statistically different from zero, the appropriate statistical test
is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Barber and Lyon (1996)).
Univariate analysis is also extended into the Change Model and summary
statistics are reported. In this case, the median industry adjusted operating
performance of the 3 pre-acquisition years is calculated and is subtracted from the
median industry adjusted operating performance of the 3 post-merger years for each
takeover. Then, the difference between the two medians provides a measure of the
change in operating performance A (lAOPj) between the post- and the pre- acquisition
periods for takeover i. The median value of these differences is tested using the
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Wilcoxon sign-rank test9 to infer whether the median change in performance is
statistically different from zero10.
Multivariate analysis is implemented using both the Regression Model and
the Change Model11. In the regression (4.9) we added several combinations of
dummy variables which represent factors associated with the acquisition which may
determine future performance. These include the method of payment, target's
management attitude towards the acquisition offer, industry relatedness, whether the
acquisition was characterised as Strategic or Financial, the relative size of the
acquisition, and whether the acquiree was purchased with a relatively high premium
over its intrinsic value or at a discount. The definitions of these dummy variables are
provided in Chapter 6.
Relative Size of the acquisition is defined as the market value of equity of the
acquirer divided by the market value of equity of the acquiree as at the beginning of
the year -1. Then, our sample was divided into two sub-samples: the first included
the 38 largest acquisitions where bidder's size ranges from 7% to 317% of the size of
the target, while the second included the 38 smallest acquisitions of the sample
where the size of the bidder ranges from 400% to 37516% of the size of the target.
Relative Premium is defined as the Value of the Acquisition as reported from
Acquisition Monthly divided by the market value of equity of the acquiree as at the
beginning of the year -1. Two sub-samples were constructed following the above
definitions; one that included companies that engaged in acquisitions where the
acquirer paid for the acquiree an amount that ranged from 16% to 100% of
acquiree's market value of equity, and a second sub-sample, where the acquirer paid
an amount that ranged from 168% to 659% of the acquiree's market value of equity.
The first sub-sample consists of acquisitions that were closed at a discount; 27 such
acquisitions were found. The second sub-sample consists of acquisitions that were
closed at a relatively high premium; as relatively high premium was considered a
9
Siegel and Castellan (1988), provide a detailed description of how Wilcoxon signed-rank test is implemented.
10 The same test is used to examine the median change in industry adjusted operating performance between the
years 2 and 3 and the year -1. By excluding the first post-acquisition year we ensure that the estimate of
performance change is unaffected by one-time costs related to the acquisition which may incur in the first post-
acquisition year and are unlikely to be repeated in the following years.
" It is appropriate to note at this point that the Change Model is produced by the Regression Model if we restrict
the coefficient of the independent variable IAOP(pre) in (4.9) to equal 1.
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premium which exceeded by more than 50% the intrinsic value of the acquiree - 27
such acquisitions were identified in our sample.
Using the Change Model in multivariate analysis required us to define
alternative dependent variables so as to examine the fraction of post-merger
performance which was explained by the aforementioned dummy variables with
varying post-merger periods. Therefore, we examined the change in the median
industry adjusted operating performance between the 5 year post- and the 5 year pre¬
merger periods (IAOPch5), the change in the median industry adjusted operating
performance between the 3 year post- and the 3 year pre-merger periods (IAOPch3),
and the change in the median industry adjusted operating performance between the 2
year pre- and the 2 year post-merger periods (IAOPch2), for each takeover. Finally,
a fourth measure of performance change was adopted; the change in the median
industry adjusted operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1
for each takeover (IAOPch23). This measure of performance change provides an
indication of the immediate effects on performance of the acquisition since it
compares operating performance of the second and third post-acquisition years and
performance of the first year prior to takeover; the first post-acquisition year is
excluded since the performance might reflect costs associated to the acquisition
which is unlikely to be repeated in the following years.
4.4. An Alternative Performance Benchmark
Ghosh (2001) shows that if acquiring firms outperform their industry peers in
the pre-merger period due to either permanent or temporary factors both the
Regression and the Change Model can lead to biased estimates of performance
improvements. According to Ghosh, the Regression Model can give unbiased
estimates of performance improvements only when any superior pre-acquisition
performance of the acquirer is expected to be permanent and persistent in the future;
then, controlling for pre-acquisition performance can solve the problem. However, if
superior pre-acquisition performance of the acquirer is related to temporary factors, it
is unlikely to persist in the future. Therefore, superior pre-acquisition performance
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will decay over time. In this case, Ghosh demonstrates, both the Regression and the
Change Model will lead to biased estimates of performance improvements. Because
there is evidence in the literature that acquiring firms tend to outperform their
industry peers in the years prior to takeover and that they are typically large firms
relatively to their industry standards (Penman, 1991), it is important to employ a
research design that counts for the possibility of biased estimates due to the existence
of unusually high cash flows in the pre-acquisition period.
Following Ghosh (op.cit.), we compare post- and pre-acquisition operating
performance of merging firms relative to control firms which are matched on the
basis of industrial relatedness, pre-acquisition performance and size. This research
design assumes that if merging firms exhibit unusually high operating performance
in the pre-acquisition years, then the fraction of the permanent and temporary
components of factors that lead to the increased cash flows, as well as the decay of
the cash flow ratio over time must be similar for merging and matched firms. Barber
and Lyon (1996) also suggest that for sample firms that perform unusually well or
poorly, test statistics are well specified only when operating performance is
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compared to matched firms on the basis of pre-event performance and size .
The matching procedure that was adopted in this study is similar to that
suggested by Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Ghosh (2001). We select a pair of
matched firms for each acquiree and acquirer in the following way: all firms in the
acquiree's and acquirer's industries with market value of equity between 25% and
200% of that of the acquiree and the acquirer respectively (as at one year prior to the
takeover) are ranked by their operating cash flows. Then, firms with cash flows
closest to those of the acquiree and the acquirer firms are chosen as the pair of
matching firms. The pro forma data of matched firms are then aggregated for each
year as in the case of merging firms in the pre-acquisition years (as in 4.2) to get a
metric of operating performance of the control firms. If no firm satisfies the above
12 However, as can be seen in Chapter 6, oui sample companies do not exhibit unusually good or bad
pertormance relatively to the industry median. In fact, the industry adjusted operating performance of the sample
companies is not statistically different from zero indicating that the median combined target and bidder perform
as well as their industry peers. Nonetheless, we employ both research designs - the Regression Model and the
Change Model - using the two alternative benchmarks; the median industry performance and the matched firm's
performance to make our results comparable with those provided by Healy et.al. and Ghosh.
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requirements then the criterion of size is extended by selecting firms between the
25% and 400% of the size of acquirer or acquiree one year prior to the takeover13.
In Chapter 7, the results from the univariate and multivariate analysis on the
performance of merging firms are illustrated. Operating performance of the pro
forma accounting data of the combined matched firms are subtracted from the pro
forma data of the combined acquiree and acquirer for the pre-merger years to provide
matched firm adjusted operating performance (MAOPj) for the takeover i for each
year and for the entire pre-merger period. In the post-merger years the operating
performance that is derived from the pro forma data of the matched firms are
subtracted from the operating performance of the combined entity to provide
matched firm adjusted operating performance (MAOPj) for takeover i for the post-
merger years and for the entire post-merger period14. We also report the change in
median matched firm adjusted operating performance between the 3 year post-
merger period and the 3 year pre-merger period A(MAOP). This is derived by taking
the median of the matched firm adjusted operating performance of years -3 to -1 for
each takeover to represent the pre-acquisition period. Similarly, post-acquisition
period is represented by the median of matched firm adjusted operating performance
of the years 1 to 3 for each takeover. The difference of the median post-merger
operating performance and the median pre-merger operating performance for the
takeover i is then A(MAOPj). In the same way we derived the difference in median
matched firm adjusted operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year
-1 for each takeover. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was then applied on the values
ofA(MAOPj) to test whether its median value is statistically different from zero.
When operating performance is adjusted using pairs of matched firms,
multivariate analysis performs similar tests as those that are performed when industry
firms' performance is used as a benchmark (the respective dependent variables in
this case are (MAOPch5), (MAOPch3), (MAOPch2), and (MAOPch23), and
regression (4.9) is as follows:
13 Powel and Stark (2005) extended the size criterion to get matched firms between 0% and 300%.
14 The cumulative daily market adjusted change of the market value of equity of the acquirer and the acquiree is
subtracted from the denominator of the cash flow ratio in each of the post-merger years to reveal any
improvements in cash flows.
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MAOPiipost) =a + bMAOP-pre) + e, (4.10)
Multivariate analysis is performed by use of Ordinary Least Square
Regressions (OLS) when industry firms are the control group of firms for
performance adjustment, as well as when pairs of matched firms are used as a
benchmark. The appropriate software for the implementation of these regressions
was considered to be the SPSS. However, in many cases an unknown form of
heteroscedasticity was detected after applying the Koenker-Basset Heteroscedasticity
Test15. Therefore, we re-ran our (OLS) regressions correcting for heteroscedasticity
using White's heteroscedasticity-corrected variances. This was implemented in
LMDEP.8. We report our corrected results from the OLS regressions at the ends of
Chapters 6 and 7, and we illustrate uncorrected results in Appendix. When
appropriate, i.e. when there are more than two regressors we apply multicollinearity
tests to diagnose the possibility that an independent variable has a linear relationship
with another one. The tests used were that of the condition index k, that of tolerance,
and the variance inflationfactor.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we report the change in unadjusted sales (A SALES), the
change in unadjusted operating costs (A Operating Costs) and the change in the
unadjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales (A Number of
employees per thousand of sales) and the change in unadjusted employment costs
per sales (A Employee costs per Sales) between the post- and the pre-merger
periods16. In Chapter 7 we report the median change in adjusted operating costs per
sales (A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted). The adjustment for the pre-merger
years is made by subtracting from the operating costs per sales of the combined
acquiree and acquirer the operating costs per sales of a combined pair of matched
firms. Data of the acquiree and acquirer and of the pair of matched firms are
aggregated as in (4.2). For the post-merger years the combined data of the pair of
15 A full description of this test is in Gujarati (2003, p.415). The specific test was considered as the appropriate
for detecting heteroscedasticity since it can be applied regardless of whether there is one regressor or many.
16 The respective values are calculated as following: we subtract the median value of each variable for the post-
merger years from the median value of each variable for the pre-merger years for each acquisition. Then, we get
the median value from all acquisitions for the respective variable. For the pre-merger years we use data from the
combined acquiree and acquirer as in the case of the unadjusted pre-merger performance (see 4.2) while for the
post merger years we use data from the combined entity.
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matched firms are subtracted from the relevant data of the united entity. Then, for
each acquisition we find the difference between the median adjusted operating costs
per sales for the post-merger years and the median adjusted operating costs per sales
for the pre-merger period. The median value for all acquisitions is A Operating Costs
per Sales-Adjusted.
4.5. Testing the Stock Market Assessment for Future Cash Flows.
As discussed in the previous Chapter there is a disparity in the results
concerning M&As profitability between short term stock price studies and long term
stock price and accounting studies. If the stock market is informationally efficient
there should be a positive relation between stock price returns to shareholders at the
event announcement and the post-merger operating cash flow returns. Therefore, we
test whether abnormal returns in market value of equity of the acquiree and acquirer
in the period around the event announcement can be explained by the actual
operating performance (cash flow return on total assets) in the post-merger years.
However, because operating performance is measured as cash flow returns on assets
and the merger announcement returns are returns on equity, asset returns at merger
announcement must be computed from equity returns to make the anticipated gains
from the merger and the actual performance changes to be comparable.
According to Healy et.al. (1992) and Ghosh (2001) abnormal asset returns at
the merger announcement are the weighted average of returns to equity and debt.
Assuming that the value of debt does not change at takeover announcement17,
abnormal asset returns equal abnormal equity returns times the equity to assets ratio
(E/TMV).
We compute the cumulative daily abnormal returns of the market value of
equity (CMARE) from 10 days before the event announcement until the day the
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merger went unconditional for each acquiree and for each acquirer, using the
following formula:
17 See Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982).
18 To compute abnormal equity returns we select a time interval from 10 before the official announcement of the
merger so as to capture the effects on stock price from any leakage of information, and we measure equity returns
until the day the merger went unconditional to capture investors' perceptions about the merger for all the period











CMARE is the cumulative daily abnormal returns on equity,
n is the day at which the takeover went unconditional,
MV, is the market value of equity at the closing of day t
MV,_i is the market value of equity at the closing of the previous day of day t,
FTSEf is the Financial Times All Share Price Index at the closing day t,
FTSEm is the Financial Times All Share Price Index at the closing day t-1,
Thus, the cumulative daily abnormal returns of assets of each acquiree
(CMARA(ce)) and each acquirer (CMARA<er)) is the product of (4.11) times the
equity market value from the year prior to the takeover to total market value of assets
(E/TMV).
Hence, the cumulative daily asset abnormal returns of the combined acquiree
and acquirer (WCMARA) is the weighted average of the acquiree and the acquirer
asset returns where TMV of assets from the year prior to the takeover (i.e. the year -







We include WCMARA in the regression (4.9) as an independent variable so
as to examine how asset returns are correlated with post-merger operating




IAOP;post) =a + bIAOP-pre) + cWCMARA, + e; (4.13)
Similarly, when the benchmark for operating performance adjustment is a pair of
matched firms, (4.13) becomes:
MAOPipost) = a + bMAOP^pre) + cWCMARAi + e.t (4.14)
If abnormal asset returns reflect stock price revaluation because of improvements in
future cash flows from acquisitions, then the coefficient (c) in (4.13) and (4.14)
should be positive and statistically significant. Healy et.al. assume that other benefits
(than operating performance improvements) to the total market value of the firm
from takeovers are negligible, and therefore, the intercept coefficient (a) should be
insignificantly different from zero. However, Manson et.al. (1994. p.30) suggest that
'no such evidence exists one way or another in the U.K. about the size of (or lack of)
other benefits from takeovers'. Further, Powel and Stark (2005) argue that the
possible operating performance improvements are not necessarily the only source of
gains from takeovers and therefore, WCMARA should capitalise all the benefits
expected to arise from takeovers. This argument is based on the assumption that
markets are informationally efficient. Thus, a statistically significant (a) would
indicate that there is at least a proportion of the post-merger operating performance
that is not explained by the market's assessment at the announcement.
Following Ghosh (op.cit.) we also test the relation between the change in
cash flows between the post- and pre-acquisition years and the abnormal asset
returns in the period of the event announcement. Formally, we ran the following
regression:
WCMARA i=a + b{MAOP.) + ei (4.i5)
Similarly, when the benchmark for operating performance adjustment is a pair of
matched firms, (4.15) becomes:
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WCMARAi =a + b(AMAOPi) + e. (4.16)
If the stock market correctly forecasts changes in operating performance due to
acquisition and capitalises them in the period of the event announcement, then (b) in
(4.15) and (4.6) should be positive and statistically significant.
4.6. Examining the Employment Effects of Mergers.
We measure the number of employees per '000 pounds of sales19 for the pre¬
merger years of the combined acquiree and acquirer (NESj,t(pre)) using the combined
data of the two firms for each of the years t = -5, -1, for acquisition i, as in (4.17):
NEi ,(ee) + NE,(etr)
NESUre)= »'(„) ~ ~(er)' t = -5, ...,-1 (4.17)
"i,t i,t
Where,
NEM(ee) is the number of employees the acquiree i employs in year t,
NEj,t<er) is the number of employees the acquirer i employs in year t,
Sj,t(ce) denotes the sales reported in thousand of pounds of the acquiree i in year t, and
Sj,t(cr) denotes the sales reported in thousand of pounds of the acquirer i in the year t.
In the post-merger years we use data for the combined entity for measuring
the number of employees per '000 pounds of sales (NESj,t(post)) for each of the years
t-1, 5 for acquisition i, as in (4.18):
NEit(er)
NEST'^-^r t- 1, .... 5 (4.18)
19 This metric was chosen to make results comparable across firms. Some firms employ less employees than
others - ceteris paribus - depending on the degree to which their operations are labour intensive.
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Then, the industry adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales for
the acquisition i for each year is:
NESlf = NEStJ -NES;,m> t-1....5 (4.19)
Where:
NESt(IND) denotes the median number of employees per thousand pounds of sales of
all firms in all the Level 5 Industrial Sectors of the Stock Exchange Year Book for
which data are available in Datastream.
In chapter 8, the results after applying the above methodology are illustrated.
Pre- and post merger benchmarked operating performance of the sample companies
is reduced to summary statistics. The median annual industry adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales (NES) of the 79 sample combined
companies is illustrated for each of the pre- and post-acquisition years and for the
entire pre- and the entire post-merger periods. To test whether the median
performance is statistically different from zero, the appropriate statistical test is the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Barber and Lyon (1996)).
We also estimate the median change of the industry adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre-
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merger periods , A (NE per '000 Sales). For each acquisition, we estimate the median
industry adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales for the pre¬
merger years and for the post-merger years. Subtracting the latter from the former we
get the median change of the industry adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales for each acquisition. The median value of these differences from all
sample acquisitions is then, the median change in the adjusted number of employees
per thousand pounds of sales for the sample companies A (NE per '000 Sales). We test
whether this value is statistically different from zero using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test.
20 When the relevant data for a 5-year window are not available we estimate the median change in the adjusted
number of employees using data for a three year window.
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The pre- and post-merger employee costs per sales (ECSj,t) for year t and for
acquisition i are calculated similarly:
, , EC^f+EC,(!r)ECS{pre) = T-T- 7~T-c(ee) c(er) ^ (4.20)i,t
'




c(er) t = 1, 5 (4.21)
i,t
Where,
ECSj,t(pre) is the employee costs per sales for the combined acquiree and acquirer for
the acquisition i, for the pre-merger year t,
ECi(t(ee) is the employee costs for the acquiree that participates in the acquisition i for
the pre-merger year t,
ECj,t(er) is the employee costs for the acquirer that participates in the acquisition i for
the pre-merger year t,
Si,t(ee) represents the sales of the acquiree that participates in acquisition i for the pre¬
merger year t,
Si,t(er) represents the sales of the acquirer that participates in acquisition i for the pre¬
merger year t.
ECSi,t(post) is the employee costs per sales for the combined acquiree and acquirer for
the acquisition i for the post-merger year t.
Then, the industry adjusted employee costs per sales for acquisition i for each year
is:




ECSt(IND) is the median value of the employee costs per sales of all firms that belong
to all Level 5 Industrial Sectors of the Stock Exchange Year Book for which data are
available in Datastream. Summary statistics for the annual industry adjusted
employee costs per sales for the each pre- and post- acquisition years is illustrated in
Chapter 8.
The median change of employee costs per sales between the post- and the
pre-merger periods A (EC per Sales) is calculated by subtracting the median value of
the employee costs per sales for the 5-year post-merger period from the median value
of the employee costs per sales for the 5-year pre-merger-period for each sample
acquisition. The median value of these differences is the median change of employee
cost per sales, and the statistical significance of this value is tested using the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
We use multivariate analysis to examine the effects ofM&As on employment
and employee costs for specific sub-samples of mergers that share certain common
characteristics after controlling for other factors that may affect employment and
employee costs after the acquisition. The independent variables are described in
chapter 8 and include variables that denote the method of payment, whether the
acquisition was hostile or friendly, industry relatedness, the strategic orientation of
the takeover, whether the deal was closed at a discount or the acquirer paid a
relatively high premium, and whether the acquisition was characterised as large or
small.
The dependent variables in these regressions were the change in the median
adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales between the 3-year post-
and the 3-year pre-merger periods (A_nr_EMPL), and the change in the median
adjusted employee costs per sales between the 3-year post- and the 3-year pre-merger
periods (A_EMPL_COSTS).
As a more precise benchmark indicator, the combined number of employees
per thousand pounds of sales and the combined employee costs per sales of a pair of
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matched firms for each acquiree and acquirer were chosen to get the adjusted
values of the respective variables.




In this Chapter the methodology applied in this work was presented. Two
alternative approaches for measuring operating performance of the U.K. M&As were
applied; Healy's et.al. Regression Model and Ghosh's Change Model. Moreover,
operating performance was adjusted for the industry's operating performance and for
the operating performance of pairs of firms matched with acquiree and acquirer on
the basis of pre-merger performance, size and industry relatedness.
Following Healy et.al., we estimate post-merger operating performance
changes after controlling for the effects of pre-merger operating performance to get
the fraction of performance changes in the post-merger years that is attributable
solely to the existence of the acquisition and not to permanent or temporary factors
that are related to pre-merger performance. This is examined using both the chosen
benchmarks for performance adjustment.
The correlation between the market's assessment of the future takeover gains
in the event announcement period and the actual benefits that are attributable to
takeover are also examined. Finally, we describe a method for measuring the effects
of the U.K. M&As on employment and on employment cost. The results from the
application of the above methodology are presented in detail in chapters 6, 7 and 8.
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CHAPTER 5.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA PROCESSING.
5.1. Introduction.
In this Chapter we describe the sources and the selection criteria for
constructing our sample and the benchmark of control firms for evaluating merging
firms' performance. Information that is provided in the Appendix of this chapter is
useful for the reader to follow the procedure by which we manipulated the data
retrieved from the alternative sources in order to get our final sample. The structure
of this chapter is as following: in the Section 5.2 we analytically illustrate the criteria
and the requirements for the sample construction procedure starting from the
retrieval of the 'raw' data until the point we get our final sample. In the section 5.3
we describe how we get industrial sector data so as to construct our industrial firms'
benchmark portfolios. In section 5.4 we discuss the criteria for creating our matched
firms' benchmark portfolio, and finally, in the conclusions we discuss some of the
difficulties that we faced in collecting and manipulating our data.
5.2. Sample Construction
The period of this study extends from the year 1990 up to 1996, i.e. it
includes the acquisitions that were completed within this period. We believe that
extending the period in examination after 1996 would entail the risk of obtaining
results that are affected from time-specific factors related to the late 1990's stock
market fluctuations. The companies are selected so as both the bidder and the target
are public companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. All the companies
should belong to manufacturing and service sectors, while banks, insurance
companies, building societies and any other financial institutions are excluded1.
1 The accounts of these firms are not comparable with industrial and service sector firms' accounts; the nature of
sales, assets, and other components of cash flow returns are different for financial firms.
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The selection took place using as a source the Acquisitions Monthly2
periodical where all the mergers and acquisitions, taking place in the UK, are quoted
in its monthly issues. Initially, 205 transactions involving 410 companies with the
preceding characteristics were identified. In a second step, where the bidder or the
target was a utility or a transportation company, the acquisition was excluded
because of the special regulatory requirements imposed by the government regarding
the pricing of their services; 11 such transactions were identified - one acquisition
took place in the telecommunications sector, five in electricity, four in the water
industry, and one acquisition was related to transportation. Moreover, 12 transactions
where either the acquiree or the acquirer or both were involved in business related to
real estate investments, were excluded, due to the differences in the accounts
between those companies and the rest of the sample3. This reduced the sample to 182
acquirers and their respective acquirees (table 5.1 in Appendix).
In all acquisitions the acquirer purchased a majority holding in the acquiree
as indicated by the information available in Acquisitions Monthly. Acquisitions
Monthly was also the source for the announcement dates of the event, the completion
dates - i.e. the date on which the bid went unconditional, the size of the acquirer and
the acquiree in terms of sales in the year before the acquisition and the method of
financing the transaction.
Acquisitions Monthly lists acquisitions where the target is a 'public'
company, that is, a U.K firm listed on the L.S.E., but it does not state whether the
bidder is listed. To discover if the bidder was listed we consulted DATASTREAM.
All of the 182 bidders were found to be listed companies.
A necessary requirement for this work and the implementation of the
methodology was that accounting data was available for the entire sample-all bidders
and targets- in DATASTREAM during the whole period in question. Unfortunately,
this further reduced the number of sample companies down to 59.
The sample of the 182 transactions can be divided into three sub-samples.
There were 40 transactions (table 5.2 in Appendix), where for both the involved
parties a full five-year window of accounting data surrounding the completion date
2
Acquisitions Monthly lists all the U.K. acquisitions - domestic and international, private and public - in contrast
to Datastream which simply provides the list of the 'dead' companies without referring to the reason of their
'death'.
3 This is for the same reason as explained in footnote 1.
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existed in DS, with the year of the completion (year 0) not included. In the case of 19
transactions (table 5.3 in Appendix) a three-year window was available. For 123
acquisitions DS contained accounting data for less than three years prior to or after
the year 0 for either the target or the bidder or for both. This last sub-sample of 123
transactions for which there was not a complete 5 or 3 year window of accounting
data in DS around the completion date subdivided into 8 sub samples with regard
their characteristics of completeness:
1. For 42 acquisitions the targets had a complete five year window around the
completion year while the bidders had no accounting data in Datastream
(table 5.4 in Appendix).
2. For 5 acquisitions the targets had a complete three year window and the
bidders had no data (table 5.5 in Appendix),
3. For 3 acquisitions the targets had accounting data for some years around the
completion year but less than three years, while bidders had no data (table 5.6
in Appendix),
4. For 8 transactions the bidders had a complete five year window of accounting
data around the completion date, while their targets had no data at all (table
5.7 in Appendix),
5. For 5 transactions the bidders had a three year window while the relevant
targets had no data (table 5.8 in Appendix),
6. In 4 transactions the bidders had accounting data in DS for some years around
the event but for less than a three year window and the relevant targets had no
accounting data in DS (table 5.9 in Appendix),
7. For 10 acquisitions DS did not provided for accounting data either for the
targets or for the bidders (table 5.10 in Appendix), and, finally,
8. In 46 cases DS provided accounting data for both the target and the bidder
but for either of them or for both, for an incomplete period around the
completion date of the event; i.e. for less than three years or for three or five
years prior to or after the completion year but not immediately prior to or
after it (table 5.11 Appendix).
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Therefore, if we rely only on DS to gain the necessary accounting data the initial
sample of the 182 acquisitions for the period in question is reduced to 59; 40 with
five year window and 19 with three year window. In other words, the results of this
study would rely only on less than the one third of the initial sample. While this
number could be regarded as satisfactory in comparison to the number of companies
used in previous similar studies for the UK and Australia4, it was considered
necessary to extend the number of companies as much as possible, using
complementary sources, to make the results as representative and robust as possible.
To increase the sample size we consulted Companies House to acquire accounting
data for more companies for the initial sample. Companies House provides the
annual accounts - Balance-Sheets, Profit-Loss accounts and Cash Flow Statements -
as well as information about the strategic decisions of the firm as they are expressed
in the annual report of the Board, the realisation of any other significant acquisitions
within the period of study and the name changes of the firm in the past. This last
piece of information was considered extremely useful for obtaining the market
capitalisation of the firms whose accounts retrieved from Companies House for past
dates, consulting Financial Times past issues, as it is described below.
For the companies involved in the 59 acquisitions, for which data are
available in DS, market capitalisation can be retrieved from DS at the date of
issuance of their accounts, and at the days before the announcement of the event and
at the date of the completion. But this information is not provided by Companies
House. However, having gained the history of the name changes for each company
from the Companies House data base, the relevant past issues of Financial Times
were employed. In most of these cases Market Capitalisation of each firm was
provided at the date in question. There were, however, a considerable number of
dates at which FT issues did not provide the market value of the firm but only the
share price at the closing of this day. In cases such as these, the 'gaps' were filled
using information provided in the Stock Exchange Year-Book.
To calculate market capitalisation, the value of the share price that was taken from
the FT at the date in question was multiplied by the number of outstanding ordinary
shares at the same date. The latter was extracted dividing the nominal value of equity
4 In their study for the UK, Manson et.al. (1994) examined 38 takeovers, while Sharma & Ho (2002) in their
study for Australian takeovers examined 36 cases.
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with the nominal value each ordinary share as these values provided in the section of
the Stock Exchange Year-Book called 'Capital' for each firm. The section 'Capital
History'' was used so as to identify the dates of any capital increases across the years
and the relevant nominal values of equity to be employed for the calculation of the
number of outstanding ordinary shares; then, the market capitalisation at the date in
question was calculated using the share price value taken from the FT.
A limitation at this point was that in most cases the SEYB refers to capital
increases and provides the month and the year of each such event. Since one of the
dates in question for the estimation of the market value of each firm was the
completion date of the acquisition, where an increase in share capital took place
within the month of the completion it was assumed that the increase took place
before the completion, as it is the case in practice, whatever the method of payment
for the transaction.
In total, for 49 (table 5.12 in Appendix) companies data were available in the
Companies House database for a five year window or for a three year window
around the completion of the acquisition - the year of the completion excluded. For
the rest of the companies the data for the bidder or the target (or both) had either
been archived from the files of CH or one of the participants was private until a
period of less than three years before or after the acquisition or for some reason some
of the annual accounts in the years surrounding the merger, were missing.
From the 49 companies whose annual accounts we gained from the Companies
House database, 39 were bidders and 10 were targets corresponding to 53 (Appendix
1-Part 1, table 12) acquisitions. Furthermore, one of the 39 bidders took place in two
acquisitions but with a sufficient time period between them, so as for the two
transactions to be treated in the sample as if they were made by two different
bidders5.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to include all the 53 acquisitions in the final
sample, since as has been stated above, market values or share price values must be
available in the FT for all these companies on the date their accounts were published
and for all the three or five years surrounding the year of the acquisition and one
month before the announcement of the acquisition and at the date of its completion.
5 Coats Viyella acquired Tootal Group and Atkins Group in 1995 and 1991 respectively.
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Table 5.12 in Appendix shows that for 11 bidders and for 4 targets6 these values were
not available at least in one of them, and thus, the number of acquisitions that were
included in the sample is reduced to 38.
Data availability for these 38 acquisitions allows calculations to be extended
to a 5 year window for 17 acquisitions and to a 3 year window for 21 of them. As a
result, the initial sample consisting of data derived from DataStream was increased to
97 pairs of companies in total (40+19+38). Analytically, the list of the eight sub-
samples mentioned above, was configured, after having been completed with the
accounting data and the market capitalisation values of the companies available in
Companies House and FT. (See Tables 5.13, 5.14, Appendix).
In summary, from both the main sources of data - the DataStream and the
Companies House databases - 194 companies had a full set of accounting and
market capitalisation data, and were involved in 97 acquisitions within the period
from 1990 to 1996. Using Companies House as a complementary source to
DataStream for accounting data, and the relevant past issues of Financial Times
and the Stock Exchange Year-Book, it was made possible to increase the number
of acquisitions in the sample from 59 to 97; 58 of them having data for a 5-year
window and 39 with a 3-year window around the year of the merger completion -
the year of the completion always excluded. In other words, it made possible the
increase in the number of the acquisitions to more than half of the initial sample.
As has been already explained in the methodology chapter, the possible change
in performance of the merged firms is detected by measuring cash flow returns for
time periods prior to and after the event. This approach creates some problems
when a bidder takes part in more than one significant acquisition within the period
of study7. In such cases the cash flow returns after the takeover under examination,
may be biased upward if a bidder acquired another target before that takeover and
biased downward if the bidder took part in another acquisition after it and the
method of payment was cash. If the method of payment was stock or a
combination of stock and cash, again, biases in the results may arise since cash
6 In the case of the acquisition of Parkdean leisure by Vardon, for the former market capitalization values do not
exist while for the latter are available, and consequently the transaction is not included in the sample.
7 In some cases this period extents form three year before the acquisition to three years after it, the year of the
completion of the acquisition not included while in some other cases it extents form five year before to five year
after the acquisition, the year of the completion not included.
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flow returns are estimated using the market value of assets which may be affected
substantially when an acquisition takes place.
To avoid such biases in the results of this study, bidders that took part in more
than one significant acquisition within the period in question were excluded. An
acquisition is defined as a 'significant' one, if the size of the target, measured by
sales in the year prior to the acquisition, is at least one third of the size of the sales
of the respective bidder in the same year. While this restriction makes the results
more robust, it has the drawback that it further reduces the size of the sample. As a
result, the size of the sample is reduced down to 85. Analytically, the process for
taking account of bidders that engaged in multiple acquisitions is explained below.
In the initial sample of the 182 transactions, 22 bidders took part in more than
one acquisition, totalling 49 acquisitions (table 5.15, Appendix). After allowing for
the reductions in the initial sample, due to the lack of data, 29 acquisitions included
in the final sample of the 97 transactions which have been conducted by 18 acquirers.
In other words, for 20 such acquisitions - where the bidder purchased more than one
companies - a complete set of data was not available in any of the sources used, and
therefore, these acquisitions had already been excluded due to the lack of data in the
previous stage (table 5.16, Appendix). From the 29 acquisitions, 12 were excluded
(Table 5.17, Appendix) for the following reasons:
1. either because the bidders took part in at least one more significant
acquisition within the period of this study,
2. or because a bidder that purchased a target for which there was not a
complete set of data in a 'significant' acquisition, also took part in other
acquisitions which had complete data and were all 'insignificant'.
Consequently, only 17 acquisitions (table 5.18, Appendix) were included in the
sample after the above filtering, and thus, the number of acquisitions is reduced to 85
(Table 5.19, Appendix).
It should be noted that allowing for the effect of possible multiple significant
acquisitions made by one bidder enhances the potential of the sample to produce
reliable results without sacrificing a substantial number of acquisitions. Only 12
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acquisitions were excluded for this reason, since 20 out of the 49 would have been
excluded in any case due to the lack of data.
However, while the period of study includes acquisitions that took place from
1990 to 1996, the year-window for some acquisitions in the sample can be
extended from 1985 to 1990 and from 1996 to 20018. To further purify the sample
we considered whether some of the sample bidders engaged in more than one
significant acquisition within these two periods, as well. Unfortunately, for the
period from 1985 to the end of 1989 data was not available for comparison9. The
delistings from the London Stock Exchange board ware examined for the period
from the 1st of January 1997 to the 31st of December 2001 as an alternative source
of data in order to avoid any further increase in the cost of this work. It was found
that BTR SIEBE made a significant acquisition in the first quarter of 1997, and
therefore the number of sample acquisitions was reduced to 8410. Moreover, while
the acquisition of BARTON by EVERED was in the initial list of the companies
with complete data, it was excluded due to the lack of data for the year 1990 from
Companies House database. For the same reason we excluded the acquisitions of
Gabbicci by Helene and Hawker Sidley by BTR11. Finally, Thames was purchased
by Thorn EMI in 1991 and then it was sold to Pearson in 1993, and for this reason
these two acquisitions were excluded from the sample. Thus, the final number of
acquisitions in examination for the period from the beginning of 1990 to the end of
1996 is 79 (table 5.20 in Appendix).
To avoid biases in cash flow returns, arising from cash that may have been
used for another significant acquisition than that in question, requires an
examination not only of the purchasing behaviour of the sample companies in the
domestic market but also of their international purchasing activity. Therefore, the
possibility that an acquirer made an international and 'significant' acquisition was
• • 12also examined. The source was again Acquisitions Monthly .
8 This depends on what is the year of the completion of the merger and how many years prior to and after the
event the performance is examined.
9 National Library of Scotland provides Acquisitions Monthly issues from 1990 onwards.
10 We excluded from our sample the acquisition of Unitech by Siebe which took place in 1996.
" While data for those companies appeared to be complete in CH database, their Pdf files were corrupted for
some years.
12 The sample of the 83 bidders and targets that participated in the corresponding acquisitions was compared with
the relevant section in the Periodical where all the UK bidders that made an international acquisition are quoted
along with their size in terms of sales, the value of the acquisition, and the size and the nationality of the target.
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It was found that in the period from the beginning of 1990 to the end of 1996,
156 such acquisitions were made by the sample companies for which at least some
details of the transaction were disclosed. The vast majority of the 156 bids come
from the sample bidders and only a few from the sample targets. Moreover, it is
obvious from the table 5.21 in Appendix, that in the specific time period most of
the sample companies which were engaged in international takeover activity
disposed to a relatively small amount of their cash in comparison to their size
measured by sales. In other words, most of the sample companies took part in
insignificant international acquisitions, in the sense described above. Where the
target's sales size was not available the definition of a significant acquisition was
modified so as to include acquisitions whose value exceeded one third of the
bidder's sales. Still, significant acquisitions were not absent.
In total, from the 156 international transactions made by the sample
companies, 12 were significant in the sense that either the value of the international
acquisition exceeded that of the domestic acquisition made by the same bidder, or
the foreign target's sales value exceeded one third of the sales value of the bidder,
while the domestic acquisition made by the respective bidder was much smaller.
It is noteworthy that the 12 sample companies made 62 international
acquisitions within the period of study, i.e. 40% of the total number of international
takeovers was made by the 12 sample companies. However, most of them, if not all
of them, could not be characterised as strategically important, neither did such
acquisition decisions have substantial impacts on the cash flow to the domestic
parent company for a number of reasons. First, while the 12 aforementioned
acquisitions 'violate' the criteria that were set to categorise a takeover as
insignificant, in fact they represent only a part of a persisting managerial behaviour
of acquiring foreign companies. Second, none of them is what is usually called a
'mega-merger', which means that in absolute terms these acquisitions can be
characterised as small ones. Third, from information retrieved from Acquisitions
Monthly many of them represent purchasing decisions taken by the mother
company in order to support the activities of its foreign subsidiaries or as a step for
expansion into foreign markets where a subsidiary was already in operation.
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Therefore, given the nature of the international acquisitions conducted by the
sample companies it was not considered necessary to further reduce the sample of
the domestic acquisitions from 83 to 71. Such a reduction would not be necessarily
offset by more robust final results. A summary of the sample construction is
provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Sample Construction Process
Number Description
205 Acquisitions between Public Companies from Acquisitions Monthly
-11 Utilities & transport sectors (bidder or target)
-12 Real Estate Investment (bidder or target)
= 182
-123 Incomplete Data (see breakdown below)
-42 Target with 5 year window - bidder with no data in DS
-5 Target with 3 year window - bidder with no data in DS
-3 Target with data for less than 3 years - bidder with no data in DS
-8 Bidder with 5 year window - target with no data in DS
-5 Bidder with 3 year window - target with no data in DS
-4 Bidder with data for less than 3 years - target with no data in DS
-10 No data for neither bidder nor target
-46 Incomplete
= 59 Total with data from DS, with complete 5 or 3-year window (see
breakdown below)
40 Where both bidder & target have 5 year window
19 Where both bidder & target have 3 year window
From Companies House (by completing data for companies from the 123
acquisitions with incomplete data from DS)
+ 38 With a complete 5 or 3-year window (see breakdown below)
17 With 5-year window
21 With 3-year window
=97 Total with a complete 5 or 3-year window from DS and Comp. House
-12 Removed due to multiple acquisitions from bidder
=85
-2 Firms involved in purchase and resale within the examined period
-2 Bidder performed significant acquisition in 1997
-2 Incomplete Companies House data for year 1990
= 79 FINAL TOTAL
The allocation of acquisitions across the years under examination is illustrated in
the following table:
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The sample consists of 158 companies - 79 bidders and their respective targets -
corresponding to 79 acquisitions that took place within the period from the 1st of January
1990 until the 31s' of December 1996.









In the sample 16 acquisitions were financed by cash, 22 were financed by stock and
42 acquisitions were financed by a combination of cash and stock (tables 5.21, 5.22,
and 5.23 respectively, in Appendix). There were also 18 hostile acquisitions and 61
friendly (Tables 5.24 and 5.25 respectively in Appendix). The acquisitions where the
acquiree and the acquirer belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector one year
prior to acquisition were found to be 52, while the acquisitions where the acquiree
and the acquirer belonged to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors one year prior to
acquisition were found to be 27 (tables 5.26 and 5.27 respectively, in Appendix). The
Strategic acquisitions were 29 (table 5.28, in Appendix). The acquisitions that closed
at a discount were 27 and the acquisitions where the acquirer paid a relatively high
premium for the acquiree were also 27 (tables 5.29 and 5.30 respectively, in
Appendix). Finally, we separated the sample into two sub-samples: one consisting of
the 38 largest acquisitions and one consisting of the 38 smallest acquisitions (tables
5.31 and 5.32 respectively, in Appendix).
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5.3. Industrial Sector Data.
Measuring and comparing performance prior to and after a takeover requires
a reliable benchmark of reference. As has been analysed in the previous chapter,
the performance of portfolios of companies belonging to the same industrial sector
as that of the acquirer and the acquiree was used as a benchmark for each of the
years under examination. To put it more simply, the industrial sector to which each
acquirer and acquiree belonged was identified one year before and one year after
the merger completion so as to capture any changes in the acquirer's industrial
classification due to any possible changes in its business operations after the
merger. The performance of the respective companies in each sector was then used
as a performance benchmark for a period of 3 or 5 years before and after the
merger13.
The main source of sector data was Datastream. Initially, the Level 5
industrial classification of the companies that took part in the 83 takeovers of the
sample was identified in Datastream's database. Datastream's industrial
classification is broadly the same as that of the L.S.E. industrial classification. At a
second step, all the company names that belonged to each sector were retrieved,
and then all equivalent industry data for all accounting and market value data
required for the target and the bidder were collected.
The Level 5 industrial classification was considered more appropriate than
level 4 industrial classification because it ensures an adequate number of
companies in each relevant sector for all the years in question as a benchmark
portfolio. Although Datastream does not give data for all the listed companies in
every single industry, it includes approximately 90% - 95% of the total number of
firms for each sector, in terms ofmarket capitalisation.
A major drawback of DataStream as a source of industry data is that it does not
provide historic data regarding industrial classification. In other words, it fails to
13 In fact, few sample companies changed industrial sector at some point earlier than the previous year of the
merger completion or later than the following year after the merger completion and within the period under
examination. To keep industry data handling manageable and time effective, it is assumed that the industrial
sector in which a sample company belongs one year before the merger completion is broadly the same during all
the 3 or 5 years before the year of the merger completion. Similarly, the industrial sector in which an acquirer
belongs one year after the merger is assumed the same for all the period in examination after the year of the
merger completion.
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deliver information as to which Level 5 sector a bidder or a target belonged to in
the past14. Datastream only provides the industry classification in the year this
information is requested15. This causes a problem in that it is not possible to create
benchmarks of performance consisting of companies classified in industrial sectors
through the years that this study extends from DataStream. In addition, it is not
possible to identify the industrial sector to which a sample company belonged 1
year before the merger and 1 year after it. To overcome this problem the Stock
Exchange Year Book was employed as an additional source of data.
Starting from Datastream's Level 5 sector allocation of the sample companies,
21 Level 5 industries were retrieved from Datastream's database for the year 2002.
The Standard Industrial Classification of the Stock Exchange Yearbook was then
used to 'build' the relevant sectors through the years from 2002 back to 1985. This
period was chosen so as to include the maximum time under examination - i.e. a
five-year window - for the takeovers of the sample that took place from the
beginning of 1990 until the end of 1996.
The 'building' of the industries for the years from 2002 back to 1985 was based
on two criteria. First, for each Level 5 industry taken from DataStream for the year
2002 the appropriate companies were removed16 in each subsequent year until
1985, having as a reference the Stock Exchange Yearbook's industrial
classification. Second, it was considered crucial for the industry building and
modification through the years to take into account the changes of Standard
Industrial Classification that took place in the years 1999 and 1992 so that the
17
'nature' of the sectors remained the same across the years under examination .
Moreover, since the companies taken from DataStream according to the 2002
Level 5 industry classification accounted for 90%-95% of the total market
capitalisation of each sector, it was ensured that for each of the companies removed
14
Moreover, firms that are delisted from the London Stock Exchange because of bankruptcy or a takeover are not
included in subsequent industry classifications and therefore, do not form part of the average (or median).
15 In the case of this work the industrial classification was provided as in 2002.
16 The same company may belong to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors in different years. Moreover, since new
companies enter the lists of the Stock Exchange Year Book each year, when working backwards in constructing
industrial sectors from 2002 to 1985, it is essential to remove those companies that are not listed before a certain
year.
17 The Level 5 industrial codes which were employed for each industry across the years from 2002, back to 1985
are illustrated in Table 5.33. in Appendix.
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• 18*in a specific year as many other companies as possible were added . However in
some cases, where only a few companies belonged to a sector, the additions made
were few, and consequently the sector remained 'thin'.
In total, accounting and market capitalisation data were retrieved for 1398
companies that were distributed across 21 industries. Some industries that
contained very few companies across the years were merged to ensure a sufficient
number of observations when extracting the median values of industry cash flow
returns. Thus, Level 5 sector 21, 'aerospace', and Level 5 sector 18, 'steel', were
included in Level 5 sector 26, 'Engineering & Machinery'. The criteria for this
unification were first, the relevant similarity of operations of companies belonging
to these sectors and second, the fact that some companies were observed to be
present interchangeably in some of these sectors across the years. This procedure
reduced the number of Level 5 sectors from 21 to 19 (Table 5.35, in Appendix).
Further to this aggregation of sectors at the initial stage of this research, two other
cases of sector unification were carried out to make the statistical analysis as robust
as possible by avoiding the presence of industrial sectors with very few companies.
Thus, Level 5 sector 'Mining' (sector 4) was merged with sector 'Oil & Gas
Exploration & Production' (sector 7), and Level 5 industrial sector
'Pharmaceuticals' (sector 48) was merged with Level 5 industrial sector 'Health'
(sector 44). As a result, the number of Level 5 industrial sectors included in the
statistical analysis was finally reduced to 17.
As mentioned above, changes to Standard Industrial Classification occurred
in 1992 and 1999. As a result, the performance of a number of sample companies
could not be compared with the performance of companies belonging to a single
sector since in such cases the sector disappeared in a year falling within the period
of study. Companies belonging to such sectors were reallocated into other sectors
with no explicit relation amongst them.
In detail, 15 bidders and 14 targets belonged to sectors that did not exist two or
three years before or after the year of the completion of the merger (Table 5.34, in
Appendix). To overcome such an abnormality produced by the different structure
18 For all the companies that were added in each sector during the years in question accounting and market value
data should be available in DS for at least some of the years in question.
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of the Standard Industrial Classification system through the years before and after
1992 and 1999 the following assumptions were made:
1. The performance of companies belonging to sector 'Diversified
Industrials' (24) that existed for the years from 1993 until 1999 and
'Industrial Conglomerates' (73) that existed for the years from 1985
until 1992, was compared with the performance of the companies which
belonged to the sector 'Engineering' (26) for the relevant years.
2. The performance of companies belonging to sector 'Miscellaneous
Unclassified' (76) 19 that existed for the years from 1985 until 1992 was
compared with the performance of the companies of all the sectors
participating in this study.
3. The sector 'Office Equipment' (69), existed only from 1985 until 1992.
From the description of sectors provided in the Stock Exchange Year
Book, it is apparent that this sector included all the companies with
business related to office furnishing, excluding computers. Therefore, the
performance of the 2 targets of the sample that belonged to this sector
were compared with the performance of the companies that belonged to
sector 'Household Goods &Textiles' (34).
4. The sector 'Plastic &Rubber' (66), was present only through the years
from 1985 until 1992. In addition, the sector was very 'thin' consisting
of a maximum of 8 companies in each year. Therefore, the sector
'Chemicals' (11) was used as a benchmark for the performance of the 2
targets of the sample that belonged to this sector.
5. It was not possible to compare the performance of companies that
belonged to the sectors 'Publishing &Printing' (53), Packaging &
Paper' (54), and 'Printing, Packaging & Paper' (28) with sector
benchmarks consisting of their respective sector companies across all the
years under examination. This was because companies of these sectors,
and even whole sub-sectors, appeared interchangeably within different
Level 5 sectors through the years. In addition, all these sectors were
19 For the year 1985 the industrial sector 'Miscellaneous Unclassified' is numbered in the Stock Exchange Year
Book as 75. After 1985, until the year 1992, the same sector is numbered as 76.
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present for a limited time period between the years 1985 and 2002, due
to the changes of the Standard Industrial Classification Systems in 1992
and 199920.
6. The Level 5 sector 'Other Services & Businesses' (51) exists only for the
•21*
years from 1993 to 1995. There is only 1 bidder in the sample that
belonged to this sector. However, after 1996, this bidder belonged to
Level 5 sector 'Media' and after 1997 to Level 5 sector 'Household
Goods & Textiles'' (34). Before 1993, the same bidder appeared to
belong to sector 'Miscellaneous Unclassified' (76). For these reasons,
'Other Services & Businesses' sector (51), is not included in the list of
Level 5 sectors that participate in this study, and the performance of the
bidder belonging to it, is compared with the performance of the
companies of all the sectors that were included in this study.
• 227. Finally, the performance of 1 target which belongs to the sector
'Distributors, Other' (41) is compared with the performance of all the
companies of the sectors used in this study. This is because, the sector
exists only after 1992, while before that year the relevant target belongs
to sector (71) 'General Traders, Wholesalers & Distributors', which
consists of few companies and accounting data are available for even
fewer23.
After the above allocations there were, effectively 18 benchmark portfolios: the
17 sectors described previously, plus 1 portfolio consisting of all companies of all
the 17 sectors.
20 In detail, while sectors 'Printing' (53), 'Packaging & Paper' (54), and 'Publishing' (52) appeared separately in
the period from 1985 to 1992, for the period from 1992 to 1999 Publishing (436) is a sub sector of Media (43)
which is included in the list of Level 5 sectors used in this study. 'Paper Packaging & Printing' (28), on the other
hand, stands alone as a different sector. Regarding the period from 1999 until 2002, 'Publishing and Printing'
(547) is a sub-sector of the Level 5 sector 'Media & Photography' (54) while 'Paper' (156) is a sub-sector of the
Level 5 sector 'Forestry & Paper' (15), which is not included in the list of Level 5 sectors participating in this
study. Thus, the performance of the 4 targets and the 5 bidders that belong in any of the above sectors is
compared with the performance of the companies of all the sectors participating in this study.
21 The bidder is EFG Group PLC, which after 1996 changed name to Tandem Group PLC, while before 1990 its
name was Economic Forestry Group PLC.
22 Wills Group PLC acquired by Roxpur PLC in early 1995.
23 Sector 71, 'General Traders, Wholesalers & Distributors', consists of 10 companies in the year 1992 and of 13
companies in 1991; data were available in Data Stream for 5 companies in the first case and for 8 companies in
the latter.
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In summary, the industrial sectors used in this study extent in a time from 1985
to 2002 so as to cover all the period under examination. In each year the necessary
modifications were made to each sector in order that they were kept updated. In
addition, because name and number labels of sectors changed more than once
during the period under examination, and sectors were segmented or consolidated
around the years 1992 and 1999 due to different Standard Industrial Classification
Systems, the homogeneity of each sample sector24 was ensured by grouping sectors
with similar operations and classifying them with the respective sectors under the
same category, before and after a date of a structural change (in 1992 and in 1999).
Thus, for each sector retrieved from Datastream in 2002, there is only one group of
companies corresponding to this sector across the whole period of this study. For
example, as can be seen in Table 5.33 in the Appendix, what is referred to as the
sector 'Construction & Building' (13) in 2002, corresponds to sectors (21) and (22)
from 1999 back to 1992, and to sectors (13), (14), (15), and (18) from 1992 until
1985. Therefore, from this point onwards, when a sample company's sector is
mentioned, it is referred to by its 2002 name, label and structure as retrieved from
DataStream.
As mentioned previously, the performance of acquirers and acquirees that
participated in this study, were compared with the performance of companies
belonging to the 17 respective industrial sectors. Sample companies that could not
be allocated into a single industrial sector across the years of examination, were
compared with a portfolio consisting of the firms of all the 17 sectors, across the
relevant years; this last portfolio of companies brings the number of performance
benchmark portfolios to 1825. The allocation of the targets and the bidders into the
18 sector-portfolios is illustrated in the following bar chart:
24 Before 1992 there were no Level 5 sectors and Level 4 sub-sectors in the Stock Exchange Year Book; there
were only Level 4 sectors which, taken as groups, constituted the level 5 sectors after 1992. Therefore, by the
phrase 'sample sector' we mean that regardless of how many level 4 sectors in 1991, for example, broadly
constitute the equivalent of a Level 5 sector and its subsequent Level 4 sub-sectors in 2002, for the needs of this
study it is assumed that there was only one Level 5 sector from 1985 to 2002. This is the 'sample sector' that
constitutes the benchmark of reference for merging companies' performance.
25 This portfolio functions in the same way as sectors in the sense that it constitutes a benchmark for the
respective sample companies. For the needs of this study this portfolio is called 'General' and is represented in
the bar chart by '0'.
148
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA PROCESSING NICK GLIMIDIS











52 25 53 11 26 34 13 54 31 43 58 7 48 63 41 97 0
LEVEL 5 SECTOR
□ TARGETS m BIDDERS
The 2002 Level 5 Industrial Sector numeric code is represented in X-axis while the number of sample
companies is represented in Y-axis.
A detailed illustration of how the sample companies are distributed across
industrial sectors can be seen in table 5.36 in the Appendix.
5.4. Matched Firms' Data.
As discussed in the previous Chapter, apart from comparing merging firms'
operating performance with that of their industry peers, a pair of matched firms for
each acquiree and acquirer was also employed as an alternative operating
performance benchmark for our sample companies. The matching criteria refer to
industry relatedness, size and pre-acquisition performance. The precise selection
criteria for matched firms were described in the Methodology Chapter.
We found 71 pairs of matched firms which satisfied the matching criteria which
were set in the Methodology Chapter (Table 5.37, Appendix). For the remaining 8
acquisitions (out of the 79 sample acquisitions), either the acquiree or the acquirer
could not be matched with a firm within the same Level 5 Industrial sector that had
a similar size and operating cash flows (the 8 bidders and their respective targets
are illustrated in table 5.38 in Appendix). For 66 out of the 71 pairs of matched
firms, the acquiree's and the acquirer' matched firm's size fell within the range
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from 25% to 200% of the size of the acquiree or the acquirer. For the remaining 5
acquisitions either the acquiree's matched firm or the acquirer's matched firm's
size fell within the range of 25% to 400% of the size of the acquiree or the acquirer
respectively (see table 5.37, in Appendix).
5.5. Conclusions.
In this Chapter, the sources from which data for this research were collected
and the criteria for choosing the appropriate merging firms for examining their
performance were illustrated. In addition, we presented the procedure by which the
collected data were 'cleaned' so as to provide a complete and pure sample.
In order to increase our sample size so as to make our results as robust as
possible and simultaneously to be able to exclude companies that do not satisfy our
selection criteria in their strongest form, we used several data sources; namely, the
Acquisitions Monthly, the Datastream, the Companies House, the Financial Times,
and the Stock Exchange Year Book. This entailed the difficulty that different
26databases are not homogeneous in the format and the presentation of their data" , and
therefore, a considerable part of our final dataset was constructed manually so as to
become appropriate for electronic manipulation.
The nature of our research required not only a large and complete portfolio of
control firms to compare the operating performance of our sample firms with but also
a portfolio of control firms that ensures the consistency of the comparisons through
several years. To this end, it was necessary to study the allocation of all public firms
into industrial sectors from the year 1985 to the year 2002 and to manually construct
control firms' portfolios with complete data for each year, since to the best of our
knowledge no electronic database for academic purposes in the U.K. provides for
historic company data that refer to industrial classification. Moreover, we followed
industrial definitions through these years to ensure that prior to and after the changes
in Standard Industrial Classification that occurred in 1992 and 1999 our portfolios of
control firms were consistent with the old and new industrial definitions.
26
Companies House, for example, provided companies' accounts as they were issued from the companies in a
PDF format while Datastream presents accounts in Excel format. The Financial Times past issues were available
at Edinburgh's University Library in the form of microfilms, while information from the Stock Exchange Year
Book was available in a 'hard' format from Edinburgh's University Library.
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Much of the academic controversy about the effects of M&As on corporate
performance focuses on the quality and the completeness of the data that are used in
studying post-merger performance. Moreover, the choice of the appropriate
benchmark and its accuracy so as to reflect the 'normal' returns is also considered
essential for judging whether takeovers improve operating performance. Therefore,
in this study, we attempted to construct a sample of U.K. takeovers which was as
'pure' as possible from other events which may distort the results in the period under
examination, and we paid great attention to the construction and the completeness of
our benchmarks against which abnormal performance is measured.
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INDUSTRY BENCHMARKED OPERATING PERFORMANCE:
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS.
6.1. Introduction.
This chapter deals with the results that are produced after applying the
methodology which was described in chapter 4 on the dataset that was illustrated in
chapter 5. Specifically, the pro-forma median industry adjusted operating
performance of targets and bidders for each of the 5 financial years preceding the
acquisition announcement is compared with the median industry adjusted operating
performance of combined firms for each of the 5 financial years following the
acquisition completion. In addition, using the same benchmark, i.e. the industry
operating performance, the median change in operating performance between the
pre-merger years and the post-merger years is illustrated. The change in the two
major components of cash flows - sales and operating costs - is also reported to
provide an indication of how these components change in the post merger years with
changes in performance.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: in Section 2, the average change in
performance is discussed for the 79 sample companies. In Section 3, the average
changes in performance of companies that share common merger characteristics are
reported. These characteristics include the mode of payment, the industry relatedness
and the attitude of each target's management towards the acquisition offer. In Section
4, the performance of strategic acquisitions is presented. In Section 5, having
segmented the sample into two sub-sets - one that includes acquisitions that took
place at a premium and another that includes acquisitions that took place at a
discount - the performance of each sub-set is reported. In Section 6, the performance
results for small and large acquisitions in the sample are discussed. Finally, in
Sections 6 and 7 we report regression analysis results using the Regression Model
and the Change Model respectively.
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6.2. Operating Performance of the Sample Companies.
In Table 1 panel A1, column 2 reports the median annual operating performance of
the 79 combined target and bidders for each of the 5 years preceding the acquisition
and each of the 5 years following the acquisition, with the year of the acquisition
completion being excluded. Before the merger, the combined firm's median
operating cash flow returns on assets falls within the range of 17.91% in year -4 and
of 15.66% in year -2.
After the merger, it is clear that there is a sharp decline in performance in year 1 with
the operating cash flow returns on assets being around 13% and in the second post-
merger year being 12.56%. In years 3, 4, and 5 there is a steady improvement in
operating performance with the respective numbers being 13.31%, 14.12%, and
15.91%. It is interesting that in year 5, operating performance is approaching the pre¬
merger levels. However, looking the median annual performance for years -5 to -1 on
aggregate2 and the median annual performance for years 1 to 5 in aggregate, it is
explicit that there is deterioration in the post-merger years. The median performance
for all the pre-merger years falls from 16.44% to 13.39% in the post-merger years.
This decline in performance, however, cannot be definitely attributed to the
merger since it can arise due to factors that are irrelevant to it. If there is a downward
trend in industry cash flow returns in the same period, for example, this may affect
the merging firms as well.
1
Operating performance is measured as the operating cash flow returns on total assets. Operating cash flows are
computed as sales, minus cost of goods sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and
goodwill expenses. Total assets are the market value of equity plus the book value of net debt and preferred stock
at the beginning of each financial year. Changes in market values of equity of the acquirer and the acquiree at the
merger announcement are excluded from the asset base for the post-merger years. Industry-adjusted cash flow
returns are calculated as the difference between each firm's value for each year and the median value of other
firms in the same industry as it is defined by the S.I.C. Pro forma pre-merger returns for the acquirer and the
acquiree are computed as the weighted averages of acquirer and acquiree returns, with the weights being the
relative asset values of each firm at the beginning of each financial year. Post merger returns are computed using
data for the merged firms. Pre-merger Industry Adjusted returns are weighted averages of acquirer and acquiree
industry median returns, with the weights being the relative asset values of the acquirer and acquiree firms at the
beginning of each financial year. In the absence of separate asset values for the two merging firms in the post-
merger years the weights used to compute industry adjusted operating returns are the relative asset values of the
acquirer and the acquiree firms at the beginning of year -1.
2 The sample median operating cash flow return on assets for years -1 to -5 is calculated after computing the
median return in each of these years for each sample firm. The sample median then, is the median of these values.
The sample median returns for the post-merger period is calculated similarly.
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TABLE 1.
Median Annual Operating Performance for the 79 combined target and acquirer firms






























16.44% -0.09% 49.52% 311
1 13.07% -1.17% 41.77% 79
2 12.56% -1.50% b 35.44% 79
3 13.31% -0.74% 41.77% 79
4 14.12% -0.33% 45.95% 37
5 15.91% 0.99% 62.16% 37
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
Panel B3.
13.39% -0.83% b 43.09% 311
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.20%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 0.22%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.89% b
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.01%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.85%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, -0.82%
A SALES 14.52% a
A Operating Costs 16.78% a
A Employee costs per Sales 0.85% b
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.32% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
\ A (IAOP) is the median of the difference in median industry-adjusted cash flow return between the post- and
pre-acquisition periods for all the sample firms.
A (SALES) is the median of the change of each firm's median sales between the post- and pre- acquisition
periods, for all the sample firms.
A (Operating Costs) is the median of the change of each firm's median operating costs between the post- and
pre- acquisition periods for all the sample firms.
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Results reported in column 3 refer to industry adjusted operating performance
which is the difference between values for the merged firms and their weighted-
average industry median estimates. Thus, the benchmark each merging firm's
operating performance with the industry operating performance correct for the
problem mentioned above. The median annual operating performance for the pre¬
merger years ranges from 1.15% to -0.59% with none of the differences between the
firms' values and industry performance being statistically different from zero. We
cannot therefore reject the idea that for each of the pre-merger years the median
operating performance of the combined targets and bidders is at their industry levels.
This is clearer when looking at the median annual performance for the years -1 to -5
(i.e. the sample median operating performance for the whole pre-merger period). The
median difference between firms' and industries' performance is a statistically
insignificant -0.09%.
In the post-merger years, however, there is a sharp decline in performance of
-1.17% in year 1, which becomes a statistically significant -1.50% in year 2. This
figure is statistically significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed
Wilcoxon ranking test (p-value 0.024). The positive observations fall from 41% in
year 1 to 35.44% in year 2. In year 3 the difference is still negative (-0.74%) but
insignificant. In year 4 there is a further improvement in performance with the
difference being -0.33% and insignificant which becomes a positive but insignificant
0.99% in year 5. The sample median for the whole post-merger period is a negative
and statistically significant value of 0.83%. This is significant at the 5% significance
level (p-value 0.03). This result indicates that merging firms, on average,
underperform their industries in the post-merger years.
Similar results are produced when the Change Model is employed for
examining merger performance, as reported in Table 1, Panel B. The median industry
adjusted performance for all the three pre-merger years - i.e. for the years -1,-2 and -
3 - is 0.22% and insignificant, suggesting that merging firms perform around
industry standards in the pre-merger period. Median operating performance for years
2 and 3 is -1.01% but statistically insignificant while the median performance for
years 1, 2, and 3 is -0.89% which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level
(p-value 0.047). The change in median industry adjusted operating performance
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between the 3 pre-merger years and the 3 post-merger years is -0.82% , and the
change between year -1 and years 2 and 3 is -0.85%, both statistically insignificant.
The results indicate performance deterioration after merger although in the
change model the difference in performance between post- and pre-merger periods,
while negative, is insignificant. Nonetheless, inferring from the sample companies it
cannot be argued that, on average, mergers improve performance.
An interesting finding is that in the three post-merger years, while sales
increase by a statistically significant 14.52%, operating costs increase at a higher
rate, i.e. by 16.78% (significant) in comparison with the three pre-merger years. This
finding, along with the dramatic decline in performance in the first two years after
the merger and the subsequent slight improvement in years 3, 4, and 5 may indicate
that mergers, on average, represent investment decisions with adverse economic
consequences at least for the first post-merger years. Merging organisations may face
tangible and intangible costs in the first post-merger years that more than offset any
synergistic gains. As time passes, however, performance improves suggesting that
the combined entity manages to overcome the inefficiencies that may have caused
performance deterioration in the first years.
6.3. Operating Performance for Mergers that Share Common Characteristics.
In this section, we focus on different types of transactions that are very often
cited in the literature as important factors affecting merger success or failure. Such
characteristics include the method of payment, the industry relatedness between
bidders and targets and whether the acquisition is friendly or hostile. Employing as
the performance metric of the operating cash flow returns on assets, the average
performance of different subsets of the sample with each of the above characteristics
is examined.
6.3.1. The Method of Payment.
There is plenty of empirical evidence suggesting that acquirers that finance
acquisitions by cash perform better than acquirers that use stock in acquisition
transactions. This evidence is consistent with the information asymmetry theory and
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supports the assumption that cash signals high levels of managerial confidence for
the investment success. Cash financing is also an indication of an acquirer's
willingness to bear all the risk of the acquisition project and to be in a position to
reap all the prospective benefits from it. Much of this evidence comes from share
price performance studies in the announcement period. In this section, the combined
firm operating performance for a 5 and 3 year period before and after the merger is
reported. The results indicate a dramatic decline in operating performance in the 3
and 5 years after the merger when the mode of payment is cash and an insignificant
decline when the mode of payment is stock or a combination of stock and cash.
In table 2 Panel A, the median annual operating performance for the 16
sample companies where the mode of payment was solely cash is illustrated. In the
pre-merger years, sample companies' operating performance ranges from 15.09% to
16.82%4 while after the merger performance falls to 10.94% in year 1, to 12.41% in
year 2 and to 10.71% in year 3. More interestingly, the median industry adjusted
operating performance (column 3) while it is positive in the pre-merger years
(though statistically insignificant), after the merger it is highly negative. In year 2 it
is -2.80% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.023) with
only 25% of the observations being positive and in year 3 it is -2.46 and significant at
a 10% significant level (p value 0.088) with 31.25% of the observations being
positive. Panel B of Table 2 reports the median change in operating performance
between the 3-year post- and pre-merger periods and the median change in operating
performance between years 2 and 3 and the year -1. The difference is highly negative
but statistically insignificant. The median industry adjusted operating performance
for the 3 pre-merger years is 0.75% but statistically insignificant. In contrast, in all
the 3 post-merger years the median industry adjusted operating performance is -
1.67% and significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.088). The median
performance of the second and third post-merger years is -2.40%, significant at a 5%
significance level (p value 0.049).
4
Actually, in the year -5 the median annual operating performance is 28.33%. However, this figure represents
only 4 observations since there are only 4 companies with data for a 5-year window that were financed with cash.
Therefore, this figure cannot be representative of the whole sample. The purpose for including all the
observations for a 5-year window in Table 2 is to compute the sample median performance for the whole pre¬
merger and post-merger periods. In Table 3 the sample is examined for a 3-year window to compare results.
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TABLE 2
Median Annual Performance for the 16 acquisitions where the method of payment was
cash.
Panel A5.
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Industry - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of observations
-5 28.33% 6.56% c 100.00% 4
-4 16.82% 1.51% 75.00% 4
-3 16.00% 0.56% 56.25% 16
-2 17.14% 1.70% 56.25% 16




16.31% 0.63% 62.50% 56
to -1
1 10.94% -2.71% 31.25% 16
2 12.41% -2.80% b 25.00% 16
3 10.71% -2.46% c 31.25% 16
4 14.40% -0.46% 25.00% 4
5 12.81% 0.62% 75.00% 4
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
11.99% -2.17% a 32.14% 56
Panel B°
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Employee costs per Sales
A Number of employees per thousand of sales
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,











5 See footnote 1.
6 See footnote 3.
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In Table 3, it can be seen that the median annual industry adjusted operating
cash flow return on assets of the sample, falls from 0.38% in the 3 pre-merger years
to a statistically significant (at a 1% significance level) of -2.80% in the three post-
merger years.
TABLE 3
Median Annual Performance for the 16 acquisitions where the method of
payment was cash.
Panel A7





to Merger Median postitive observations
-3 16.00% 0.56% 56.25% 16
-2 17.14% 1.70% 56.25% 16




16.11% 0.38% 58.33% 48
to -1
1 10.94% -2.71% 31.25% 16
2 12.41% -2.80% b 25.00% 16
3 10.71% -2.46% c 31.25% 16
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
11.69% -2.80% a 29.17% 48
The median annual operating performance of the 21 sample companies that
issued stock for financing an acquisition is illustrated in table 4. Results in Panel A,
indicate that both in the pre- and the post-merger period industry adjusted operating
performance is around industry standards. The median of the difference between
sample firm annual operating performance and the industry median operating
performance is indistinguishable from zero in both the 5 year pre-merger period and
the 5 year post-merger period. Similarly, results produced using the Change model
(Panel B) indicate a statistically insignificant change of the median annual operating
performance of the sample between the post- and pre-merger periods.
See footnote 1.
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TABLE 4
Median Annual Performance for the 21 acquisitions where the method of
payment was stock.





















































IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 -2.12%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 - 0.91%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.89%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 1.78%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.15%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.33%
A SALES 23.49%
A Operating Costs 28.35%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.23%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.29%
a
a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
8 See footnote 1.
9 See footnote 3.
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However, as far as Panel A is concerned, because there are only 9 acquirers
with data available for a 5 year window that financed their acquisitions with stock,
the median annual operating cash flow returns on assets for years -5, -4 and 4 and 5
is based on a very small number of observations. This may have distorted the
reliability of the results and statistical tests referring to the respective years. For this
reason, in Table 5 we illustrate the operating performance of the 21 companies that
used stock to finance their acquisitions for a 3 year window (in this case 9
observations are missing for each of the years -5, -4, 4 and 5, i.e. a total of 36
observations, from the estimation of median performance for the whole 5 year pre-
and post-merger periods).
As it can be seen in Table 5, unadjusted performance of merging firms does
not change dramatically between the pre- and post-merger periods. In the three pre¬
merger years it ranges from 14.28% to 14.94% while in the post-merger period it is
13.64% in year 1, and increases to about 14% in years 2 and 3. The median annual
industry adjusted operating performance however, increases from negative and
statically significant -2.46 % in the 3 year pre-merger period to an indistinguishable
from zero -1.32%. In other words, there is an improvement in performance after the
merger.
A noteworthy element of these results is that acquirers and acquirees that
proceeded with a stock transaction underperform their industry peers in the 3 year
pre-merger period and their performance approaches their industry standards in the 3
year post-merger period. Since most of the stock acquisitions, in general, and in the
sample, are friendly10, this may indicate that companies which underperform their
industry peers proceed with agreed acquisitions that are financed by stock to
strengthen their competitive position and improve performance. Stock is considered
as a 'cheap' means of payment since it mitigates the impact of any valuation errors in
the transaction and it also allows for the risk of the project to be shared between the
acquirer's and the acquiree's shareholders.
10 16 out of the 21 acquisitions that are financed by stock are friendly.
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TABLE 5
Median Annual Performance for the 21 acquisitions where the method of payment was
stock. The period in examination is a 3-year window around merger completion, the
year of completion not being included.
Panel A





to Merger Median postitive observations
-3 14.89% -2.65% 42.86% 21
-2 14.28% -2.61% 42.86% 21




14.69% -2.46% b 41.27% 63
to -1
1 13.64% -1.39% 38.10% 21
2 14.00% -1.40% 38.10% 21
3 13.98% 0.84% 52.38% 21
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
13.98% -1.32% 42.86% 63
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed test.
In Table 6, the post-merger operating performance for the 42 acquirers and
acquirees that merged after an offer proposal which included both stock and cash as a
means of payment in the transaction is illustrated. Pre-merger operating performance
of the combined target and bidder is about the same as that of their industry peers,
since the median of the differences between sample firms' operating performance
and the weighted average of their industry median operating performance is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Post-merger performance remains at the
same levels, i.e. there is not an improvement but there is not a decline either.
11 See footnote 1.
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TABLE 6
Median Annual Performance for the 42 acquisitions where the acquirer offered a
choice between cash and stock to the target's shareholders.
Panel A12
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Industry - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of observations
-5 15.31% -2.07% 29.17% 24
-4 17.51% -1.31% 41.67% 24
-3 16.02% 0.29% 52.38% 42
-2 16.36% -0.95% 42.86% 42





16.89% -0.59% 45.98% 174
1 13.18% -0.30% 47.62% 42
2 12.36% -1.68% 38.10% 42
3 13.19% -0.56% 40.48% 42
4 13.45% -0.31% 45.83% 24
5 16.20% 1.69% 58.33% 24
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
13.16% -0.46% 44.83% 174
Panel B13
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.57%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 0.05%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1,2,3 - 0.67%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.52%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.67%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.83%
A SALES 9.36%
A Operating Costs 13.76%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.08%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.44% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
12 See footnote 1.
13 See footnote 3.
163
INDUSTRY BENCHMARKED OPERATING PERFORMANCE N.GLIMIDIS
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Similar results are also provided by the Change model. In panel B, the
median of the difference in operating performance between the 3 post- and the 3 pre¬
merger periods is -0.83%, but statistically insignificant. The median of the difference
in performance between years 2 and 3 and year -1 is 0.67% and also statistically
insignificant. In the 3 years post-merger period the median sales increase is 9.36% in
relation to the 3 years pre-merger period, while the median change in the operating
costs for the same periods is 13.76%.
Unlike Powell and Stark (2005), the results in this study indicate that the
method of payment has a significant impact on post-merger performance. Indeed,
when acquirers use cash to finance acquisitions there is a dramatic decline in
performance in both the 3 and 5 years following merger completion. When the mode
of payment is stock or a mix of stock and cash, performance remains at industry
standards in the post-merger period. There is evidence that stock-financed mergers
are conducted by firms that underperform their industry peers in the pre-merger years
and that they manage to improve performance up to their industry levels in the 3 year
period following acquisition completion. Considering that the average outcome of
mergers in the sample was found to be negative, it can be said that stock and stock
and cash acquisitions perform better than cash acquisitions.
6.3.2. The Target's Management Attitude.
In the sample 18 deals that were characterised as hostile and 61 that were
characterised as friendly were identified. Following the classification as it was made
by the main source of the data, the 'Acquisitions Monthly', a deal is considered as
'friendly' when the acquisition was agreed between the target's and bidders'
managements after negotiations. A hostile acquisition is one where bidder's
management made a tender offer directly to the target's shareholders without the
agreement of the target's management.
The annual median pre- and post-merger operating performance of the 18
hostile transactions are reported in Table 7 Panels A and B. As illustrated in Panel A,
unadjusted operating performance declines in the post-merger years in relation to
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Median Annual Performance for the 18 hostile acquisitions.










-5 17.46% -1.22% 50.00% 10
-4 19.14% 0.73% 50.00% 10
-3 19.08% 0.80% 55.56% 18
-2 18.14% 0.70% 55.56% 18
-1 15.91% -1.88% 44.44% 18
Median
Annual
Performance 17.76% 0.15% 51.35% 74
for years -5
to -1
1 12.03% -2.16% 38.89% 18
2 12.39% -2.17% b 27.78% 18
3 12.12% -1.12% 33.33% 18
4 14.40% -0.17% 50.00% 10
5 15.47% 0.73% 60.00% 10
Median
Annual





IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 -1.88%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 -0.45%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -1.01 %
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.81%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.22%
A(IAOP)Years -1,-2,-3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.31%
A SALES 4.86%
A Operating Costs 3.56%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.35%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.53%
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
14 See footnote 1.
15 See footnote 3.
165
INDUSTRY BENCHMARKED OPERATING PERFORMANCE
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
N.GLIMIDIS
pre-merger period. After year 3, however, there is a gradual improvement and it
approaches the levels of year -1. As far as the median annual industry adjusted
operating performance is concerned, while sample firms that engaged in hostile
acquisitions enjoyed a performance that was indistinguishably different from that of
their industry peers in the pre-merger years, they experienced a decline in the first 3
post-merger years with the year 2 industry adjusted operating performance being -
2.17% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level. In years 4 and 5 there is
an improvement towards industry standards. Nonetheless, the sample median annual
industry adjusted operating performance for the whole 5 year post-merger period is
negative -1.09% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level. Results
produced using the Change model (Panel B), however, indicate that the median
change in performance between the three post-merger years and the three pre-merger
years is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is also the case for the median
change in operating performance between the second and third post-merger years and
year -1. Interestingly, and unlike the average outcome of the sample mergers, the
change in sales between the post- and pre-merger periods is higher than the change in
operating costs (4.86% vs. 3.56%).
As far as the operating performance of the 61 friendly takeovers is concerned,
the results are illustrated in Table 8.
Column 2 of Panel A shows the unadjusted median annual operating
performance for the combined target and bidders that conducted friendly
acquisitions. Operating performance declines in the first and second post-acquisition
years, and gradually improves in years 3, 4 and 5. However, in all the post-merger
period the combined firms' median annual operating performance is lower (13.90%)
than that of the pre-merger years (16.25%). The third Column reports the median
annual industry adjusted operating performance of the firms. Performance is negative
but statistically insignificant in the 4 post-merger years. After the second year it is
gradually improves to become positive (though statistically insignificant) in year 5,
with 62.96% of the sample observations being positive. The sample median annual
operating performance for all the five post-merger years is close to industry levels.
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TABLE 8
Median Annual Performance for the 61 acquisitions where the acquirer made an
agreed offer to the acquiree.
Panel A16









-5 17.35% -0.44% 44.44% 27
-4 17.60% 1.15% 55.56% 27
-3 15.74% -0.11% 49.18% 61
-2 14.28% -0.91% 42.62% 61




16.25% -0.11% 48.95% 237
to -1
1 13.64% -0.95% 42.62% 61
2 12.56% -1.49% 37.70% 61
3 13.68% -0.74% 44.26% 61
4 14.10% -0.33% 44.44% 27
5 15.91% 0.99% 62.96% 27
Median Annual
Performance
13.90% -0.74% 44.30% 237
Panel B17
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.37%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 0.22%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.83%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.47%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -1.01%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.83%
A SALES 21.50%
A Operating Costs 21.54%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.78% c
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed t Wilcoxon est.
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
16 See footnote 1.
17 See footnote 3.
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Panel B illustrates the median of the differences between post- and pre¬
merger periods. The median difference in annual industry adjusted operating
performance between the 3 post-merger years and the 3 pre-merger years is negative
but it is statistically insignificant. Similarly, the change in performance between the
years 2 and 3, and the year -1 is also statistically insignificant.
The findings in this study support the hypothesis that friendly acquisitions
outperform hostile ones. While firms that are engaged in hostile acquisitions
experience a decline in operating performance, firms that are merged after an agreed
deal can achieve performance similar to that which prevails in their industries.
6.3.3. The Industry Relatedness.
Industry relatedness between target and bidder is another factor that has been
frequently cited as determining to the success or failure of a merger. Evidence in the
literature suggests that unrelated acquisitions destroy value. Results in Table 9 Panel
A and Panel B, confirm the existing evidence.
In the 5 pre-merger years, unadjusted firm median annual operating cash flow
returns on assets range from 20.54% to 16.43% while in the 5 post-merger years it is
between 13.07% and 15.49%. The industry adjusted cash flow return on assets for
the entire sample and all the pre-merger years is positive (0.22%) and statistically
insignificant, indicating that the combined target and bidder perform as well as their
industry peers. This is also true for each one of the 5 pre-merger years. In the post
merger period, however, the sample median annual industry adjusted operating cash
flow return on assets for all the years, is -0.61% and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level (p value 0.075). The decline in performance is more obvious in the
first and the second year after the merger completion. In Year 1, the median annual
industry adjusted performance for the 27 acquirers is -1.39% with only 37.04% of the
observations being positive. Even worse, in the second year performance falls to -
1.79% (which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level, p value 0.024),
with 70.37% of the observations being negative.
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TABLE 9
Median Annual Performance for the 27 acquisitions where the acquirers and
acquirees belong to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors.
Panel A18
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Industry - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of observations
-5 18.30% -2.69% 41.67% 12
-4 20.54% 2.51% 58.33% 12
-3 17.50% -0.49% 48.15% 27
-2 16.43% 0.33% 59.26% 27





17.59% 0.22% 52.38% 105
1 13.07% -1.39% 37.04% 27
2 13.14% -1.79% b 29.63% 27
3 14.17% -0.06% 48.15% 27
4 15.04% 0.39% 66.67% 12
5 15.49% 0.52% 58.33% 12
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
14.12% -0.61% c 43.81% 105
Panel B19
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.23%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 0.57%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1,2,3 - 0.89% c
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.47%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.85% b
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -1.98% b
A SALES 16.55%
A Operating Costs 16.92%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.60% a
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.56% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
18 See footnote 1.
19 See footnote 3.
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This finding is indicative of the inefficiencies in operations during the first
period after the merger arising from the possible difficulties of the acquirer to run
and integrate a target with unrelated business operations. Performance improves in
year 3, 4 and 5 but not substantially enough so as to reverse the negative median
performance for the 5 year period.
Similar results are provided by the Change model and they are illustrated in
Panel B. The median industry adjusted operating performance in the year
immediately before the merger is positive and statistically insignificant which means
that target and bidders, on average perform as their industries. The same is also the
case for the 3 years before the merger. The median change in operating performance
between the year before the merger and the second and third year after the merger is
-0.85% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p value 0.049%). The
median change in operating performance between the 3 pre-merger years and the 3
post-merger years is -1.98% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p
value 0.034).
The median change in sales and operating costs between the 3 pre- and the 3
post-merger years are 16.55% and 16.92% respectively. Sales increased after the
merger as it was expected after the expansion in operations due to acquisition.
Operating costs increased at the same pace and not more as was the case in the entire
sample of this study. This may indicate that the decline in performance is attributable
to the increase of other costs than operating like costs arising from the need of
monitoring the acquired unit's performance and costs associated with the integration
process. The finding that operating performance declined sharply in the first and the
second year of the merger and afterwards there is an improvement supports this
view.
Table 10 illustrates the pre- and post-merger operating performance of the 52
acquisitions where bidder' and target's operations fall within the same Level 5
Industrial classification. The median annual industry adjusted operating cash flow
returns on assets is approximately at industry standards in the 5 year pre-merger
period; it is 0.16% and statistically insignificant which means that the combined
target and bidder neither outperform nor underperform the industry peers. Operating
performance remains around industry standards in the 5 year post-merger period.
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TABLE 10
Median Annual Performance for the 52 acquisitions where the acquirer belong to the
same Level 5 Industrial Sector with that of the acquiree in the year before the
takeover.
Panel A20










-5 16.47% -0.09% 48.00% 25
-4 17.65% 0.67% 52.00% 25
-3 15.71% 0.22% 51.92% 52
-2 14.11% -0.91% 38.46% 52




15.60% -0.31% 48.06% 206
to -1
1 13.00% -1.06% 44.23% 52
2 12.43% -1.49% 38.46% 52
3 12.45% -1.48% 38.46% 52
4 13.27% -2.39% 36.00% 25
5 15.91% 1.42% 64.00% 25
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
12.98% -0.86% 42.72% 206
Panel B21
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.16%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 -0.54%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -1.01%
!AOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.14%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -0.81%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl ,2,3 0.31 %
A SALES 13.78%
A Operating Costs 16.40%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.38%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
20 See footnote 1.
21 See footnote 3.
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The slight decline of -0.86% is statistically insignificant. The number of
positive observations for the respective periods is about 48% (pre-merger) and about
43% (post-merger).
Related acquisitions, therefore, exhibit better performance in comparison to
unrelated ones and in comparison to the average outcome for the entire sample.
Average performance remains unchanged in the 5 year period following merger
completion. Similar findings are provided by the Change model (Panel B). The
median change in operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is
negative but statistically insignificant. The median change between the 3 post- and
the 3 pre-merger years is also negative but statistically insignificant.
Operating Costs increase by a higher rate than that of sales after the merger, a
fact that may contribute to the slight and statistically insignificant performance
decline in the post-merger period.
The examination of the three merger characteristics that are most commonly
cited in the literature as possible determining factors of the success or failure of a
merger indicated that acquisitions that are financed by cash perform worse than
acquisitions that are financed by stock or by a combination of stock and cash.
Moreover, hostile acquisitions experience a performance decline, in contrast to
friendly ones which retain their pre-merger performance standards. Finally, unrelated
acquisitions exhibit a performance decline in the 5 year post-merger period while
related ones perform almost as well as their industry peers. In all the above cases, it
is noteworthy that the highest decline is observed in the second year after the merger
completion which is followed by a gradual improvement in years 3, 4 and 5.
An interesting finding of this study is that while the average outcome of the
sample mergers is negative, friendly acquisitions and acquisitions that are financed
by stock or stock and cash and related acquisitions, manage to maintain their pre¬
merger performance in the post-merger years. The exceptions to this are acquisitions
that are financed by stock where the combined target and bidder underperform their
industry peers and improve their performance to industry standards in the post
merger period. In the next section the operating performance of acquisitions that
share some of the above characteristics - i.e. they are friendly, they are financed by
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stock and the target and the bidder belong to the same Level 5 industrial sector, is
illustrated.
6.4. Operating Performance of Strategic Acquisitions.
Strategic acquisitions are defined those that are friendly, are financed by
stock or a combination of stock and cash, and the bidder and the target belong to the
same industry. In the sample, we identified 29 such acquisitions. In the previous
paragraph the operating performance of friendly acquisitions was found to be higher
than that of hostile ones, and approaching their industry's standards. Stock and stock
and cash acquisitions found to outperform cash acquisitions which experience a
sharp decline in post-merger performance. Finally, acquisitions in unrelated
industries to that of the acquirer exhibit negative post-merger performance while
related acquisitions maintain the pre-merger performance standards which are about
at the level of the industry median.
The operating performance of the 29 combined targets and bidders that
engaged to a friendly acquisition that was financed by a means of payment other than
cash within the same Level 5 Industrial Sector, is illustrated in Table 11, Panel A.
The firm median annual operating cash flow returns on assets declines from
16.25% in the 5 pre-merger years to 14.65% in the 5 post-merger years. The median
annual industry adjusted operating performance, however, seems to slightly improve
after the merger. In the pre-merger 5 year period it is -0.33% and statistically
insignificant, but in the post-merger period it increases to 0.49% (though statistically
insignificant) with more than 51% of the observations being positive. Thus, there is
some evidence that strategic acquisitions, on average, perform better than the average
sample acquisition.
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TABLE 11
Median Annual Performance for the 29 acquisitions where the method of payment was
stock or a combination of stock and cash and the bidder and the target belonged to
the same Level 5 Industrial Sector, and the bid was friendly.
Panel A2
Pre and Post-Merger Operating cash flow returns
Year Relative to Firm
Merger Median
Industry - Adjusted
Median % postitive Number of observations
-5 16.47% -0.44% 41.18% 17
-4 17.91% 2.01% 58.82% 17
-3 15.78% 1.30% 55.17% 29
-2 13.13% -0.99% 34.48% 29
-1 16.69% 1.13% 55.17% 29
Median Annual
Performance for 16.25% -0.33% 48.76% 121












Performance for 14.65% 0.49% 51.24% 121
years 1 to 5
Panel B23
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 1.13%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 -0.52%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 0.72%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 1.84%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 0.87%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Years 1, 2, 3 2.17%
A SALES 25.22%
A Operating Costs 28.75%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.20%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
1- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
22 See footnote 1.
23 See footnote 3.
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This is also confirmed by results produced by the Change model which are illustrated
in Panel B. The median difference in operating performance between the 3 year post-
and the 3 year pre-merger periods is 2.17% (which however is statistically
insignificant). The median difference in operating performance between the years 2
and 3 and the year -1 is 0.85% (which is also statistically insignificant). Operating
costs increase faster than sales in the 3 post-merger years relative to the 3-pre-merger
years.
6.5. Operating Performance and Acquisition Premium.
Takeover premium is often associated with post-merger performance in the
sense that the more synergy value a particular acquisition is expected to generate, the
higher the maximum price an acquirer is justified in paying. On the other hand, a
high acquisition price may deprive valuable resources from an acquirer that are
necessary to finance other more profitable projects or it may lead to a disruption of
ongoing projects; thus, an overpriced acquisition may adversely affect post-merger
performance. In this study, the acquisition premium is defined as the excess value an
acquirer pays over the intrinsic value of the target, i.e. over the price of its stock
before any acquisition intensions are announced24. Because acquisition intensions -
not necessarily by the ultimate acquirer - are often speculated by investors possibly
many months before the acquisition, the intrinsic value of the target is taken at the
beginning of the year -1.
In table 12 Panel A the operating performance of the 27 combined targets and
bidders where the acquirer paid a premium from 62% over the intrinsic value of the
target up to 6.5-fold of the intrinsic value of the target as at the beginning of the year
-1 is illustrated. This classification took into account two parameters. First, a
substantial premium to have been paid by an acquirer; for example, a 10% premium
over the intrinsic value of a target, while it is a substantial premium when
considering large acquisitions, it may not have any visible effects in post-merger
performance. Second, while the intension was to examine the most expensive
acquisitions, the sample should not be reduced below a level where a very small
24 This definition is as at Eccles et.al. (1999).
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number of observations make a statistical test unreliable. As far as the Wilcoxon test
is concerned this number should not be less than 13. Thus the 27 most expensive
acquisitions were selected for which there were at least 13 observations in years -4,-
5, 4 and 5.
The results in Table 12 Panel A indicate that there is a decline in post-merger
performance when the acquirer paid a large premium. The combined target and
bidder median annual operating cash flow return on assets ranges from 12.12% to
16.01% in the 5 pre-merger years and it is 14.89% for the whole period. In the post-
merger years it ranges from 12.46% to 14.49% and falls to 13.39% for the whole
period. The decline in median annual industry adjusted operating cash flow return on
assets is sharper. While it is positive (0.29% and statistically insignificant) in the five
pre-merger years it falls to -1.17% in the post-merger period. This number is
statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.017). The number of
positive observations for the entire sample falls from 52.34% in the pre-acquisition
period to 39.25% in the post-acquisition period. Acquirers that paid a premium well
above the intrinsic value of the target to target shareholders, perform below industry
standards in the post-merger period.
The results in Panel B also indicate performance deterioration in the post-merger
period. The median annual industry adjusted operating performance for the 3 pre¬
merger years is 0.99% and statistically insignificant which indicates that the
combined target and bidder perform as well as their industry peers. In the three post-
merger years, however, the median annual industry adjusted operating performance
is -0.85% significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.097). The median change
in performance between the 3 post- and the 3-pre merger years is -0.83% but
statistically insignificant, while the median change between the year 2 and 3 and the
year immediately prior to the acquisition is -3.70% and statistically significant at a
5% significance level (p-value 0.021). The median difference in sales for a 3-year
window around the year of merger completion is 26.33% while the median change of
operating costs in the same period is 28.75%.
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TABLE 12
Median Annual Performance for the 27 cases of the sample where the acquirer paid a
premium between 162% and 658.5% of the acquiree's market value as at the beginning
of the year -1.
Panel A25










-5 15.49% 0.29% 53.85% 13
-4 12.12% -2.11% 38.46% 13
-3 14.89% 0.99% 55.56% 27
-2 13.87% -0.47% 48.15% 27




14.89% 0.29% 52.34% 107
to -1
1 13.07% -0.61% 48.15% 27
2 12.46% -2.73% 33.33% 27
3 13.39% -1.41% 37.04% 27
4 13.53% -2.77% 30.77% 13
5 14.49% -0.62% 46.15% 13
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
13.39% -1.17% b 39.25% 107
Panel Bzo
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.57%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 0.99%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.85% <
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.13%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -3.70% I
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.83%
A SALES 26.33%
A Operating Costs 28.75%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.49%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.31 %
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
25 See footnote I.
26 See footnote 3.
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In Table 13 Panel A, the operating performance of the 27 acquisitions where
the acquirer paid an amount that was less or equal to the intrinsic value of the target
as at the beginning of the first pre-acquisition year is illustrated. The combined
firm's unadjusted median annual operating performance fell from 17.35% in the
entire pre-acquisition period to 13.28% in the entire post-acquisition period. The
median annual industry adjusted operating performance, however, is statistically
insignificant both in the pre- and post acquisition periods. This means that the
average combined firm performance does not deviate substantially from industry
standards before and after the acquisition. However, it is noteworthy that the number
of positive observations falls from 48.57% in the entire pre-acquisition period to
43.81% in the post-acquisition period. The median industry adjusted performance for
the entire post-acquisition period, though statistically insignificant, is negative (-
0.95%). In other words, there is a slight decline in performance. Another finding is
that the median annual operating cash flow returns on assets increases gradually from
-2.18% in the first year after the merger to 2.04% in the fifth year27.
The results from the Change model also confirm some decline in performance
(Panel B). The median operating performance for years 1, 2, and 3 is -1.49% and
statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.049). The median
change in industry adjusted operating performance between years 2 and 3 and the
year -1 is statistically insignificant and -1.20%. The median change in industry
adjusted operating performance between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger years is -
0.90% and also statistically insignificant. The median change in sales for the same
periods increases modestly relatively to the average increase in the entire sample
(2.13%). Operating costs increase by 3.15%.
27 Both the figures are statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 13
Median Annual Performance for the 27 acquisitions where the acquirer paid an
amount that ranges from 16% to 100% of the acquiree's market value as at the
beginning of the year -1.
Panel A28










-5 19.42% 1.79% 58.33% 12
-4 19.88% 3.00% c 66.67% 12
-3 17.11% -0.18% 48.15% 27
-2 17.10% -0.29% 48.15% 27





17.35% -0.29% 48.57% 105
1 12.68% -2.18% 33.33% 27
2 12.37% -1.79% b 25.93% 27
3 13.98% -0.30% 48.15% 27
4 15.42% 0.39% 66.67% 12
5 15.47% 2.04% 75.00% 12
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
13.28% -0.95% 43.81% 105
Panel B29
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 -1.64% b
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 -0.56%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1,2,3 -1.49% b
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.20%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 1.07%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.90%
A SALES 2.13%
A Operating Costs 3.15%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.47% a
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.29% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
28 See footnote 1.
29 See footnote 3.
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Acquisitions in discount seem to perform better than acquisitions in premium.
The average performance for the 5 post-merger periods while negative is very close
to industry standards. However there is some evidence of a decline in performance
which is modest in comparison to that of the acquisitions in premium. Presumably,
acquisitions in discount refer to targets that face efficiency and operations problems.
There is not much competition among bidders for acquiring such targets with
ambiguous futures and a declining competitive advantage. Thus, a bidder may
express an interest for a purchase but at an advantageous price. Increasing efficiency
of such targets may prove a difficult task for the acquirer, and definitely this may
require time. This is consistent with the finding that adjusted performance is -2.18%
in the first post-acquisition year with 33% of the observations being positive,
becoming -1.79% and statistically significant in the second year with only 25.93% of
the observations being positive and increases afterwards. In the third year the decline
is only -0.30% with 48.15% of the observations being positive, and it becomes
0.39% and 2.04% in the fourth and fifth post-acquisition years respectively.
6.6. Operating Performance and Relative Size.
It is well established in M&As literature that the acquisition size may be an
important parameter affecting post-merger performance. Acquisition size is
determined by the relative size of the acquirer and the target. In this study the sample
of the 79 acquisitions was divided into two sub-samples that consisted of 38
acquisitions each. The first included the 38 largest acquisitions in the sample; the
relative bidder's size ranged from 7% to 317% of the size of the target in the first
sub-sample. The second sub-sample included the 38 smallest acquisitions of the
sample where the relative bidder's size ranged from 400% to 37516% of the size of
the target. Size was based on market values of the two firms at the beginning of the
year -1. The results of the operating performance of the largest and smallest
acquisitions in the sample are illustrated in Table 14 and Table 15, respectively.
As Table 14 Panel A shows, median annual industry adjusted operating
performance improves slightly after merger. In the entire five year pre-merger period
the combined target and bidder performance is very close to industry standards
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TABLE 14
Median Annual Performance for the 38 largest acquisitions of the sample. Relative
bidders' size ranges from 7% to 317% of the size of target; size is based on market
value of equity of the two firms at the beginning of year -1.
Panel A30
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Industry - Adjusted




-5 19.25% -0.44% 47.06% 17
-4 19.60% 3.12% 64.71% 17
-3 15.76% -0.06% 50.00% 38
-2 15.73% -0.28% 50.00% 38





16.44% -0.09% 49.52% 148
1 16.15% 1.64% 57.89% 38
2 13.16% -1.36% 39.47% 38
3 14.59% 0.83% 52.63% 38
4 14.44% 0.15% 52.94% 17
5 15.91% 2.38% 64.71% 17
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
5
14.58% 0.27% 52.03% 148
Panel B31
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted O. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.85%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 0.22%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.10%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 1.13%
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 0.66%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.30%
A SALES 14.00%
A Operating Costs 13.47%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.87% c
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.34% a
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
30 See footnote 1.
31 See footnote 3.
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(-0.09% and statistically insignificant). In the post-merger period it becomes a
positive of 0.27% (though statistically insignificant). The aggregate positive
observations in the entire pre-merger period is 49.52% while in the post-merger years
the respective figure slightly improves to 52.03%. Industry adjusted operating
performance in each of the post-merger years is positive, with the positive
observations to exceed 52%. The only exception is year 2 where industry adjusted
operating performance is a negative (but statistically insignificant) of -1.36% and the
positive observations 39.47%.
Panel B shows results from the Change model. The median change in
industry adjusted operating performance between the 3 post-merger years and the 3
pre-merger years is 0.30% and statistically insignificant. The median change between
years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is 0.66% and also statistically insignificant. Median
change in sales between the 3 post- and the three pre- acquisition years is 14% while
the median change in operating costs is 13.47%.
Large acquisitions in the sample outperform the average acquisition of the entire
sample. There is some evidence of performance increases in the post-merger years,
though this is not statistically significant.
Small acquisitions on the other hand, exhibit a dramatic decline in
performance in the post-merger years. Table 15 shows performance changes for the 5
year pre-merger and the 5 year post-merger periods of the 38 smallest acquisitions in
the sample.
As it is reported in Panel A, the combined firm median annual unadjusted
operating cash flow returns on assets fall from 15.96% in the 5 pre-merger years to
12.74% in the 5 post-merger years. More importantly, the median industry adjusted
operating performance while -0.15% and statistically insignificant in the pre-merger
period - i.e. performance which is indistinguishable from industry standards - it
becomes -1.30% and statistically significant at a 1% significance level (p-value
0.001) in the post-merger years. Positive observations for the same periods are
48.03% and 36.18% respectively. In the first post-merger year the median annual
industry adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is -2.70%, significant at a 5%
significance level (p-value 0.013) with only 26.32% of the observations being
positive. In the second post-merger year it is -2.80%, statistically significant at a 1%
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significance level (p-value 0.09) with 31.58% of values being positive. In the third
year performance improves to -1.48%. However this figure is statistically significant
at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.032) and only 34.21% are positive. In year four
the positive observations increase to 42.11% of cases and the performance is still
negative (-0.33%) but statistically insignificant, and finally, in year five median
industry adjusted performance becomes positive (but statistically insignificant).
Panel B demonstrates the median change in annual industry adjusted
operating performance. This is -1.92% between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1.
This figure is statistically significant at a 5% significance level. The median change
in operating cash flow return on assets between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger
years is -2.03% and statistically significant at a 10% significance level. In other
words, there is a sharp decline in performance of the combined firm in the post-
merger years when the acquisition is small.
The results concerning post-merger performance agree with those derived by Healy's
model. The median annual industry adjusted operating cash flow return on assets for
years 2 and 3 is -2.14% (and statistically significant at a 1% significance level - p-
value 0.01) while it is -1.67% and statistically significant at a 1% significance level
(p-value 0.004) for the years 1, 2, and 3. The median change in sales between the 3
post and the 3 pre-merger years is 14.92% and the median change in operating costs
between the same periods is 16.85%.
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TABLE 15
Median Annual Performance for the 38 smallest acquisitions of the sample. Relative
bidders' size ranges from 400% to 37516% of the size of target; size is based on
market value of equity of the two firms at the beginning of year -1.
Panel A32










-5 15.26% -0.09% 47.37% 19
-4 17.21% -0.84% 47.37% 19
-3 16.71% 0.19% 52.63% 38
-2 15.97% -1.11% 42.11% 38





15.96% -0.15% 48.03% 152
1 11.53% -2.70% b 26.32% 38
2 12.51% -2.80% a 31.58% 38
3 12.30% -1.48% b 34.21% 38
4 14.10% -0.33% 42.11% 19
5 16.06% 0.90% 63.16% 19
Median Annual
Performance




12.74% -1.30% a 36.18% 152
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Employee costs per Sales











a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
32 See footnote 1.
33 See footnote 3.
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Large acquisitions, therefore, outperform small ones. The phenomenon is
amplified when the bidder is a relatively large firm. Taking the 19 largest acquirers
in the sub-sample of the 38 largest acquisitions the post-merger operating
performance increases significantly. Results are illustrated in Table 16.
As Panel A of Table 16 illustrates, the combined targets and bidders
outperform their industry peers in the 5 years before the merger. The median of the
difference between firms' operating cash flow return on assets and the weighted
median performances of their respective industries is positive (0.71%) and
statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.036) in the entire 5 year
pre-merger period. Median annual industry adjusted operating performance increases
to a statistically significant 0.86% in the five year post-merger period (which is
statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.021). The positive
observations increase from about 56% in the entire 5 year pre-merger period to about
60% in the post-merger period.
The median difference in operating performance between the 3-year post- and
the 3-year pre-merger periods is positive (0.27%) but statistically insignificant (Panel
B). The same is the case for the median difference in performance between years
2and 3 and the year -1 (0.87%, and statistically insignificant).
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TABLE 16
Median Annual Performance for the acquisitions completed by the 19 largest
acquirers, within the sub-sample of the 38 larger acquisitions of the sample.
Panel A34










-5 18.72% -1.80% 30.00% 10
-4 21.07% 2.89% c 60.00% 10
-3 17.50% 2.21% 57.89% 19
-2 17.15% 0.33% 57.89% 19




17.50% 0.71% b 55.84% 77
to -1
1 16.53% 1.64% c 63.16% 19
2 13.19% -0.44% 47.37% 19
3 16.17% 2.18% b 68.42% 19
4 14.35% -1.60% 50.00% 10
5 17.26% 2.52% 70.00% 10
Median Annual
Performance
for years 1 to
15.65% 0.86% b 59.74% 77
Panel
CHANGE MODEL
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 1.13%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 1.22%
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 0.86% c
IAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 1.68% c
A (IAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 0.87%
A (IAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.27%
A SALES 3.89%
A Operating Costs 3.65%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.89%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.31% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
34 See footnote 1.
35 See footnote 3.
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6.7. Abnormal Industry Adjusted Cash Flow Returns.
Following Healy et. al. (1992), we measure the abnormal industry adjusted
cash flow returns by running the regression (4.9), as described in Chapter 4. The
intercept (a) in the regression captures the percentage change in industry adjusted
operating cash flow return on assets which is attributable to merger. The coefficient
(b) represents the fraction of the pre-merger performance which persists in the post-
merger years.
To estimate the relationship between post-merger performance and the
transaction characteristics we include in equation (4.9) the necessary dummy
variables. A dummy variable which is one when an acquisition was financed by
stock and zero otherwise (STOCK), a dummy variable which is '1' when the medium
of financing was a mix of stock and cash and '0' otherwise (MIX), a dummy variable
which becomes '1' if the acquisition was friendly and '0' if it was hostile
(FRIENDLY), and a dummy which denotes whether the acquirer and the target
operated in the same Level 5 industry with the value of ' 1' (RLTD). Furthermore, 3
other dummy variables were used. One for denoting whether the acquisition occurred
in premium (RELPREM) which takes the value of ' 1' in this case and '0' otherwise,
and one which takes the value of '1' if the acquisition is large (LARGEacqtn) and the
value of '0' in all other cases. Results from the regressions are illustrated in Table
1736.
The first column of Table 17 illustrates regression (1) which shows that the
coefficient (b) is 0.056 and statistically insignificant, indicating that industry adjusted
cash flow returns of the pre-merger period do not persist in the post merger period.
The intercept coefficient (a) is -0.017 and statistically significant denoting that there
is a 1.7% decline in annual operating performance after controlling for pre-merger
performance. These results do not agree with those derived by Healy et.al. (1992)
who found pre-merger performance persistence in the post-merger years and a 2.8%
increase in annual performance after the merger.
36 The regressions were initially run in SPSS 11.0 statistical package. While no multicollinerarity was detected in
any of them, an unknown form of heteroscedasticity was detected. Table 17 illustrates the results produced using
Limdep 8.0 statistical package which implements White correction for heteroscedasticity.
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In Regression (2) the coefficient (b) is also statistically insignificant
indicating that pre-merger performance has no significant effect on post merger
performance. The coefficients of the dummy variables (STOCK) and (MIX) are both
positive but statistically insignificant. The intercept coefficient (a) is -0.028
indicating that acquisitions that are financed by cash experience a significant decline
in annual operating performance of 2.8% on average. This finding is not consistent
with evidence provided by Healy et. al. and by Powell and Stark (2005) who report
that the medium of payment seem to have no effect in post-merger performance.
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Regression (3) describes the effect of target's management attitude. Whether
the acquisition is friendly (dummy variable FRIENDLY) or not seems that it is
irrelevant to the post-merger performance after controlling for the effects of pre¬
merger performance (which is statistically insignificant). However, the intercept
coefficient is -0.012 and statistically significant denoting a decline in annual
operating performance of 1.2% for hostile acquisitions.
In regression (4) the coefficient of the dummy variable (RLTD) is positive but
statistically insignificant, indicating that the sample acquirers and targets which
operate in the same Level 5 industry exhibit a post-merger performance increase.
This is 2.7% increase in annual industry adjusted cash flow returns after pre-merger
performance effect (which is also statistically insignificant) is controlled for. The
intercept coefficient (a) captures the effect of performance change of unrelated
acquisitions and it is a negative of -3.5% and statistically significant. These findings
are different than those provided by Healy et.al. and Powell and Stark who report
that industry relatedness does not have any significant effect on post-merger
performance.
Regression (5) describes the effect on post merger performance when the
acquisition was financed by a means of payment other than cash and the acquirer and
the target belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector. This effect is captured by
the coefficient of the dummy variable (nCash x Related) which is the product of the
dummy variable (nCash) that is ' 1' when the means of payment is not cash and '0'
otherwise times the dummy variable (RLTD). This coefficient is 0.027 and
statistically significant indicating an improvement in annual operation performance
of 2.7% in the post-merger period after controlling for the (insignificant) effect of
pre-merger performance. The intercept coefficient (a) captures the performance
change due to merger of all the other types of acquisitions. This is -0.03 and highly
significant.
The effect on post-merger performance when the method of payment was a
combination of stock and cash (dummy MIX) and the target and the acquirer
belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector (dummy RLTD) after controlling for
pre-merger performance is described in regression (6). This is captured by the
coefficient of the dummy variable (RLTD XMIX) which is the product of the dummy
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variables (.RLTD) and (MIX). This coefficient is 0.023 and statistically significant,
indicating that related acquisitions that are financed by a combination of stock and
cash perform better than the rest. The intercept coefficient (a) indicates the decline in
performance of the rest acquisitions which is 2.5% annually (and statistically
significant).
In regression (7) the dummy variable (FR X RLTD X nCASH) is the product
of the dummy variables (FRIENDLY), (RLTD) and (nCASH) and describes the sub-
sample of the STRATEGIC acquisitions. Its coefficient indicates that strategic
acquisitions perform better than the average combined company of the sample and
the improvement in median annual performance is 3% (after controlling for the
effects of pre-merger performance on the post-merger performance) and statistically
significant. The intercept coefficient (a) is -0.028 and statistically significant
indicating a deterioration of 2.8% in annual performance for the acquisitions that are
not strategic. Regression (8) is derived from (7) after a dummy variable was added.
This dummy variable (FR X RTD X nCASH X IAOPpre) is the product of the three
respective dummy variables and its coefficient captures any amplification effect the
pre-merger performance may have on the performance of strategic acquisitions
Indeed, the coefficient is statistically significant which implies that much of the
variation of the post-merger performance of Strategic acquisitions is explained by
pre-merger performance. This implies that the above average performance of
Strategic acquisitions in the post-merger years is attributable to pre-merger
performance. This in turn implies that firms that are engaged in Strategic acquisitions
enjoy a competitive advantage in their industries' which persists in the post-merger
years .
In regression (9), the coefficient of the dummy variable (RLTD) is positive
(0.03) and statistically significant indicating that related acquisitions perform better
than unrelated ones, after controlling for the effects of the method of payment (the
intercept coefficient is -0.048 and statistically significant). It is also noteworthy, that
although the coefficients of the dummy variables (MIX) and (STOCK) are
statistically insignificant, they are both positive indicating that our sample companies
experience performance improvements when the acquisition is financed by stock or a
combination of stock and cash.
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In regression (10) the coefficient of the variable (RELPREMIUM) is negative
but statistically insignificant indicating that premium has not a substantial impact on
post-merger performance after controlling for the effect of pre-merger performance.
Regression (11) expresses the relationship between whether an acquisition is large
and the post-merger performance. Large acquisitions exhibit an improvement in
median annual operating performance of 2.2% (the coefficient of the dummy
variable (LGacqn) is 0.022 and statistically significant) while the intercept
coefficient indicates that all other acquisitions experience a performance decline of -
2.8% (a = 0.028 and statistically significant). The pre-merger performance does not
have a significant effect on post-merger performance. In regression (12) the
coefficient of the dummy variable (LGxRLTD) which is the product of the dummy
variables {LGacqn) and (RLTD) is positive (0.029) and statistically significant,
indicating that large acquisitions between firms that operate within the same Level 5
Industrial Sector exhibit an increase in annual operating performance which is 2.9%.
Regression (13) in Table 17 examines the relation between median annual
industry adjusted operating cash flow returns on assets and the combined cumulative
market-adjusted returns of total assets in the announcement period. This tests the
ability of the stock market to forecast post-takeover changes in operating
performance. The relation is positive and statistically insignificant. The implications
of regression (13) are discussed in Chapter 9.
Table 17a illustrates regression equations with dummy and interaction
variables together so as to include both linear and non-linear terms. All regressions
have been tested for multicollineartity using condition index and eigenvalues,
tolerance, and variance inflation factor. No multicollinearity was detected. As it can
be seen most of coefficints were statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 17a (heteroscedasticitv corrected (White))
Healy's et.al. (1992) Regression Model. OLS regressions of post-takeover
industry adjusted operating performance on combined target and bidder
industry adjusted pre-takeover operating performance
EQUATION 1 2 3 4 5
INDEPENTEND IAOP IAOP IAOP IAOP IAOP
VARIABLES post post post post post
CONSTANT (a) -0.045" -0.0642 -0.038 -0.017 -0.047"
t-stat -2.267 -1.135 -1.678 -0.512 -2.076
lAOPpre 0.074 0.105 0.091 0.085 0.025





nCASH 0.033 0.000 0.020





RLTD 0.026 0.044 0.024 0.007 0.029*










RSQ 0.0821 0.071 0.059 0.091 0.093
ADJ R sq 0.0325 0.059 0.009 0.029 0.031
F stat 1.66 1.43 1.18 1.47 1.51
Nr of Observations 79 79 79 79 79
IAOPpost denotes the median annual industry adjusted cash flow returns for each combined firm in
the five years after the year of the merger completion.
IAOPpre denotes the median annual industry adjusted cash flow returns for each combined firm in the
five years prior to the year of the merger completion.
*** denotes significance at a 1% significance level using a two-tail test
** denotes significance at a 5% significance level using a two-tail test
* denotes significance at a 10% significance level using a two-tail test
For the definition of the above dummy variables, see Table 17, Chapter 6.
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6.8. The Change Model.
As discussed in Chapter 4, restricting (b) to equal '1' in regression (4.9), the
benchmark for measuring post-merger performance becomes the pre-merger
performance. Results that derived from this model - i.e. the Change Model - are
shown in Table 18.
In Table 18 the variables that denote the changes in median industry adjusted
cash flow returns between different time periods around merger completion are
IAOPch5, LAOPch3, IAOPch2 and IAOPch23. The first refers to a time period that
includes the five post- and the five pre-merger years. That is, the second refers to a
time period that includes the 3 post- and the three pre-merger years, the third refers
to a time period that includes the 2 post- and the two pre-merger years, and
LAOPch23 denotes the change in median industry adjusted operating performance
between the years 2 and 3 and the year -l37. Dummy variables are as in Table 17.
Results from regression (1) indicate that cash acquisitions are followed by a
statistically significant decline of -3.6% in annual performance. Acquisitions that
were financed by stock or by a combination of stock and cash do not experience a
significant change in performance (their coefficients although negative they are
statistically insignificant). When regressing IAOPch5 against the dummy variable
(.RELATED) the results indicate that related acquisitions are followed by a 5.2% per
annum improvement in performance (Regression 2). The intercept coefficient (a)
denotes that unrelated acquisitions experience a 5.3% decline in annual
no
#
performance . In regression (3), IAOPch23 is regressed against the dummy
(RELPREM). Results indicate a deterioration in annual performance of -5.9% for the
sample acquisitions where the acquirer paid a high premium (as it was defined in
Chapter 4). The intercept coefficient is also statistically insignificant indicating that
all other acquisitions were not followed by a change in performance39. In regression
(4) the dummy variable (LARGEacqn) is positive but statistically insignificant
37 In all the cases the year ofmerger completion is excluded from the time periods in examination.
38 Results do not change substantially when regressing IAOPch3, IAOPch2, and IAOPch23 against the variable
{RELATED).
39 Results when cash flow differences are represented by the variables IAOPch3, IAOPch5 and IAOPch2 are also
statistically weak.
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indicating that large acquisitions do not explain much of the variation of the change
in post-merger performance. However, the intercept coefficient is negative and
statistically significant meaning that all other acquisitions exhibit a performance
decline. Regression (5) indicates that large acquisitions between firms operating in
the same Level 5 Industrial Sector exhibit a statistically significant increase of 4.1%
in operating performance in the post-takeover years. In regression (6), the dummy
variable (RLTD X nCASH) is the product of the dummy variables (RLTD) and
(nCASH) and takes the value of ' 1' when an acquisition is financed by a means of
payment other than cash and the target and the bidder belong to the same Level 5
Industrial Sector. The results from this regression indicate that such acquisitions are
followed by a 5.1% improvement in annual performance. In regression (7) the
dummy {RLTD X MTX) takes the value of ' 1' when an acquisition is financed by a
combination of stock and cash and the target and the bidder belong to the same Level
5 Industrial Sector. Such acquisitions exhibit in the post-acquisition period an
improvement in annual performance of 3.5%.
The dummy (FR X RLTD X nCASH) in regressions (8), (9) and (10) denotes
the Strategic acquisitions, i.e. it takes the value of 1 if an acquisition is strategic.
Strategic acquisitions are followed by a 5% improvement in annual performance
when the variable IAOPch3 is regressed against {FR X RLTD X nCASH), a 6%
improvement in annual performance when cash flow differences are denoted by the
variable IAOPch2, and a 4.5% improvement when IAOPch5 is regressed against {FR
X RLTD X nCASFT).
Regression (11) examines the effects of acquisitions that were financed by a
means of payment other than cash on cash flow differences between the three post-
and the three pre-merger years after controlling for the effect of friendly and related
acquisitions. Coefficient of the variables {nCASH) and {FRIENDLY) are statistically
insignificant indicating a negligible effect. However, they are positive as expected.
The coefficient of the dummy {RLTD) is 0.061 and statistically significant indicating
that related acquisitions are followed by a 6.1% improvement in annual performance
after controlling for the effects of friendly and non-cash acquisitions. Regression (12)
examines the effects of the same variables on differences in cash flows which refer to
5 year post- and pre-merger periods (IAOPch5). When the dummy variable {FR X
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RLTD X nCASH) is added (regression 13) results are similar. However, all the
coefficients are statistically insignificant (see Table 18).
Regressing the differences in cash flows between the years 2 and 3 and the
year -1 (IAOPch23) against the dummy (STOCK) after controlling for the effects of
(.FRIENDLY) and (UNRELATED) (regression (14)), the results indicate a 7.3% per
annum improvement in performance for stock acquisitions and 6.9% per annum
decline in performance for unrelated acquisitions. The coefficient of the dummy
(FRIENDLY) is statistically insignificant. Regression (15) provides similar results to
those derived by regression (14).
Cash flow differences between acquisitions occurred in the period 1990-1993
and in the period 1994-1996 are examined by regressing the change in cash flows
(.\AOPch23) on the dummies (ACQTION_90_93) and (ACQTIONS_94_96),
(regression (16)). The first takes the value of '1' if an acquisition occurred in the
period from 1/1/1990 until 31/12/1993 and the second takes the value of '1' if an
acquisition occurred in the period from 1/1/1994 until 31/12/1996. Results indicate
that acquisitions in the period 1994-1996 are followed by a 6.9% decline in annual
performance. On the contrary, acquisitions occurred in the period 1990-1993 do not
experience any decline in performance.
Regression (17) confirms evidence from regression (16). Regressing
IAOPch5 on the dummy the results indicate a 3.4% increase in annual performance
for acquisitions occurred in the period 1990-1993. The intercept coefficient (a) is -
0.038 indicating a 3.8% decline in annual performance for the remaining acquisitions
in the sample (i.e. for acquisitions occurred in the period from 1994-1996). Similarly,
regressing IAOPch23 on the dummy (ACQTION_90_93) there is a 6.8% increase in
annual performance for acquisitions completed in the period 1990-1993 (regression
(18)). The intercept coefficient indicated a 6.9% decline in annual performance for
acquisitions occurred in the period 1994-1996.
Regression (19) examines the relation between the combined cumulative
market-adjusted returns of total assets in the announcement period and the median
change in industry adjusted cash flow returns on total assets. The relation is positive
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TABLE 18a (heteroscedasticitv corrected (White))
Ghosh's (2001) Change Model. OLS regressions of the change in median
annual industry adjusted operating performance of the combined firm
between post- and pre- merger periods on dummy variables that describe
certain merger characteristics.
EQUATION 1 2 3 4
INDEPENTEND
VARIABLES IAOP ch5 IAOP ch5 IAOP ch5 IAOP ch5
CONSTANT (a) -0.084 -0.047* -0.0859 -0.042











RLTD 0.058 0.040 0.054 0.031







R SQ 0.107 0.086 0.108 0.097
ADJ R sq 0.071 0.050 0.060 0.061
F stat 3.01 2.37 2.26 2.7
Nr of Observations 79 79 79 79
IAOPch5 denotes the change in median annual industry adjusted operating performance of the
combined firm between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre-merger periods.
*** denotes significance at a 1% significance level using a two-tail test.
** denotes significance at a 5% significance level using a two-tail test.
* denotes significance at a 10% significance level using a two-tail test
For the definition of the above dummy variables see Table 17, Chapter 6.
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In table 18a we include the linear and non-linear terms of regression equations.
Nearly all coefficients are statistically insignificant40.
6.9. Conclusions.
In this Chapter we presented the results on the effects of acquisitions on
corporate operating performance after applying the methodology that was described
in Chapter 4. The benchmark that was used to adjust performance was the median
performance of other firms that belong to the same industries to that of the acquiree
and the acquirer.
The main finding was that merging firms, on average, experience a
statistically significant decline in annual performance of 1.7% in the post-merger
years, once the effects of pre-acquisition performance are controlled for.
Interestingly, while pre-acquisition performance appears to be equivalent to that of a
firm's industry in the pre-merger years, it does not explain much of the variation of
operating performance in the post-merger years.
Strategic acquisitions exhibited a statistically significant increase in their
post-merger operating performance and related acquisitions perform better than
unrelated ones. Hostile acquisitions exhibited a statistically significant decline in
annual in performance in the post-acquisition years and large acquisitions
outperform small ones. Firms that engaged in cash acquisitions exhibit a post-
takeover performance decline, unlike firms that engaged in stock and mix
acquisitions which perform as well as their industry peers. Finally, large acquisitions
outperform other acquisitions while whether the acquisition closed at a premium
appears to have no effect on post-merger performance. These results do not change
when using either Regression Model or the Change Model.
40
Multicollinearity tests have been implemented using tolerance, eigenvalues, condition index, and
variance inflation factor. No multicollinearity waas detected.
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CHAPTER 7.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT USING A
MATCHED FIRMS BENCHMARK: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS.
7.1. Introduction.
In the previous Chapter, we estimated the adjusted operating cash flow
returns on assets of merging firms using as a performance adjustment benchmark, the
median industry operating performance. However, Ghosh (2001) argues that this
benchmark might produce biased estimates of post-merger performance if acquirers
outperform their industry peers in the pre-merger period or if they are relatively large
firms. Healy et al, in their study, include the 50 largest acquisitions in terms of dollar
value. Because large firms tend to outperform small ones and because typically firms
undertake acquisitions after a period of superior performance, Ghosh critises Healy
et al that they include a very particular dataset which may provide biased
performance estimation. To make our empirical evidence comparable to that
provided by both Ghosh and Healy and to avoid biases which might arise by factors
which are related to size and pre-merger performance, in this Chapter, we examine
the post-merger performance of merging firms using a pair of matched firms for each
sample target and bidder. As discussed in Chapter 4 the matching was made on the
basis of industry relatedness, pre-merger performance and size.
The results produced in this Chapter do not differ substantially from those
derived in Chapter 6. Merging firms, on average, experience a performance decline
in the post-merger years. Related and Strategic acquisitions exhibit a post-takeover
performance improvement, while large acquisitions between firms with similar
operations lead to an increase in performance. Using this benchmark for performance
adjustment the method of payment appears to have no effect in post-merger
performance. However, for our sample companies stock acquisitions perform better
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than cash and mix acquisitions. Acquisitions that were completed during the first half
of the time period under examination tend to perform better than later acquisitions.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: In Section 2 the results from the
univariate analysis of the post-takeover operating performance of the 71 sample
companies1 are presented. The operating performance of merging companies that are
classified according to the method of the acquisition financing, the industry
relatedness between target and bidder, and the attitude of each target's management
towards the acquisition offer, is reported In Section 3. In Section 4 the post-merger
performance of Strategic acquisitions is illustrated. In the fifth Section we report the
results concerning the operating performance of acquisitions where the acquirer paid
a relatively high premium for the target and of acquisitions where the target was
purchased at a discount. The operating performance results for large and small
acquisitions are reported in Section 6. In the seventh and eighth Sections the results
from multivariate analysis after applying the Regression Model and the Change
Model respectively, are reported. Finally in Chapter 9 we summarise the main
findings of this Chapter.
7.2. Operating Performance relative to matched firms for the sample
companies.
The operating cash flow return on total assets of the 71 combined targets and
bidders for which data were available for their matched firms is illustrated in Table 1.
The results from Panel A2 of Table 1 indicate combined firms' median cash flow
returns on assets decline from 16.43% in the entire pre-merger period to 13.31% in
the 5 post-merger years. These figures are about the same as in Chapter 6, as it was
'
The initial sample of the 79 targets and bidders was reduced to 71 because of the restrictions imposed by the
pre-merger performance and size matching criteria (see chapter 4).
Operating performance is measured as the operating cash flow returns on total assets. Operating cash flows are
computed as sales, minus cost of goods sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and
goodwill expenses. Total assets are the market value of equity plus the book value of net debt and preferred stock
at the beginning of each financial year. Changes in market values of equity of the acquirer and the acquiree at the
merger announcement are excluded from the asset base for the post-merger years. Firms are matched on the basis
of acquiring and target firms' performance and size one year prior to the acquisition from their respective
industries. Pro-forma data of merged firms for pre-acquisition years are created by aggregating acquiring and
target's firm data. Pro-forma data of matched firms are created by aggregating the data of the two matched firms.
Matched-firm adjusted cash flow returns are calculated as the difference between each firm's value for each year
and the value of the matched firm. Then the median of these differences is calculated for each year.
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expected, since the performance metric is the same in this research design and the
only difference stems from the fact that only 71 bidders and targets were used to
measure performance instead of 79 in the previous Chapter. The interesting element
of the results of this research design refers to matched firms adjusted operating
performance which is illustrated in Column 2 of Panel A of Table 1.
As in Chapter 6, the results indicate a decline in adjusted operating
performance after the merger, even after using an alternative benchmark which
controls for pre-merger performance and size effects. Specifically, except from the
year -5, in all pre-merger years the combined targets and bidders perform better than
similar firms in their industries, though the difference is not statistically significant in
any of the pre-merger years. Because the matching criterion referring to the pre¬
merger performance applied on the basis of the targets' and bidders' performance as
at the year -1, the median difference in operating performance between the combined
firm and the matching firms is only 0.08% in year -1. For the entire pre-merger
period the matched firms adjusted operating performance is positive but statistically
insignificant (0.22%), while the number of positive observations is 53.05%. After the
merger, the adjusted operating performance deteriorates and becomes an
insignificant of -0.84% in year 1 and declines further to -2.03% in year 2 (which is
statically insignificant). In year 3 the adjusted operating performance is a negative of
-1.70% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.036). In
years 4 and 5 performance improves to an insignificant level of -0.13% and to a
positive and insignificant level of 0.62% respectively. It is obvious that the highest
deterioration in operating performance in the post-merger years occurs in years 2 and
3 which seems plausible since in year 1 the effects of the merger may have not yet
been observable while any problems in productivity may have been alleviated after
four or five years. The adjusted operating performance in the entire 5-year post-
merger period, however, is negative (-0.60%) and statistically significant at a 5%
significance level (p-value 0.025). The results for the entire sample as illustrated in
Panel A of Table 1 are consistent with the results that were produced using a research
design which employed a portfolio of many firms from the respective industries as
they were presented in Panel A of Table 1 in Chapter 6- instead of a pair of matched
firms.
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TABLE 1.
Median Annual Performance for the 71 sample companies.
Panel A
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year
Relative to Firm % Number of
Merger Median Matched Median postitive observations
-5 18.54% -1.08% 42.42% 33
-4 17.91% 0.90% 54.55% 33
-3 15.74% 1.47% 54.93% 71
-2 15.66% 0.99% 52.11% 71
-1 16.01% 0.08% 56.34% 71
Median
Annual
Performance 16.43% 0.22% 53.05% 279
for years -5
to -1
1 12.68% -0.84% 42.25% 71
2 12.56% -2.03% 43.66% 71
3 13.31% -1.70% b 42.25% 71
4 14.67% -0.13% 48.48% 33
5 16.06% 0.62% 57.58% 33
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.08%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 0.40%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -1.38%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.08% b
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -2.10% b
A(MAOP) Years -1,-2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -1.10%
A SALES 13.48%
A Operating Costs 16.02%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 0.50%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.91% c
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
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The median change in adjusted operating performance between the years 2
and 3 and the year -1 is -2.10% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level
(p-value 0.047) while the median change in operating performance between the 3
post- and pre-merger years is a negative but statistically insignificant value of -1.10%
(Panel B3 of Table 1).
The change in sales and in operating costs follows the same pattern as in
Table 1, Panel B of Chapter 6, i.e., operating costs increase faster than sales after the
merger. This is what was expected, as calculations in this research design include the
71 out of 79 merged firms for which the same calculations took place in Table 1,
Panel B of Chapter 6. What is also interesting from the results presented in Panel B is
the increase in the adjusted operating costs per sales. To adjust the median operating
costs per sales of the combined sample companies for each year, the median
operating cost per sales for each combined pair of matched firms was subtracted. The
median change refers to the three post- and pre-merger years. In Panel B it can be
seen that there is an increase in operating costs per sales for the merged firms
relatively to the matched firms. This increase is 0.50%, though it is statistically
insignificant.
The general finding for the sample companies is that there is a performance
deterioration in the 5 post merger years relatively to the operating performance of
matched firms that did not engage in merger activity.
7.3. Operating Performance for Mergers that Share Common Characteristics.
The operating performance of merged firms that belong to different sub-sets
of the sample which were selected according to various merger characteristics is
examined in this section. Such characteristics include whether the payment means
was cash, stock, or a combination of them, whether targets and bidders had the same
34 (MAOP) is the median of the difference between the median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return
on assets of years 3 to 1 and the median of years -1 to -3 for all the sample firms.
A SALES is the median of the change of each firm's median sales between the post- and pre- acquisition periods,
for all the sample firms.
A Operating Costs is the median of the change of each firm's median operating costs between the post- and pre-
acquisition periods for all the sample firms.
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted is the median of the change of each firm's operating costs over sales
after subtracting the relative value of the respective matched firm between the post-and pre-acquisition periods,
for all the sample firms.
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business operations before the merger and whether the acquisition offer was agreed
with the target's management or not.
7.3.1. The Method of Payment.
The results in Chapter 6 indicated a dramatic decline in post-merger operating
performance for cash acquisitions when the operating performance benchmark is the
median industry operating performance. When the performance benchmark is the
operating performance of a pair of firms from the same industry as that of target and
bidder which are matched to the combined entity on the basis of size and pre-merger
performance, the results do not change substantially.
Indeed, in Column 3 of Panel A of Table 2, it can be seen that the adjusted
operating cash flow return on assets in the 3 pre-merger years range from 0.40% in
year -1 to 2.53% in the year -2. The median adjusted operating performance for the
entire 3-year pre-merger period is positive (1.31%) but statistically insignificant. The
number of positive observations for the same period is 62.22%. In the post-merger
period, however, the median adjusted operating performance is negative for all the 3
years and for the entire period as well. In the year 1 it is -0.60%, it becomes -3.58%
in year 2 with the number of positive observations being only 26.67%, and -0.37% in
the year 3. The median adjusted operating performance for the entire year period is -
2.03% and the number of positive observations falls to 40%. It is noteworthy,
however, that none of these figures is statistically significant.
In Panel B of Table 2 the median adjusted operating performance in the 3
pre-merger years is 1.31% (though statistically insignificant), while the median
adjusted operating performance for the 3 post-merger years is a statistically
insignificant value of -0.66%. The median of the difference in operating performance
between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -2.60% which is statistically significant
at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.088). The median difference in adjusted
operating performance between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger years is also
negative (-3.31%) but statistically insignificant. Sales increase less than operating
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TABLE 2.
Median Annual Performance for the 15 acquisitions where the method of payment
was cash.
Panel A4
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of ob:
-3 16.31% 0.75% 53.33% 15
-2 17.42% 2.53% 73.33% 15
-1 14.28% 0.40% 60.00% 15
Median
Annual
Performance 16.31% 1.31% 62.22% 45
for years -5
to -1
1 11.44% -0.60% 46.67% 15
2 12.46% -3.58% 26.67% 15
3 10.98% -0.37% 46.67% 15
Median
Annual





MAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.40%
MAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 1.31 %
MAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 - 0.66%
MAOP-(lndustry Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.99% c
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -2.60% c
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -3.31 %
A SALES 12.33%
A Operating Costs 16.33%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 0.37%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.47% b
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.11 % a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
4 See footnote 2.
5 See footnote 3.
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costs in the post-merger years for the 15 cash acquisitions which are included in this
research design as it was the case for the 16 cash acquisitions in Chapter 66. The
median matched firms adjusted change in operating Costs per Sales is 0.37%
between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger years, which however is statistically
insignificant.
In Table 3, Panel A, the performance of the 17 sample combined targets and
acquirers that used stock as a means of payment for the acquisition is presented.
Consistent with the findings of the previous Chapter, adjusted operating performance
improves after the merger although this improvement is small and statistically
insignificant. However, this finding becomes more important if it is considered in the
context of the median post-merger performance of the entire sample as illustrated in
Table 1. In other words while the sample companies experience a statistically
significant deterioration in operating performance after the merger, for the 17
mergers where the method of payment was stock there is an improvement.
Specifically, the median adjusted operating cash flow return on assets
increases from 0.22% in the entire pre-merger period to 0.62% in the entire post-
merger period. However none of these figures is statistically significant. The number
of positive observations increases from 52.31% to 55.38% in the same periods7.
From Panel B of Table 3 the median change in operating performance
between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 and between the three post- and the three
pre-merger years is negative but statistically insignificant in both the cases (in the
first case the median change is -1.04% and in latter -0.18%). The matched firms
adjusted change in operating costs per sales between the 3-year post- and pre-merger
periods is negative (but statistically insignificant), indicating some improvement in
costs relative to sales after the merger.
6 In fact, because the calculation of ASales and AOperating costs remains unaffected from the alternative
benchmarks used to measure adjusted operating performance, it is expected that their values will remain about at
the same levels as in Chapter 6 for each of the sub-samples of merged firms under examination. For this reason,
in the rest of this Chapter a discussion on the values of these variables will be provided only when there is a
substantial change from the respective results provided in Chapter 6.
7 In Table 3 the number of observations for the years -4, -5, 4, and 5 is only 7 for each one of these
years, since there were only 7 acquisitions that were financed by stock and where data for the acquirer
and the target were available for 5 years. This makes the results for the respective years not
representative for the whole sample. However it was considered useful to include these 28
observations in the calculations of the median operating performance and the statistical tests for the
entire pre- and post-merger periods.
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TABLE 3.
Median Annual Performance for the 17 acquisitions where the method of payment
was stock.
Panel A8
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of ob:
-5 19.56% 6.52% 57.14% 7
-4 22.91% 7.85% c 85.71% 7
-3 12.48% -0.74% 47.06% 17
-2 14.28% -1.24% 41.18% 17
-1 13.15% 0.05% 52.94% 17
Median
Annual
Performance 16.43% 0.22% 52.31% 65
for years -5
to -1
1 13.07% -0.84% 41.18% 17
2 14.00% 0.62% 58.82% 17
3 13.98% -0.14% 47.06% 17
4 15.42% 2.26% c 71.43% 7
5 18.17% 3.65% 85.71% 7
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3
A Employee costs per Sales












b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
8 See footnote 2.
9 See footnote 3.
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In Table 4, Panel A, the operating performance of firms that engaged in
acquisitions where the method of payment was a combination of stock and cash is
presented. The matched firms adjusted operating cash flow return on assets declines
dramatically after the merger, especially during the first three post-merger years.
This finding is different from what was the case when the benchmark used to
evaluate the operating performance of the combined entity was the median industry
performance (Table 6, in Chapter 6). In the entire pre-merger period the median
merging firms' performance is about the same as that of matched firms and the
number of positive observations is 50.92%.
In the entire post-merger period, however, the median difference between the
operating performance of the combined entities and the operating performance of the
matched firms is -1.35% and significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.07)
with only 42.33% of the observations being positive. The highest decline in the post-
merger years is observed at year 3 where the adjusted operating performance is -
2.97% and significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.035).
In Panel B also, it can be seen that the median change in operating
performance between years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -2.10% and significant at a
10% significance level (p-value 0.076) The median change between the 3 post- and
the 3 pre-merger years is also negative (-1.10%) but statistically insignificant). The
median change in adjusted operating costs per sales for the same period is 1.15% and
significant at a 1% significance level (p-value 0.001). This last finding indicates that
operating costs increase disproportionably to sales after the merger and that merged
firms while increase sales do not manage costs efficiently.
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TABLE 4.
Median Annual Performance for the 39 acquisitions where the acquirer
offered a choice between cash and stock to the target's shareholders.
Panel A10
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 15.36% -1.78% 34.78% 23
-4 17.42% -0.18% 47.83% 23
-3 15.78% 1.92% 58.97% 39
-2 16.43% -0.22% 48.72% 39
-1 17.35% 0.06% 56.41% 39
Median
Annual
Performance 16.87% 0.05% 50.92% 163
for years -5
to -1
1 12.44% -1.35% 41.03% 39
2 12.32% -2.25% 43.59% 39
3 13.07% -2.97% b 38.46% 39
4 13.62% -0.24% 43.48% 23
5 16.06% -0.26% 47.83% 23
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.06%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Yrs -1,-2, -3 0.06%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -2.38% c
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -2.82% c
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -2.10% c
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -1.10%
A SALES 6.89%
A Operating Costs 11.50%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 1.15% a
A Employee costs per Sales 0.05%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.33%
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
10 See footnote 2.
11 See footnote 3.
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In summary, acquisitions that were financed solely by stock appear to
perform better than acquisitions that were financed solely by cash or by a
combination of stock and cash. Stock acquisitions perform as well as the matched
firms in the post-merger period whereas mixed acquisitions perform worse than the
control firms in the entire post-merger period. Both cash and mixed acquisitions
exhibit a statistically significant change in the median matched-firm adjusted
operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1.
7.3.2. The Target's Management Attitude.
The results in the previous Chapter indicated that firms engaged in hostile
takeovers underperform their industry peers in the post-merger year while in agreed
takeovers firms manage to keep their post-merger performance at about the same
levels as their industry peers. In Table 5, Panel A results confirm that firms that
conduct hostile takeovers perform worse than other firms in the same industry and of
a similar size and similar pre-merger performance. However, when the benchmark is
industry performance the decline effect is higher than when the benchmark is a pair
of matched firms12.
Panel A results indicate that in the 3-year pre-merger period the median
matched firms adjusted operating cash flow returns on assets is 0.67%. This figure is
not statistically significant but indicates that the combined entities' performances are
at least at the level of pairs of similar firms. More importantly, for the entire period,
the number of positive observations is 52.08%. In the 3-year post-merger period,
however, the median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is a
negative -0.45% (though statistically insignificant). The number of positive
observations falls to 41.67%. Again, the worst level of performance is observed in
year 2 and 3.
12 See Table 7 in Chapter 6.
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TABLE 5.
Median Annual Performance for the 16 acquisitions where the acquirer
made a hostile bid for the acquiree.
Panel A13
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-3 17.05% -0.28% 43.75% 16
-2 17.26% -1.58% 43.75% 16























for years 1 to
5
12.43% -0.45% 41.67% 48
Panel B14
CHANGE MODEL
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 1.22%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3 1.06%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -0.09%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.33%
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -1.79%
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.91%
A SALES 4.86%
A Operating Costs 3.56%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 -1.77%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.03%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.33% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
In Panel B of Table 5 it can be seen that the median adjusted 3-year pre¬
merger operating performance is 1.06% (but statistically insignificant) while the
13 See footnote 2.
14 See footnote 3.
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years 2 and 3 median adjusted operating performance is a negative and statistically
insignificant -0.33%. In the 3-year post-merger period the median adjusted operating
performance is -0.09% and statistically insignificant, i.e. very close to the median
performance of the pair of matched firms. The median change in operating
performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -1.79% indicating a
statistically insignificant decline. The median change in operating cash flow return
on assets between the 3 post-merger years and the 3 pre-merger years is a statistically
insignificant of -0.91%. The median matched firms adjusted change in operating
costs per sales between the post- and pre-merger periods is -1.77% (though
statistically insignificant) implying a positive improvement in operating costs relative
to sales after the acquisition. The possible improvement in operating costs per sales
suggests that hostile acquisitions may increase efficiency in terms of economising in
operating costs, or in terms of increasing sales. The possible decline in operating
performance, however, may occur due to other costs which may arise from the
disruption in operations caused after the target's management replacement and the
change of their ongoing projects. Such disruption typically accompanies hostile
takeovers.
As far as the friendly acquisitions are concerned, the results from Panel A of
Table 6 indicate a decline of median operating performance in the post-acquisition
period.
In the entire pre-merger period the median matched firm adjusted operating
cash flow return on assets is 0.40%. This figure is statistically insignificant implying
that the combined firms perform at the same levels as the matched firms. The number
of positive observations is 54.46%. In the entire 5-year post-merger period the
median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is a negative of -
1.07% which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.034).
The number of positive observations falls to 44.60%. The highest decline in
performance is observed at the year 3, with the median adjusted operating cash flow
return on assets being -2.94%. This figure is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level (p-value 0.050). In year 2 the decline is also high (-1.81%, and the
number of positive observations is 45.45%) but statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 6.
Median Annual Performance for the 55 acquisitions where the acquirer
made an agreed offer to the acquiree.
Panel A15
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 17.95% -0.87% 45.83% 24
-4 17.76% 2.43% 58.33% 24
-3 15.74% 1.90% 58.18% 55
-2 14.62% 1.24% 54.55% 55
-1 16.01% 0.05% 52.73% 55
Median
Annual
Performance 16.25% 0.40% 54.46% 213
for years -5
to -1
1 13.07% -0.98% 40.00% 55
2 12.56% -1.81% 45.45% 55
3 13.48% -2.94% b 43.64% 55
4 14.42% -0.19% 45.83% 24
5 16.20% 0.51% 54.17% 24
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.05%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Yrs -1 ,-2, -3 0.06%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -1.70%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -1.99% c
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -2.10%
A(MAOP) Years -1,-2,-3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -1.11%
A SALES 17.51%
A Operating Costs 16.92%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1 ,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 1.42% b
A Employee costs per Sales 0.91% c
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.18% b
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
15 See footnote 2.
16 See footnote 3.
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In year 4 performance improves (-0.19%) and in year 5 becomes positive (0.51%
with 54.17% of the observations being positive) but statistically insignificant.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the median matched firm adjusted difference in
operating performance between post- and pre-merger years. This difference is -
2.10% between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 and 1.11% between the years 1, 2
and 3 and the years -1, -2, and -3. The median matched firm adjusted operating
performance for the years 2 and 3 is -1.99% and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level (p-value 0.077). The adjusted operating costs per sales increase
after the merger by a significant (at a 5% significance level, p-value 0.017) 1.42%,
suggesting that friendly acquisitions increase inefficiencies since operating costs
increase disproportionably relatively to sales.
The above results provide some evidence that the performance of friendly
acquisitions declines after the merger. This is in contrast with the evidence that was
produced when the benchmark for measuring performance was the firms from the
respective industries (see Table 8 in Chapter 6). In other words, when controlling for
size and pre-merger performance effects friendly acquisitions seem to perform worse
than when the performance is compared with other industry firms.
7.3.3. The Industry Relatedness.
In Table 7 it is shown that unrelated acquisitions cause a decline in operating
performance in the post-merger years. This evidence is consistent with the general
view that prevails in the literature that diversification destroys value. It is also
consistent with the results that illustrated in Table 9 of Chapter 6.
In Panel A of Table 7 the median matched firm adjusted operating
performance of the 24 unrelated acquisitions of the sample is illustrated. In Column 2
it can be seen that in the 3 pre-merger years the median adjusted operating
performance is close to zero (-0.08% and statistically insignificant), indicating that
the merging firms perform as well as the matched firms. The number of positive
observations is 48.61%.
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TABLE 7
Median Annual Performance for the 24 acquisitions where the acquirers and
acquirees belong to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors.
Panel A
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns




















































13.11% -2.65% a 37.50% 72
Panel B18
CHANGE MODEL
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1,-2, -3
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1,2,3
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3
A Employee costs per Sales
A Number of employees per thousand of sales
a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
17 See footnote 2.
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However, in the 3-year post-merger period the number of positive
observations falls to 37.50% and the median adjusted operating performance for the
entire period is -2.65% and statistically significant at a 1% significance level (p-value
0.008). In each of the 3 post-merger years the median adjusted operating
performance is negative; it is -2.24% in year 1 with 29.17% of the observations being
positive and -3.14% in year 2 with 45.83% of the observations being positive. These
performance figures, however, are statistically insignificant. In year 3 performance is
negative (-2.32%) and statistically significant at a 10% significance level (p-value
0.076). The number of positive observations is 37.5%.
The results from Panel B of Table 7 also indicate a decline in the post-merger
performance following unrelated acquisitions. The median matched firm adjusted
operating performance in year -1 is 0.01% and the respective figure for the 3 pre¬
merger years is -0.10% both statistically insignificant indicating that merging firms
and matched firms exhibit similar performance. In the 3 post-merger years, however,
the median adjusted performance is -3.24% and statistically significant at a 5%
significance level (p-value 0.049). In the years 2 and 3, the median adjusted
performance is -2.23% and statistically significant at a 10% significance level (p-
value 0.056). More importantly, the median difference in adjusted operating
performance between years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -1.81% and statistically
significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.076). The median difference in
adjusted operating performance between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger years is
negative (-2.23%) but statistically insignificant. The median change in adjusted
operating costs per sales is 0.55% (but statistically insignificant) indicating a higher
increase in operating costs relative to sales after the merger.
Table 8 illustrates the pre- and post-merger operating performance of the 47
acquisitions where bidder's and target's operations fall within the same Level 5
Industrial Classification.
In Column 3 it can be seen that merging firms outperform matched firms in
the pre-merger period. Specifically, in the entire 5-year pre-merger period the median
matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is 0.90% and statistically
significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.062) with the number of positive
observations being 57.22%.
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TABLE 8
Median Annual Performance for the 47 acquisitions where the acquirer
belong to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector with that of the acquiree in the
year before the takeover.
Panel A19
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 18.54% 1.30% 52.17% 23
-4 17.91% 1.77% 60.87% 23
-3 15.74% 2.07% 61.70% 47
-2 14.15% 0.99% 51.06% 47
-1 15.35% 0.10% 59.57% 47
Median
Annual
Performance 15.78% 0.90% c 57.22% 187
for years -5
to -1
1 12.93% -0.15% 48.94% 47
2 12.41% -1.81% 42.55% 47
3 13.03% -0.37% 44.68% 47
4 13.53% -0.84% 34.78% 23
5 16.06% 0.42% 56.52% 23
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.14%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Yrs -1 ,-2, -3 1.18%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -0.46%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.71%
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -2.13%
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.91 %
A SALES 13.78%
A Operating Costs 16.40%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 0.69%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.76%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.22% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
19 See footnote 2.
20 See footnote 3.
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This is an indication that bidders and targets which are engaged in horizontal
acquisitions are profitable firms which outperform similar firms in their industries. It
is noteworthy that from the 47 horizontal acquisitions the 36 are agreed transactions,
a fact that indicates that best performers follow an acquisition strategy towards
friendly and horizontal mergers. In the post-merger years operating performance is
about at the same levels as that of the matched firms. In other words, there is no
decline or improvement in operating cash flow return on assets relative to matched
firms. Specifically, for the entire 5-year post-merger period the median matched firm
adjusted operating performance is -0.37% and statistically insignificant which means
that the combined entity performs as well as the pair of matched firm. However,
there is a decline to the number of positive observations from 57.22% in the pre¬
merger period to 45.45% in the post-merger period.
This is because in the pre-merger period the combined firms outperform the
matched firms and not because of a deterioration in performance of the merged firms
relatively to the matched firms in the post-merger period. Results from Panel B
strengthen this finding. The median change in matched firm adjusted performance
between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -2.13% but it is statistically insignificant.
The median change in adjusted performance between the 3-year post-merger period
and the 3-year pre-merger period is an insignificant of -0.91%. The median adjusted
operating costs per sales increase by 0.69%, which however is statistically
insignificant.
Overall, our results indicated that unrelated acquisitions perform worse than
related ones. In the three year post-takeover period the matched firm adjusted
operating performance of unrelated acquisitions is negative and statistically
significant. The median change in matched firm adjusted operating performance
between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is also negative and statistically significant.
Related acquisitions, on the other hand, do not exhibit any statistically significant
change in the median matched firm adjusted operating performance between the
post- and the pre-merger periods. Moreover, they perform as well as their matched
firms in the post-takeover years (however they appear to outperform their matched
firms in the entire pre-merger period).
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7. 4. Operating Performance of Strategic Acquisitions.
In the previous Chapter the median performance of Strategic Acquisitions
was found to be higher in the post-merger period than the median performance of the
sample acquisitions. Firms that were engaged in strategic mergers achieved to keep
their performance near their industry's standards. In Table 9 the median performance
of firms that conducted strategic acquisitions is illustrated with the benchmark for
comparison being the performance of similar firms on the basis of size and pre¬
merger performance.
In Column 3 of Panel A it can be seen that in the pre-merger years the median
performance of the combined entity is higher than that of the matched firm. In the
year -4 the median matched firm adjusted operating performance is 3.25% and
statistically significant at a 10% significance level (p-value 0.098). The number of
positive observations is 68.75%. In the year -3 the adjusted performance is 2.66%
which is statistically significant at a 5% significant level (p-value 0.026) and the
number of positive observations is 69.23%. In the years -2 and -1 the median
performance of the combined entity converges to that of the matched firms since the
selection of the matched firms was made on the basis of the performance as at the
beginning of the year -1. In the entire pre-merger period the median adjusted
operating performance is 1.50% and statistically significant at a 1% significance
level (p-value 0.01). Thus, firms that were engaged in friendly acquisitions which
were financed by stock or a combination of stock and cash within the same Level 5
industrial sector outperform similar firms in their industries; a finding that indicates
that such firms are more profitable and more efficient than similar firms in their
industries in the pre-merger years.
In the post-merger period the median performance of firms that engaged in
strategic acquisitions is equivalent to that of the median firms. In each of the post-
merger years the matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is not
statistically significant. In the entire 5-year post-merger period the adjusted
performance is -0.14% which is statistically insignificant and the proportion of
positive observations is 49.09%.
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TABLE 9
Median Annual Performance for the 26 acquisitions where the method of payment was
stock or a combination of stock and cash and the bidder and the target belonged to the
same Level 5 Industrial Sector, and the bid was friendly.
Panel A21
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm °//o Number of
Merger Median Matched Median postitive observations
-5 17.51% 1.87% 56.25% 16
-4 18.76% 3.25% c 68.75% 16
-3 16.56% 2.66% b 69.23% 26
-2 13.56% 0.20% 50.00% 26
-1 16.47% 0.06% 57.69% 26
Median Annual
Performance for 16.58% 1.50% a 60.00% 110
years -5 to -1
1 16.97% 0.29% 53.85% 26
2 13.92% -0.34% 50.00% 26
3 13.79% -1.43% 46.15% 26
4 12.98% -0.19% 43.75% 16
5 17.07% -0.07% 50.00% 16
Median Annual
Performance for 14.69% -0.14% 49.09% 110
years 1 to 5
Panel B22
CHANGE MODEL
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.06%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Yrs -1 ,-2, -3 1.26%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -0.71%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.51%
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -1.12%
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.74%
A SALES 25.78%
A Operating Costs 28.55%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 1.56%
A Employee costs per Sales 0.25%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
21 See footnote 2.
22 See footnote 3.
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In strategic acquisitions, therefore, firms manage to keep performance at
levels equivalent to those of their control firms in the post-merger period.
The findings in Panel B of Table 9 indicate that strategic mergers perform as
well as their matched firms. The median change in operating performance between
the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -1.12% but this figure is statistically insignificant.
The median change in adjusted operating performance between the 3 post-merger
years and the 3 pre-merger years is also insignificant (-0.74%). The median adjusted
operating performance of the years -1, -2 and -3 is 1.26% but is statistically
insignificant. The median change in the adjusted operating costs per sales between
the 3-year post-merger period and the 3-year post-merger period is positive (1.56%)
but it is statistically insignificant.
7. 5. Operating Performance and Acquisition Premium.
In Chapter 6 we found evidence that the acquisition premium is negatively
associated with post-merger performance when the performance benchmark was the
performance of other companies operating in the same Level 5 Industrial Sector. In
acquisitions where the acquirer paid a high premium over the intrinsic value of the
target the post merger performance deteriorated, while in acquisitions where the
acquirer paid less than the intrinsic value of the target post-merger performance was
around industry standards.
In Panel A of Table 10, the annual operating performance of the 24
acquisitions where the acquirer paid a premium between 162% and 658.5% of the
target's market value as at the beginning of the year -1 is illustrated, with the
benchmark of operating performance for each target and bidder being a pair of
similar firms on the basis of size and pre-merger performance within the respective
industries. As can be seen in Column 3 the median matched firm adjusted operating
performance in each of the pre-merger years is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, indicating that the median combined target and bidder performs as well as their
matched firms. In the entire post-merger period the median adjusted performance is -
0.47% and statistically insignificant. The number of positive observations is 48.96%.
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TABLE 10
Median Annual Performance for the 24 cases of the sample where the acquirer paid
a premium between 162% and 658.5% of the acquiree's market value as at the
beginning of the year -1.
Panel A23
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched %
to Merger Median Median postitive Number of ob
-5 15.32% 0.11% 50.00% 12
-4 11.61% -1.87% 33.33% 12
-3 14.66% -0.49% 50.00% 24
-2 14.28% 0.22% 50.00% 24
-1 15.09% 0.03% 54.17% 24
Median
Annual
Performance 14.69% -0.47% 48.96% 96
for years -5
to -1
1 12.40% -0.25% 50.00% 24
2 12.43% -3.28% c 33.33% 24
3 13.35% -6.03% b 37.50% 24
4 12.69% -0.80% 41.67% 12
5 14.83% -0.43% 50.00% 12
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.03%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1 ,-2, -3 -0.27%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -1.97%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -4.25% b
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -4.74% b
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.10%
A SALES 28.17%
A Operating Costs 28.93%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1 ,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 -0.21 %
A Employee costs per Sales 0.90%
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.18% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
23 See footnote 2.
24 See footnote 3.
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However, in the post-merger years, performance declines dramatically. After
year 1 where median operating performance of the combined entity is similar to that
of the matched firms, the median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return
on assets deteriorates, in year 2 to -3.28%. This figure is statistically significant at a
10% significance level (p-value 0.052) and the number of positive observations is
33.33%. In year 3 adjusted performance declines further to -6.03%, a figure which is
statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.013). The number of
positive observations is 37.50%. In the year 4 the performance decline is reduced and
in the year 5 the adjusted operating performance is -0.43% but statistically
insignificant with 50% of the observations being positive.
In the entire post-merger period the median adjusted operating performance is
a negative of -1.37% which is statistically significant at a 1% significance level (p-
value 0.010). The number of positive observations falls to 41.67%.
These findings are confirmed by the results that are produced by the Change
Model and are illustrated in Panel B. The median adjusted operating performance in
the years 2 and 3 is -4.25% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-
value 0.012).
The median difference in matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return
on assets between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is -4.74% and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.026). However, when the median
change in performance is measured between the 3 post- and the 3 pre-merger years, it
is 0.10% but indistinguishable from zero. This is probably because the highest
decline in performance occurs in the second and the third post-merger years. The
median change in adjusted operating costs per sales is negative (-0.21%) but
statistically insignificant.
In Table 11 the operating performance of firms that engaged in acquisitions
where the acquirer purchased the target at a price below its intrinsic value is
illustrated. The combined targets and bidders outperform their matched firms in the
entire pre-merger period. The median matched firm adjusted operating performance
is 1.43% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.016), while
the number of positive observations is 59.60%.
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TABLE 11
Median Annual Performance for the 25 acquisitions where the acquirer paid
an amount that ranges from 16% to 100% of the acquiree's market value as
at the beginning of the year -1.
Panel A25
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 19.42% -2.35% 41.67% 12
-4 19.88% 2.17% 66.67% 12
-3 17.11% 3.23% c 68.00% 25
-2 17.10% 2.77% b 64.00% 25
-1 15.15% 0.17% 52.00% 25
Median
Annual
Performance 17.35% 1.43% b 59.60% 99
for years -5
to -1
1 12.68% -1.07% 44.00% 25
2 12.37% -1.81% 44.00% 25
3 13.98% 0.52% 52.00% 25
4 15.42% 0.82% 50.00% 12
5 15.47% 2.31% 66.67% 12
Median
Annual





MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1 0.17%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Yrs -1 ,-2, -3 1.53% b
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1, 2, 3 -0.03%
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2, 3 -0.98%
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3 -1.30%
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.95%
A SALES 2.13%
A Operating Costs 3.15%
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1 ,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3 0.37%
A Employee costs per Sales 1.37% b
A Number of employees per thousand of sales -0.25% a
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
25 See footnote 2.
26 See footnote 3.
227
OPERATING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT USING A MATCHED FIRMS N.GLIMIDIS
BENCHMARK: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In the year -3 the adjusted performance is 3.23% and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level (p-value 0.069). The number of positive observations is 68%. In
the year -2 the median combined target and bidder outperforms the matched firm by
2.77% which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.037).
The number of positive observations is 64%.
In the post-merger period the median matched firm adjusted operating cash
flow return on assets is indistinguishable from zero in each of the post-merger years
indicating that the median combined entity perform as well as the pair of the control
firms. In the years 1 and 2 the adjusted performance is negative and improves after
the year 2. In the entire post-merger period the adjusted performance is close to zero
(-0.03%) and statistically insignificant with the number of positive observations
being 49.49%.
In Panel B of Table 11 it can be seen that although in the 3 pre-merger years
the median matched firm adjusted operating performance is 1.53% and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.045), the median change in adjusted
operating performance between the 3 post-merger years and the 3 pre-merger years is
statistically insignificant (though negative of -0.95%). The median change in
adjusted performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is also negative but
statistically insignificant (-1.30). The median change in adjusted operating costs per
sales is 0.37% but statistically insignificant, indicating that there is not a substantial
increase after the merger.
As far as the relation between the premium paid in the transaction and the
post merger performance, the results in this Chapter are consistent to the findings
provided in Chapter 6. Acquisitions in discount seem to perform better than
acquisitions in premium.
7. 6. Operating Performance and Relative Size.
On the basis of the segmentation of the sample into large and small
acquisitions that was discussed in the previous Chapter we identified 34 large
acquisitions and 35 small acquisitions that met the necessary criteria for being
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included in the sample of the 71 acquisitions for which there were available data for
the matched firms.
TABLE 12
Median Annual Performance for the 34 largest acquisitions of the sample. Relative
bidders' size ranges from 7% to 317% of the size of target; size is based on market
Panel A27
values of the two firms at the beginning of year -1.
Pre and Post-Meraer Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 19.25% -1.78% 40.00% 15
-4 19.60% 2.56% 73.33% 15
-3 15.64% 1.45% 55.88% 34
-2 15.73% 1.15% 52.94% 34




17.13% 0.75% 54.55% 132
to -1
1 15.70% -1.21% 44.12% 34
2 13.16% 0.34% 52.94% 34
3 14.20% 0.77% 52.94% 34
4 15.42% -0.13% 46.67% 15
5 16.34% 1.41% 60.00% 15
Median Annual
Performance
14.44% 0.20% 50.76% 132
Panel B28
CHANGE MODEL
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Year -1
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years -1
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 1,
MAOP-(Matched Firm Adjusted Op. Performance): Median of Years 2,
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3
A Employee costs per Sales















a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
27 See footnote 2.
28 See footnote 3.
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In Table 12, Panel A the operating performance of the firms that engaged in
the 34 largest acquisitions is illustrated. As it can be seen from Column 3 the median
firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets is close to zero in both the pre- and
the post-merger period. This means that in large acquisitions the median combined
entity manage to achieve performance standards equivalent to those of its matched
pair of firms. There is, however, a slight decline in performance between the two
periods from 0.75% to 0.20% but it is statistically insignificant.
These findings are also confirmed by results that are illustrated in Panel B.
The median change in matched firm adjusted operating performance between the 3-
year post-merger period and the 3-year pre-merger period is 0.18% but statistically
insignificant. The median change in adjusted operating performance between the
years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is 0.85% but also statistically insignificant.
The median matched firm adjusted operating costs per sales is 0.14% but
statistically insignificant.
In Table 13 the median annual operating performance of the firms that were
engaged in the 35 smallest acquisitions in the sample is illustrated. Adjusted
operating performance, while being at control firms' standards in each of the pre¬
merger years, declines dramatically in the post-merger period. Specifically, the
median annual matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets ranges
from -0.68% in the year -4 to 2.07% in the year -3. In each of the pre-merger years
the adjusted performance is indistinguishable from zero, i.e. it is equivalent to that of
the control firms. In the entire pre-merger period the median annual matched firm
adjusted operating performance is 0.17% and statistically insignificant with the
53.24% of the observations being positive.
In the post-merger years, performance declines to an insignificant of -0.90%
in year 1, then declines further to -3.54% (which is statistically significant at a 10%
significance level (p-value 0.077)) in year 2, and it becomes -5.76% which is
statistically significant at a 1% significance level (p-value 0.008) in year 3. In years 4
and 5 performance improves to a statistically insignificant value of 0.67% and to a
statistically insignificant 0.40% respectively.
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TABLE 13
Median Annual Performance for the 35 smallest acquisitions of the sample. Relative
bidders' size ranges from 400% to 37516% of the size of target; size is based on
market values of the two firms at the beginning of year -1.
Panel A29
Pre and Post-Merger Operating Cash Flow Returns
Matched Firm - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Matched % Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 15.49% -0.40% 47.06% 17
-4 17.21% -0.68% 41.18% 17
-3 16.31% 2.07% 57.14% 35
-2 15.66% 0.99% 54.29% 35
-1 14.31% 0.05% 57.14% 35
Annual
Performance 15.69% 0.17% 53.24% 139
for years -5
to -1
1 11.62% -0.98% 40.00% 35
2 12.46% -3.54% c 31.43% 35
3 13.07% -5.76% a 34.29% 35
4 14.67% 0.67% 52.94% 17




for years 1 to5
Panel B30
CHANGE MODEL
12.89% -1.38% a 39.57% 139
A (MAOP) Year -1, Years 2, 3
A (MAOP) Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
A SALES
A Operating Costs
A Operating Costs per Sales-Adjusted, Years -1,-2,-3, Years 1,2,3
A Employee costs per Sales












a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
29 See footnote 2.
30 See footnote 3.
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However, this improvement is not enough to offset the decline in annual
operating performance in the 3 previous years. Thus, the adjusted operating
performance for the entire 5-year post-merger period is -1.38% and statistically
significant at a 1% significance level (p-value 0.001). The number of positive
observations falls from 53.24% in the 5-year pre-merger period to 39.57% in the
entire post-merger period.
In Panel B it can be seen that the median change in matched firm adjusted
operating cash flow return on assets between the year 2 and 3 and the year -1 is a
negative of -4.25% which is statistically significant at a 1% significance level (p-
value 0.007). The median change in operating performance between the 3-year post
and the 3-year pre-merger period is -3% and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level (p-value 0.89). The median adjusted operating costs increase
relative to sales by a significant of 1.13% (p-value 0.08).
The findings in Tables 12 and 13 indicate that firms that are engaged in large
acquisitions outperform the typical acquisition in the sample. Moreover, small
acquisitions lead to performance deterioration and to an increase of the operating
costs relative to sales. This evidence is consistent with that provided in Chapter 6.
7.7. Abnormal Matched Firm Adjusted Cash Flow Returns.
In this section the results from running regression (4.10) as described in
Chapter 4 are given. Regression (4.10) represents Healy's et. al. (1992) model, which
for reasons of comparison with results from the previous Chapter, is run here using
matched firm adjusted operating cash flow returns on total assets. The variables
MAOPpre and MAOPpost denote the median matched firm adjusted operating
performance in the pre- and the post-merger years respectively. For 33 acquisitions
pre-merger and post-merger periods extend to 5 years, whereas - due to the lack of
data - for 37 acquisitions pre- and post-merger periods extend to 3 years. All other
dummy variables are defined as in Chapter 6. The intercept (a) of the regression
captures the percentage change in matched firm adjusted operating cash flow returns
on total assets which are attributable to merger; i.e. the abnormal matched firm
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adjusted cash flow return on total assets. The coefficient (b) represents the fraction of
the pre-merger performance which persists in the post-merger years. Results from the
regressions are illustrated in Table 7.1 in the Appendix. However, an unknown form
of heteroscedasticity was detected in most of the regressions and a Heteroscedasticity
Correction White Test was applied on them. The heteroscedasticity corrected results
are illustrated in Table 14.
The coefficient (b) in regression (1) is 0.118 and statistically insignificant
denoting that pre-merger performance does not persist in the post-merger period. In
other words, post-merger rate of matched firm adjusted cash flow returns on assets is
not explained by pre-merger matched firm adjusted cash flow return on assets. The
intercept coefficient (a) is -0.020 and statistically significant at a 10% significance
level, indicating a decline in annual matched firm adjusted performance of 2%. This
decline in performance is attributable to merger since any effects of pre-merger
performance persistence in the post-merger period are controlled for. These results
are in contrast to those provided by Healy et.al. (1992) for the U.S., who report an
increase of 2.8% in annual post-merger performance.
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In regression (2) the effects of the method of payment on post-merger
performance are reported. There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the mode
of financing the acquisition has any impact on post-acquisition performance after
controlling for the effects of the pre-merger performance (which are statistically
insignificant). This is because the coefficients of the dummy variables (STOCK) and
(MIX) are not statistically significant. The intercept coefficient (a) is also
insignificant indicating that (CASH), which is the missing category, has no
substantial impact on post-merger performance either. It is noteworthy, however, that
stock financing has a positive impact on post-merger performance, which is
consistent with results of the previous Chapter.
Whether an acquisition is a hostile or a friendly one seems to be irrelevant for
the post-merger operating performance when the benchmark for adjusting
performance is a pair of similar firms to bidder and target. The effects of target
firm's management attitude towards the acquisition bid are illustrated in regression 3.
Controlling for pre-merger performance (which has an insignificant effect on post-
merger performance) both the intercept coefficient and the coefficient of the dummy
variable (FRIENDLY) are insignificant.
There is a statistically significant increase of 5.6% in annual matched firm
adjusted operating performance in the post-merger period when the acquirer and the
target belong to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector. This finding is shown in
regression (4). The coefficient of the dummy variable (RLTD) is 0.056 and
statistically significant at a 5% significance level. The intercept coefficient (a) is -
0.057 and statistically significant at a 5% significance level denoting that
diversification leads to performance decline. This finding is consistent with that
provided by Healy et.al. (op.cit.) and Powell and Stark (2005).
Regression (5) describes the effects on post-merger performance when the
target and the bidder belong to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector and the method of
financing the acquisition is stock or a combination stock and cash. The coefficient of
the dummy (RLTDxnCASH) is 0.035 and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level, indicating an increase of 3.5% in annual post merger performance
after controlling for any persistence of the pre-merger performance in the post-
merger period (which are statistically insignificant). The intercept coefficient is -
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0.037 and statistically significant at a 5% significance level denoting that all other
acquisitions experience a decline in the post-merger annual performance of 5.7%.
Acquisitions where the bidder and the target belonged to the same Level 5
Industrial Sector and the method of financing was a combination of stock and cash
perform better than the average sample acquisition. In regression (6) the coefficient
of the dummy variable (RLTDxMIX) is positive but statistically insignificant while
the intercept coefficient is a negative of -0.028 which is statistically significant at a
10% significance level, indicating a decline in annual performance of 2.8% for
acquisitions which are unrelated and there was not offered a choice in the payment
method.
Strategic acquisitions exhibit an improvement of 3.9% in annual performance
after controlling for the pre-merger performance effects. In regression (7), the
coefficient of the dummy variable (FRxRLDTxnCASH) is 0.039 and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level. The intercept coefficient which denotes the
performance effect of the merger for all the other acquisitions in the sample is a
negative of -0.035 which is significant at a 5% significance level. Thus while
strategic acquisitions exhibit an improvement of 3.9% median annual performance,
in non strategic acquisitions the decline in annual performance is 3.5%. When an
additional variable is included in the regression (8) to capture the combined effect of
the pre-merger performance and that of the strategic acquisitions' performance (i.e.
the FRxRLTDxnCASHxMAOPpre), its coefficient of the variable
(FRxRLTDxnCASHxMAOPpre) is positive but statistically insignificant (p-value
0.101).
When the combined effects of the mode of payment and the industry
relatedness and the target's management attitude on post-merger performance are
examined (regression (9)), only industry relatedness seems to have a significant
impact. Indeed, after controlling for the effects of the financing method and the
target's firm attitude towards the offer, the coefficient of the dummy variable (RLTD)
is 0.062 and statistically significant at a 5% significance level.
Regression (10) indicates that whether the acquirer paid a relatively high
premium for the target does not explain much of the variation of the post-merger
performance. The coefficient of the respective dummy is negative but it is
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statistically insignificant. Similarly, the intercept coefficient is negative and
statistically insignificant (-0.014). Regression (11) indicates that large acquisitions
perform better than all other acquisitions in the sample. The coefficient of the
variable (LGacqn) is positive but statistically insignificant. The intercept coefficient
is a negative of -0.023 and statistically significant at a 10% significance level,
indicating that all other acquisitions in the sample experience decline in annual
operating performance of 2.3%. Large acquisitions between firms with similar
operations experience a statistically significant post-merger performance
improvement of 4.1% (regression 12)
Regression (13) results from regression (4.10) by including the independent
variable (WCMARA), where (WCMARA) is the combined cumulative abnormal
market adjusted asset returns to the acquiree and acquirer firms measured around the
takeover announcement. If markets are efficient then there should be a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the post-merger operating performance
and the market reaction to the announcement of the merger. In other words, if
markets are informationally efficient, then they can predict the future changes in
performance of the merging firms. Abnormal returns in principle capture the
market's perceptions for future changes in operating performance due to merger. The
results from regression (13) indicate that there a positive and statistically significant
relationship between post-merger operating performance and abnormal asset returns.
The implications of regression (13) will be analytically discussed in Chapter (9).
In Table 14a we include regression equations with both linear and non-linear
terms. Coefficients are statistically insignificant in all regressions except for
regression 5 where related acquisitions seem to experience an increase in post-
merger performance.31
31 No multicollinearity was detected after testing with tolerance, eigenvalues, condition index, and
variance inflation factor.
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TABLE 14a (heteroscedasticity corrected (White))
Healy's et.al. (1992) Regression Model. OLS regressions of post-takeover
matched firm adjusted operating performance on combined target and
bidder matched firm adjusted pre-takeover operating performance
EQUATION 1 2 3 4 5
INDEPENTEND MAOP MAOP MAOP MAOP MAOP
VARIABLES post post post post post
CONSTANT (a) -0.068 -0.038 -0.047** -0.007 -0.043
t-stat -1.132 -1.423 -2.139 -0.178 -1.423
MAOPpre 0.102 0.105 0.110 0.0647 -0.045





nCASH 0.0127 -0.027 -0.004





RLTD 0.0715 0.045 0.038 0.0259 0.053*










R SQ 0.098 0.116 0.106 0.116 0.115
ADJ R sq 0.043 0.063 0.052 0.048 0.047
F stat 1.8 2.18 1.97 1.71 1.7
Nr of Observations 71 71 71 71 71
MAOPpost denotes the median annual matched firm adjusted cash flow returns for each combined
firm in the five years after the year of the merger completion.
MAOPpre denotes the median annual matched firm adjusted cash flow returns for each combined firm
in the five years prior to the year of the merger completion.
*** denotes significance at a 1% significance level using a two-tail test.
** denotes significance at a 5% significance level using a two-tail test.
* denotes significance at a 10% significance level using a two-tail test.
For the definition of the dummy above variables see Table 14, Chapter 7.
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7.8. The Change Model.
When restricting (b) in regression (4.10) to equal 1 the benchmark for
measuring post-merger performance is pre-merger performance. This is the Change
Model as described and analysed in Chapter 4. The variables that denote the changes
in median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow returns on total assets between
different time periods around merger completion are MAOPch5, MAOPch3,
MAOPch2 and MAOPch23. The first refers to a time period that includes the five
post and the five pre-merger years. That is the second refers to a 3-year time period
around merger completion, the third refers to 2-year time period around merger
completion and MAOPch23 denotes the change in median matched firm adjusted
operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -l32. Dummy variables
are as in Table 14.
Results from the regressions are illustrated in Table 7.2 in Appendix.
However, because an unknown form of heteroscedasticity was detected, a
Heteroscedasticity Correction White Test was applied and the correct results are
illustrated in Table 15.
Results from regression33 (1) indicate that the method of payment does not
have a significant effect on post-merger performance. The coefficient of the dummy
variable (STOCK) is positive denoting a positive effect on post-merger performance
when the acquisition is financed by stock. However this is not statistically
significant. Acquisitions that are financed by a combination of stock and cash seem
to experience a decline in annual performance of 0.1%, which, however, is not
statistically significant. An insignificant decline is also experienced by merging firms
that are financed by cash. These results are consistent with those illustrated in Table
14 where Healy's Regression Model was employed. They are not consistent,
however, with the results produced when the benchmark for measuring adjusted
performance was firms in the same industry as in the previous Chapter. Regression
(2) confirms previous results produced in this study, i.e. related acquisitions increase
32 In all the cases the year ofmerger completion is excluded from the time periods in examination.
33 We use the regression 'through the origin' for estimating the effects of the method of payment on
post-merger performance without including an intercept to make our results comparable with those
produced by Ghosh.
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operating performance. The coefficient of the respective dummy variable is 0.08 and
statistically significant at a 10% significance level denoting an increase in annual
performance by 8% for acquisitions where the target and the bidder belong to the
same Level 5 Industrial Sector. The intercept coefficient is -0.06 and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level indicating a 6% decline in annual performance
for unrelated acquisitions34.
34 Similar results are produced when the dependent variable is MAOPch2. When MAOPch3 is the
dependent variable results are statistically weak which is reasonable since the highest decline or the
lowest increase in performance is observed during the years 2 and 3.
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In regression (3) the results indicate that whether acquirers paid a relatively
high premium for the targets or not does not have any significant effect on the post-
takeover performance. In regression (4) the coefficient of the dummy variable
LRGacqn is negative but statistically insignificant. Therefore, whether the acquisition
is large or not has no impact on the post-merger performance.
When the target and the bidder belong to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector
and the acquisition is financed by a means other than cash, annual post-merger
performance increases by a rate of 4.6%. This is shown in regression (6) where the
coefficient of the respective dummy variable is 0.046 and statistically significant at a
10% significance level35. The intercept coefficient is -0.046 and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level denoting a 4.6% decline in annual operating
performance for the rest of the acquisitions in the sample.
Results from regression (7) indicate that when the means of payment is a
combination of stock and cash and the bidder and the target belong to the same Level
5 Industrial Sector annual post merger performance increases by a rate of 3.9%. The
coefficient of the dummy variable RLTDxMIX is 0.039 and statistically significant at
a 10% significance level. The intercept coefficient is -0.038 indicating a decline in
post-merger annual performance of 3.8% for all the other mergers in the sample.
Strategic acquisitions exhibit an annual post-acquisition performance which
increases by 3.9%. In regression (8) the coefficient of the respective dummy variable
is 0.039 and statistically significant at a 10% significance level. Non strategic
acquisitions exhibit a post-merger decline of 3.8% in annual performance since the
intercept coefficient is 0.038 and statistically significant at a 5% significance level.
In regression (9), where the median change in matched firm adjusted operating
performance is measured for 2 year post- and 2 year pre-merger time periods,
strategic acquisitions exhibit a median performance change of 4.7% which is
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. However, when the median
change in performance is measured between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre¬
merger periods strategic acquisitions exhibit a median performance change which is
statistically insignificant (regression 10).
35 When MAOPch5 is the dependent variable results are statistically week. Similar results are
produced when MAOPch2 or MAOPch.23 are the dependent variables.
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In Regression (11) the MAOPch3 is regressed against the dummy variables
nCASH, FRIENDLY and RLTD. Related acquisitions are followed by a 6.3%
improvement in annual performance after controlling for the effects of friendly and
non-cash acquisitions. The coefficient of the dummy variable RLTD is 0.063 and
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. The coefficients of the dummy
variables nCash and FRIENDLY are insignificant, indicating a negligible effect. The
intercept coefficient is -0.071 and statistically significant at a 10% significant level
and it captures the effect on the 3-year performance change of all the other
acquisitions in the sample. Regression (12) results from regression (11) after
including the dummy variable FRxRLTDxnCASH. After controlling for the effect of
strategic acquisitions none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Strategic
acquisitions have a positive effect on the 5-year adjusted performance change but it
is statistically insignificant since the coefficient of the variable FRxRLTDxnCASH is
positive but statistically insignificant.
Regression (13) indicates that stock acquisitions experience a positive change
in performance which, however, is statistically insignificant after controlling for the
effects of friendly and unrelated acquisitions. The coefficient of the variables
(FRIENDLY) and (UNRELATED) are also statistically insignificant. Regression (14)
examines the effects of payment method after controlling for the effects of unrelated
acquisitions. The change in median matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return
on total assets between the 2-year post- and the 2-year pre-merger periods is positive
but statistically insignificant. Unrelated acquisitions experience, as expected, a
decline of 7.9% in annual performance which is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level. After controlling for the effect of unrelated acquisitions the
intercept coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant.
Regressions (15), (16) and (17) examine the time effect of the results
produced for the sample of the 71 acquisitions. The sample is segmented into two
subsamples; one that includes acquisitions that occurred within the period from the
beginning of 1990 until the end of 1993, so as to include part of the sample that was
used by Powell and Stark (2005) and one that includes acquisitions that occurred in
the period from the beginning of 1994 until the end of 1996. After running the
regression through the origin (15) it is observed that acquisitions which occurred
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during 1994-1996 experienced a decline in annual operating performance of 6.4%
which is statistically significant, while acquisitions that occurred from 1990 to 1993
exhibit an indistinguishable from zero performance decline. Thus, the median change
in the matched firm adjusted performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1
(which is represented by the dependent variable MAOPch23) is negative and refers to
the acquisitions that occurred after 1993. These results are strengthened by the
evidence which is produced from regression (16). Using as dependent variable the
median change in matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets
between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre-merger periods, acquisitions that
occurred during the period 1990-1993 (that represented in the regression by the
dummy variable ACQTIONS-1990-193) are followed by an increase of 1.6% in
annual performance (which however is statistically insignificant). The intercept
coefficient on the other hand that represent the effect on performance of the
remaining acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions that occurred after 1993 and until the end of
1996, is negative (-0.033) and statistically significant at a 10% significance level.
Results that are produced from regression (17) where the dependent variable
represents the change in performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1, are
similar.
Regression (18) examines the relation between the combined cumulative
market adjusted abnormal asset returns to the acquirer and the target and the median
change in matched firm adjusted operating cash flow return on assets between the 5
post-merger years and the 5 pre-merger years. This relation is positive but
statistically insignificant. The implications of regression 18 are analytically discussed
in Chapter 9.
Table 15a illustrates regression equations with both linear and non-linear
terms. There are no statistically significant coefficients .
36 All the appropriate multicollinearity tests were implemented; tolerance, eigenvalues, condition
index, and variance inflation factor. No multicollinearity was detected.
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TABLE 15a (heteroscedasticitv corrected (White))
Ghosh's (2001) Change Model. OLS regressions of the change in median annual
matched firm adjusted operating performance of the combined firm between
post- and pre- merger periods on dummy variables that describe certain merger
characteristics.
EQUATION 1 2 3 4
INDEPENTEND
VARIABLES MAOP ch3 MAOP ch3 MAOP ch3 MAOP ch23
CONSTANT (a) -0.632 -0.027 -0.062 -0.053











RELATED 0.054 .0.20 0.0572 0.016







R SQ 0.074 0.114 0.074 0.068
ADJ R sq 0.033 0.074 0.018 0.027
F stat 1.79 2.89 1.33 1.65
Nr of Observations 71 71 71 71
For the definition of the above dummy variables see Table 14, Chapter 7.
MAOPch3 denotes the median change in matched firm adjusted operating performance between the 3-
year post- and the 3- year pre-merger periods.
MAOPch23 denotes the median change in matched firm adjusted operating performance between the
years 2 and 3 and the year -1.
*** denotes significance at a 1% significance level using a two-tail test.
** denotes significance at a 5% significance level using a two-tail test.
* denotes significance at a 10% significance level using a two-tail test.
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7.9. Conclusions
In this Chapter, we used both Healy's et.al. (1992) Regression Model and
Ghosh's (2001) Change Model to estimate changes in the adjusted operating
performance of merging firms in the post-takeover period. The benchmark for the
performance adjustment was a pair of matched firms for each target and bidder.
Matching was made on the basis of industry relatedness, pre-merger performance
and size.
We found that merging firms exhibit a statistically significant decline in their
post-merger median annual performance of 2% after controlling for the effects pre¬
merger performance. Pre-merger performance appears to have no significant effect
on post-merger performance. This is consistent with the evidence provided in the
previous Chapter. The median change in matched firm adjusted operating
performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 was also found negative and
statistically significant.
Strategic acquisitions and acquisitions within the same Level 5 Industrial
Sector exhibit performance improvements in the post-merger years which possibly
reflect the presence of synergies and the exploitation of cost economies. Large
acquisitions perform better in comparison to all other acquisitions, and large
acquisitions between firms within the same Level 5 Industrial Sectors exhibit
significant performance improvements in the post-merger years.
The method of payment seems not to explain much of the variation of the
post-takeover performance. However, for our sample companies stock acquisitions
outperform acquisitions that were financed solely by cash or by a combination of
stock and cash.
Hostile acquisitions underperform friendly ones while whether the acquirer
paid a relatively high premium for the acquiree does not seem to have any significant
effect on post-merger performance.
We found that early acquisitions in our sample (i.e. the ones completed
between 1990-1993) tend to perform better than late acquisitions (1994-1996). This
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might explain some of the differences in results between this study and previous
studies. Finally, cumulative market adjusted abnormal asset returns in the period of
the event announcement and the cash flow returns on assets are positively correlated
but the relation is not statistically significant. This finding will be analytically
discussed in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 8.
THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON EMPLOYMENT.
8.1. Introduction.
This study so far has focused on the effects of M&As on the productivity of
assets which in turn directly affects the firm's owners. While other stakeholders of
the firm like the government, society, suppliers and clients are all affected by a
merger decision, it was considered necessary for a thorough examination of the
effects of M&As to consider their impact on arguably the second, most important
group of stakeholders after the owners, namely the employees. The purpose of this
Chapter is to provide an analysis of the effects ofM&As on employment in the U.K.
As described in the methodology Chapter, two measures for examining the
impact ofM&As on employment were adopted. The first is the number of employees
working in the firm for each financial year before and after the merger completion
for a 5-year period. This number was deflated by the annual sales of the firm so as to
obtain a metric which can be compared across firms; namely the number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales. However, robust inferences about the
capability of the united entity to increase efficiency cannot be made merely from this
metric. This is because the popular view in the press and in academia that
downsizing is an indication of more efficient use of labour resources does not
necessarily hold unless it is accompanied by labour cost savings. By the same token,
if acquisitions lead to an increase of the workforce this is not an undeniable
indication of lower levels of efficiency or management indifference about achieving
a more flexible organisational structure that is based on cost savings through the
elimination of unnecessary and overlapping jobs. Mergers are often motivated by the
desire of expansion to new markets and new products which may require new
expertise and additional workforce. Thus, it is not only the size of the workforce that
matters but also the costs associated with that workforce. Therefore, the second
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metric that was adopted for examining the impact of M&As on employment was the
labour costs per sales.
The former metric provides for an examination of the impact of takeover
activity on the creation or the elimination of jobs. The latter indicates the degree to
which the united entity manages efficiently operating costs that are associated with
labour resources. Examining the effects of different types ofM&As on the number of
employees and the labour costs of the firm, along with the implications so far of the
performance results, allows for interesting inferences to be drawn about the
effectiveness and the desirability of different types of M&As.
The examination of the effects of mergers on employment is conducted
through two alternative approaches; a univariate approach and a multivariate
approach. In the univariate analysis the outcome of the research was based on a
comparison of the respective variables between the sample firms and the benchmark
firms for each pre- and post-merger year and for the entire pre- and post-merger
periods. As discussed in Chapter 5, the point of reference for any change in
employment rates and in employment costs in the pre- and the post merger years is
the median value of the respective variables of the control firms for each year and for
each period in examination. As control firms we used all the firms within all Level 5
Industrial Sectors in the Stock Exchange Year Book for which data were available in
Datastream.
The median employee number per thousand pounds of sales and the median
labour costs per thousand pounds of sales for each year were benchmarked by
subtracting from each combined firm's values for each year the median value of the
number of employees per thousand pounds of sales and the labour costs per sales of
all the other firms from all Industrial Sectors in the Stock Exchange Year Book for
which data were available, so as to obtain figures of the respective variables that are
independent of factors that are unrelated to the merger and may have affected
employment rates and costs.
In the multivariate analysis we used the change of the median benchmark
adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales and the labour costs per
sales between the three post- and the three pre-merger years as a point of reference so
as to judge the effects of M&As on employment. The benchmark used here was a
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pair of firms matched for each target and bidder on the basis of industry relatedness,
pre-merger performance and size. The adoption of this benchmark makes the results
directly comparable with those derived by Ghosh (op.cit.).
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: first a discussion of the existing
literature on the subject and the possible predictions about the employment
consequences of acquisition activity are explained. Second, the results of this
research for the entire sample are discussed. Third, different types of takeovers and
their effects on employment are considered, and finally a series of regressions for
measuring the effects of M&As on employment after controlling for other variables
that are related to acquisition are estimated and discussed.
8.2. The Impact ofMergers on Employment.
Despite the extensive literature on the topic of M&As there is very little
systematic empirical evidence on the employment effects of mergers. This evidence
is even less outside the U.S.
There is a widespread perception that M&As are often motivated and
frequently lead to substantial workforce reductions. The merged firms may attempt
to economise on variable costs by reducing labour costs through a more efficient use
of the combined resources. On the other hand, as Shleifer and Summers (1988)
suggest, merger activity and the change of control that is associated with it often
offers the opportunity for the renegotiation of implicit or explicit labour contracts
within the firm. This in turn leads to a 'breach of trust' with employees, which may
impose efficiency losses due to the loss of firm-specific human capital and the
reduced incentives on behalf of employees to work efficiently. Therefore, cost
savings from a more efficient use of labour resources should be seen in relation to the
possible efficiency losses which are associated with the control change that often
follows merger activity.
It is, therefore, plausible to assume that if merger activity leads to a decrease
in the number of jobs and if this decrease is a manifestation of a reneging of labour
contacts, then there should be costs associated with the reluctance of employees to
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invest their firm-specific human capital in the firm. These costs will be reflected in
an increasing expenditure by the firm in financing its workforce through time.
It is also reasonable to expect that in related acquisitions there should be
observed a higher level of job cutting and labour cost savings since firms that operate
in the same markets can more easily benefit from abandoning overlapping operations
and a more efficient utilisation of their workforce than firms that operate in unrelated
markets. Moreover, as Conyon et.al. (2002) argue, if unrelated acquisitions are
primarily motivated by a managerial desire to just diversify earnings or a reluctance
to return free cash flow to shareholders then there should not be a presumption of job
losses.
On the other hand, if acquisitions are primarily motivated by a managerial
desire to increase the labour efficiency of the target and to more productively employ
the target's resources then one can expect cost economies and savings in labour costs
to follow. This assumption must hold especially in hostile acquisitions, where the
market for corporate control operates as a disciplinary mechanism for managers, and
acquisitions are assumed to be an instrument for diverting resources to more talented
or diligent management teams. After a hostile acquisition, the new management team
has not yet developed the necessary ties with existing employees and the ongoing
activities so as to honour the implicit labour contracts that have been shaped with the
previous management. Moreover, in any confrontation with employees the new
management would appear to pose a credible threat, especially when the transaction
is made by using debt (as is typically the case in most hostile acquisitions) where the
threat of bankruptcy is greater. Therefore, it is expected that hostile acquisitions lead
to more employment losses than friendly ones. However, the degree to which the
possible job elimination after a hostile acquisition is accompanied by an increase in
efficiency depends on the reason for this decrease in the number of employees. If a
decrease in employment occurs because of an increase in efficiency by a competent
management team which utilises labour in a more efficient way, then one should
expect a reduction in labour costs. On the other hand, if an acquisition leads to a
disruption of the ongoing operations and to a feeling of insecurity on behalf of the
labour to such a degree that employees would be unwilling to invest their firm-
specific knowledge in the firm, then in the mid-term labour costs should increase
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since the firm will lose in efficiency and it will must pay higher compensations to
attract talented and experienced employees.
In acquisitions where the acquirer paid a relatively high premium for the
target one could expect that employment rates and employee costs in the post-merger
years to be lower than those of the benchmark due to the realisation of the potential
synergies in the utilisation of employees which presumably justify the premium that
was paid1. To put it more simply, an acquirer would be willing to pay a higher price
than that of the intrinsic value of the target only if they expect that there are potential
synergies; in this case, then, it is more likely that employee utilisation synergies to
exist and to be realised. This should be translated to a reduction in the number of
employees and in employment costs after the merger. Similarly, in the absence of
potential synergies in employee utilisation it is more likely that the deal would close
at a discount
A recent empirical work on the topic for the U.K. is provided by Thompson
and Haynes (1999). The authors examined mergers' efficiency by focusing on the
demand for labour by acquiring firms after the merger. Using a sample of 93 U.K.
building societies in the period from 1981 to 1993 and employing a standard labour
demand equation - i.e. one that controls for real wage and output factors -
augmented by acquisition variables, the authors attempted to capture the impact of
long-run effects of mergers on firm employment. The results indicated that mergers
increase efficiency in the sense that they were followed by a fall in the acquiring
firm's demand for labour. The model indicated that immediately after the merger
there is a statistically significant positive impact on an acquirer's demand for labour
(after controlling for the output change) which, however, disappears and becomes a
statistically significant negative effect in subsequent years as the acquisition is being
absorbed.
Conyon et.al. (2002) examined the employment effects of mergers in the
U.K., using a sample of 442 acquiring and acquired firms in the period from 1967 to
1996. The authors found that merger activity is followed by a substantial and
statistically significant employment fall. It was also found that related and hostile
1 A relatively high premium can be justified by a variety of potential synergies such as operational, financial,
managerial, etc. However, it is more likely that firms that purchase a target at a premium expect and realise
synergies in the utilisation of the workforce of the combined entity than firms that purchase a target at a discount.
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merger activity is followed by large falls in labour demand which, having controlled
for output changes, can be interpreted as being consistent with increased efficiency
of labour utilisation. Substantial job losses for hostile acquisitions - especially
among white-collar workers - are reported by Franks and Mayer (1996) for the U.K.
and by Bhagat et.al. (1990) for the U.S. In contrast, McGuckin et.al. (1995) found
that employment in acquired plants increased relatively to non-acquiring firms, while
when firm-level data were used there were no significant effects on employment.
8.3. The Employment Effects of Mergers on Sample Companies.
In Table 1 the median annual number of employees is reported for every
thousand pounds of sales. In Column 1 the annual firm median value is reported
while in Column 2 the median of all listed firms for which data were available is
illustrated.
The results from Column 1 indicate that there is a decline in the median
number of employees in the united entity in relation to the number of employees of
the combined target and bidder in the pre-merger years. In the entire pre-merger
period the median number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is 1.61%
which falls to 1.19% in the 5-year post-merger period.
The median of the benchmark-adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales, as is shown in Column 3, also falls from a statistically insignificant
value of -0.02% in the entire pre-merger period to a significant value at a 5%
significance level of -0.07% in the post-merger years. The number of positive
observations for the same periods also falls from 48.87% to 43.09%. Therefore, in
the pre-merger years the combined target and bidder seem to employ the same
number of employees for each thousand pounds of sales as that of the control firms.
None of the differences between merging firms' medians and control firms' medians
is statistically different from zero in each of the pre-merger years. In the post-merger
years, however, there is a gradual decline in the adjusted number of employees.
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TABLE 1
Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 79 sample companies.




Year Relative Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 1.79% 1.91% -0.11% 45.95% 37
-4 1.77% 1.80% 0.04% 54.05% 37
-3 1.68% 1.71% 0.02% 50.63% 79
-2 1.54% 1.67% -0.05% 48.10% 79
-1 1.46% 1.54% 0.00% 46.84% 79
Median
Annual Nr of
Employees 1.61% 1.71% -0.02% 48.87% 311
per Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.29% 1.34% -0.03% 44.30% 79
2 1.24% 1.28% -0.04% 46.84% 79
3 1.18% 1.26% -0.06% 44.30% 79
4 1.06% 1.22% -0.20% c 37.84% 37





1.19% 1.26% -0.07% b 43.09% 311
per Sales for
years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)3 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.042%
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
The median control firms' adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales is a statistically insignificant -0.03% in the first post-merger year
which becomes an insignificant -0.04% in the second year, and an insignificant -0.06
in the third year. In the fourth and the fifth post-merger years the decline is even
sharper; the adjusted number of employees per sales in year 4 is -0.20% which is
statistically significant at a 10% significance level and -0.23 %, statistically
2 The number of employees is reported for every thousand pounds of sales at the end of each financial year. Pro-
forma data of merged firms for pre-merger years are created by aggregating acquiring and target firms' data.
Benchmark adjusted Number of Employees per thousand pounds of Sales are calculated by subtracting from each
firm's value for each year the median value of the respective variable of all the other firms from all Industrial
Sectors in the Stock Exchange Year Book for which data are available in DataStream and Companies house.
3 A (NE per '000 Sales) is the median of the differences in median adjusted Number of Employees per '000
pounds of Sales between the post- and the pre-merger periods for all sample firms.
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significant at a 5% significance level, in the year 5. The number of positive
observations falls accordingly from 44.30% in the first post-merger year to 35.14%
in the fifth year following the acquisition. The employment rate appears to fall in the
years following the acquisition. This decline becomes more intense as time passes
after the merger, and the acquisition is absorbed by the acquirer. This is an indication
of a more efficient utilisation of labour by merged companies which increases after
the third post-merger year. However, the median change of the adjusted number of
employees per '000 pounds of sales between the post- and the pre-merger periods is
statistically insignificant.
The results from Table 2 are supportive of this finding; for the sample
companies, labour costs decrease in the post-merger period indicating greater
efficiency (the change in labour cost per sales between the post- and the pre-merger
periods is negative but statistically insignificant).
Although in each of the pre-merger years the median benchmark adjusted
labour costs per sales are statistically indifferent from zero, in the entire pre-merger
period the adjusted labour costs per sales are below control firms' standards by
1.21% which is statistically significant at 1% significance level. This finding
indicates that the median merging firm is more efficient in labour expenditure than
the median control firm. This finding implies that firms which are strategically
oriented towards acquisitions and firms that are chosen to be targets enjoy
efficiencies associated with lower employee costs in relation to non-acquiring and
non-acquired firms4.
In the post-merger years, the adjusted labour costs per sales decline further.
In the entire post-merger period the benchmark adjusted labour costs are -2.44% and
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. Positive observations decrease
from 45.02% in the pre-merger period to 42.44% in the post-merger years. In year 1
the combined entity's adjusted labour costs are -2.83% which is statistically
significance at a 10% significant level and the number of positive observations is
39.24%. It is apparent that in the first post-merger year the merged firms manage to
shrink labour expenditure, while as indicated in Table 1, the number of employees
does not decrease significantly.
4 It must be noted, however, that this finding refers to the aggregate labour costs of both bidders and targets. It
requires further research for the identification of whether the targets or the bidders are more labour cost efficient.
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TABLE 2
Employee Costs per Sales for the 79 sample companies.5























































































A (EC per Sales)6 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.231 %
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
This suggests that management may economise on labour costs by reneging the
implicit or explicit terms of labour contracts. In years 2 and 3 the median labour
costs are lower than those of the control firms, however they are not statistically
5
Employee costs per Sales are the ratio of the total labour costs over sales at the end of each financial year. Pro-
forms data of merged firms for pre-merger years are created by aggregating acquiring and target firms' data.
Benchmark adjusted Employee Costs per Sales are calculated by subtracting from each firm's value for each year
the median value of the respective variable of all the other firms from all Industrial Sectors in the Stock Exchange
Year Book for which data are available in DataStream and the Companies house.
6 A (EC per Sales) is the median of the difference in median Employee Costs per Sales between the post- and the
pre-merger periods for all the sample firms.
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significant and are apparently higher relative to the control group than those of the
year 1. But in the years 4 and 5 and as the acquisition has been absorbed, labour costs
- though statistically insignificant - are much lower than those of the control firms.
Overall, the number of employees per thousand pounds of sales declines after
the merger and especially in the fourth and the fifth years. This indicates a higher
degree of efficiency in labour utilisation by the combined entity in comparison to the
target and the bidder when operated as separate firms.
Merging firms in the sample are more labour cost efficient than the control
firms in the entire pre-merger period and remain efficient in the post-merger period.
In the first year following the acquisition labour costs decline while the number of
employees remains at the same standards as those of the control firms, a finding that
supports the view that immediately after the merger there is a renegotiation of
employment contracts on behalf of the management so as to reduce costs. Labour
costs decline more in the year 4 and 5 for the sample companies, indicating a greater
degree of efficiency as time passes and the acquisition is being absorbed, but this was
not statistically significant so does not carry over to M&As in general. Thus, it could
be argued that the median combined target and bidder in the sample enjoys labour
cost efficiencies after the merger.
8.3.1. Employment effects on Hostile and Friendly acquisitions.
The results of this study for employment effects of hostile takeovers are
illustrated in Table 3. Contrary to expectations, in the years following hostile
acquisitions the median control firms adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales are statistically indifferent from zero. This means that merging firms
after a hostile acquisition keep the number of employees at the same level as that of
the control firms. This may imply that hostile acquisitions do not lead to a more
efficient utilisation of labour as was hypothesised to occur after transactions that are
mainly justified by the intention to better utilise target's resources7. The results also
do not appear to confirm Shleifer and Summers' (op.cit.) argument that takeovers
that transfer wealth from stakeholders to shareholders must be hostile. This finding is
7 Hostile acquisitions are typically justified by anticipated gains resulting from the utilisation of target's resources
by a more competent management team or one which is more loyal to shareholder interests.
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consistent with the hypothesis that after hostile acquisitions the acquirers focus
mainly to the replacement of management teams and less to the reduction of the
workforce though more research would be needed to confirm this.
TABLE 3
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 18 acquisitions where
the acquirer made a hostile bid for the acquiree8.
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Employees 1.41% 1.34% 0.06% 53.70% 54
per K of
Sales for
years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)9 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.053%
The results of Table 4 which looks at employee costs, support the findings
that were shown in Table 3. Merging firms that are engaged in hostile transactions
exhibit higher labour costs than the control firms, both in the pre- and the post-
merger periods. In the entire pre-merger period the median adjusted labour cost per
sales for the combined target and bidder is 2.28% and statistically significant at a 1%
significance level. In the entire post-merger period the adjusted labour cost per sales
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is 2.46% and statistically significant at a 1% significance level. It can be argued
therefore, that sample companies that were engaged to hostile takeovers do not
contribute to economising on labour costs; at the best case costs do not deteriorate10.
On the contrary, the decline in positive observations between the two periods (from
70.37% to 62.96%) is an indication of some deterioration in labour costs expenditure.
The finding that firms that are engaged in hostile acquisitions have higher
labour costs than control firms could possibly be explained by organisational culture.
The typically bigger acquirer that bids for an inefficient target may be a firm that
follows an aggressive expansionary policy and it may be oriented towards growth
and not towards a policy that rationalises expenditure. The targeted firm may suffer
inefficiencies and relatively high labour and other costs. Thus, the median combined
target and bidder in hostile acquisitions exhibit labour costs that are higher than those
of the control firms in the pre-merger period which they do not manage to improve in
the years following the merger.
10 To argue that hostile takeovers contribute to economising on labour costs there should be a
statistically significant negative difference in employee costs between the post- and the pre-merger
periods. However, as illustrated in section 8.9 of this Chapter where the change in employment costs
is regressed against the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the acquisition is
characterised as Friendly and the value of 0 when the acquisition is characterised as Hostile, the
intercept coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 4
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 18 acquisitions where the acquirer
made a hostile bid for the acquiree11.
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark % Number of
Merger Median Median Median postitive observations
-3 23.75% 21.57% 2.38% 61.11% 18
-2 24.77% 21.68% 2.03% c 72.22% 18




24.49% 22.56% 2.28% a 70.37% 54
years -5 to -1
1 25.79% 24.03% 1.93% 55.56% 18
2 26.11% 24.20% 2.46% b 72.22% 18




26.11% 23.76% 2.46% a 62.96% 54
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)
12 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.286%
a - Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
In friendly acquisitions, however, the evidence is exactly the opposite. As can
be seen in Table 5, while the combined targets and bidders that engaged in agreed
transactions, exhibit employment rates at the same levels as that of the control firms
(i.e. the median control firm adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of
sales is statistically insignificant) in the pre-merger years, in the entire post-merger
period the adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is below the
control group's standards by 0.11% which is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level.
11 See footnote 5.
12 See footnote 6.
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TABLE 5
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 61 acquisitions where
the acquirer made an agreed offer to the acquiree13.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 of Sales
Year Relative Firm Benchmark
Median % postitivito Merger Median Median
-5 1.61% 1.80% -0.11% 44.44%
-4 1.55% 1.71% -0.20% 48.15%
-3 1.60% 1.71% -0.10% 47.54%
-2 1.46% 1.67% -0.05% 45.90%
-1 1.35% 1.54% -0.02% 44.26%
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per 1.50% 1.67% -0.06% 45.99%
k of Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.26% 1.34% -0.06% 42.62%
2 1.22% 1.28% -0.07% 42.62%
3 1.12% 1.26% -0.08% 42.62%
4 1.01% 1.19% -0.22% c 33.33%




k of Sales for
years 1 to 5
1.16%
A (NE per '000 Sales)14 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.076%
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.















Moreover, employment rates decline sharply after the third post-merger year. While
in the years 1, 2, and 3 the adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of
sales are -0.06, -0.07 and -0.08 (all statistically insignificant) respectively, and the
number of positive observations 42.62% in each of these years, in year 4 the adjusted
number of employees is -0.22% (significant at a 10% significance level) with the
number of positive observations being 33.33%. A further decline is observed in the
year 5; the adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales falls to -
0.26% which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level with the number of
1
See footnote 2.
1 See footnote 3.
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positive observations being 37.04%. We must however be cautious of this last result
because the number of observations falls from year 3 to years 4 and 5. This applies to
several of the following tables as well.
TABLE 6
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 61 acquisitions where the acquirer
made an agreed offer to the acquiree15.
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 18.24% 21.68% -4.93% b 40.74% 27
-4 17.99% 22.56% -5.36% b 37.04% 27
-3 19.73% 22.56% -3.47% b 36.07% 61
-2 18.81% 23.76% -3.60% b 37.70% 61




18.93% 23.33% -3.89% a 37.13% 237
years -5 to -1
1 19.57% 23.76% -4.20% b 34.43% 61
2 19.56% 23.62% -4.83% c 36.07% 61
3 19.45% 23.62% -4.44% c 39.34% 61
4 16.47% 23.62% -7.19% b 33.33% 27




18.72% 23.62% -4.91% a 35.44% 237
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)16 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.231%
a - Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Our results concerning labour costs of firms that are engaged in friendly
takeovers is also in contrast to the evidence concerning the hostile ones. As Table 6
shows, the median combined target and bidder enjoy adjusted labour costs per sales
that are much lower than those of the control firms in all individual pre-merger years
and in the entire pre-merger period. More importantly, all figures are statistically
15 See footnote 5.
16 See footnote 6.
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significant. In the post-merger years the median combined entity also keeps labour
expenditure below those of the control group. In the entire post merger period the
median control firms adjusted labour costs per sales are -4.91% and statistically
significant at a 1% significance level (for the pre-merger period the respective
number is -3.89%, also significant at a 1% significance level). The number of
positive observations falls from 37.13% in the pre-merger period to 35.44%in the
post-merger period.
Overall the results indicate that friendly acquisitions lead to a more efficient
utilisation of the workforce while labour costs expenditure remains below those of
control group's standards both in the pre- and the post-merger period. This pattern is
accelerated after the third post-merger year when the acquisition has been absorbed.
In stark contrast to hostile takeovers, in friendly ones the typical combined target and
bidder exhibit a greater capacity to keep employment costs under the typical control
firm's standards in the pre-merger period. This evidence indicates that firms that are
strategically oriented towards agreed acquisitions are more cost efficient at least as
far as labour costs are concerned.
8.3.2 Employment effects of Related and Unrelated acquisitions.
In related acquisitions, as it was expected, there is a decline in employment
rates in the post-merger years indicating that merged firms utilise their labour more
efficiently. Table 7 shows that whilst in each of the pre-merger years the median
control firm adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is close to
zero, for the entire pre-merger period as a whole the adjusted number of employees
per thousand pounds of sales is -0.14% and statistically significant at a 10%
significance level. This indicates that targets and bidders that are engaged in related
acquisitions enjoy greater labour costs efficiencies in comparison to non-acquiring
and non-acquired firms.
In the post-merger years the decline in employment rates starts after the year
3. In the fourth post-merger year, the median adjusted number of employees per
thousand pounds of sales is -0.27% and statistically significant at a 10% significance
level. The proportion of positive observations is 36%. In the fifth post-merger year
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the respective figures are -0.26% (which is statistically significant at a 10%
significance level) and 32%. In the entire post-merger period the adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales is decreased to -0.19% which is statistically
significant at a 1% significance level. Positive observations fall to 37.86% (in
comparison to 45.15% in the entire pre-merger period).
TABLE 7
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 52 acquisitions where
the acquirer belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector as that of the acquiree in
the year before the takeover17.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 of Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 1.56% 1.80% -0.16% 40.00% 25
-4 1.47% 1.71% -0.23% 44.00% 25
-3 1.57% 1.69% -0.14% 48.08% 52
-2 1.44% 1.61% -0.05% 46.15% 52
-1 1.33% 1.49% -0.05% 44.23% 52
Median Annual
Nr of
Employees per 1.42% 1.71% -0.14% c 45.15% 206
K of Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.23% 1.31% -0.18% 38.46% 52
2 1.13% 1.27% -0.15% 40.38% 52
3 1.08% 1.24% -0.12% 38.46% 52
4 0.87% 1.19% -0.27% c 36.00% 25
5 0.81% 1.13% -0.26% c 32.00% 25
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per 1.06% 1.26% -0.19% a 37.86% 206
K of Sales for
years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)18 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.095%
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
17 See footnote 2.
18 See footnote 3.
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As far as labour costs are concerned (Table 8), firms that are engaged in
related acquisitions exhibit better expenditure rates in comparison to control firms. In
each of the pre-merger years the adjusted labour costs are below the standards of the
control firms and all the figures are statistically significant.
TABLE 8
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 52 acquisitions where the acquirer
belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector as that of the acquiree in the year
before the takeover19.














years -5 to -1
Year Relative Firm Benchmark












19.19% 22.56% -3.50% a 38.35% 206
1 19.88% 23.69% -4.01% b 30.77% 52
2 20.35% 23.62% -3.95% b 32.69% 52
3 20.16% 23.69% -3.75% 36.54% 52
4 17.23% 23.62% -6.39% c 36.00% 25






years 1 to 5
19.40%
A (EC per Sales)20 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
23.62% -4.58% a 33.98% 206
-0.376%
19 See footnote 5.
20 See footnote 6.
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In the entire pre-merger period the control firm adjusted employee costs per sales are
-3.50% and statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The number of
positive observations is 38.35%.
The median adjusted employee costs per sales is also below control group's
median in the post-merger years. In the year 1 they are -4.01% and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level, in the year 2 they are -3.95% and statistically
significant at a 5% significance level and in the year 3 they are -3.75% and
statistically insignificant. In the years 4 and 5 the adjusted employee costs per sales
decline further to -6.39% and -6.10%. Both figures are statistically significant at a
10% significance level. The number of positive observations in the entire post-
merger period falls to 33.98% from 38.35% in the entire pre-merger period.
It is apparent from the results that related acquisitions lead to labour costs
savings and a rationalisation in the way that employees are utilised. These effects are
more obvious after the third post-acquisition year, possibly because such employee-
utilisation and labour costs efficiencies need some time to appear. In horizontal
mergers therefore, as was expected, the possible overlapping activities of the
merging firms, the greater opportunity for scale economies, and the cross-utilisation
of resources allow for efficiencies of workforce utilisation to be achieved. Firms that
are engaged in related acquisitions employ fewer employees and enjoy less labour
costs than the control firms in the pre-merger years. This finding may be related to
the fact that most of the horizontal acquisitions in the sample are also friendly ones21.
Thus, the possible reasons that explain the better pre-acquisition employee utilisation
in friendly acquisitions may apply to the horizontal acquisitions. Therefore, it could
be argued that firms that are strategically oriented towards agreed acquisitions within
the same industrial sector manage to utilise their workforce more efficiently in the
pre-merger years The individual effects of friendliness and strategic direction are
explored later in this Chapter in the regression analyses.
Unrelated acquisitions in the sample exhibit exactly the opposite picture, as
far as employment rates and costs are concerned, compared with those of the related
ones. In Table 9 it can be seen than in each of the pre-merger years the median
adjusted employees per thousand pounds of sales is statistically insignificant from
21 40 out of the 52 related acquisitions are friendly.
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zero. In the entire pre-merger period, however, the median combined target and
bidder employs 0.04% more number of employees per thousand pounds of sales than
the control firms. In each of the post-merger years and in the entire post-merger
period the median merged firm keeps employment rates at the same levels as those of
the control firms.
TABLE 9
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 Sales for the 27 acquisitions where
the acquirers and acquirees belong to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors22.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 of Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 2.00% 1.91% 0.05% 58.33% 12
-4 2.07% 1.80% 0.10% 75.00% 12
-3 1.75% 1.71% 0.03% 55.56% 27
-2 1.73% 1.67% 0.04% 51.85% 27
-1 1.69% 1.54% 0.02% 51.85% 27
Median Annual Nr of
Employees per K of
Sales for years -5 to -
1
1.77% 1.71% 0.04% c 56.19% 105
1 1.53% 1.34% 0.06% 55.56% 27
2 1.42% 1.28% 0.09% 59.26% 27
3 1.29% 1.26% 0.01% 55.56% 27
4 1.19% 1.22% -0.02% 41.67% 12
5 1.14% 1.19% -0.05% 41.67% 12
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per K of
1.32% 1.28% 0.01% 53.33% 105
Sales for years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)23 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.122%
In other words, the number of employees declines from above that of the control
firms in the pre-merger period to the industry standards in the post-merger period.
However, this is not enough so as to argue that unrelated acquisitions lead to
employee utilisation efficiencies. Bearing in mind that many unrelated acquisitions
are typically followed by the divestment of the unnecessary divisions and plants for a
22 See footnote 2.
23 See footnote 3.
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variety of reasons, including the incentive for cash recovery after the acquisition or
the rationalisation of operations (Weston et.al. (1998)), it cannot be argued that
unrelated acquisitions lead to a more efficient utilisation of labour.
The same argument regarding unrelated acquisitions can be also applied to
labour costs per sales. As presented in Table 10, the median control firm adjusted
employee costs per sales for both the pre- and the post-merger years are statistically
close to industry standards. Therefore, it can be said that unrelated acquisitions do
not lead to increased efficiencies as far as employee costs are concerned, if they are
compared to other non-acquiring and non-acquired firms.
TABLE 10
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 27 acquisitions where the acquirers
and acquirees belong to different Level 5 Industrial Sectors24.
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark -
Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark Number of
Merger Median Median Median % postitive observations
-5 23.62% 21.54% 2.11% 66.67% 12
-4 23.10% 21.68% 1.48% 66.67% 12
-3 22.19% 22.56% 0.16% 51.85% 27
-2 23.64% 23.33% 0.38% 59.26% 27




23.35% 22.56% 0.91% 58.10% 105
years -5 to -1
1 24.83% 23.76% 0.82% 55.56% 27
2 25.33% 23.76% 1.63% 66.67% 27
3 24.39% 23.76% 0.97% 59.26% 27
4 24.67% 23.36% 1.31% 58.33% 12




24.83% 23.76% 1.00% 59.05% 105
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)25 Years -1,-2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.120%
24 See footnote 5.
25 See footnote 6.
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8.3.3. Employment Effects and the Method of Payment.
In this Section, the employment effects of acquisitions that were financed by
alternative means of payment are examined. First, we examine the impact on
employment rates and employee costs of acquisitions that were financed by cash,
then the effects on employment rates and employee costs of acquisitions that were
financed by stock, and finally of the acquisitions that were financed by a
combination of stock and cash.
Acquisitions that were financed by cash are expected to offer a greater
disciplinary motive to acquirer's management for job elimination and greater cost
economies than acquisitions that were financed totally or partly by stock. This is
because acquirers that use cash to finance an acquisition often use debt to raise the
necessary funds for the transaction which may provide a greater motivation for
management to economise on labour costs than if the means of payment was stock.
In Table 11 the median control firm adjusted number of employees per
thousand pounds of sales of the combined targets and bidders that were engaged to
cash acquisitions is shown. The results in Column 3 indicate that the median adjusted
number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is statistically insignificant in
each of the pre- and post-merger years and for the entire pre- and post-merger
periods. Thus, the utilisation of the workforce in the pre- and the post-merger years is
about at the same levels as those of the control firms.
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TABLE 11
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 16 acquisitions where
the method of payment was cash26.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark % Number of
Merger Median Median Median postitive observations
-3 1.48% 1.69% -0.04% 50.00% 16
-2 1.42% 1.61% -0.17% 43.75% 16
-1 1.36% 1.49% -0.07% 43.75% 16
Median Annual
Nr of Employees
per K of Sales for
years -5 to -1






















of Sales for years
1 to 5
1.12% 1.27% -0.15% 39.58% 48
A (NE per '000 Sales)27 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2,3 0.090%
As far as employee costs per sales in cash acquisitions are concerned, as
shown in Table 12, in the pre-mergers years the median control firm adjusted
employee costs per sales range from -3.47% to -5.06% and in the entire pre-merger
period the relevant figure is -4.11% which is statistically significant at a 10%
significance level. In the post-merger years, however, the adjusted employment costs
are statistically very close to control firms standards. In the entire post-merger period
the median control firms adjusted employee costs per sales are -1.92% which is
statistically insignificant, and the proportion of positive observations is 43.75%
(from 31.25% in the entire pre-merger period). Therefore, while before the merger
labour costs are below industry's standards, after the merger they are close to them, a
fact that indicates deterioration in the labour costs management on behalf of the
united entity.
26 See footnote 2.
27 See footnote 3.
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TABLE 12
Median Annual Employee Cost per Sales for the 16 acquisitions where the method of
payment was cash28.









































1 20.38% 23.69% -3.63% 31.25% 16
2 22.93% 23.69% -1.30% 43.75% 16






years 1 to 5
22.10%




c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Noteworthy also is the finding that in the first post-merger year the adjusted
employee costs per sales are -3.63% with the positive observations being 31.25%
(i.e. exactly at the level of the pre-merger years) while in year 2 they were increased
to -1.30% (and the positive observations have increased to 43.75%) and in year 3
they are further increased to 0.56% (and the positive observations to 56.25% (the
figures that are referring to the adjusted employee costs per sales, however, are
statistically insignificant).
The above results indicate that in the pre-merger period the median combined
target and bidder that engaged to a cash acquisition manages to keep employee costs
See footnote 5.
' See footnote 6.
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below control firms' standards while in the post-merger period costs converge
towards control firms' standards.
In summary, as far as the number of employees is concerned, the median for
the combined targets and bidders exhibits employment rates very close to the
benchmark both in the pre- and the post-merger periods. In other words, there is not
any improvement to the utilisation of the workforce after the merger relatively to the
benchmark.
The above evidence does not support the hypothesis that cash transactions
(which in many cases are financed by debt) offer a disciplinary motive to the merged
firm management for jobs elimination and greater labour costs efficiencies. The
evidence is also compatible with the free cash flow hypothesis in the sense that when
the available cash of an acquirer is used as a means of payment for a well projected
and a beneficial acquisition one would expect a more efficient utilisation of the
workforce and an improvement in employee costs rates. Therefore, in the absence of
such improvements one could argue that acquirer's management might proceed with
acquisitions with negative net present value prospects (at least as far as labour costs
are concerned) after having financed all other positive net present value investments.
In Table 13 the effects on employment rates of stock acquisitions are
presented. In each of the pre-merger years the combined target and bidder median
control firms adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is
statistically insignificant which means that employment rates in the combined target
and bidder are about at the levels of those of the control firms. In the entire pre¬
merger period they are -0.12% and also statistically insignificant. In the post merger
years there is a modest and statistically insignificant increase on the number of
employees. Specifically, in each of the post-merger years the adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales is positive (though statistically insignificant)
and the number of positive observations ranges from 52.38% in the first and the third
post-merger years to 61.90% in the second year. In the entire post-merger period the
adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is 0.12% (which
however is statistically insignificant) and the proportion of positive observations in
the sample increases to 55.56% from 44.44% in the entire pre-merger period.
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TABLE 13
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 21 acquisitions where
the method of payment was stock30.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £000 of Sales.
Benchmark -
Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median 0/° Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-3 1.75% 1.80% -0.16% 47.62% 21
-2 1.56% 1.71% -0.19% 42.86% 21




years -5 to -1





















Employees per 1.48% 1.34% 0.12% 55.56% 63
Sales for years 1
to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)31 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.097%
Despite the modest increase in employment rates of the sample companies
following stock acquisitions, employment costs per sales are improving (Table 14).
The combined target and bidder that were engaged in stock acquisitions enjoy better
cost economies associated with employee expenditure than the control firms in the
pre-merger years. In the entire pre-merger period the median control firms adjusted
employment costs per sales are -2.39% and statistically significant at a 5%
significance level with the number of positive observations being 38.10%. In the
post-merger years there is a further improvement in employee costs per sales. In the
year 1 they are falling to -3.83% which is statistically significant at a 10%
significance level. In the years 2 and 3, they are -3.72% and 3.82% respectively,
however both statistically insignificant. In the entire post-merger period the adjusted
30 See footnote 2.
31 See footnote 3.
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employment costs per sales are -3.82% which is statistically significant at a 1%
significance level and the number of positive observation is falling to 36.51%.
TABLE 14
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 21 acquisitions where the method of
payment was stock32.




























































20.21% 23.76% -3.82% a 36.51% 63
for years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)33 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.166%
a - Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
In general, firms that are engaged in stock acquisitions keep the number of
their employees at about the same levels as those of the control firms in the post-
merger period (though there is some statistically insignificant evidence that there is
slight increase in the number of employees after the merger). Despite this finding,
employee costs are below those of industry's standards after the merger. These
findings indicate that merged firms that used stock as a means of payment may have
managed to economise on employee costs after the merger without reducing the
32 See footnote 5.
33 See footnote 6.
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number of jobs34. Indeed, in the first post-merger year the adjusted labour costs are
negative and statistically significant . This possibly means that the management of
the combined entity might have changed the terms of the employment contacts so as
to reduce costs. While this explains the finding of the lower post-merger employee
costs in the first three post-merger years it needs further analysis to investigate
whether in the subsequent years costs increase due to possible luck of trust on behalf
of employees and their subsequent reluctance to invest their firm-specific knowledge
in the firm unless they get a higher compensation36.
The above results are not compatible with those derived by Ghosh (2001) for
the U.S. Ghosh found that more employees are let go following stock acquisitions
than cash acquisitions and acquisitions that were financed by a combination of stock
and cash. In this study, only mixed acquisitions are followed by substantial job
elimination.
As it can be seen in Table 15, the combined target and bidder median control
firms adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is falling from -
0.02% (which is statistically insignificant) in the entire pre-merger period to -0.06%
which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level in the entire post-merger
period.
Positive observations are falling to 40.80% in the 5-year post-merger period from
48.28% in the pre-merger period. The highest decline in employee jobs is observed
in the years 4 and 5. In the former the adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales is -0.22% and statistically significant at a 10% significance level,
while in the latter it is -0.24% and also statistically significant at a 10% significance
level.
34 The comparison of employee costs between the pre- and the post-merger periods here is made with reference to
the benchmark firms. Later in this Chapter, using regression analyses, it is clearer that stock acquisitions are
followed by cost reductions (after controlling for the effects of industry relatedness).
35 It should be noted that in none of the pre-merger years the adjusted employee costs are statistically different
from zero.
36 Unfortunately data availability of this study did not allow the analysis to be extended to 5 years after the
merger.
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TABLE 15
Number of employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 42 acquisitions where the acquirer
used a combination of stock and cash for the transaction37.
Pre and Post-Merqer Number of Emolovees oer £ 000 Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted




-5 1.79% 1.91% -0.13% 37.50% 24
-4 1.66% 1.80% -0.08% 50.00% 24
-3 1.69% 1.67% -0.02% 50.00% 42
-2 1.55% 1.54% 0.07% 52.38% 42
-1 1.44% 1.44% 0.00% 47.62% 42
Median Annual Nr
of Employees per 1.64% 1.71% -0.02% 48.28% 174
Sales for years -5
to -1
1 1.28% 1.28% -0.03% 40.48% 42
2 1.23% 1.26% -0.02% 45.24% 42
3 1.19% 1.22% -0.04% 42.86% 42
4 1.05% 1.22% -0.22% c 33.33% 24
5 1.01% 1.19% -0.24% c 37.50% 24
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per 1.19% 1.26% -0.06% b 40.80% 174
Sales for years 1 to
5
A (NE per '000 Sales)38 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.003%
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
This reduction in the workforce after the merger may be attributed to a capability on
behalf of the merged firm's management to utilise labour resources more efficiently,
especially if the reduction in employee costs is considered simultaneously. In Table
16 it can be seen that there is a substantial improvement in labour costs in the post-
merger period. While in each of the pre-merger years and for the entire pre-merger
period the median control firm adjusted employee costs per sales are statistically
insignificant, in the post-merger years there is a gradual annual decline which is
becoming statistically significant when adjusted employee costs per sales are
37 See footnote 2.
38 See footnote 3.
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considered for the entire post-merger period. Specifically, the median adjusted
employee costs are -0.08% in the year 1, they fall to -0.25% in year 2 and to -0.76%
in the year 3. In year 4 the adjusted employee costs per sales fall further to -5.18%
and in year 5 they become -4.73%. In the entire post-merger period employment
costs are -1.05% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level.
TABLE 16
Employee Costs per Sales for the 42 acquisitions where the acquirer used a
combination of stock and cash for the transaction39.
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 21.67% 21.68% 0.17% 50.00% 24
-4 21.21% 21.68% -0.40% 45.83% 24
-3 22.72% 23.89% -0.40% 47.62% 42
-2 24.04% 23.76% 0.58% 57.14% 42




23.06% 22.56% 0.31% 51.72% 174
years -5 to -1
1 24.04% 23.52% -0.08% 47.62% 42
2 23.46% 23.62% -0.25% 47.62% 42
3 23.05% 23.62% -0.76% 42.86% 42
4 18.58% 23.62% -5.18% 37.50% 24




22.66% 23.62% -1.05% c 43.68% 174
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)40 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.723%
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
In summary, acquisitions that were financed by cash or stock do not exhibit a
better utilisation of their workforce relatively to the benchmark firms in the years
following the merger. Employee costs in cash acquisitions converge towards those of
39 See footnote 5.
40 See footnote 6.
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the control firms in the post-merger years from below control firms' standards in the
pre-merger years. In stock acquisitions employee costs are below benchmark's levels
both in the pre- and the post-merger periods. When the financing method was a
combination of stock and cash both the number of employees per thousand pounds of
sales and the employee costs per sales are below benchmark's standards in the post-
merger years in contrast to the pre-merger years where both figures are statistically
close to industry's standards. These results indicate that in mixed acquisitions there
are the greatest labour utilisation efficiencies.
8.3.4 Employment Effects and Strategic Acquisitions.
So far, the evidence of this study has indicated that friendly, related and stock
acquisitions are followed by a reduction in the number of employees and by labour
costs savings which were more observable after the third post-acquisition year. The
results in this Section refer to Strategic acquisitions, i.e. to acquisitions where the
method of payment was stock or a combination of stock and cash, the bidder and the
target belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector and the bid was friendly.
As can be seen in Table 17, whilst targets and bidders that were engaged in
Strategic acquisitions exhibit employment rates equivalent to those of the control
firms' standards in each of the pre-acquisition years, in the entire pre-merger period
the median control firms adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales
is -0.16% and statistically significant at a 10% significance level. This implies that
acquirers and targets that conduct Strategic transactions, i.e. when acquirers select
targets from within the industry in which they belong and use other means of
payment than cash to finance agreed acquisitions, they utilise employee resources
more efficiently than could group firms in the pre-merger period41.
Regarding the post-merger period, in years 1, 2, and 3, the adjusted number
of employees per thousand pounds of sales is -0.15%, -0.10% and -0.09%
respectively, all statistically insignificant. In the year 4, however, the median
adjusted number of employees declines to -0.38% and in the year 5 to -0.36%, which
41 It must be stressed however that this finding refers to the aggregate data of the combined target and bidder.
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are both statistically significant at a 10% significance level. In the entire post-merger
period the adjusted number of employees is -0.19% which is statistically significant
at a 5% significance level.
TABLE 17
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 30 acquisitions where
the method of payment was stock or a combination of stock and cash, the bidder and
the target belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector, and the bid was friendly42.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 of Sales
Benchmark - Adiusted
Year Relative Firm Benchmark % Number of
to Merger Median Median Median postitive observations
-5 1.53% 1.80% -0.28% 33.33% 18
-4 1.45% 1.71% -0.28% 38.89% 18
-3 1.56% 1.67% -0.14% 46.67% 30
-2 1.41% 1.54% -0.05% 46.67% 30
-1 1.34% 1.44% -0.04% 43.33% 30
Median
Annual Nr of
Employees 1.41% 1.67% -0.16% c 42.86% 126
per K of
Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.23% 1.28% -0.15% 33.33% 30
2 1.16% 1.26% -0.10% 40.00% 30
3 1.11% 1.22% -0.09% 36.67% 30
4 0.82% 1.19% -0.38% c 33.33% 18




Employees 1.08% 1.26% -0.19% b 35.71% 126
per K of
Sales for
years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)43 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.099%
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
The number of positive observations also falls to 35.71% in the entire post-merger
period from 42.86% in the pre-merger years.
42 See footnote 2.
43 See footnote 3.
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TABLE 18
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 30 acquisitions where the method of
payment was stock or a combination of stock and cash, the bidder and the target
belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector, and the bid was friendly44.
























years 1 to 5
Firm Benchmark




18.67% 21.96% -4.34% c 38.89% 18
18.06% 22.56% -4.66% c 33.33% 18
19.01% 24.03% -4.33% 33.33% 30
19.72% 23.76% -3.56% c 33.33% 30
20.15% 23.76% -2.80% c 36.67% 30
19.19% 23.76% -3.85% a 34.92% 126
19.43% 23.41% -4.32% b 30.00% 30
18.18% 23.62% -5.50% b 26.67% 30
18.67% 23.62% -5.11% 30.00% 30
16.68% 23.76% -6.79% 27.78% 18
16.99% 24.08% -6.42% c 27.78% 18
18.30% 23.62% -5.35% a 28.57% 126
A (EC per Sales)45 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.550%
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Firms that were engaged in Strategic acquisitions are more labour cost
efficient than the control firms in the pre-merger years (Table 18). In the year -1 the
control firms adjusted employee costs per sales are -2.80% and in year -2 they are -
3.56%, both statistically significant at a 10% significance level. In the years -4 and -5
the adjusted employee costs per sales are -4.66% and -4.34% respectively and
See footnote 5.
45 See footnote 6.
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statistically significant at a 10% significance level. In the year -3, they are -3.56%
and again statistically insignificant. In the entire pre-merger period the adjusted
employee costs per sales are -3.85% and statistically significant at a 1% significance
level with the number of positive observations being 34.92%.
During the post-merger years the adjusted employee costs decline
dramatically, from -4.32% in the year 1 to -5.50% in the year 2 (which are both
statistically significant at a 5% significance level), to 5.11% in the year 3. In the year
4 they fall to -6.79%, and in the year 5 to -6.42% (which is statistically significant at
a 10% significance level). In the entire post-merger period the median control firms
adjusted employee costs per sales become -5.35% which is statistically significant at
a 1% significance level. The number of positive observations falls to 28.57%.
The results indicate that firms that are engaged in Strategic acquisitions are
more labour costs efficient and employ fewer employees per every thousand pounds
of sales than the control firms in the pre-merger years. After the merger they retain
their efficiency levels since the number of jobs and the employee costs are below
control group's standards.
8.3.5. Employment Effects and the Size of the Acquisition.
The effects on employment and employee costs of large acquisitions versus
small ones are presented in this Section. Table 19, illustrates the median control
firms adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales for the 38 largest
acquisitions in the sample. The results indicate that large acquisitions do not affect
employment rates. The combined target and bidder exhibit the same employment
rates as those of the control firms both in the pre- and the post-merger periods.
Specifically, in the entire pre-merger period the median control firms adjusted
number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is 0.03% and statistically
insignificant with the number of positive observations being 51.35%. In the entire
post-merger period the figure is falling to -0.01% but it is also statistically
insignificant. The number of positive observations is falling to 48.65%.
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TABLE 19
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 38 largest
acquisitions of the sample. Relative bidders' size ranges from 7% to 317% of the size
of target; size is based on market values of the two firms at the beginning of year -146.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 2.08% 1.91% 0.09% 52.94% 17
-4 1.84% 1.80% 0.01% 52.94% 17
-3 1.78% 1.71% 0.06% 50.00% 38
-2 1.72% 1.67% 0.08% 52.63% 38
-1 1.64% 1.54% 0.01% 50.00% 38
Median Annual Nr
of Employees per
Sales for years -5
to -1
1.75% 1.71% 0.03% 51.35% 148
1 1.39% 1.34% 0.05% 52.63% 38
2 1.31% 1.28% 0.03% 50.00% 38
3 1.28% 1.26% 0.00% 52.63% 38
4 1.04% 1.22% -0.20% 35.29% 17
5 0.93% 1.19% -0.23% 41.18% 17
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per 1.28% 1.26% -0.01% 48.65% 148
Sales for years 1
to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)47 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2,3 0.044%
Employment costs are also at the standards of the control firms for large
acquisitions. In the entire pre-merger period the median control firms adjusted
employment costs per sales are -0.38% but the figure is statistically insignificant.
Similarly, in the post-merger period the relevant figure is -0.46% and also
statistically insignificant. The number of positive observations is 47.97% in the pre¬
merger years and 46.62% in the post-merger period.
In summary, it is apparent from the results that in large acquisitions, the
employment rates and the costs associated with employees remain at about the same
levels as those of the control firms both in the pre- and the post-merger periods.
46 See footnote 2.
47 See footnote 3.
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TABLE 20
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 38 largest acquisitions of the
sample. Relative bidders' size ranges from 7% to 317% of the size of target; size is
based on market values of the two firms at the beginning of year -148.
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years 1 to 5
23.40% 23.62% -0.46% 46.62% 148
A (EC per Sales)49 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.140%
The picture is exactly the opposite in the case of small acquisitions. As can be
seen in Table 21, firms that were engaged in small acquisitions exhibit the same
employment rates as those of the control firms in each of the pre-merger years. In the
entire pre-merger period, however, the median control firms adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales is -0.13% and statistically significant at a
1% significance level.
In year 1 the adjusted number of employees is -0.14% and it falls to -0.15%
in the year 2. Both are statistically significant at a 10% significance level. A further
48 See footnote 5.
49 See footnote 6.
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decline is observed in the year 3 to -0.16% which is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level. In the year 4 the adjusted number of employees becomes -0.21%
which is statistically significant at a 10% significance level and in the year 5 they are
-0.23% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level. The number of
positive observations falls from 42.76% in the entire pre-merger period to 34.21% in
the entire post-merger period.
TABLE 21
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of Sales for the 38 smallest
acquisitions of the sample. Relative bidders' size ranges from 400% to 37516% of the
size of target; size is based on market values of the two firms at the beginning of year
^ 50
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 1.71% 1.91% -0.11% 36.84% 19
-4 1.71% 1.80% 0.04% 52.63% 19
-3 1.59% 1.76% -0.15% 47.37% 38
-2 1,45% 1.69% -0.27% 39.47% 38
-1 1.36% 1.61% -0.11% 39.47% 38
Median Annual
Nr of Employees 1.51% 1.71% -0.13% a 42.76% 152
per Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.23% 1.39% -0.14% c 34.21% 38
2 1.12% 1.31% -0.15% c 39.47% 38
3 1.10% 1.27% -0.16% b 31.58% 38
4 1.07% 1.22% -0.21% c 36.84% 19
5 0.99% 1.19% -0.23% b 26.32% 19
Median Annual
Number of
Employees per 1.10% 1.26% -0.16% a 34.21% 152
Sales for years 1
to 5
A(NE per '000 Sales)51' Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2,3
0.055%
a - Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
50 See footnote 2.
51 See footnote 3.
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The results appear to be in contrast to those derived by Conyon et.al. (op.cit.),
who found that smaller acquirers make proportionately larger reductions in labour
demand than their larger counterparts.
TABLE 22
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 38 smallest acquisitions of the
sample. Relative bidders' size ranges from 400% to 37516% of the size of target; size
is based on market values of the two firms at the beginning of year -1 .
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 21.63% 21.68% -0.33% 47.37% 19
-4 21.08% 21.68% -0.46% 42.11% 19
-3 19.15% 22.12% -3.47% b 36.84% 38
-2 18.07% 22.94% -5.06% a 34.21% 38




18.83% 22.56% -3.97% a 38.16% 152
years -5 to -1
1 18.84% 23.89% -5.07% b 31.58% 38
2 19.48% 23.76% -4.00% c 42.11% 38
3 17.81% 23.76% -5.56% b 39.47% 38
4 18.22% 23.62% -5.93% c 31.58% 19




18.38% 23.76% -5.02% a 36.18% 152
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)53 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.206%
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
b- Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Employee costs per sales also decrease relatively to control firms following
small acquisitions (Table 22). The median control firm adjusted employee costs per
52 See footnote 5.
53 See footnote 6.
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sales in the pre-merger period are -3.47% and statistically significant at a 5%
significance level in the year -3, -5.06% and statistically significant at a 1%
significance level in the year -2 and -4.53% and statistically significant at a 1%
significant level in the year -1. In the entire pre-merger period the adjusted employee
costs are -3.97% which is statistically significant at a 1% significance level.
Following the acquisition, the adjusted employee costs per sales fall to -5.07%
(which is statistically significant at a 5% significance level) in the year 1, they
become -4.00% (and statistically significant at a 10% significance level) in the year 2
and -5.56% (and statistically significant at a 5% significance level) in the year 3. In
the years 4 and 5, the adjusted employee costs per sales become -5.93% and -4.91%
respectively, both being statistically significant at a 10% significance level. In the
entire post-merger period the adjusted employee costs per sales fall to -5.02% which
is statistically significant at a 1% significance level.
Small acquisitions exhibit a more efficient utilisation of labour resources in
each of the pre-merger years relatively to group firms and labour costs which are
below those of the control firms standards both before and after the merger. In
contrast, large acquisitions do not lead to labour costs improvement or a more
efficient utilisation of employees54. This finding implies that possibly acquirers that
conduct small acquisitions can have better control over targets' resources than
acquirers that conduct large acquisitions. This, in turn, allows for a better utilisation
of them and a more efficient allocation of the production factors. The acquirer may
need a much smaller company either to use part of its resources or for its specific
know-how and expertise, divesting the less important facilities. Moreover, small
acquisitions are possibly more 'digestible' than larger ones, and therefore, faster
integration leads to labour cost economies and to the elimination of unnecessary jobs
immediately after the merger. Because the combined target and bidder is more
efficient in terms of employment costs and employee utilisation than the control
firms in the pre-merger years, it is possible that this trend is continued after the
merger due to an organisational culture that leads the specific acquirers to select
smaller targets that have the potential for such efficiencies.
54 In fact, as can be seen in regression analysis in Table 28 later in this chapter, labour costs increase by a
statistically significant value of 2.7% per annum after controlling for the effects of the method of payment,
industry relatedness and whether the acquisition price was at premium or at a discount.
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8.3.6. Employment Effects and the Acquisition Premium.
The effects on employment and the employee costs of acquisitions where the
acquirer paid a relatively high acquisition premium versus the acquisitions where the
acquirer paid a relatively small acquisition premium are presented in this Section.
TABLE 23
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 of sales for the 27 cases of the
sample where the acquirer paid a premium between 162% and 658.5% of the
acquiree's market value as at the beginning of the year -155.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per £ 000 Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
to Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 1.56% 1.80% -0.11% 38.46% 13
-4 1.44% 1.71% -0.23% 46.15% 13
-3 1.60% 1.67% 0.03% 51.85% 27
-2 1.43% 1.54% -0.06% 48.15% 27
















1.50% 1.67% -0.06% 47.66% 107
1.23% 1.28% -0.14% 40.74% 27
1.22% 1.26% -0.08% 44.44% 27
1.15% 1.22% -0.06% 44.44% 27
0.78% 1.19% -0.41% c 46.15% 13
0.75% 1.13% -0.39% c 38.46% 13
1.14% 1.22% -0.11% b 42.99% 107
A (NE per '000 Sales)56 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3
0.098%
b - Significant at the 5% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
55 See footnote 2.
56 See footnote 3.
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As it can be seen in Table 23, when the acquirer pays a high premium over
the intrinsic value of the target, the number of employees is below control group's
standards in the post-merger period while in the pre-merger period is statistically
indifferent from the median of the control firms. Specifically, while in the each of the
pre-merger years and in the entire pre-merger period the median control firm
adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is statistically indifferent
from zero, in the post-merger years it is negative and statistically significant. In the
years 1, 2, and 3, the adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales are
-0.14%, -0.08% and -0.06% respectively, all statistically insignificant. In the years 4
and 5, however, there is a sharp decline in the employment rates relatively to control
firms standards, which is -0.41% for the fourth post-merger year and -0.39% for the
fifth post-merger year (both figures are statistically significant at a 10% significance
level). In the entire post-merger period the adjusted number of employees per sales
are -0.11% and statistically significant at a 5% significance level with the number of
positive observations fall at 42.99% from 47.66% in the entire pre-merger period.
The median control firms adjusted labour costs per sales are below the
benchmark standards both in the pre- and the post-merger periods (Table 24).
However, there is some evidence of further improvement in the post-merger years
especially after the year 3. In the fourth post-merger year they become -7.69% and in
the fifth post-merger year -7.99% which are both statistically significant at a 5%
significance level. The adjusted employee costs per sales are -4.87% in the entire
pre-merger period and -5.34% in the entire post merger period; both figures are
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The number of positive
observations between the two periods is 35.51% in the entire pre-merger period and
33.64% in the entire post-merger period. Thus, in transactions where the target was
purchased at relatively large premium the combined targets and bidders manage to
keep employee costs below industry standards before the merger as well as after it.
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TABLE 24
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 27 cases of the sample where the
acquirer paid a premium between 162% and 658.5% of the acquiree's market value as
at the beginning of the year -157.


















































years 1 to 5
18.85% 23.76% -4.87% a 35.51% 107
18.45% 23.41% -4.91% b 33.33% 27
20.76% 23.62% -2.86% b 37.04% 27
18.82% 23.62% -4.88% b 40.74% 27
16.41% 23.62% -7.69% b 23.08% 13
16.23% 24.08% -7.99% b 23.08% 13
18.20% 23.62% -5.34% a 33.64% 107
A (EC per Sales)58 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 -0.578%
a- Significant at the 1% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test,
c- Significant at the 10% significance level using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
In cases of the sample where the target was purchased at a discount the
picture is exactly the opposite. There is no evidence of job elimination after the
takeover while there is some evidence of deterioration in employee expenditure.
57 See footnote 5.
58 See footnote 6.
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TABLE 25
Median Annual Number of Employees per £ '000 Sales for the 27 acquisitions where
the acquirer paid an amount that ranges from 16% to 100% of the acquiree's market
value as at the beginning of the year -159.
Pre and Post-Merger Number of Employees per K
Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number
to Merger Median Median postitive observatic
-5 2.24% 1.99% 0.39% 58.33% 12
-4 2.11% 1.86% 0.19% 58.33% 12
-3 1.55% 1.80% -0.16% 40.74% 27
-2 1.48% 1.71% -0.07% 37.04% 27
-1 1.54% 1.67% -0.07% 44.44% 27
Median
Annual Nr of
Employees 1.61% 1.71% -0.07% 44.76% 105
per Sales for
years -5 to -1
1 1.38% 1.44% -0.03% 48.15% 27
2 1.23% 1.34% -0.04% 44.44% 27
3 1.12% 1.28% -0.09% 40.74% 27
4 1.12% 1.24% -0.06% 41.67% 12





1.22% 1.28% -0.05% 43.81% 105
per Sales for
years 1 to 5
A (NE per '000 Sales)60 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.036%
As can be seen in Table 25, the median control firm adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales is insignificantly different from zero in all
the pre- and post-merger years and in the entire pre- and post-merger period.
Similarly, the median control firms adjusted employee costs per sales are statistically
insignificant both in the pre- and the post-merger periods (Table 26).
59 See footnote 2.
60 See footnote 3.
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TABLE 26
Median Annual Employee Costs per Sales for the 27 acquisitions where the acquirer
paid an amount that ranges from 16% to 100% of the acquiree's market value as at the
beginning of the year -161.
Pre and Post-Merger Employee Costs per Sales
Benchmark - Adjusted
Year Relative to Firm Benchmark
Median
% Number of
Merger Median Median postitive observations
-5 23.95% 21.54% 2.16% 58.33% 12
-4 22.63% 21.63% 1.00% 58.33% 12
-3 18.48% 21.68% -3.47% 37.04% 27
-2 21.46% 22.56% -2.29% 44.44% 27




21.30% 22.56% -1.57% 46.67% 105
years -5 to -1
1 22.83% 24.20% -1.29% 40.74% 27
2 23.37% 23.76% -0.06% 48.15% 27
3 24.16% 23.76% 0.75% 51.85% 27
4 25.25% 23.36% 1.81% 75.00% 12




24.75% 23.76% 0.94% 52.38% 105
years 1 to 5
A (EC per Sales)62 Years -1, -2, -3 , Yearsl, 2, 3 0.027%
The results indicate that firms which engaged in acquisitions at a premium
are more efficient in terms of employee utilisation and employee cost savings than
firms which engaged in acquisitions at a discount, in the post-merger period. This
finding implies that the payment of a premium may be justified by potential
employee cost savings which are realised after the merger. Acquirers may select
targets on the basis of the realisation of future synergies in the utilisation of
employee resources. By the same token when synergies in employee utilisation are
absent the deal is closed at a discount since there is not much space for cost savings
efficiencies as far as the employees are concerned.
61 See footnote 5.
62 See footnote 6.
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8.4. Employment Effects of M&As. A Multivariate approach.
So far in this Chapter we have considered the employment effects of M&As
using univariate approach, i.e. by examining the employment variables in the entire
sample and in the different sub-samples without reference to the effect of other
factors that may affect the employment rates and the employee costs. Moreover, the
point of reference for inferring these effects was the median value of the relevant
variables of the portfolio of all companies in the Stock Exchange Year Book for
which data were available in Datastream for each pre- and post-merger year and for
the entire pre- and post-merger periods.
To test the robustness of the results and to control for other variables in each
case and in order for them to be comparable with those derived by previous studies
we considered a multivariate approach for examining the employment effects of
M&As. In this case, the adopted benchmark was a pair of firms that was matched to
each target and bidder on the basis of pre-merger performance, industrial relatedness,
and size. The point of reference for examining the effects of M&As on employment
and employee costs was the difference of the medians of the respective variables for
each combined target and bidder between the post- and pre-merger 3-year periods.
The number of employees per thousand pounds of sales and employee costs per sales
were adjusted for each combined target and bidder and for each year by subtracting
the values of the respective variables of the matched firms. The dependent variables
of the regressions are as defined in Chapter 4.
The results that are produced by multivariate analysis are considered more
robust than those derived by univariate analysis because the effects of M&As on
employment can be captured after controlling for other variables that are related to
acquisition. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, the methodology that was adopted
to implement the multivariate analysis focuses directly on the value of the change of
the variables under examination, unlike the methodology adopted for the univariate
analysis which compares employment rates and employee costs by reference to the
control group for each year and for the entire pre- and post-merger periods. Finally,
the use of pairs of matched firms as a benchmark in the multivariate analysis is
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considered more precise than the portfolio of all companies in Stock Exchange Year
Book which was used in the univariate analysis.
Specifically, in this topic the change of the median adjusted number of
employees and employee costs between the 3-year post- and the 3-year pre-merger
periods are regressed against dummy variables that describe several merger
characteristics. Merger characteristics include the method of payment, the attitude of
target's management towards the offer proposal, the industry relatedness between
target and bidder and the nature of the acquisition - i.e., whether it is considered as
strategic or not. In addition, we examine the effects on employment for acquisitions
where the acquirer paid a premium over the intrinsic value of the target and we also
separate between large and small acquisitions.
The dummy variables that describe merger characteristics are defined as
following. The variable {MIX) takes the value of '1' when the acquisition was
financed by a combination of stock and cash and '0' otherwise, the variable (CASH)
takes the value of 1 when the acquisition was financed by cash and '0' otherwise, the
variable (FRIENDLY) takes the value of '1' when the acquisition was agreed
between the target's and bidder's management and '0' otherwise and the variable
(RLTD) takes the value of '1' when the target and the bidder belong to the same
Level 5 Industrial Sector and '0' otherwise. When the acquisition is a Strategic one
the dummy variable (FRxRLTDxnCASH) takes the value of '1' and the value '0'
otherwise. Finally, the variable (RELPREM1) takes the value of '1' when the target
was purchased at premium over its intrinsic value and the value '0' when it was
purchased at a discount while the variable (LGacqn) takes the value of '1' if the
acquisition is defined as large and the value '0' if the acquisition is defined as small.
The results from the Ordinary Least Squares regressions are presented in
Table 8.1, Appendix. However, having identified an unknown form of
heteroscedasticity, regressions were run again applying White Heteroscedasticity
Correction Test. Corrected results are presented in Table 27.
The dependent variable in regressions (l)-(8) is the difference of the median
matched firm adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds of sales between
the 3-year post-merger period and the 3-year pre-merger period. Results in regression
(1) indicate that the method of payment does not have any effect on the change in
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employment rates after the acquisition. These results are in contrast to those derived
by Ghosh (op. cit); the author reports that in acquisitions where the method of
payment was a combination of stock and cash there is a significant (at a 10%
significance level) decline in employment rates by 4.98% between the 3 post- and the
an the 3 pre-merger years. It is noteworthy, however, that for the sample companies
the sign of the (STOCK) coefficient is negative while it is positive for the (CASH)
coefficient. This indicates an insignificant decline in employment rates for stock
acquisitions and an insignificant increase for cash acquisitions between the post- and
the pre-merger periods.
As shown in regression (2), the coefficient and the t-statistic of the
independent variable indicate a negative but insignificant effect of the industry
relatedness between targets and bidders. The sign of the (RELATED) coefficient is
negative indicating a decline of the employment rates for the sample companies after
the merger. In Regression (3) the coefficient of the variable (FRIENDLY) is
statistically insignificant but the intercept coefficient is -0.002 and statistically
significant indicating a 0.2% decline in the number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales in the 3-post merger years in comparison to the 3 pre-merger years
for the hostile acquisitions. This finding is in contrast to the results produced by the
univariate analysis as presented in Table 3 of this Chapter. Possibly, this difference is
due to the different benchmarks used to measure the adjusted number of employees
per thousand pounds of sales.
As can be seen from results produced in regression (4), in Strategic
acquisitions the change in number of employees is not substantial, since the
coefficient of the dummy variable (FRxRELATxnCASH) is not statistically
significant. In regression (5), large acquisitions exhibit an insignificant decline in
employment rates of 0.1 % after the merger. This is consistent with results produced
using industry firms as a benchmark in the univariate analysis as presented in Table
20 where the employee rates for large acquisitions remain at the benchmark's levels
both in the pre- and the post-merger periods. From the results derived from
regression (6) it can be seen that whether the acquirer paid a relatively high premium
has no statistically significant effect on employment rates.
296
THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON EMPLOYMENT. N. GLIMIDIS
In regression (7) the dependent variable that denotes the changes in
employees between the post- and the pre-merger periods is regressed against the
variables that denote the method of payment after controlling for the effects of
industry relatedness between targets and bidders, and the attitude of target's
management towards the deal. Only the coefficient of the dummy variable
(FRIENDLY) is statistically significant indicating a 0.3% increase in the number of
employees relative to the benchmark firms after the merger. Results produced by
Ghosh (op.cit.) indicate an increase in employment rates for friendly acquisitions
which however is statistically insignificant. Sample acquisitions that were financed
by cash, exhibit an increase in employment rates which is statistically insignificant.
In stock acquisitions employment rates decline by an insignificant value of 0.2%,
while in related acquisitions employment rates for sample companies decline by
0.2% as well (which is statistically insignificant). Ghosh (op.cit.) reports an
insignificant increase of the employment rates for cash acquisitions and an
insignificant decrease for acquisitions that were financed by a combination of stock
and cash. For stock acquisitions the author reports an insignificant decline in
employment rates while in related acquisitions there is a statistically significant
increase.
In regression (8) two additional dummy variables were added to control for
the effects of the size of the acquisition and of whether the acquisition closed at a
premium. Acquisitions that were financed by cash exhibit a statistically significant
increase in employment rates relative to the benchmark of 0.4%. Friendly
acquisitions also exhibit a statistically significant positive change in employment
between the post- and the pre-merger years of 0.3%. An insignificant increase in the
number of employees for the sample companies is also observed for acquisitions
where the target was purchased at a premium and an insignificant increase in
employment rates is observed for large acquisitions. Stock acquisitions in the sample
exhibit decreasing employment rates after the merger which however is statistically
insignificant.
The dependent variable in regressions (10)-( 16) is the difference of the
median matched firm adjusted employee costs per sales between the 3-year post-
merger period and the 3-year pre-merger period. Results from regression (10)
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indicate a statistically significant decline of 2.8% in employee costs after the merger
when the acquisition is financed by stock. In cash acquisitions employee costs
increase but the coefficient of the respective variable is statistically insignificant. The
coefficient of (RELATED) variable in regression (10) is -0.022 and statistically
significant indicating a decline in employee expenditures of 2.2% in the post-merger
period. In friendly acquisitions employee costs increase but the coefficient of the
dummy variable is statistically insignificant as can be seen in regression (11).
Regression (12) indicates an insignificant decline of 1.6% in employee costs in the
post-merger period for strategic acquisitions in the sample since the coefficient of the
respective variable is -0.016 and statistically insignificant. Regression (13) indicates
that in large acquisitions of the sample the median adjusted employee expenditure
fall by 0.2% in the post-merger period (however this is a statistically insignificant
decline). Whether a relatively high premium was paid is a statistically insignificant
factor for labour cost increase in the post-merger years for the sample companies
since in regression (14) the coefficient of the dummy variable (RELPREM) is 0.022
and statistically insignificant.
As can be seen from results in regression (15) in stock acquisitions there is a
statistically significant decline in the median adjusted employment costs per sales in
the post-merger period after controlling for the effects of friendly and related
acquisitions. Cash acquisitions exhibit an insignificant increase in employee costs in
the post-merger years while related acquisitions exhibit a statistically insignificant
decline in employee costs. However, after controlling for the effects of the
acquisition size and for the effects of the acquisitions at a premium in regression
(16), stock acquisitions exhibit a statistically significant decline in the median
adjusted employment costs of 3.9% in the post-merger years while cash acquisitions
exhibit a statistically significant increase of 3.9% in the post-merger years. In related
acquisitions the median adjusted employee costs decline by 3.4% in the post-merger
years, while friendly acquisitions do not have any significant effect on employee
costs (although the sign of the coefficient of the respective dummy variable is
positive). In acquisitions that were carried out at a relatively high premium a
statistically significant increase in employment costs of 2.6% is observed. After
controlling for the effects of the above independent variables, the sign of the
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coefficient of dummy variable (LARGEacqn) becomes positive and statistically
significant.
The results of the regressions presented in Table 27 provide some interesting
insights into the issue of the employment effects of M&As. Acquisitions that were
financed by stock lead to labour cost economies without a substantial reduction of
workforce. Cash acquisitions lead to an increase in the workforce but not in the
employee costs in the three years following the takeover (however an increase in
labour costs following cash acquisitions is observed after controlling for other
variables (regressions 15 and 16 in table 27)).
As expected, in hostile acquisitions the number of employees decline after the
merger but not the costs associated with them. This implies that there is a more
efficient utilisation of the workforce but costs fail to fall substantially since the
reorganisation of tasks and responsibilities that typically follow hostile acquisitions
may impose additional costs to the merged entity. On the other hand, in friendly
acquisitions the number of employees increases but the costs associated with them do
not change. This finding implies that friendly acquisitions may be more beneficial for
the shareholders since with the same level of spending for the workforce the merged
company creates more jobs in the case of friendly acquisitions than in the case of
hostile ones. This difference in results between friendly and hostile acquisitions
could possibly be explained by the strategic orientation of the two types of
acquisitions. Friendly acquisitions are typically conducted with the aim of expansion
in the same product markets in order to increase market share and to exploit
economies of scale and scope. Therefore, cost savings from the exploitation of scale
and scope economies offset additional employee costs that are incurred from the
recruitment of additional employees that may be required for the expanded
operations. Hostile acquisitions, on the other hand, are typically conducted with the
aim ofmore efficient utilisation of target's resources by a more competent or diligent
management. This implies that attempting to rationalise and more efficiently utilise
the new resources, acquiring management may cut unnecessary jobs or it may renege
existing employee contracts. This creates the opportunity for employee cost savings
which are being offset by the cost that are associated with this reorganisation of
managerial operations in the manner analysed by Shleifer and Summers (1988).
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Consistently with what is expected, the results also indicate that related
acquisitions lead to employee cost savings. However the number of employees
remains constant between the post- and the pre-merger periods. This can be possibly
explained by the fact that in related acquisitions the target and the bidder operate in
the same product markets which creates opportunities for the exploitation of
synergies in the utilisation of the workforce.
Finally, large acquisitions exhibit an employee costs increase with a no
statistically significant change in the number of employees after the merger. This
finding could possibly be explained by the increased employee expenditure that may
be required for the integration of a relatively large target after the merger.
Reorganising employment structure in the first post-merger years may impose
unexpected costs like compensations for retiring management teams or expenditure
associated with the recruitment of new staff with managerial skills necessary for the
merger success. Acquisitions where the target was purchased at a premium exhibit
an increase in labour costs but not in the number of employees which indicates an
increase in the costs per employee.
300
TABLE27-(HeteroscedasticityCo rected(Whitest))
















































































































































































































AnrEMPLdenotesthifferencesm dianatchedfi madjustnumb rfemployeesptho dounsalb tw nth3-y arpost-3-ypre-m rgerriods A_EMPL_COSTSdenotesthifferencesmediana chedfi madjustedmployeeco tsp rsal sbetwe nth3-y arpo t-n3-ypre-m rgerrio s. ***denotessignificanceat1%significancel v lusingtwo- aile t **denotessignificanceat5%significancel v lusingtwo-taile t *denotessignificanceat10%sign ficancel v lusingtwo- aile t VariableSTOCK:takeshv lueof1iftmodepaym ntst cknd0o herwise;variableCASH:t kaluftm thodp ym ntc shnth rwise; variableLGXRLTD:isthep oductoftdummyvariableLG,whicht k shva uf1ift cq isi ionl gnd0oth rwise,tdu myv riableLTDwhich takeshvalueof1iftacq ir endcquir roperatithsambu i sslinnd0oth rwise;va ableFRIENDLY:t kv lufcquisitionfr ndly and0otherwise;variableRLTDXnCa h:ist ep o uctftdummyvari bleRLTDndhduvar ableshwhict k sluf1itr s tionot involvecashand0therwise;v riableRLTDXMIX:itpro uctfvariablesRLTDandMI ;v riableFRXRLTDXnCASHithproductfv r abl sF ENDLY, RLTD,andnCASHitt keshvalueof1Ift eacquisitionsStr t gicond0h rwise;var ableRELPREM:kvalufit cquirwp rchas dt premiumand0otherwise(relativpr miumisd finedtval ftacq i itiondi i edbyarketv luofq ityhc uireesttbeg n ngy ar-1). 302
THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON EMPLOYMENT. N. GLIMIDIS
TABLE 27a - (Heteroscedasticity Corrected (White test))
OLS regressions of the change in the median matched firm adjusted number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales and of the change in median
employment costs per sales between the 3-year post- and the 3-year pre¬
merger periods on dummy variables that describe certain merger
characteristics.
EQUATION 1 2
INDEPENTEND VARIABLES A_nrEMPL A__EMPL_COSTS










R SQ 0.104 0.112
ADJ R sq 0.05 0.058
F stat 1.92 2.08
Nr of Observations 71 71
For the definition of the above dummy variables see Table 27, Chapter 8.
A nrEMPL denotes the differences in median matched firm adjusted number of employees per thousand pounds
of sales between the 3-year post- and the 3-year pre-merger periods
A EMPL COSTS denotes the differences in median matched firm adjusted employee costs per sales between
the 3-year post- and the 3-year pre-merger periods.
*** denotes significance at a 1% significance level using a two-tail test.
** denotes significance at a 5% significance level using a two-tail test.
* denotes significance at a 10% significance level using a two-tail test.
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Table 27a illustrates the effects of strategic mergers on the number of
employees and employee costs, using both dummy and interactive variables.
Strategic acquisitions do not have a significant effect on employment rates and
employee costs. Acquisitions where payment involved stock exhibit labour
efficiencies after the merger as well as related acquisitions. Friendly acquisitions
seem to lead to a decrease in costs per employee but by a statistically insignificant
rate. Both regressions were test for multicollinearity using tolerance, eigenvalues,
condition index, and variance inflation factor. No effect of multicollinearity was
detected.
8.5. Conclusions.
This Chapter discussed the effects of M&As on employment by examining
the parameters of employee numbers and employment costs before and after the
merger. Two approaches were used: a univariate approach where the benchmark that
was used was the firms that belonged to the Industrial Levels of the Stock Exchange
Year Book and for which data were available in Datastream, and a multivariate
approach where a pair of matched firms for each target and bidder was used as a
benchmark.
The results indicated that while the number of employees is at the industry
levels in the pre-merger years, they decline after the merger below these levels by a
statistically significant value. The median merging target and bidder exhibits fewer
employee costs per sales than those of the median industry firm both in the pre- and
the post-merger years.
Firms that engaged in acquisitions that were financed by stock and in
acquisition that were financed by cash exhibited workforce utilisation efficiencies.
Indeed, evidence from this study indicated for stock acquisitions, while employment
rates remain at the pre-merger levels, employee costs decline after the merger. In
cash acquisitions there is an increase in the number of employees but employee costs
remained unchanged after the merger. Thus, both acquisitions that were financed by
stock and acquisitions that were financed by cash are followed by lower costs per
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employee. In friendly acquisitions jobs are increased after the merger while
employment costs do not. In hostile acquisitions there is a decline in the employment
rates but not in employee costs and when the target and the bidder belong at the same
Level 5 Industrial Sector, there is a decline at employment costs but not in the
number of employees.
In friendly acquisitions although more jobs were created after the merger,
employee costs remained at the pre-merger standards in contrast to hostile
acquisitions where despite the job cutting due to merger labour costs remained as at
before the merger.
Strategic acquisitions did not exhibit any significant change either to the
number of employees nor to the employee costs after the merger.
In large acquisitions while there is no statistically significant difference in the
number of jobs between the post- and the pre-merger periods, there is evidence that
employee costs increased, probably due to extensive restructuring that is needed for
the integration of the target after an acquisition where target's size is equivalent to
that of the bidder. This increase is observed after controlling for the effects of the
method of payment, industry relatedness, whether the acquisition was friendly or
hostile and whether the transaction closed at a premium, (regression 16, table 27)
Where the acquirer paid a relatively high premium for the target, an increase in
employee costs in the post-takeover period is observed after controlling for the above
variables.
Finally, there is evidence from the univariate analysis that when a target is
purchased at a relatively high premium the employment rates of the combined target
and bidder in the pre-merger years are about at the same levels as those of the
benchmark. However, employment rates fall below those of the benchmark's in the
post-merger period.
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The fundamental issue this study deals with is that of whether M&As create
value for the engaging parties. The approach that was chosen to do so was the
examination of operating cash flow return on market value of total assets of the
combined entity for 3 or 5 years surrounding the year of merger completion. Two
methodologies were applied; Healy's (1992) Regression Model and Ghosh's (2001)
Change Model. To compare results with those derived by previous studies we used
two alternative benchmarks for evaluating post-merger performance. The former was
the relevant industry's performance and the latter was the performance of a pair of
firms that were matched with the target and bidder on the basis of pre-merger
performance, size and industry.
Three other primary questions are considered in this work. First, what was the
performance of M&As that shared certain common characteristics; second, whether
the stock market revaluation of the merging firms' assets at merger announcement
reflects future changes in cash flow performance due to merger, and finally, what are
the effects ofM&As on employment.
The results of this research were presented in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, along with
a brief discussion on their implications for the above issues. The aim of this chapter
is to extend the analysis of the findings so as to get a deeper understanding of their
meaning and their implications for M&As in the U.K.
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 9.2 we discuss the
implications of the results concerning the performance of firms that engaged in
M&As in the U.K. In Section 9.3 we discuss the implications of the results for the
market for corporate control and for managerial objectives. In Section 9.4 we discuss
the evidence on the post-merger performance of merging firms that share certain
common characteristics. Section 9.5 deals with the evidence which concerns strategic
acquisitions. In Sections 9.6 we discuss the results regarding operating performance
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of firms that engaged in acquisitions where the acquirer paid a relatively high
premium for the acquiree and in Section 9.7 the discussion is focused on the effects
of the acquisition size on performance. In Section 9.8 we analyse the relation
between merging firms' asset revaluation by the market at the time of the event
announcement and the operating cash flow returns in the post-merger period, so as to
evaluate the ability of stock markets to forecast post-merger performance. In Section
9.9 we analyse the effects of various types ofM&As on merging firms' employment
rates and employee costs, and finally in Section 9.10 a summary of the main results
of this study is given.
9.2. The Change in Performance due to Merger.
The results in Chapters 6 and 7 indicated that merging firms underperform
both their industry peers and firms that were matched to targets and bidders, on the
basis of pre-merger performance, size and industry relatedness, in the post-merger
years. This is in contrast to the pre-merger years where their performance was
equivalent to that of the benchmarks1. On the other hand, the change in operating
performance between the post- and the pre-merger years was negative and
statistically significant when the performance of a pair of matched firms was used as
a benchmark and negative but insignificant in the case where performance
adjustment was made using the performance of the industry's firms. Moreover, the
results from regression analysis (regressions 4.9 and 4.10) suggested that after
controlling for the effects of pre-merger performance, merging firms suffered a
deterioration in annual performance of 1.7% when operating performance was
adjusted using industry median performance, and a decline in annual performance of
2% when the benchmark used was the performance of a pair ofmatched firms.
This evidence is supportive of that reported by Ghosh (2001) for mergers in
the U.S. Using firms matched on performance, size and industry relatedness, Ghosh
found no evidence that operating performance improves following acquisitions. On
the other hand, our results are in contrast to those derived by Mealy et.al. (1992) for
1 In the case where pairs of matched firms are used as a benchmark, pre-merger performance of sample firms is
equivalent to that of the benchmark at the year -1 from the definition of this research design.
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the 50 largest acquisitions in the U.S. in the period from 1979 to mid-1984. Healy
et.al. reported significant improvements in operating performance following
acquisitions using industry firms as a performance benchmark.
As far as the U.K. evidence is concerned, the results of this study are
consistent with those derived from studies focusing on profitability metrics (Utton
1974; Meeks 1977; Kumar 1984; Dickerson et.al. 1977). In these studies the authors
report a significant decline in profitability following mergers. However, Chatterjee
and Meeks (1996) and Cosh et.al. reported a modest increase in profitability after
merger.
Studies that examined the operating performance of the U.K. takeovers were
those by Manson et.al. (1994) and Powell and Stark (2005). Our results do not
confirm the findings derived from these studies. Manson et.al. report an annual
statistically significant increase in operating performance of 3.7% in the post-
acquisition years. However, the relatively small size of their sample and the fact that
the acquisitions under examination were clustered in a very short period of time
might pose doubts about the generalisability of the conclusions. Moreover, while the
authors addressed the problem of the possible distortion of the results when acquirers
that took part in more than one acquisition are included in the sample, they only
exclude those acquirers who took part in more than one takeover in an unspecified
relatively short period of time surrounding the takeover under examination.
However, the period for estimating operating cash flows extends from five years
before the merger to five years after it with the year of the takeover being excluded.
In addition, the authors report that they include only those acquisitions that constitute
a single major strategic decision for the acquirer. It is not specified, however, when
an acquisition is defined as strategic and most importantly how financial reports of
an acquirer may have been affected by an additional acquisition which, although not
a strategic one, is of a substantial size and takes place within the period of
examination.
Powell and Stark's study for U.K. takeovers indicated some improvements in
post-merger performance ranging from 0.13% per annum to a statistically significant
3.10% per annum, depending on the definition of cash flows and the deflator used in
the two alternative methodologies for measuring post-merger performance (i.e.
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Healy's et.al. and Ghosh's). This study also fails to deal with the issue of successive
acquisitions that were made by the same acquirers. Moreover, the distribution of the
takeovers in the sample of this study gives emphasis to takeovers that took place in
the 1980's. Eighty percent of Powell and Stark's sampled takeovers occurred in the
period from 1985 until 1989 and over 72% of the sample acquisitions occurred
during the takeover boom period of 1985 to 1988. This might increase the possibility
that some of the reported results are time specific to the period during which most of
the sample acquisitions took place. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the period
1987-1989 was a typical period of expansion ofU.K. companies through acquisitions
and it is possible the motives and consequently the effects of takeovers differ
between periods of peaks and troughs of merger activity. In addition, a greater
percentage of takeovers were hostile in the 1980's than in the 1990's which is
another possible factor that may lead to different effects of mergers between the two
periods. Finally, since the 1980's competition policy has been more oriented towards
considering the effects of takeovers on competition which may have altered the
priorities and objectives of acquirers from the pursuit of rapid increases in profits
through market power or increases in market share to the achievement of synergies
and scale economies or to the expansion to newly emerged industries.
Therefore, Powell's and Stark's study, apart from failing to explain how the
important issue of successive acquisitions by the same acquirers is dealt with, refers
more to the corporate environment of the 1980's than that of the 1990's which is
undeniably completely different. This may explain the differences in results between
our study and that provided by the authors.
We tested this possibility by segmenting our sample into two sub-samples:
one that included companies that were merged in the period from the beginning of
1990 to the end of 1993 and another that included the acquisitions completed in the
period from the beginning of 1994 until the end of 1996. The former period overlaps
with the final period under examination in Powell's and Stark's study. Indeed, the
results (regressions 16, 17, 18, table 18, chapter 6) indicated that merging firms that
were included in the period which Powell and Stark examined tend to perform better
than our sample companies. This conclusion is unchanged regardless of the
benchmark used for operating performance adjustment. This difference in operating
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performance between the two sub-sets of the sample may also be due to the
downturn is stock values which occurred in the period 1990-1992 and which may
have affected upwards cash flow returns since the denominator reflects the market
value of total assets.
9.3. Implications for the Market for Corporate Control.
The results produced for U.K. takeovers in this study, whether different from
those derived from previous studies due to time specificity reasons or because of
methodological drawbacks of these studies, carry interesting implications for M&A
activity and for the market for corporate control in the U.K.
The evidence produced in this study suggests that the average outcome of
M&As in the U.K. is negative. When Healy's model is employed, where post-merger
performance is measured against pre-merger performance, the outcome of mergers is
negative both when the combined operating cash flow returns are adjusted for the
industry's performance and when they are adjusted for pairs of matched firms'
performance (regression 1 in table 17 of chapter 6 and regression 1 in table 14 of
chapter 7). When the Change model is employed, where it is supposed that there is
no relation between post- and pre-merger performance, post-merger performance is
measured against zero and the average outcome of M&As is also negative when
performance is adjusted using the performance of pairs of matched firms, (panel B in
table 1 of chapter 7).
Therefore, we can accept the interpretation that the U.K. market for
corporate control is competitive, and hence, there is not a large number of profitable
acquisitions left in the U.K. In other words, the existence of impediments to takeover
in the U.K. corporate environment is weak making the outcome of a relatively large
number of acquisitions negative or at best zero. As was discussed in Chapter 3, an
9 •
active and competitive market for corporate control implies that firms operate to
their maximum level of efficiency and management teams act in accordance with
shareholders' best interests. This, in turn, implies that most would-be target firms
2 Franks & Mayers (1996) argue that the UK and U.S., unlike many other countries have active markets for
corporate control. In 1985 and 1986 there were 80 hostile bids in the U.K.
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have exhausted all possible opportunities for performance improvements and
consequently few takeovers can offer new opportunities for further improvements.
Indeed, in the corporate environment of the 1990's impediments to takeover
have loosened due to the rapid advancements in financial services and information
technology. Financing an acquisition has become more feasible for a large number of
potential acquirers because of the development of innovative financial products by
investment banking. Information technology also made monitoring of a firm's
internal operations more effective and has contributed to the wide dispersion of
information about a firm's performance. These conditions are reflected in the
evidence of this study. Our results do not support the prediction that capital
constraints to takeover and information asymmetry about firms' performance create
opportunities for a large proportion of profitable acquisitions. Moreover, the
distribution of managerial capabilities and managerial objectives do not seem to be
an important factor for the existence of a large number of profitable investment
opportunities in the U.K. takeover market for corporate control.
The aforementioned advancements in monitoring and information technology
have increased the take-over related discipline. Intensive monitoring, coupled with
complicated management reward schemes can deter management from actions that
may harm shareholders interests and reduce firm's efficiency levels. Incapable
management teams can be replaced by other means than a takeover before a firm's
efficiency levels decline dramatically so as the firm becomes a takeover target that
offers opportunities for substantial performance improvements.
Notice, however, that the results could be open to other interpretations. One
such interpretation is that competition in the market for corporate control is weak and
managers are pursuing non-profit maximising objectives when acquiring other
companies. A further possibility is that competition is weak and managers are
pursuing profit maximising acquisitions as they expect to increase profits, but fail to
do so. This may be due to poor planning or unexpected events. Our data does not
allow us to distinguish between these possibilities.
Interestingly, unlike Healy et.al. (op.cit.) and Powell and Stark (op.cit.) we
found that pre-merger performance does not explain much of the variation of post-
merger performance (the coefficient (b) is statistically indifferent from zero in
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regressions (4.9) and (4.10)). This implies that, on average, there are not temporary
or permanent patterns in cash flows of the combined targets and bidders in the pre¬
merger years which persist in the post-merger period.
In summary, the results of this work suggest that M&As, on average, reduce
performance regardless of the point of reference for performance comparison and the
benchmark that is used. The decline in the average operating performance of the
U.K. M&As implies that the U.K. market for corporate control is sufficiently
competitive so there is not a large number of profitable opportunities to takeover.
9.4. The Performance ofMerging Firms that share Common Characteristics.
While the main finding of this study is that M&As, on average, do not
improve operating performance, there is a wide dispersion of returns among different
types of takeovers. As expected, some factors differentiate deals and predispose them
to success or failure (Bruner (2004)). The performances of acquirers exhibit different
patterns depending on the method of financing the acquisition, whether the merger is
a hostile or a friendly deal, and whether the target and the bidder operate in the same
or similar industry or not. Finally, the most interesting finding of this study as far as
which acquisitions are successful is concerned, is the performance behaviour of the
Strategic takeovers.
9.4.1. Financing.
Our results provide some evidence that the mode of financing an acquisition
has a significant impact on post-takeover performance, depending on the benchmark
and the model used to measure performance. The operating performance of firms that
used cash to acquire falls below the industry's standards in the post-merger period,
while it is at industry levels in the pre-merger years. Stock acquisitions exhibit
industry adjusted operating performance that is insignificantly different from zero in
the 5-year pre- and the 5-year post-merger periods. The same is the case when the
acquirer offered a choice between stock and cash to a target's shareholders (tables 2,
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3, 4, 6 in chapter 6). However, the median industry adjusted difference in
performance between the post- and the pre-merger periods is statistically
insignificant regardless of the currency used to takeover.
When the benchmark for measuring a combined firm's performance is a pair
of matched firms, matched on the basis of pre-merger performance, size and industry
relatedness, both cash and stock acquisitions exhibit a performance which is
equivalent to that of the control firms in the pre- and the post-merger periods.
However, only the former exhibit a median change in adjusted performance between
the post- and the pre-merger periods which is negative and statistically significant.
Acquisitions that were financed by a combination of stock and cash perform worse
than the pair of matched firm in the post-merger period and the change in the median
adjusted operating performance between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1 is negative
and statistically significant (tables 2,3,4, in Chapter 7).
The regression analysis indicated that cash acquisitions exhibit a statistically
significant decline in annual performance in the post-merger years while stock and
mixed acquisitions do not seem to explain much of the variation of post-merger
performance once the effects of pre-merger performance are controlled for
(regression 2, table 17, chapter 6).
Following Ghosh (2001), we regress the variable that denotes the median
change in industry adjusted operating performance between the 3 years post- and the
3 years pre-merger periods against the 3 dummy variables that denote whether the
acquisition was financed by cash, stock or a combination of them. The results
indicate again that cash acquisitions exhibit a statistically significant decrease in
annual industry adjusted operating performance . The coefficients of the two other
variables are statistically insignificant (regression 1, table 18, Chapter 6). Controlling
for industry relatedness and whether the acquisition was friendly or hostile, stock
acquisitions exhibit a statistically significant improvement in annual operating
performance4 (regression 14, table 18, Chapter 6).
3 However, when the performance benchmark is a pair of matched firms the method of payment appears to have
an insignificant effect on post-merger performance (regressions 2 and 1 in tables 14 and 15 respectively, Chapter
7)
4
Also, regression 9 in table 14 of chapter 7 indicates that cash acquisitions exhibit a post-acquisition annual
matched firm adjusted performance decline when we control for the effects of pre-merger performance, industry
relatedness and whether the acquisition was hostile or friendly.
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Our results do not confirm previous evidence reported by Powell and Stark
(2005). These authors found that the method of payment does not have any
significant impact on post-merger performance for U.K. firms. In the U.S., Ghosh
(op.cit.) reports that cash acquisitions have a positive and significant impact on post-
merger performance while stock and mixed acquisitions do not have any significant
impact. However, after controlling for the effects of industry relatedness and whether
the acquisition was hostile or friendly, Ghosh reports a significant and positive
impact for stock and cash acquisitions. Healy et.al. (1992) also report that the mode
of financing an acquisition does not have any significant post-merger impact on
performance but in a later study (Healy et.al. (1997)) the authors report that stock
acquisitions perform better than acquisitions that were financed by other means of
payment.
In summary, the evidence provided from this work suggests that we can reject
the hypothesis that cash acquisitions exhibit better performance than stock
acquisitions in the U.K. It is interesting that the vast majority of share price studies
provide evidence that when acquisitions are financed by cash acquirers' shareholders
enjoy substantial gains at the time of the announcement^ - an indication that capital
markets very often capitalise an improvement in future performance when cash is the
method of payment - while in stock acquisitions shareholders face significant
losses6. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers issue stock to finance a
takeover when they hold internal information that the stock is overvalued. Investors
perceive stock financing as bad news and the takeover announcement returns may
reflect both an anticipated decline in performance and the negative news about the
acquirer's stock valuation. Therefore, assuming that markets are efficient, if an
acquirers' share price decline at the announcement is an anticipation of a
performance decline in the future then there should be lower cash flow returns for
stock financed acquisitions than for cash financed acquisitions. The evidence of this
study, however, is based on the actual post-merger performance of the combined
entity and does not confirm this prediction. Thus, in efficient stock markets, the share
5 This is despite the fact that in acquisitions that are financed by cash targets' shareholders are immediately tax
liable while in acquisitions that are financed by stock tax liability does not occur until when targets' shareholders
sell their shares.
6
Rappaport and Sirower (1999).
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price decline at the announcement of a stock acquisition is not necessarily a
reflection of an actual future decline in performance.
A possible explanation of the evidence provided by our study is that stock
acquisitions perform better than cash acquisitions, on average, because they represent
strategic investment decisions. Most of the stock acquisitions in this study are agreed
n
transactions between targets' and bidders' management . Therefore, the operating
performance of stock acquisitions reflects performance improvements that result
from friendly transactions which are usually oriented towards the expansion of
existing operations and the exploitation of scale or scope economies and synergies in
contrast to hostile takeovers which represent aggressive investments that mainly aim
to profit through the more efficient utilisation of a target's resources by a more
competent or diligent management team or represent expansionary investments to
o
t .
new product markets . Moreover, in agreed transactions the acquirer has a better
insight about a target's internal operations and the cooperation between the two
management teams is ensured by the risk sharing on the acquisition project that
results from the exchange of stock. Stock is also considered as a 'cheap' means of
payment since it mitigates the impact of any possible valuation errors. On the other
hand, financing acquisitions by cash increases the possibilities that the acquirer may
be deprived of the necessary cash to finance other more profitable projects. In
addition, it is more possible for managers to use firms' available cash or debt
capacity to proceed with acquisitions that serve their personal interests, instead of
those of shareholders, in the way that the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis suggests, than
when stock is the means of payment. Cash is also considered as a strong currency for
financing an acquisition in the sense that any miscalculation about profit
opportunities from the acquisition or wrong estimations in the projection plans or any
failure to achieve potential synergies has a more severe impact on a firm's operating
performance than when the acquisition has been financed by stock.
7 As mentioned in Chapter 6 of this study 16 out of the 21 acquisitions that were financed by stock are friendly.
Also, from the 18 hostile acquisitions that are included in the sample, 13 of them have been financed by cash or a
combination of stock and cash.
8 The majority of stock acquisitions, i.e. 11 out of 21, are characterised as related since the acquirer and the target
operate in the same Level 5 Industrial Sector.
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9.4.2. Attitude.
The preceding analysis is confirmed by the results that were produced in this
study for friendly, hostile and related acquisitions. There is some evidence that
friendly acquisitions perform better than hostile acquisitions and related takeovers
outperform unrelated ones.
As illustrated in Chapter 6, the median industry adjusted operating cash flow
return on assets of firms that were engaged in hostile acquisitions is negative and
statistically significant in the 5-year post-merger period. Friendly acquisitions on the
other hand exhibit performance which is at levels equivalent to those of their industry
peers in the post-merger period. However, results from the Change Model indicate a
statistically insignificant change in industry adjusted performance between the post-
and the pre-merger periods. When the benchmark that is used for adjusting
performance is a pair of matched firms hostile acquisitions exhibit performance
which is around the matched firms' standards while friendly ones underperform the
benchmark in the post-merger period. The results produced by the Change Model
also indicated an insignificant change in performance between the post- and the pre¬
merger years for both hostile and friendly acquisitions. Univariate analysis, therefore,
provides results that depend on the benchmark that is used to calculate performance.
We used regression analysis to examine the performance of friendly
acquisitions after controlling for the effects of other variables that are associated with
acquisition-related performance factors. Friendly acquisitions do not exhibit neither a
performance decline nor of performance increase when the effects of the method of
payment and industry relatedness are controlled for (regressions 9 and 11 in tables 14
and 15 respectively, in Chapter 7)9. Our results provide some evidence that firms that
were engaged in friendly acquisitions exhibit better post-acquisition operating
performance than firms that were engaged in hostile ones (regression 3, table 17 in
Chapter 6). Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that target management is on
average inefficient and that hostile takeovers outperform friendly ones. This in turn,
implies that, on average, targets' strategies are successful and their management
efficient. Otherwise, the abandonment of targets' strategies and replacement of
9 The results do not change when we control for the effects of pre-merger performance on post-merger
performance (regressions 3, 9 in table 17 and 11, 12, 13, 14 in table 18, in Chapter 6)
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existing management teams, which is the practice in hostile acquisitions, should lead
to a better performance for hostile transactions.
This finding is consistent with the results that were discussed in the previous
section regarding the competitiveness of the U.K. market for corporate control. A
high degree of competition ensures that potential targets operate near their maximum
level of efficiency and consequently there are not many opportunities for a large
number of profitable acquisitions'0.
9.4.3. Industry Relatedness.
Unsurprisingly, acquisitions where the target and the bidder belonged to the
same Level 5 Industrial Sector exhibit a significant annual increase in adjusted
operating performance regardless of the benchmark that was used. Thus, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that horizontal mergers create value.
As expected, economic benefits through the realisation of potential synergies
or through the achievement of economies of scale and scope or because of an
increase in market share are more likely to occur in mergers between firms that
operate within the same or similar lines of business than in mergers between firms
with unrelated business operations.
Diversification does not improve performance since it is a risky and costly
procedure. As noted in Chapter 3, the financial synergies through the creation of
internal capital markets and the strategy for balancing the investment portfolio of an
acquirer are often the primary reasons for the justification of unrelated acquisitions.
However, it is more likely that the allocation of resources within a diversified firm
may be less efficient than the allocation which can be achieved through the stock
markets when divisions operate as independent firms. Subjective criteria, personal
feelings and internal lobbying may influence decisions for internal funding and
reduce a firm's efficiency levels. Moreover, in unrelated acquisitions employee
productivity can be lower than that of related ones since new owners who are
unfamiliar with business operations may attempt to economize from lowering
10 It should be noted, however, that even if potential targets operate at their maximum level of efficiency some
mergers can produce economic benefits from the exploitation of potential synergies, or from economising on
costs through scale or scope economies or through an increase in market power. This is more the case of Strategic
acquisitions that will be discussed later in this Chapter.
317
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS NIKOLAOS GLIMIDIS
employee benefits that are based on implicit or explicit contracts. This, in turn, may
cause employees to hesitate to invest in the firm their firm-specific knowledge and
consider leaving the firm if they receive less than what the external market offers for
their firm-specific knowledge. Recruitment of new experienced labour would be very
costly for the firm since they will be reluctant to invest in firm specific assets unless
they are sufficiently compensated for the risk of not receiving quasi-rents in the
future. Such situations could also be possible with other stakeholders of the firm like
suppliers creditors or customers when relationships are based on implicit rather than
explicit contracts. Therefore, long term efficiency of the firm may be reduced". Our
results indicated that unrelated acquisitions lead to a statistically significant
performance decline (regressions 4 and 2 in tables 17 and 18 respectively, in Chapter
6, and regressions 4 and 2 in tables 14 and 15 respectively, in Chapter 7)
The question which arises then is that, if diversification destroys value what
drives acquirers to conduct unrelated acquisitions? The answer is not simple since
acquisitions motives are based in multifactor decision processes. In general,
however, one could argue that acquiring firm's managers either overestimate their
1 9
generic managerial capabilities - infected by a kind of 'hubris' - or, take advantage
of information asymmetries with shareholders and ignore shareholders' interests and
conduct value destroying acquisitions to serve their own interests, ensuring higher
bonuses and binding company's future with their expertise13.
However, the 'hubris' hypothesis refers more to a management
misconception about the future prospects of a dubious and possibly expensive
acquisition than to the reasons for conducting it. The evidence from past studies
(Amihud and Lev (1981); Donaldson and Lorsch (1983); Morck et.al. (1990)) and
from this work give is consistent with the hypothesis that badly performing unrelated
acquisitions occur because the acquiring management team is pursuing its private
interests. Managers may be keen to enter new lines of business in order to assure the
" Indeed, the results that were illustrated in the previous chapter indicated that employee costs decline in the
post-merger period in related acquisitions while they remain around benchmark's standards in unrelated ones.
12 This is not to say that managerial hubris could not be a driving force behind related acquisitions. However, in
this case other motives like the pursue of synergistic gains from expanding in a familiar industry justifies their
choice and it is the challenge of the synergy realisation that will determine the success or failure of the
investment. Valuation errors on behalf of acquirer's management may well exist, but their expectations can
materialise to the degree that synergistic gains more than offset acquiring management's valuation mistakes.
Therefore, in unrelated acquisitions hubris can be identified more straightforwardly.
13 Such actions may also include anti-takeover 'poison-pills' which are costly to shareholders and make it harder
to remove managers.
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survival and continuity of the firm even when shareholder wealth maximisation
dictates shrinkage or liquidation of the firm. Moreover, when managers consider an
acquisition they evaluate both the net present value of their own benefits and the
wealth effects to the owners. When the former are adequately served by an
acquisition that increases job security or increases rewards then they may be willing
to lose the criteria of considering the attractiveness of an acquisition to shareholders.
Our results are also consistent with the Free Cash Flow Flypothesis; unrelated
acquisitions represent negative net present value projects decided by the acquirer's
management in order to increase their job security and to possibly bind their
expertise with the firm's future by disposing free cash flow to acquire new business
rather than to return it to shareholders.
Our results are not consistent with those derived by Ghosh (op.cit.). Ghosh
reports a statistically significant decline in annual operating performance of 6.13%
for related acquisitions after controlling for the effects of the method of payment and
whether the acquisition was friendly or hostile. On the other hand, the results
reported by Healy et.al.(op.cit.) are confirmed by our results since the authors found
that acquisitions with a high degree of business overlap between targets and bidders
show significant post-merger improvement, whereas other types of mergers do not.
Powell and Stark (op.cit.) report that industry relatedness does not have a
significant explanatory effect on post-merger performance when performance is
measured as the adjusted14 cash flow returns on total market value of assets. Both
Healy and Ghosh report an insignificant impact of friendly acquisitions on post-
merger performance while Powell and Stark report that disciplining15 acquisitions
have a statistically significant positive impact on post-merger performance only
when operating profits adjusted for short term accruals are deflated by the book value
of assets or the total sales and when the benchmark for the performance adjustment is
the median performance of the respective industry. In all other cases disciplining
acquisitions had an insignificant impact on performance. The difference in results
14 This finding does not change regardless of the benchmark used to adjust operating cash flow returns on total
assets. The authors report a negative and significant impact of industry relatedness on cash flow performance
when operating profits are deflated by the book value of assets. However, this measure of performance is not
indicative of the actual performance of the firm since the book value of assets represents more an accounting
measure rather than the real value of the assets.
15 The authors define an acquisition as disciplining when it results in the removal of the target Chief Executive
Officer.
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concerning related acquisitions between our study and that by Powell and Stark
could possibly be due to different definitions used for industry relatedness. Related
acquisitions in our study are defined as those where the target and the bidder
belonged to the same Level 5 Industrial Sector, while Level 4 Industrial Sector was
that used by Powell and Stark. However, using Level 4 Sectors to measure industry
performance may be problematic for some sectors in some years since there may
exist very few firms included in these sectors. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this
study the authors do not report how they treated the change in industrial
classification that took place in 1992. Some firms that belonged to a specific sector in
1991, belonged to a different one in 1992 without changing their operations; this
happened just because the definition of industrial sectors changed. Therefore, unless
such changes have been taken into account, the results may be biased.
The analysis of the empirical evidence of this study so far, has indicated that
the U.K. M&As, on average, reduce operating performance. However the
profitability of individual transactions varied widely. Some mergers perform better
than others and this finding has been associated with specific merger characteristics.
Stock acquisitions perform better than cash acquisitions and there is some evidence
that if the method of payment includes both stock and cash performance is better
than if only cash is used to finance the acquisition. Moreover, industry relatedness
has a positive and significant impact on merger performance and hostile and
unrelated acquisitions lead to performance deterioration. There is also evidence that
friendly acquisitions do not lead to performance deterioration.
9.5. Strategic Acquisitions.
We examined the impact on post-merger performance of acquisitions that
were financed by a means of payment other than cash, the transactions were friendly
and the target and the bidder operated in the same Level 5 Industrial Sector. These
transactions were characterised as 'Strategic' in this work. We identified 29 Strategic
takeovers in the sample and we estimated regression (4.9) including a dummy
variable that takes the value of ' 1' when the acquisition is a Strategic one and the
value of'0' otherwise (regressions 7 and 8, table 17, in Chapter 6). The coefficient of
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the dummy variable indicated an increase in industry adjusted annual operating
performance of 3% for Strategic acquisitions after controlling for the effects of pre¬
merger performance (which were statistically insignificant). The intercept coefficient
which captures the effects of all other acquisitions in the sample on post-merger
performance indicated a significant decline in annual performance of 2.8%. Similar
results are produced when regressing the median change in industry adjusted
operating performance between the 2, 3 and 5 post- and the 2, 3, and 5 pre-merger
periods respectively against the dummy variable that indicated that an acquisition is
Strategic (regressions 8, 9, and 10 in table 18 in Chapter 6). The results remain
almost the same when the benchmark for adjusting the combined firm's performance
is a pair of matched firms1 .
Therefore, we accept the hypothesis that the U.K. Strategic acquisitions
outperform other types. Our results are consistent with those produced by Healy et.al.
(1997) for the U.S. The authors report that the estimated dummy coefficient in
regression (4.9) was 5% and statistically significant and that Strategic acquisitions
produced greater synergies than the financial transactions did.
The reasons for the superior performance of Strategic acquisitions are
associated with their specific characteristics as they were discussed above, separately
for friendly, related and stock acquisitions. Strategic deals avoid the disruption of
organisational operations, the replacement of incumbent management and the
abandonment of ongoing projects and policies which are associated with hostile
acquisitions. Moreover, since they are friendly negotiations key managers are
retained and the absorption of the acquired firm is easier, while mid and lower
management is more likely to be cooperative because established implicit and
explicit working contracts can continue to exist. Negotiations before the acquisition
allow acquirers to get a better insight about internal operations of the target and the
possibilities for valuation errors are reduced. Additionally, Strategic acquisitions are
deals between firms with identical or similar operations and so can benefit from scale
16 After controlling for pre-merger performance Strategic acquisitions exhibit a statistically significant increase in
median annual matched firm adjusted operating performance of 3.9% (regressions 7 and 8, table 14, in Chapter
7). The regressions in which the dependent variables are the median change in matched firm adjusted operating
performance between the 2 and 3 post- and the 2 and 3 pre-merger periods respectively and the independent
variable is the dummy variable that indicates when an acquisition is a Strategic one indicated statistically
significant annual increases in performance of 3.9% and 4.7% respectively (regressions 8, and 9, table 15, in
Chapter 7).
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economies synergies and a mutual understanding of businesses between the acquirers
and the acquirees. The combined entity also has the necessary cash available for
restructuring or for other investments since the acquisition has been financed
(entirely or partly) by stock.
The empirical evidence for Strategic acquisitions in this study supports the
interpretation that the U.K. market for corporate control appears to be competitive.
Unless there are opportunities for exploitation of economies of scale or an increase in
market share which are achieved with the increase of a firm's size, and a knowledge
of a target firm's operations which is possible when the target operates in familiar
businesses, and the acquisition occurs after negotiations, there are not many
opportunities for a large number of profitable takeovers.
Moreover, according to the economic theory, when markets are reasonably
competitive players will earn a normal rate of return. This is also true for the market
for takeovers, especially for corporate environments such as those of the U.K. and
17 # # #
the U.S. . An acquisition's benefits can easily be replicated by competitors who will
• •18
not stand idly by, while an acquirer attempts to generate synergies at their expense .
Only those acquisitions that can achieve a sustainable competitive advantage will
bring permanent improvements in performance within competitive markets, and this
seems to be the outcome of Strategic acquistions.
9.6. Acquisition Premium.
In this study we attempted to identify the possible factors which differentiate
bad deals from good deals since there is a wide dispersion of outcomes from
different types of takeovers.
As far as the price over the intrinsic value of a target (the premium) that was
paid by an acquirer is concerned, our results are mixed. The univariate analysis
indicated that when an acquirer paid a relatively high premium for the acquiree the
united entity underperforms control firms in the post-merger years regardless of the
17 The market for corporate control seems to exist mostly in the U.S. (Morck et.al. (1988), Bhide (1989), Martin
and McConnell (1991)) and in the U.K. (Firth et.al.(2001)).
18 It is not surprising then that research evidence suggests that mergers occur in waves within industries. First
movers may attempt to strengthen their positions in industries which face technological or economic
transformation and competitors follow in order to sustain and increase their market share.
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benchmark used to adjust performance. Moreover, the median change in industry
adjusted (as well as in matched firm adjusted) operating performance between the
post- and the pre-merger periods is negative and statistically significant. Acquisitions
that were closed at a discount exhibited a performance that was equivalent to that of
the control firms and the median change between the post- and pre-merger periods
was indistinguishable from zero.
This could possibly imply that when an acquirer proceeds with a takeover to
increase competitive advantage and reap synergistic gains from a more efficient use
of a target's resources, then, more value is added to the united entity when the
purchase is made at a discount than when it is made at a relatively high premium.
Furthermore, a purchase at a discount may indicate strong negotiation skills on
behalf of the acquirer's management and alignment to shareholders' interests.
However, the regression analysis indicated that industry adjusted post-
acquisition performance is not explained by whether the acquirer purchased the
target at a relatively high premium or not, once we control for the effects of the
industry adjusted pre-merger performance (regression 10, table 17, Chapter 6).
Moreover, whether the acquisition was closed at a premium or not does not explain
much of the variation of the median change in operating performance between the
years 2 and 3 and the year -1 (regression 3, table 18, Chapter 6). Similar results were
produced when the benchmark for performance adjustment was a pair of matched
firms (regression 10, table 14, chapter 7).
Therefore, the findings from regression analysis indicated that, on average,
there is no relationship between post-merger performance and whether the acquirer
paid a relatively high premium for the target.
9.7. Acquisition Size.
In Chapter 3 we hypothesized that large acquisitions perform better than other
acquisitions. The results produced in this study confirm this prediction. The
univariate comparisons do not suggest that the prediction can be supported, but they
do suggest that the operating performance of small acquisitions deteriorates.
However, in regression (4.9), when we included a dummy variable that takes the
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value of T when an acquisition is characterised as large and the value of '0'
otherwise, the relative size of target and bidder can explain post-takeover
performance once pre-takeover performance is controlled for. The coefficient of the
dummy variable is 0.022 and statistically significant denoting an increase in industry
adjusted annual operating performance of 2.2% when the takeover is large. The
intercept coefficient is -0.028 and statistically significant indicating a decrease in
annual post-merger performance for all other acquisitions of 2.8%. The regression
using the Change Model indicated for large acquisitions a positive change in median
performance between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre-merger period which,
however, was statistically insignificant. The intercept coefficient was negative and
statistically significant indicating that all other acquisitions exhibited a performance
decline in the 5 post-merger years (regressions 11 and 4 in tables 17 and 18
respectively, Chapter 6)19.
Therefore, there is evidence from the regression analysis that large
acquisitions in the U.K. perform better than other acquisitions. In addition, there is
evidence that large acquisitions perform as well as the benchmark firms both in the
pre-and the post-merger years, while small ones underperform the benchmark in the
post-merger years regardless of the choice of the control firms (tables 14 and 15 in
Chapter 6 and tables 12 and 13 in Chapter 7).
When a large acquisition is carried out by a relatively large acquirer operating
performance is above benchmark standards both in the pre- and the post-merger
90
periods . This may indicate that relatively large firms that make large acquisitions
are efficient and profitable firms with a diligent and competent management who
undertake well-balanced takeover decisions for profitable targets. This implies that
the main aim of such acquisitions is not simply to manage a target's resources more
efficiently, but to increase value from the combined operations. However, it needs
further research to identify whether the pre-merger superior performance is mainly
19 When the performance benchmark was a pair of matched firms, large acquisitions did not exhibit a
performance improvement but all other acquisitions exhibited deterioration in annual post-acquisition
performance once the effects of pre-acquisition performance are controlled for (regression 11, table 14, Chapter
7).
20
Taking the 19 largest acquirers from the sub-sample of the 38 largest acquisitions the post-merger industry
adjusted operating performance is positive and statistically significant which means that the combined firms
outperform their industry peers. The combined target and bidders outperform their industry peers in the pre¬
merger period as well.
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attributable to the target or the bidder since our pro-forma data reflect only the
combined pre-merger operations.
The evidence that is provided from the results suggests that when potential
synergies exist and the cost economies are feasible then the larger the size of the
acquisition the higher the performance improvements that can be observed.
Successful small acquisitions will produce performance improvements that are
negligible relatively to the acquirer's size.
Previous results of this study provided some indications that the U.K. market
for corporate control is competitive. Therefore, takeovers that aim to make more
efficient use of a target's resources due to improved management efficiency would
not have many chances for performance improvements since in a competitive market
for corporate control firms operate near their maximum level of efficiency.
Consequently, a possible source for performance improvements would be an increase
in market share or the exploitation of scale economies and synergies. These benefits
are more likely to be observed when mergers occur between firms that operate within
the same industry. Indeed, evidence from this piece of research indicated that related
acquisitions lead to a statistically significant performance improvement while
unrelated acquisitions are followed by a performance decline. Therefore, it was
expected that large acquisitions between firms that operate within the same Level 5
Industrial Sector will produce greater benefits than other acquisitions.
To test this prediction, we included a dummy variable in regression (4.9)
which took the value of ' 1' when an acquisition was large and between firms that
operated in the same industrial sector and '0' otherwise. After controlling for the pre¬
merger performance the dummy variable was found to explain much of the post-
merger performance. The coefficient of the dummy variable was 0.029 (the
respective coefficient for large acquisitions was 0.022) and statistically significant
indicating an increase in annual operating performance for large and related
acquisitions of 2.9%. The intercept coefficient which captures the effects of all other
acquisitions in the sample after controlling for the pre-merger performance was
found to be -0.026 and statistically significant. Employing the same dummy variable
as an independent variable and using the Change Model with the dependent variable
being the median change in industry adjusted operating performance between the 5-
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year post- and the 5-year pre-merger periods, we found that large and related
acquisitions are followed by a performance increase of 4.1% which is statistically
significant while the change in performance of all other acquisitions (which is
captured by the intercept coefficient) is -3.3% and statistically significant
• 91
(regressions 12 and 5 in tables 17 and 18 respectively, in Chapter 6) .
Therefore, we conclude that performance improvement effects for large
acquisitions are amplified when the target and the bidder operate within the same
industry.
Our results do not agree with those of Powell and Stark (op.cit.). Those
authors report that the relative size of target and bidder can explain post-takeover
performance once pre-merger performance is controlled for. However, they found a
statistically significant negative relationship between post-takeover performance and
the size of the acquisition (-1.1%) only when the operating performance deflator is
the total market value of assets unadjusted for the assets revaluation at the period of
the merger announcement, and when the operating performance deflator is the book
value of assets. When the total market value of assets, adjusted for the assets
revaluation at the period of merger announcement is used as deflator, the authors
report an insignificant effect of size on performance. Moreover the authors do not
report any results regarding the size effect on post-takeover performance using the
22
Change Model . Healy et.al. (op.cit.) also report that size does not explain cross-
sectional variation in post-merger performance. However, it should be noted that the
authors in their study include only the 50 largest acquisitions in the U.S. in the period
of examination. Therefore, any systematic differences between large and small
acquisitions could not be revealed due to the nature of their sample.
21 Similar results are produced when using a pair of matched firms on the basis of pre-merger performance, size
and industry relatedness for each combined target and bidder. The coefficient of the dummy variable is -0.041
once pre-takeover performance is controlled for, while the intercept coefficient is -0.034 both statistically
significant. The Change Model produces significant results only when the dependent variable is the median
change between the years 2 and 3 and the year -1. The coefficient of the dummy variable is 0.062 and the
intercept coefficient is -0.059 both statistically significant.
22 Actually the authors report results that are derived from the Change Model using only a univariate analysis
which refers to their entire sample. Moreover, findings that would be produced from the Change Model if the
analysis would be applied to alternative sub-samples are ignored.
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9.8. The Market Revaluation of Assets and Cash Flow Returns.
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the major controversies in academic
discussion about M&As is the contradictory evidence about their profitability from
different types of research. On average the short-term share price studies support the
view that M&As are profitable and that stock markets capitalise anticipated future
improvements in the period of the event announcement, while much of the evidence
that comes from long-term share price studies and from ex-post accounting studies
suggests that acquirers suffer losses in the years following the merger completion.
However, in efficient stock markets investors would capitalise future expected
changes in cash flows and any improvements or deterioration in post-merger
operating performance should be reflected on the stock price of merging firms. The
contradictory evidence between the different types of research would either suggest
that this is an indication that stock markets do not have the ability to precisely
forecast the changes in cash flows that are attributable to merger or that markets
correctly forecast the anticipated changes in operating performance due to merger but
in the period of the target's integration other factors than that of the merger may
affect performance.
To test whether the abnormal returns of the market value of equity at merger
announcement can be explained by post-merger cash flow return on assets, following
Healy et.al. (1992), we run regression (4.13) to re-examine this issue using data from
our sample which refer to U.K. takeovers in the first part of the 1990's. The
dependent variable in regression (4.13) is the annual median industry adjusted
operating performance of the sample companies in the post-merger years (IAOPpost)
and the independent variable is the cumulative daily abnormal market adjusted
returns of the total market value of the combined assets of the target and bidder
(WCMARA) from 10 days before the event announcement to the date of merger
completion . In regression (4.13) the coefficient of (WCMARA) represents the
association between the expected performance changes from takeovers and the actual
operating performance changes post-takeover once pre-merger performance is
controlled for. If the stock market correctly forecasts and capitalises future changes
23 i.e. the date that the event went unconditional.
327
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS NIKOLAOS GLIMIDIS
in performance, then we should observe a positive and significant relationship
between the two variables; i.e. the coefficient of the variable would be positive and
statistically significant.
Indeed, the results from the regression revealed a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the actual post-merger operating performance and
the market revaluation of assets in the period from 10 days before the event
announcement to the date of the event completion. The coefficient of the variable
(WCMARA) is 0.064 indicating that the stock market anticipates operating
improvements which are capitalised with a pre-tax discount rate24 of 6.4%. Pre¬
merger performance does not have any statistically significant effect on post-merger
performance. The intercept coefficient is negative and statistically significant (-
0.021).
Table 1 shows the mean of the daily cumulative abnormal asset (equity)
returns for the target and the bidder and for the combined firm.
TABLE 1
Cumulative daily market-adjusted25 equity (assets) returns measured from 10 days
before the announcement to the date of the merger completion.









Abnormal asset returns are computed from equity returns in the period of the announcement to ensure
comparability of the anticipated changes in performance and the measured changes in cash flow return on
assets. Abnormal asset returns can be defined as the weighted average of returns to debt and equity (Healy
et.al. (1992)). Assuming that the value of debt does not change around the acquisition announcement (Kim
and McConnel (1977)) abnormal asset returns equal abnormal equity returns times the equity to assets
ratio. The combined equity (asset) return is a weighted average of the target and the bidder equity (asset)
returns where total market value from the year prior to takeover is used to calculate the weights (see
formulae 4.12. in Chapter 4) ***, **, * denote significant difference from zero using a two-tailed test at the
1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
24 Since (WCMARA) is the capitalised value of future cash flow return improvements and IAOPpost is the pre-tax
cash flow return improvement per year, the coefficient of (TCHMV) represents the pre-tax capitalisation rate.
25 The Financial Times All Share Index was used as a proxy for movements in the market. In Chapter 4 we
described the procedure by which we adjusted the returns (formulae 4.11).
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Consistent with the existing evidence, the mean of the cumulative daily
equity abnormal returns in the period of the event announcement is 29.7% for the
targets, 5.2% for the bidders and 9.3% for the combined firm, all statistically
significant. The respective figures for the market revaluation of asset are 28.2%,
4.3%, and 8%. Thus, the stock market anticipates improvements in operating
performance after merger.
However, in light of the results referring to post-merger operating
performance that were derived from this study it could be argued that the stock
market reacts optimistically to the prospect of the merger. The mean annual industry
adjusted cash flow return on assets of the combined firms is - 1.6% and statistically
significant. However, regression (9.1) suggests that given pre-acquisition industry
adjusted cash flow, a positive expectation about the direction of the future share price
is positively correlated with post-merger industry adjusted cash flow. In other words,
given a level of pre-acquisition industry adjusted cash flow, an increase in optimism
by the market is positively correlated with an increase in industry adjusted post-
merger cash flow.
IAOPpost =-0.021*** +O.OWIAOPpre+ 0.064*WCMARA (9.1)
(-3.023) (0.048) (1.827)
The market's optimism at the announcement of acquisition event is more
clearly observed from regression (9.2). Following Ghosh (2001), the dependent
variable here is the cumulative daily market-adjusted abnormal asset returns of the
combined targets and bidders and the independent variable is the median change in
industry adjusted operating performance of the combined targets and bidders
between the 5-year post- and the 5-year pre-merger periods.
The coefficient of the independent variable is positive (0.17) but statistically
insignificant while the intercept coefficient is positive (0.083) and statistically
26
significant . The results of the regression suggest that in the absence of any change
26 As can be seen in Tables 14 and 15 of Chapter 7 the results from regressions (13) and (18) respectively are not
different when we use a pair of matched firms on the basis of pre-merger performance, size, and industry
relatedness for each combined target and bidder as a performance benchmark to calculate the adjusted operating
performance of sample firms.
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in industry adjusted operating performance between the post- and the pre-merger
periods, the daily cumulative market adjusted abnormal asset returns of the combined
firm would be 8.3% (a figure which is statistically significant) indicating that the
market behaves optimistically at the announcement of a takeover even if there are no
post-merger improvements. In other words, the stock market revaluates upwards the
combined assets just because of the event announcement. The relation, however, of
the dependent and independent variables is positive indicating that any
improvements in cash flows in the post-merger years would cause an increase in
cumulative asset abnormal returns above the 8.3%. The market capitalises expected
improvements for the sample companies in post-merger operating performance using
a discount rate of 1/17%, i.e., a discount rate which equals an annual rate of 5.88%.
However, this coefficient is not statistically significant so cannot be generalise for all
U.K. acquisitions.
WCMARA = 0.083"* + 0.17 IAOPch5 (9.2)
(4.381) (0.728)
Our results agree with previous evidence for the U.S. that is provided by
Healy et.al., who report a statistically significant correlation between abnormal asset
returns at the announcement and annual industry adjusted cash flow returns in the
post-merger years once the effect of pre-merger performance is controlled for. The
authors, however, found improvements in post-merger operating performance which
can explain the change in the market value of assets around the announcement with
no indication that stock market reacts optimistically at the announcement. The results
from regression (9.2) are also consistent with those reported by Ghosh for the U.S.
Ghosh reports a positive but insignificant coefficient for matched firm adjusted
operating performance in regression (9.2).
Evidence for the ability of the stock market to predict post-merger
performance for the U.K. is provided by Powell and Stark (op.cit.). The authors
applied regression (9.1) using alternative cash flow definitions, benchmarks, and
operating returns deflators, to conclude (p.314 ) that their findings 'taken at face
value offer little comfort that the market has much ability to predict improvements in
post-takeover performance'. However, when they used an industry adjusted cash
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flow return metric similar to that which was used in our study, their results are
97
consistent with those that are reported here . Manson et.al. (1994) also report a
positive and statistically significant relationship between the market's assessment of
post-acquisition performance at the announcement and industry adjusted operating
cash flow return on the market value of total assets in the post-merger years.
Overall, our findings indicate that the market has the ability to forecast post-
merger operating performance once pre-merger performance is controlled for. There
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between post-acquisition
operating performance and abnormal asset (and equity) returns at the announcement.
However, there is a degree of optimism by the market in the period from 10 days
before the event announcement until the day of the merger completion. The stock
market agents perceive the prospect of a takeover as good news and initially
revaluate the combined firm's assets upwards just because of the event. In the case
where the effects of pre-merger performance are not controlled for, the change in
operating performance between the post- and the pre-merger periods is still
positively correlated with abnormal asset returns at the announcement but the
relation is not statistically significant. The respective regression indicates that even in
the absence of cash flow improvements the market offers a premium of 8.3% for the
combined firm's assets because of increased optimism. This last finding provides not
much comfort that the market forecasts post-merger performance with much
precision.
9.9. The Employment Effects of Mergers.
The results of this study provide some evidence that there is a decline both in
the number of employees per thousand of sales and in employee costs per sales
following the merger. The benchmark adjusted number of employees per thousand
pounds of sales is close to zero in the pre-merger period while it is negative and
statistically significant in the entire post-merger period. Thus, merging firms, on
average, seem to employ fewer employees per thousand pounds of sales after the
27 The authors also report that when an accrual definition of cash flow was used the relationship between post-
acquisition performance and the market revaluation of assets at the announcement is even stronger.
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merger than they employed before it, relative to their industry peers. However, the
median change in the number of employees per thousand pounds of sales for the
combined firm between the 3 post- and the 3 year pre-merger years though negative
is statistically insignificant, indicating a decline for the sample companies which
nonetheless cannot be generalised for the population ofmergers.
Employee costs per sales for merging firms are below those of their industry
peers both in the pre- and the post-merger period. The median change in labour costs
per sales for the combined targets and bidders between the 3 year post- and the 3
year pre-merger periods is negative indicating a decline in labour costs. However,
again the figure is statistically insignificant.
Therefore, the average outcome of mergers indicates some improvements as
far as the number of employees per thousand pounds of sales is concerned, while
employee costs per sales do not seem to improve substantially. Nonetheless, the
evidence is not strong enough to argue that M&As, on average, are followed by a
more efficient utilisation of the workforce and a reduction in labour costs.
As in the case of operating performance there is a wide dispersion of results
concerning the issue of employee utilisation efficiencies and labour costs
improvements depending on the type of the acquisition.
Acquisitions that were financed by cash are followed by an increase in the
number of employees as resulted from regression (1) in Chapter 8 (table 27). Other
types of payment do not seem to have any explanatory power on the median change
in the number of employees between the 3 year post- and the 3 year pre-merger
periods. However, stock acquisitions are associated with lower employee costs while
in cash acquisitions employee costs remain unchanged (regression 9, table 27 in
Chapter 8) after the merger despite the increase in the number of employees.
Therefore, following cash acquisitions the combined entity employs more employees
with the same costs as in the pre-merger period, while following stock acquisitions
the combined entity employs the same number of employees as in the pre-merger
period with less labour costs. Consequently, both acquisitions that were financed by
cash and acquisitions that were financed by stock are followed by lower costs per
employee; the difference is that, in the case of cash acquisitions the number of
employees increases while in stock acquisitions the labour costs decline. Thus, we
332
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS NIKOLAOS GLIM1DIS
can reject the hypothesis that cash acquisitions offer a greater disciplinary motive for
a more efficient employee utilisation and greater labour cost economies than stock
and mixed acquisitions28.
Consistent with expectations, hostile acquisitions appear to lead to greater
employment losses than friendly ones (regression 3, table 27, Chapter 8). This
supports the hypothesis that it is easier for the new management team to reorganise
operations without considering explicit or implicit contracts with existing employees
since it has not yet developed the necessary ties with them. Moreover, hostile
acquisitions are assumed to be an instrument for diverting resources to more talented
or diligent management. Thus, hostile acquisitions are followed by a greater degree
of rationalisation in the utilisation of the workforce. However, it is interesting that
the reduction in the number of employees after hostile acquisitions is not
accompanied by a reduction in labour costs (regression 11, table 27, Chapter 8). This
implies that the disruption in a firm's operations and the feeling of insecurity on
behalf of employees which are typically associated with hostile acquisitions, may
cause labour costs not to decline despite the decrease of the workforce; the firm may
need to recruit some new expertise in the place of the existing employees who either
no longer have interest in investing their firm-specific knowledge in the firm or their
positions have been abandoned by the new management. In this process, new
employees are likely to demand more remuneration to invest their expertise in the
firm so as to be compensated for the risk of losing their jobs in the future29.
Labour costs decrease in related acquisitions while the number of employees
do not change significantly. This is not surprising, since the increased size of the
united firm may allow for a reorganisation after the merger so as to take advantage of
technological innovations and automation of some operations which may lead to the
replacement of the existing experienced workforce with cheaper, and consequently,
28 In the univariate analysis mixed acquisitions were found to exhibit the greatest labour utilisation and labour
costs efficiencies. However, in that case the comparison was based not on the change in the number of employees
and the labour costs between the post- and the pre-merger periods but on what employment rates and labour costs
the combined firm exhibited before and after the merger relatively to the benchmark. Because the benchmark
used in the multivariate approach controls for more variables we assume that these results are more robust than
those derived from the univariate approach.
29 In Chapter 8, the analysis of the annual median industry adjusted number of employees indicated that the
number of employees remained at benchmark's levels before and after hostile acquisitions and below
benchmark's levels after friendly ones. However, the comparison here is made on the basis of the change between
the post- and the pre-merger years, and moreover, the benchmark that is used is more precise. Thus, we assume
the results that are taken from the regression analysis as more reliable.
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to lower costs per employee. These findings stand in contrast with the evidence
provided by Conyon et.al. (2005) that wages increase after related acquistions and
that hostile acquisitions lead to greater employee utilisation efficiencies.
The relative size of the acquisition seems to explain changes in employee
costs per sales (but not in the number of employees) only after controlling for other
variables that represent factors associated with the merger (regression 16, table 27 in
Chapter 8). The results suggest that there is a statistically significant increase in the
labour costs per sales in the post-merger years, after controlling for the effects of the
method of payment, the industry relatedness, whether the acquisitions was friendly or
hostile, and whether a relatively high premium was paid. The effect can be associated
with specific merger characteristics. Thus, the median labour costs decline in the
post-merger years for stock acquisitions, while in cash acquisitions there is a
statistically significant increase. When the target and the bidder operate in the same
Level 5 Industrial Sector, the median employee costs decline in the post-acquisition
period. Contrary to our expectations, labour costs increase in acquisitions where a
relatively high premium was paid for the target.
When considering for the effects of acquisition size on the number of
employees per thousand pounds of sales after controlling for the effects of the
method of payment, the industry relatedness and whether the acquisition was friendly
or hostile, and whether a relatively high premium was paid, we found that large
acquisitions do not exhibit any difference in the median control firm adjusted value
(regression 8, table 27, in chapter 8). When we control for size (consistent to the
results we discovered so far) we find that where a relatively high premium is paid
there is a statistically insignificant increase in the adjusted number of employees per
thousand pounds of sales. Cash acquisitions are followed by a statistically significant
increase in the number of employees per thousand pounds of sales in the post-merger
years. Stock acquisitions exhibit an insignificant decline in employment rates while
in friendly acquisitions there is a statistically significant increase in the median
number of employees per thousand pounds of sales. Related acquisitions seem not to
have a significant explanatory effect on the change in employment rates between the
post- and the pre-merger periods.
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Overall, our results provide some evidence that in the U.K. merging firms
employ fewer employees in the years following the acquisition relative to the median
industry firm. Employee costs appear to decline in the post-acquisition years for the
sample companies. Stock acquisitions are followed by a decline in employee costs
while the number of employees remains unchanged. In cash acquisitions the number
of employees increases in the post-acquisition period while employee costs do not
change. Hostile acquisitions lead to job reductions but not to the elimination of
employee costs, and, finally, industry relatedness appears to be a determining factor
explaining the reduction in employee costs in the post-acquisition years but it does
not appear to affect the employment rates. The relative size of the acquisition has a
positive and statistically significant relationship with the median change in control
firm adjusted employment costs per sales between the post- and the pre-merger
periods only after controlling for the effects of the above variables. Whether the
transaction closed at a relatively high premium does not appear to affect the post-
merger employment rates. Employee costs, however, increase after controlling for
the effects of the method of payment, industry relatedness, whether the acquisition
was friendly or hostile, and the relative size of the acquisition.
9.10. Conclusions.
The empirical evidence of this study demonstrates that M&As in the U.K.
are, on average, performance deteriorating investments or at best, have no effect on
performance, depending on the methodology that is applied to measure performance.
This implies that the U.K. market for corporate control is competitive. Our results do
not confirm previous evidence provided by Manson et.al.(op.cit) and Powell and
Stark (op.cit.) which was based on similar methodologies as that used in this study.
This difference may be either because of the different time periods under
examination or due to certain methodological drawbacks of these studies.
However, it was found that acquisitions that share certain common
characteristics perform better than others. Specifically, acquisitions that were
financed by stock perform better than acquisitions that were financed by other means
of payment. In fact, cash acquisitions exhibited significant operating performance
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deterioration in the post-merger years. There is also evidence that friendly
acquisitions outperform hostile ones, and consistent with expectations and with
previous evidence, industry relatedness is a determining factor for the success or the
failure of an acquisition. Specifically, related acquisitions create value in the post-
acquisition years while diversification results in a performance decline.
Acquisitions that were characterised as having a Strategic orientation
exhibited an operating performance improvement in the post-acquisition years, in
contrast to other types of acquisitions whose operating performance deteriorates
following the takeover.
The relative size of an acquisition is also a factor that explains post-merger
performance. Large acquisitions perform better than other acquisitions, and large
acquisitions that are conducted by relatively large bidders perform better than the
control firms both in the pre- and the post-merger periods. When relatively large
acquisitions occur between firms that operate in related industries then post-
acquisition performance is even higher. Finally, transactions that were closed at a
premium lead to a better post-takeover performance than other acquisition.
As far as the market's ability to predict post-merger performance goes there
is a positive relationship between the cumulative daily market adjusted combined
asset returns at the announcement period and the industry adjusted operating cash
flow returns on assets for the 5 post-merger years. This indicates that the stock
market can forecast the correct direction of change of the operating performance in
the post-acquisition years. The market anticipates improvements in performance
from the merger which, however, are realised above a certain level of gains at the
announcement. In other words the market behaves optimistically at the event
announcement. This is also consistent with the observed relationship between the
cumulative daily market adjusted abnormal asset returns at the announcement and the
median change in industry adjusted cash flow returns on assets after and before the
merger (although this positive relationship is statistically insignificant).
As far as the employment effects of M&As in the U.K. are concerned our
evidence suggests that merging firms employ fewer employees than the median
industry firm in the years following the acquisition. There is also some evidence that
employee costs decline following the merger, however not by a statistically
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significant rate. Merging firms that were engaged in stock and cash acquisitions
appear to spent less per employee, since in the former employee costs decline but the
number of employees remains unchanged while in the latter the number of
employees increases but the employment costs do not increase in the post-merger
years. As expected, hostile acquisitions are followed by a reduction in the number of
employees. However this does not lead to lower labour costs. Acquisitions that occur
within the same Level 5 Industrial Sector are followed by a reduction in employee
costs but not to lower employee rates. In large acquisitions labour costs increase and
the employment rates remain unchanged after controlling for the effects of the above
variables. Finally, whether a relatively high premium is paid by the acquirer is not a
determining factor that explains post-acquisition employee rates and employment
costs. However, after controlling for the effects of the factors that were discussed





10.1. A recap of the M&A problem.
Despite the voluminous literature on M&As in the last decades, we still do
not have a definite answer to the question concerning the effects of takeovers on
merging firms' performance. Nonetheless, each subsequent merger wave is larger
than the previous one both in terms of the number of the transactions and the amount
ofmoney that is invested in firms' consolidation.
The economic press frequently hosts extensive analyses of the benefits that a
would-be or a pending takeover will deliver to the engaging parties, and 'synergy' is
a buzz word among CEOs and investment bankers. The share price of a target firm
often soars at the time when a potential acquirer makes a bid while the premiums
paid for the purchase of the option of managing a target's resources are often well
above its market value. On the other hand, the rate of acquisitions that fail to deliver
the promised economic benefits some years after the completion of the deal is
increasingly high (Sirower, 1997).
The empirical evidence is inconclusive about whether M&As create value.
Share price studies around the date at which a bid is made by a potential acquirer
provide a sanguine view about what economic benefits takeovers can deliver to the
engaging parties. These studies, on average, indicate that targets' shareholders enjoy
substantial abnormal returns while acquirers' shareholders break even in the worst
case. Assuming that markets are efficient, this evidence is interpreted as an
anticipation of increased future cash flows due to merger; the stock market agents
capitalize the increased future cash flows at the time of the merger announcement.
However, a large number of studies that focus on the share price of the acquirer for a
longer period indicate statistically significant negative abnormal returns in the three
or five year period after the merger. Academic controversy here is about the stock
market's ability to forecast post-merger performance for a number of years after the
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completion of the deal and about the ability of the statistical models that are used to
measure 'normal' returns when the share price performance examination extends to a
period of several years. By the same token, accounting studies that examine the
'actual' outcome of takeovers provide mixed results about the economic benefits that
can be derived from them. Studies that use profitability measures for measuring post-
merger performance provide, on average, a pessimistic view about M&As, while
studies that focus on the measurement of cash flows indicate, on average,
performance improvements. Nevertheless, the view about ex-post performance of
merging firms is far from unanimous. A controversial issue, again, is the choice of
the benchmark against which ex-post performance is measured.
10.2. Contribution to Knowledge.
This study contributes to knowledge in a number of ways. First, we use a
more complete dataset than other studies consisting of 79 acquisitions that were
completed between 1st January 1990 and 31st December 1996. Unlike previous
studies we augmented data from Datastream with data from Companies House.
Second, this study uses a more recent dataset than any other study for the U.K. and
so is able to distinguish the effects of mergers between the periods 1990 - 1993 and
1994 - 1996. Third, the examination of the performance of Strategic acquisitions in
the U.K. is an additional significant feature of this research which is not
accommodated in previous studies. Fourth, unlike previous studies of similar type,
this study extends to the examination of the effects of acquisitions where the acquirer
paid a relatively high premium for the acquiree versus transactions that were closed
at a discount. Fifth, the assessment of the stock market's ability to forecast operating
performance is examined using both the methodologies provided by Healy et.al.
(1992) and Ghosh (2001) for the U.S., in contrast to previous studies, each using
only one of the two methods. Finally, this study contributes to the limited literature
on the effects of acquisitions on employment and employee costs in the U.K., using a
different methodology than that employed by previous studies. Moreover, unlike
previous studies on the effects of M&As on operating performance, this study
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provides evidence for both groups of stakeholders (owners and employees) whose
private interests are mostly affected by such decisions.
Moreover, previous studies suffer from a number of limitations. First,
previous U.K. studies have considered data mainly from the 1980's1 and with much
depleted datasets. That is, samples construction relied only on Datastream where
many values are missing. Second, previous studies measure industry adjusted
operating performance using the median operating performance of firms that belong
to Level 4 Industrial Sectors. But Level 4 Industrial Sectors consist of very few firms
in some years (sometimes less than 6). Therefore, the estimation of industry's
median operating performance might not reflect merging firms' normal performance
in the absence of the takeover. Third, previous studies do not exclude from their
samples acquisitions where the acquirer participated in another significant
acquisition in the entire examined period before and after the year of merger
completion. Such contaminating events would distort results since operating
performance changes might not reflect only the effects of the takeover under
examination.
In this study we have investigated the effects of acquisitions on cash flows
and employment having corrected some of these limitations.
10.3. Outcomes of the Research.
The main finding of this study is that corporate acquisitions, on average, lead
to a substantial operating performance decline in the three or five years following the
year of merger completion. This finding is unchanged when using either industry
firms or matched firms to control for industry and economy-wide factors that may
affect operating performance. Although it was found that pre-merger performance
does not explain much of the variation in post-merger performance, the performance
decline in the post-merger years is clearer when controlling for the effects of pre¬
merger performance. Assuming that there is no relation between the pre- and the
post-merger operating performance, the median change of the benchmarked
1 We became aware of the paper by Powell and Stark (2005) only several years after the research for
this thesis was begun.
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operating performance deteriorates in the first three post-acquisition years when it is
compared with that of the combined target and bidder in the year prior to the
takeover.
The investigation of the post-takeover performance of our sample companies
indicated that the average outcome of takeovers in the U.K. in the period under
examination did not reflect gains from an exploitation of synergies. The decline of
the average corporate performance in the post-merger years implies that there are not
many opportunities for performance improvements after the merger, and this is
consistent with a view that the U.K. market for corporate control is competitive.
Firms appear to operate near their maximum level of efficiency and for this reason
there are not many opportunities for a large number of profitable takeovers.
Alternatively, our findings may imply that competition in the U.K. market for
corporate control is weak and managers are pursuing non-profit maximizing
objectives. Another possibility is that competition is weak and managers are pursuing
profit maximizing acquisitions as they expect to increase profits, but fail to do so.
However there was a wide dispersion of outcomes concerning post-
acquisition corporate operating performance, depending on various merger
characteristics. Strategic acquisitions exhibited an average increase in post-merger
operating performance, and probably, synergistic or other gains are present in this
kind of acquisitions. Stock acquisitions perform better than cash and mixed ones and
acquisitions within the same Level 5 Industrial Sectors outperform unrelated
acquisitions. Whether this result is due to the exploitation of synergies and cost
economies or because of an increase in market power needs further investigation.
Consistent with the view of a competitive U.K. market for corporate control, the
average operating performance of hostile acquisitions was found to be negative in the
post-takeover years. Acquisition size was found to have a positive impact on
operating performance and large acquisitions outperform other acquisitions. Large
acquisitions between firms with similar operations exhibited an average increase in
operating performance after the merger, and finally, it was found that whether the




As far as the stock market's ability to forecast future operating performance
at the time of the merger announcement, our results indicated that there is a degree of
optimism on behalf of the stock market agents when takeovers are announced.
However, the relationship between abnormal returns in the period of the event
announcement and post-merger operating cash flow returns on assets is positive.
Finally, we found that the number of employees per thousand pounds of sales
is below benchmark levels in the post-merger years. Our sample companies exhibited
a reduction in labour costs but this cannot be generalized to the population of
mergers. Hostile acquisitions are followed by job losses which are not accompanied
by lower employee costs. Both stock and cash acquisitions lead to lower costs per
employee and in related acquisitions employee costs decrease without a decrease in
the number of employees.
10.4. Limitations and further Research.
This study sought to investigate whether M&As lead to operating
performance improvements in the post-merger period. However, the results as well
as their implications should be viewed in light of the following limitations. First, it
should be noted that our sample consists only of public companies from the industrial
and service sectors. In the period under examination a large wave of consolidation in
the financial sector began which is not examined in this study for reasons explained
in Chapter 4. In addition, there is a large number ofM&As which took place among
companies where at least one of the parties involved was a private firm. It was
extremely difficult to find data for such transactions, and therefore, they were
excluded from our research. Second, this work did not examine the effects on
corporate operating performance of international acquisitions due to time constraints
and accounting method disparities across different countries. However, during the
1990's, 5188 overseas transactions were made by U.K. companies with a total value
of £265 billion according to Office for National Statistics. Thus, the generalisation of
our inferences from this study should be made in the light of these restrictions. Third,
the post-takeover period examined in this study is limited to a three or a five year
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window depending on the data availability for each acquisition case. Nevertheless,
this time period may not seem adequate for the gains resulting from takeovers to
crystallise. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate the operating performance of
merging firms up to seven or more years after merger completion, especially for the
largest deals.
Another issue which calls for further investigation is the causes of the decline
in operating cash flows in the post-merger years. Is that a result of managerial
inefficiencies during the period of organizational restructuring or, it is a result of the
abandonment of the ongoing strategies and the diversion of the orientation of firm
towards new investment, marketing, and administrative policies which have been
mistakenly projected in the pre-acquisition period?
It would be also important to investigate the effects of cash flow decline on
R&D and firms' investment policies. Do merging firms reduce R&D and investment
expenditure in the post-merger years when cash flows decrease? And also for those
mergers that exhibit an increase in cash flows, is that at the expense of R&D and
other investment expenditure? Or, increased cash flows lead to an increase in R&D
and other investment expenditure? Therefore, a fertile ground for future research
would be the examination of the relationship between the amount of money that
merging firms invest in R&D and other investments and cash flows.
The examination of cash flow returns in the years following the acquisitions
could also be viewed in relation to the share price behaviour of the combined firm in
the same period. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, long term event studies suffer
from a number of methodological limitations. Therefore, further research could
introduce a panel data analysis to address the issue of the effects of mergers on cash
flows and on share price in the post-merger period. One of the findings of this study
was that while there is a positive relation between the stock market's reaction at the
time of merger announcement and post-merger cash flows, there is a degree of
market optimism on behalf of stock market agents at the time of the event
announcement. A question arises then as to whether this optimism persists in the
years following the merger.
While cash flow returns on assets is a reliable indicator to evaluate firm
performance, there are various profitability ratios and sub-ratios which could be
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included in the regression equations so as to examine the effects ofmergers on firm's
profits using alternative definitions for them.
Evidence resulting from this study leaves open the question as to whether
this performance decline is a result of the existence of few profitable opportunities in
a competitive market for corporate control, or whether weak competition allows
managers to pursue other objectives when acquiring companies, or to seek to exploit
opportunities for profitable acquisitions but fail to do so. Because performance
examination in this study focuses on the combined cash flow returns rather than on
those of the two firms separately, it is not identifiable whether targets are profitable
in the years prior to the acquisition. This leaves space for further empirical research
for investigating what is the targets' performance in the pre-merger years and what
are the managerial motives when deciding an acquisition strategy, so as to draw
inferences on the above question.
Therefore, conclusive proof for the effects of M&As on corporate
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